Essays on the design of Kidney Exchange


Projet de thèse en Sciences économiques

Sous la direction de Victor Hiller et de Olivier Tercieux.

  • Titre traduit

    Essai en Économie sur l’organisation d'un programme de don croisé de rein

  • Résumé

    The present research proposal aims to study the design of kidney exchange both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In that line, a benchmark model based on random allocation mechanisms is proposed to improve our understanding of the fairness-effciency trade-off in Kidney Exchange programs. Then, the performance of the proposed mechanisms will be assessed using data from the french program. Afterwards, the research moves towards theoretical and empirical exercises to analyze participation and collaboration in kidney exchanges taking into account the incentives that patients, hospitals or even countries may have (or not) to participate in large Kidney Exchange programs. Finally, a dynamic framework is proposed by combining tools borrowed from the random graph literature with the theoretical framework developed in the previous step in which incentives to participate are explicitly taken into account.

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