ON INSTITUTIONALIZED NORMS OF EXCHANGE: A STUDY OF FAMILY INFLUENCE ON RWANDAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements 2

Table of Contents 4

Abstract 7

Résumé 8

List of tables 9

List of figures 9

EXTENDED ABSTRACT 10

SYNTHESE EN FRANÇAIS 16

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 33

Entrepreneurship and institutions in developing countries 33

The pervasiveness of entrepreneurship discourse as answer to socio-economic challenges . 33

Fundaments of institutional theory 34

Institutional complexity, institutional logics, and social change 37

Institutional complexity in developing countries 39

Family and entrepreneurship 41

A research grounded in Rwandan data 44

Presentation of the research setting 46

Presentation of the data 50

Data analysis method 57

Integration of the three chapters 59

TO WHOM ARE ENTREPRENEURS RESPONSIBLE? BALANCING SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD FAMILY AND THE PUBLIC IN RWANDA 62

Introduction 63

Theory 65

The social responsibility of SMEs in developing countries *65*

Distributing jobs and wages in resource-poor environments *67*

Data analysis 69

Findings 70

Responsibilities toward nation and family *70*

Varying approaches to hiring *73*

Nesting responsibilities: extended family as subset of the needy Rwandan population *77*

Balancing responsibilities: family solidarity, as long as it does not harm others *81*

Decoupling responsibilities: private family vs. civic business *88*

Evolution of social responsibility perspectives across generations *91*

Discussion 96

Conclusion 101

COMPLY, LOVE, OR GROW TOGETHER: DECOUPLING FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONS FROM ELEMENTAL LOGICS IN RWANDAN FAMILY ENTREPRENEURSHIP 103

Introduction 104

Theory 106

Family, a fundamental, yet understudied institutional logic *106*

The variability of family logics across time and space *111*

Identifying the family logic in context *113*

Data analysis 115

Findings 115

The family institution in contemporary Rwanda *115*

Tensions between the family institution and the logic of business *118*

Giving sense to the family institution: the three perspectives *121*

Contradictions between the three logics. *131*

Discussion 137

Logic complexity and institutional change *137*

The disconnect between family as fundamental institution and explanatory logics *139*

Conclusion 144

WHAT DO FAVORS COST? ON THE DIVERSITY OF NORMS OF SOCIAL EXCHANGE AND THEIR EFFECTS ON ENTREPRENEURIAL RESOURCE ACQUISITION 145

Introduction 146

Resource acquisition from a social exchange perspective 149

Resource Acquisition from Formal and Informal Sources *149*

"Favors" from a Social Exchange Perspective *152*

Fundamental forms of exchange and resource acquisition 156

Market Pricing *157*

Equality Matching *161*

Authority Ranking *166*

Communal Sharing *171*

Discussion 178

Studying Norms of Exchange in Entrepreneurship *178*

Implications for network theory *183*

Conclusion 186

GENERAL DISCUSSION 188

Entrepreneurship and inequalities in developing countries 188

The role of incorporation in protecting business assets 190

Bridging network and institution theories 191

GENERAL CONCLUSION 193

REFERENCES 195

ABSTRACT

Since the 1990s, entrepreneurship has been promoted as a solution for the issues faced by developing countries. However, the outcome of the global push for entrepreneurship as a way toward socio-economic development depends on how entrepreneurship-friendly policies interact with local institutions. In particular, entrepreneurship has intricate relationships with the family, an institution that still remains a key component of daily life in many societies. But how do the extended, highly normative family networks that characterize most developing countries interact with institutional pressures to venture?

To answer this question, I turned to Rwanda, East-Africa, and collected interview data on how business and family interplay. I observed that governmental calls to follow business best practices contradict family expectations to draw benefits from entrepreneurs' businesses. In the first chapter, I use the concept of business social responsibility and show can feel responsible towards several audiences. I explain that they can articulate their multiple social responsibilities either by nesting them into each other, by balancing the entitlements of each stakeholder, or by strictly decoupling personal responsibility from business responsibility.

To investigate individual difference in how entrepreneurs articulate their various social responsibilities, I then adopted an institutional logic perspective. In the second chapter, I show that the family institution in Rwanda does not obey to a clear institutional logic; instead, the meaning of institutionalized family practices is ambiguous. This leads me to suggest that the family logic is neither as monolithic nor as fundamental as it is presented in the literature. I propose to disconnect logics from fundamental, yet contingent institutions such as family. I explain how this helps understand change in fundamental institutions over long periods of time.

In the third chapter I push this idea forward and use social exchange theory to explore how different elemental logics, here declined into norms of social exchange, can influence entrepreneurial resource acquisition and subsequent business development.

RESUME

Depuis les années 1990, l'entrepreneuriat est considéré comme la panacée à tous les problèmes des pays en développement. Cependant, les effets de cette frénésie d'entrepreneuriat dépendent de l'environnement institutionnel local. L'entrepreneuriat a des relations d'interdépendance particulières avec la famille, une institution qui reste un des piliers de la vie sociale dans bien des pays. Mais comment les réseaux familiaux et leur système normatif complexe interagissent-ils avec l'entrepreneuriat prôné par les spécialistes du développement ?

Pour répondre à cette question, je me tournai vers le Rwanda, en Afrique de l'Est, où je collectai des données par entretien. J'observai que les entrepreneurs se sentent socialement responsable envers différent publics. Dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse, je montre que les appels de l'Etat rwandais à suivre les « bonnes pratiques » du management vont à l'encontre de l'attente des familles à bénéficier d'un accès privilégié aux bénéfices tirés des entreprises. Je montre aussi que les entrepreneurs parviennent à réconcilier leurs multiples responsabilités sociales soit en les imbriquant, soit en les mettant en balance, soit en séparant strictement leur responsabilité personnelle de leur responsabilité en tant que gestionnaire d'entreprise.

Pour mieux comprendre pourquoi différents entrepreneurs n'articulent pas de la même manière leurs responsabilités sociales, j'adoptai ensuite la perspective des logiques institutionnelles. Dans le second chapitre, je montre que la famille n'obéit pas à une logique institutionnelle claire, mais que le sens des pratiques familiales telles qu'institutionalisées au Rwanda est ambigu. Cela me mène à penser que la logique « familiale » n'est pas aussi fondamentale qu'elle paraît. Je suggère de déconnecter logiques d'une part, institutions de l'autre, car cela pourrait aider à comprendre l'évolution des institutions fondamentales sur le long terme.

Enfin, dans le troisième chapitre, je poursuis cette idée et explore de façon théorique comment différentes normes d'échange – facettes interactionnelles de logiques institutionnelles élémentaires – influencent l'accumulation de ressources nécessaire à tout projet entrepreneurial.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: data supporting the distinction between 2 targets of social responsibility..... 74

Table 2: data supporting the distinction between 3 approaches to hiring family..... 78

Table 3: data supporting the distinction between 3 ways to articulate social responsibilities. 83

Table 4: list of fundamental institutional orders and associated logics or principles 109

Table 5: alternative logics underlying family practices 122

Table 6: the four elementary forms of relationships 155

Table 7: effect of elementary forms of relationships on resource acquisition 176

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: political and institutional change in Rwanda in modern times..... 47

Figure 2: chronology of data collection and analysis..... 51

Figure 3: description of the data..... 56

Figure 4: example of 1st order coding: the role of "responsible head of family"..... 58

Figure 5: logical articulation of the three chapters..... 61

Figure 6: data structure..... 71

Figure 7: evolution of entrepreneurs' perspective with time of founding and family socio-economic status at the time 94

Figure 8: articulating responsibilities toward different publics and hiring preferences..... 97

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

By the end of 2021, the world will never have been richer, despite the Covid-19 pandemic (IMF, 2021). However, rampant poverty, social inequality, and environmental issues continue to threaten the well-being and even survival of billions of humans, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Oxfam, 2021; World Bank, 2020). In the last few decades, economists interested in tackling these global challenges have been emphasizing more and more the role of entrepreneurial individuals in boosting socio-economic development (Naudé, 2011). International organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development or the World Bank have followed suit ; they have consequently been encouraging public policies making venturing easier and more rewarding (De Mello & Dutz, 2012; Independent Evaluation Group World Bank, 2013; Lundstrom & Stevenson, 2006; Weiss, 2000).

However, in deprived contexts where daily survival depends on collective solidarity, entrepreneurial activity might disrupt traditional security nets based on collective solidarity. Venturing is often feared, misunderstood, or frown upon by individuals who depend on these security nets (Baland, Bourguignon, Platteau, & Verdier, 2020; Banerjee, Banerjee, & Duflo, 2011). Hence, development through entrepreneurship depends not only on favorable laws, efficient public governance, and incentives to venture, but also on a change in what people collectively see as possible and desirable, so that entrepreneurial activity adapts smoothly to pre-existing social structures (Platteau, 2000). In other words, development through entrepreneurship depends not only on formal institutions (i.e. laws and regulations) but also on informal institutions (i.e. social norms and cognitive frames – Baland et al., 2020; DiMaggio, 1997; Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby, & Sahlin-Andersson, 2008, North, 1990).

In particular, entrepreneurship is extremely dependent on the family institution (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003). That is particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa, where the family commonly take

the form of an extensive set of social ties loaded with strong behavioral expectations that influence interactions, exchange, mutual help… (Baland et al., 2020). While it gives individuals access to valuable resources, institutionalized family norms also constrain behavior and often hinders entrepreneurial activity (Grimm, Hartwig, & Lay, 2017; Khavul, Bruton, & Wood, 2009). The overall effect of these positive and negative sides of the family institution on entrepreneurship and on socio-economic development is difficult to assess.

The case of Rwanda, in East-Africa, is interesting because it is a small nation-State whose population shares a single language and culture (Chrétien, 2000; Newbury, 2009): this rules out the difficulty of comparing family institutions rooted in different cultures, as it is necessary when one studies larger, culturally heterogeneous African countries. Family has been the core institution of Rwandan society until at least the middle of the 20th century and remains central in Rwandans' daily life today (Adrianssens, 1954; Pontalti, 2018). On the other hand, the Rwandan government has drastically reformed the country's formal market institution over the last 25 years, to the point of transforming Rwanda into the entrepreneurial country by excellence (Ggombe & Newfarmer, 2017; Honeyman, 2016; Porter et al., 2008). Rwanda thus seems the perfect setting to study the interplay between family and entrepreneurship. Between August 2018 and July 2019, I consequently interviewed entrepreneurs, employees of their businesses, members of their families, as well as consultants, accountants, and other experts of Rwandan business environment.

Data shows that Rwandans are deeply embedded in extended family networks. Strong identification to family goes hand in hand with constant flows of resources between relatives to cover the cost of children's education, housing, healthcare, unhappy events, and family ceremonies. Also, relatives are expected to help each other with connections, advice, money, and time to find jobs. In addition to be collectivist, Rwandan families are rather hierarchical – as already described in the middle of the 20th century (Adrianssens, 1954). In family life, a

strict hierarchy based on age and gender lasts despite Rwanda has been making tremendous progress on gender issues over the last 20 years (Debusscher & Ansoms, 2013). Furthermore, in many families, a "head of the family" – an elder male appointed for life by the previous role holder – organizes family solidarity, and therefore somehow keeps control over family resources. Because family is an important source of material and immaterial resources for entrepreneurs, Rwandan entrepreneurship remains consequently deeply influenced by family collectivism and social hierarchy, although the family institution has been progressively weakening for more than one century and still loses influence as generations succeed each other.

In particular, family members expect entrepreneurs to use their business as a tool for helping relatives in need. By contrast, the State, international organizations, NGOs, and peers call entrepreneurs to follow impersonal management practices to develop their business and the national economy. In a country where jobs are scarce and unemployment means deep poverty, these contradicting calls translate into a choice between preferentially hire relatives even if they do not contribute much to business, or avoid working with family to maximize business efficiency. Making this choice is a heavy social responsibility that weights on Rwandan entrepreneurs. Yet, what exactly is their primary social responsibility – toward family or toward the country and society at large – is unclear.

I observed that Rwandan entrepreneurs either nest, balance, or decouple their social responsibilities, and hire accordingly. "Nesting" entrepreneurs see family and business responsibilities as two Russian dolls nested into each other: for them, hiring a relative in need means helping a poor Rwandan citizen get a job, so it is contributing to national development goals. "Balancing" entrepreneurs believe that their family has rights to be helped, but that other Rwandans also have rights: their business partners and clients have right to be partnering with a professionally run, efficient, business; their employees have right to have competent colleagues who contribute to the firm's long-term stability and growth; non-family job

candidates have right to get a chance; etc. Balancing entrepreneurs thus only hire family if this does not deprive other (potential) stakeholders of their business. Finally, "decoupling" entrepreneurs see family and business responsibilities as entirely different and often see hiring family as incompatible with sound business management. Consequently, they answer family claims on their personal assets; but they refuse to let family influence business or to use business assets to help family.

But why do entrepreneurs differ in their conception of family compatibility or incompatibility with business? Starting from the postulate that individual difference in hiring decisions is related to the encounter of two different institutions (business and family - Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012), I investigate the meaning of "family" in the Rwandan context. I find that, in Rwanda, the family institution and related solidarity practices – although rather consensual – cannot be explained by one single logic. Instead, Rwandans vary in how they explain family: for some, family is about rigid hierarchy of status and compliance to authority; for other, it is about sharing based on love; finally, some say that the features of the Rwandan family institution are best explained by the responsibility one has to "grow" oneself and one's relatives.

These three different explanations of family have practical implication, in particular when it comes to the limits put to family solidarity, and to the designation of heads of families. Tenants of the "authority" logic hold that disrespectful, or simply innovative, potentially disruptive relatives are likely to be deprived access to family resources, while tenants of the "love" logic explain that family solidarity has no limits. Rwandans having a "responsibility" perspective believe that family support is conditional to merit and potential to put resources received to good use. Likewise, one is more likely to be designated head of family if one is respectful and obedient; rich and generous; or wise and able to lead, according to the authority, love, or responsibility logic respectively.

Interestingly, entrepreneurs who see family as "responsibility to grow" see the family institution as compatible with business and integrate family and business together; whereas entrepreneurs who see family as "sharing" or "compliance" generally see family as incompatible with business development. Consequently, the formers tend to bring business and family together, while the latters do not. This suggests that entrepreneurs have a key role in interpreting informal family institutions, hence in maintaining these institutions or not depending on how they see the fit between traditional family and modern business.

Also, I observed that successful entrepreneurs who have a "responsibility" perspective on family often become respected heads of their extended family. As family leaders, they are in the capacity to promote a spirit of "responsibility" in their family, which fosters the creation of a bubble of sustainable prosperity around their firm as they hire, advise, and/or train in-house their relatives. In particular, resources flowing from a successful business toward the family of its founder tend to boost the education of younger family members. Interestingly, young, highly educated people stemming from such better-off families led by a successful entrepreneur who sees family as a responsibility to "grow" oneself and others seem to remain more attached to family as a key component of their personal lives than other young Rwandans. However, they tend to feel primarily responsible for national-level social issues rather than for their family when they come of age and start their own ventures. That is an encouraging finding, given that many Rwandan families and communities have so far remained excluded from national economic growth (Corry, 2012; Dawson, 2018; Ratzmann, 2018).

On the whole, this study thus highlights the role of entrepreneurs' and SMEs' sense of responsibility in determining the impact of national development policies. Indeed, how the proceeds of profitable entrepreneurial activity is distributed determines whether entrepreneurship translates into sustainable, long-term social development or remains a flash in the pan (Banerjee et al., 2011; Yunus, 2009). Policy makers should thus take entrepreneurs'

values and sense of responsibility into account when evaluating the socio-economic effects of pro-entrepreneurship development policies. Local entrepreneurs embedded in dense, strong networks of familial and local solidarity are likely to distribute resources differently from foreign corporations. This finding reinforces economic theory according to which the balance between protection of endogenous economic development and openness to foreign competition is key for a country to catch-up in the race for development (Rodrik, 2005; Schumpeter, 1934, 1940).

SYNTHESE EN FRANÇAIS

Justification de la thèse

A la fin de 2021, le monde n'aura jamais été aussi riche, malgré la pandémie de Covid-19 (FMI, 2021). Cependant, une pauvreté galopante, les inégalités sociales, et des problèmes environnementaux croissants continuent de menacer le bien-être et même la survie de milliards d'humains (Oxfam, 2021; Banque Mondiale 2020). Au vu de l'opulence globale, on pourrait croire que ces défis pourraient être surmontés facilement (Sachs, 2006). Mais les experts divergent sur la meilleure façon de ce faire. Alors que certains pensent que c'est aux Etats et aux organisations intergouvernementales qu'incombe cette tâche (Oxfam, 2021; Sachs, 2006), d'autres considèrent que ces problèmes sont plus efficacement résolus par des individus entreprenant, mieux à même, grâce à leur connaissance du terrain, de trouver des solutions adaptées aux contraintes et aux besoins locaux (Collier, 2007; Easterly, 2006; Yunus, 2009).

Ces dernières décennies, les économistes ont progressivement imposés au centre du débat le rôle des entrepreneurs dans le développement socio-économique, au détriment des politiques de développement planifiées (Aoki, Greif, & Milgrom, 2001; Naudé, 2011; North, 1990). Un discours quasi-exclusivement positif sur l'entrepreneuriat a infusé non seulement l'économie, mais aussi la politique, les affaires sociales, le management, et la théorie des organisations (Brandl & Bullinger, 2009) : en sus de favoriser la croissance économique, les entrepreneurs créeraient des emplois, répondraient à des besoins locaux par des produits et services locaux, et apporteraient des changements positifs dans le fonctionnement de la société (Easterly, 2006; McMullen, 2011). Par conséquent, les organisations internationales telles que l'Organisation pour la Coopération et le Développement ou la Banque Mondiale ont largement encouragé les réformes juridiques rendant l'entrepreneuriat plus facile et plus attrayant (De Mello & Dutz,

2012; Independent Evaluation Group World Bank, 2013; Lundstrom & Stevenson, 2006; Weiss, 2000).

Mais l'entrepreneuriat dépend des normes et mécanismes cognitifs qui structurent les sociétés. Par exemple, là où la survie quotidienne dépend de la solidarité collective, la constante réallocation des ressources pour répondre à des besoins urgents est généralement la norme, ce qui est contradictoire avec l'accumulation et l'immobilisation de ressources dans une entreprise (Geschiere & Konings, 1993). La prise de risque inhérente à un projet d'entreprise est, de manière compréhensible, découragée dans les groupes sociaux vivant à la limite de la survie, car une éventuelle faillite détruirait des ressources précieuses dont le manque pèserait ensuite sur tous (Shantz, Kistruck, & Zietsma, 2018). De plus, dans les zones isolées et démunies, les entrepreneurs potentiels peuvent ne même pas être capables d'identifier ce qui pourrait être fait de nouveau ou de différent de ce qui a toujours été fait autour d'eux (Banfield, 1958).

Ces freins structurels sont souvent citées, mais ils sont plus difficile à comprendre et à changer que la loi et le fonctionnement des administrations (Banerjee, Banerjee, & Duflo, 2011; North, 1990; Naudé, 2011; Welter, 2011). En réalité, le développement par l'entrepreneuriat dépend non seulement d'une législation favorable et d'une bonne gouvernance publique, mais aussi d'une évolution de ce que les gens perçoivent, collectivement, comme possible et désirable (Platteau, 2000). Ce changement peut fragiliser les réseaux d'entraide traditionnels, alors qu'il n'y a aucune garantie que les projets entrepreneuriaux conduiront effectivement à une amélioration de la situation collective (Baland et al., 2020; Banerjee et al., 2011). Le besoin de changer les choses sans détruire le tissu social pose d'importantes questions. Qu'est-ce qui détermine ce que les gens pensent possible et désirable ? Comment cela contraint-il ou permet-il le développement ? Comment l'entrepreneuriat peut-il être réconcilié avec les normes de solidarité collective traditionnelles ?

L'influence de l'institution familiale sur l'entrepreneuriat africain

Ces questions se posent de façon particulièrement aiguë en Afrique sub-saharienne. Cette région est de loin la plus pauvre du monde (IMF, 2021; World Bank, 2020). Elle n'a été intégrée que relativement tard à l'économie politique mondiale, notamment via un processus d'esclavage et de colonisation qui a bouleversé les institutions locales (Fage, 2013; Wallerstein, 1991). Ce continent est aujourd'hui caractérisé par un profond manque de cohérence entre, d'une part, les lois et règles formelles modelées sur celles des anciens pouvoirs coloniaux, et d'autre part, les institutions informelles enracinées dans l'histoire locale qui continuent à fortement influencer la façon dont les gens voient le monde et se comportent (Platteau, 2000).

De plus, le transfert des institutions formelles d'origine occidentale est souvent imparfait. Pour cette raison, les pays en voie de développement sont souvent caractérisés par ce qu'on appelle des « vides institutionnels » : ils manquent de certaines institutions et organisations pourtant essentielles au fonctionnement d'une économie de marché moderne (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Ces vides institutionnels pénalisent les affaires en général, et l'entrepreneuriat en particulier. Cependant, les entrepreneurs peuvent compenser ces vides en tirant parti des institutions informelles, mieux ancrées (Bothello, Nason, & Schnyder, 2019). Les entrepreneurs qui maitrisent les normes et structures sociales locales peuvent se lancer et développement leur entreprise dans des environnements où des acteurs économiques habitués aux institutions formelles des pays développés seraient voués à la faillite (Mair & Marti, 2009).

Les entrepreneurs africains sont en particulier influencés par l'institution cruciale qu'est la famille (Bewayo, 2009; Khavul et al., 2009), comme tous les entrepreneurs du monde d'ailleurs (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Au & Kwan, 2009; Edelman, Manolova, Shirokova, & Tsukanova, 2016). Bien que la famille soit généralement associée avec l'intimité du foyer dans les pays occidentaux (Godelier, 2004; Shorter, 1975), cette institution influence la société bien au-delà de ces limites restreintes (Anderson, Jack, & Drakopoulou Dodd, 2005; Bhappu, 2000;

Dyer, 2003). Les entrepreneurs sont tout particulièrement dépendant des dynamiques familiales (qui encouragent ou découragent la décision de devenir entrepreneur à un moment donné) et des normes de solidarité familiales (qui facilitent ou rendent plus difficiles l'acquisition de ressources et l'investissement – Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Randerson, Bettinelli, Fayolle, & Anderson, 2015). De plus, la famille est un point de référence universel pour construire ou décrire des relations sociales fortes, confiantes, intimes (Bloch, 1971) ; ses logiques et son vocabulaire influencent donc souvent les affaires entre des partenaire proches qui ne sont pourtant pas de la même famille (Dyer, 2003; Fairclough & Micelotta, 2013). Dans les pays en voie de développement, et notamment en Afrique sub-saharienne, la famille est ainsi une institution essentielle pour les hommes et femmes d'affaire, qui l'utilisent pour compenser les manques des institutions formelles censées organiser l'économie de marché (Ge, Carney, & Kellermanns, 2019; Karra, Tracey, & Phillips, 2006; Verver & Koning, 2018).

Pourtant, les normes et les mécanismes qui régissent la famille restent différents de ceux qui gouvernent l'économie de marché (Bloch, 1973; Sahlins, 1972; Stewart, 2003). De ce fait, l'influence de la famille ne bénéficie pas forcément l'entrepreneuriat. La somme des influences positives et négatives de la famille est difficile à évaluer (Di Falco & Bulte, 2011; Gras & Nason, 2015; Khayesi, George, & Antonakis, 2014; Mehrotra, Morck, Shim, & Wiwattanakantang, 2011; Sharma & Sharma, 2019).

Cela est d'autant plus difficile que la famille – institution pourtant universelle – prend des formes très différente selon les temps et les lieux (Lévi-Strauss, 1979; Meillassoux, 1975; Verdon, 1982). Même la mondialisation actuelle ne semble pas faire converger les multiples institutions familiales traditionnelles vers un modèle unique malgré l'influence croissante du modèle occidental (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Ainsi, la famille, qui perd peu à peu le rôle d'institution dominante qu'elle avait dans les sociétés prémodernes (Meyer & Bromley, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012), reste une institution complexe, changeante (Godelier, 2004), dont l'influence sur

l'entrepreneuriat varie énormément selon le contexte (George, Corbishley, Khayesi, Haas, & Tihanyi, 2016; Sharma & Chua, 2013; Welter, 2011). Pour comprendre cette influence, il est nécessaire de multiplier les études de cas approfondies qui prennent en compte les subtilités de chaque environnement institutionnel. Dans le cadre de ma thèse, je choisis de me concentrer sur le Rwanda, un pays qui a embrassé l'entrepreneuriat comme voie privilégiée vers le développement mais où la famille reste, malgré plusieurs siècles d'affaiblissement progressif, un élément central de la vie sociale et économique.

Le cas du Rwanda

Le cas du Rwanda est intéressant, car c'est un relativement petit Etat-nation dont la population est unie par un seul langage – le kinyarwanda – et une culture homogène (Chrétien, 2000; Newbury, 2009), ce qui n'est pas le cas de la plupart des pays africains.

La famille élargie a longtemps été le cœur de la société rwandaise. Un Etat monarchique centralisé s'y développait dès le XVIe siècle, mais « la plupart des gens, la plupart du temps, n'avaient que peu de rapports avec l'Etat » (Newbury, 2009: 4). En fait, les postes administratifs étaient attribués le plus souvent à des chefs de lignages influents (Adrianssens, 1954; Chrétien, 2000; Maquet, 1954). Ces lignages étaient des réseaux familiaux étendus, menés par des patriarches chargés de la gestion des biens collectifs, notamment des terres de la famille. Ces chefs de famille arbitraient également les conflits entre les nombreux membres du lignage, et incarnaient le groupe dans ses relations avec les autres familles et avec l'administration royale (Adrianssens, 1954; Kagamé, 1954). Cette dernière s'appuyait donc fortement sur les lignages. Imbriquées l'une dans l'autre, les structures familiales et politiques se renforçaient mutuellement, déterminant une hiérarchie sociale extrêmement codifiée qui déterminait la distribution des ressources matérielles et immatérielles (Kagamé, 1954; Maquet, 1961; Newbury, 2009). En revanche, les principes et outils de l'économie de marché – troc,

commerce, monnaie – étaient pratiquement absents du pays, seulement visité de temps en temps par des marchands swahilis cherchant à échanger des biens de prestige avec les élites (Chrétien, 2000; Newbury, 2009).

Le Rwanda fut violemment secoué à la fin du XIXe siècle par l'arrivé d'occupants allemands, puis belges. Le royaume, quoique préservé, fut vidé de sa substance, l'administration royale étant remplacée par une bureaucratie coloniale visant à exploiter le pays. De ce fait, l'institution familiale perdit son lien étroit avec la vie civique et politique. Surtout, la famille fut affaiblie par l'émancipation des individus vis-à-vis du lignage, émancipation encouragée par l'éducation de type occidental, l'apparition du travail salarié, et les migrations vers les centres urbains naissants (Chrétien, 2000; Newbury, 2009; Prunier, 1997). Néanmoins, les lignages et leurs patriarches restèrent le cœur de la vie sociale et économique au moins jusqu'au milieu du XXe siècle (Adrianssens, 1954).

A l'indépendance, en 1962, un régime autoritaire tirant profit de la bureaucratie coloniale hérité de la période précédente, ainsi que de la structure hiérarchique séculaire de la société, mis en place un régime d'apartheid pseudo-ethnique au détriment des citoyens assimilés, à l'époque, à l'ancienne aristocratie du royaume (Prunier, 1997). Sous ce régime, les rares diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur, sélectionnés principalement sur des critères politiques, se voyaient offrir une carrière dans l'administration ou les entreprises publiques. Ce n'est qu'à partir des années 1980 qu'une libéralisation relative permit à de plus en plus de jeunes Rwandais d'accéder à l'éducation supérieure et de lancer des entreprises privées – un changement lié à une évolution des paradigmes de l'économie du développement à l'échelle mondiale – Bewayo 2009, Naudé 2011). Mais contrairement au service du roi, puis de la république, l'entrepreneuriat restait une carrière associée à un statut social inférieur, choisie principalement par des gens appartenant à des familles exclues des fonctions politiques et administratives en raison de leur origine sociale et géographique.

En 1990, le régime rwandais fut attaqué militairement par le FPR, une organisation formée en Ouganda par des membres de la minorité discriminée qui avait fui à l'étranger. Sous pression, l'Etat rwandais organisait le tristement fameux génocide de 1994, qui ne s'achevait que par la prise du pouvoir par le FPR. Ces événements secouèrent violemment la société tout entière, et donc l'institution familiale. D'abord, les migrations transfrontalières liées aux persécutions entre les années 1960 et 80, à la guerre civile et au génocide dans les années 1990, dispersèrent de nombreuses familles, qui bien souvent ne se retrouvèrent jamais. Puis, comme les adultes – notamment les hommes – furent tués de façon disproportionnelle (De Walque & Verwimp, 2010), de nombreuses pratiques familiales durent être modifiées après la crise afin de faire face aux besoins des nombreux orphelins : les enfants furent confiés à des tantes, oncles, ou parents éloignés ayant survécu ; les familles maternelles prirent des rôles qui, normalement, étaient remplis par les familles paternelles ; dans de nombreux cas, les enfants de parents éloignés, de voisins, ou d'amis furent *de facto* adoptés par les familles qui les avaient recueillis... Enfin, des dizaines de milliers d'enfants et d'adolescents finirent dans des orphelinats, dans la rue, ou en prison (Cantwell, 1997) ; ceux-ci durent se reconstruire des familles à partir de rien.

Après la prise du pouvoir par le FPR, le pays connu une modernisation rapide reposant simultanément sur, d'abord, un control général par l'Etat – désormais dominé par la minorité précédemment discriminée – et, ensuite, l'entrepreneuriat privé (Ggombe & Newfarmer, 2017; Honeyman, 2016; Reyntjens, 2011). Le nouveau régime aligna rapidement les institutions formelles du pays sur le modèle prôné par la Banque Mondiale et le FMI (Lundstrom & Stevenson, 2006; Porter et al., 2008). La stabilité politique et la politique économique favorable aux entreprises attirèrent de nombreuses organisations internationales publiques ou privées qui relayèrent le discours étatique portant aux nues l'entrepreneuriat comme voie vers le développement socio-économique. Au jour d'hui, le pays tout entier résonne comme une école

de commerce ou un incubateur de start-ups et est considéré internationalement comme le pays de l'entrepreneuriat par excellence (Honeyman, 2016).

Malgré ces changements récents, les familles élargies menées par leurs patriarches restent pour la plupart des Rwandais des réseaux incontournables pour accéder à l'éducation, aux emplois, et autres opportunités d'améliorer sa vie (Dawson, 2018; Honeyman, 2016; Pontalti, 2018). Les biens, quoique appartenant légalement aux individus et non plus au collectif familial comme avant époque coloniale, sont encore plus ou moins considérés comme un pot commun qu'il est attendu de partager en cas de besoin. L'allocation de ces ressources plus ou moins partagées est encore largement influencée par les chefs de lignage dans les familles dans lequel cette fonction a survécu aux crises successives (c'est-à-dire la plupart). Les jeunes sont donc extrêmement dépendants et respectueux des anciens qui contrôlent les ressources, que ce soit l'argent, la terre, ou simplement les relations sociales avec des gens riches ou influents (Green, 2011; Ingelaere, 2014; Sindambiwe, 2020). Par ailleurs, de nombreux hommes aspirent à devenir chef de leur lignage, puisque cela donne un accès privilégié aux ressources familiales ainsi qu'à un statut social envié. Comme les chefs de lignage peuvent nommer n'importe lequel de leurs fils ou neveux comme héritier, la succession est souvent une source de tensions entre hommes de la même génération : au Rwanda, les relations familiales sont chargées de jalousie, de compétition, et minées par la petite politique (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, 2008; Pontalti, 2018; Sindambiwe, 2020). D'après les chercheurs en science de la famille, qu'ils soient rwandais ou occidentaux, l'accès plus ouvert qu'avant à l'éducation supérieur exacerbe ces tensions, car l'éducation peut, en quelques années, mettre des individus d'une même phratrie à deux extrêmes de l'échelle sociale, ce qui met sous tension les traditions familiales qui définissent l'accès aux ressources et à la fonction de chef de lignage principalement en fonction de l'âge. En particulier, un projet entrepreneurial couronné de succès donne accès à des ressources financières et matérielles sans commune mesure avec les

standards rwandais, excédant même plusieurs fois les traitements des cadres de la fonction publique. Comme expliqué par un chercheur rwandais, « la jalousie dans les familles rwandaises est un problème de transition incomplète à la modernité. C'est un signe que l'institution familiale est secouée par le changement social ».

Le Rwanda semble donc le lieu parfait pour collecter des données sur l'imbrication entre les institutions familiales informelles et l'économie de marché dans sa déclinaison « entrepreneuriale ». Entre aout 2018 et juillet 2019, j'interrogeai donc des entrepreneurs sur la façon dont ils gèrent l'interface entre famille et affaires. Pour mieux comprendre leurs récits, je collectai des données sur les institutions du Rwanda et leur histoire, croisai ces données en rencontrant des membres de leurs familles et des employés de leurs entreprises, et interrogeai des consultants, chercheurs, et autres experts. Au total, je passai environ six mois au Rwanda et conduisait 67 heures d'entretien avec 88 personnes différentes, sans compter les discussions informelles qui me permirent de développer ma connaissance du contexte.

Ces données montrent tout d'abord que la plupart des entrepreneurs rwandais sont encore très influencés par le collectivisme et la hiérarchie qui caractérisent l'institution familiale au Rwanda, malgré plusieurs siècles d'affaiblissement progressif de cette institution (affaiblissement qui se poursuit au jour d'hui au fil des générations). L'identification au collectif familial va de pair avec d'importants flux de ressources matérielles que les membres de la famille échangent pour couvrir le coût de l'éducation des enfants, du logement, de la santé, des événements malheureux, et des cérémonies familiales. On attend également des parents proches ou éloignés des contacts, des conseils, de l'argent, du temps pour trouver des emplois et, le cas échéant, lancer une entreprise. Comme par le passé, ces flux de ressource sont supervisés, parfois de fort près, par des chefs de famille à l'autorité reconnue. Sous leur égide, les familles restent structurées par une hiérarchie de statut et de genre bien visible, malgré les progrès faits

par le Rwanda dans la lutte contre les inégalités homme-femme dans la vie publique (Debusscher & Ansoms, 2013).

L'importance du sens de la responsabilité sociale des entrepreneurs

Le premier chapitre de cette thèse est basé sur l'observation que, au Rwanda, le discours politique et les attentes sociales donnent aux entrepreneurs de lourdes responsabilités sociales : non seulement bâtir des entreprises et développer l'économie, mais aussi résoudre des problèmes de développement social et politique. Mais comment répondre à ces responsabilités est ambigu. D'un côté, l'Etat et la société en général appellent les entrepreneurs à suivre les standards de management dominants afin de développer l'économie. Cela mène nombre d'entrepreneurs à voir l'implication de membres de leur famille dans leurs entreprises comme une pratique à éliminer pour permettre au pays d'aller de l'avant (Demuijnck and Ngnodjom 2013). D'un autre côté, les solidarités familiales traditionnelles restent essentielles à la plupart des Rwandais pour trouver des emplois, éduquer leurs enfants, voire subsister au quotidien. Il est donc difficile pour des entrepreneurs de simplement cesser d'assister leurs parents dans le besoin. Dans un pays où les emplois sont rares et où chômage signifie profonde pauvreté, ces appels contradictoires de l'Etat et des familles se traduisent en un choix entre, d'une part, éviter de travailler avec la famille pour maximiser l'efficacité de l'entreprise ; de l'autre, embaucher de façon préférentielle des membres de la famille pour leur garantir un salaire même s'ils ne sont pas capables ou pas motivés pour contribuer à l'entreprise de façon significative. Mes données me permettent d'examiner comment les entrepreneurs du Rwanda articulent les responsabilités dont ils sont investis par leur famille et par l'Etat, respectivement, and comment leur sens de la responsabilité influe sur leurs pratiques de recrutement.

J'identifie trois principales façons pour les entrepreneurs rwandais de comprendre leurs responsabilités sociales. La distribution d'emploi à des membres de leur famille peut être vue comme une mise en œuvre à petite échelle des objectifs nationaux de réduction de la pauvreté

par la création d'emplois. Cela réconcilie les injonctions à la responsabilité envers la famille et envers la nation en imbriquant le niveau familial dans le niveau national, tout comme deux poupées russes sont imbriquées l'une dans l'autre. Pour des entrepreneurs « imbriquant », embaucher un parent dans le besoin équivaut à embaucher un concitoyen rwandais dans le besoin, donc cela est une décision responsable tant sur le plan familial que social.

D'un autre point de vue, les responsabilités envers la famille et la société au sens large peuvent être « équilibrées ». Les entrepreneurs qui "équilibrent" pensent que leur famille a droit d'être aidée, mais que les autres Rwandais ont des droits également : leurs partenaires et clients ont le droit d'avoir affaire à une entreprise efficace, profitable, gérée de manière professionnelle ; leurs employés ont le droit d'avoir des collègues compétents et motivés, qui contribuent à la stabilité de l'entreprise qui leur procure un revenu ; les gens qui candidatent pour un emploi ont le droit d'avoir leur chance même s'ils ne sont pas de la famille ; etc. Ces entrepreneurs n'embauchent donc la famille que si cela ne prive pas d'autres parties prenantes potentielles de ce à quoi ils peuvent prétendre.

Enfin, certains entrepreneurs voient leurs responsabilités en tant que membre d'une famille et en tant qu'acteur économique comme entièrement déconnectées. Ils voient souvent la famille comme incompatible avec un management sain : pour eux, la solidarité familiale, si elle déborde dans le domaine économique, créé forcément une injustice ou une inefficacité. Par conséquent, ils "détachent" leur responsabilité familiale de leur activité professionnelle. Les entrepreneurs qui "détachent" remplissent leur responsabilité familiale avec leurs fonds personnels (leur salaire), mais refusent d'utiliser les ressources de leur entreprise pour aider la famille. Ils évitent donc autant que possible d'embaucher des parents.

J'observai que les entrepreneurs à succès qui embauchent des membres de leur famille peuvent changer le destin d'une famille étendue qui peut compter plusieurs centaines de personnes. Le sens de la responsabilité de ces entrepreneurs envers leur famille créé une bulle

de prospérité et de développement humain autour de leur entreprise. A l'inverse, quand les entrepreneurs détachent leur responsabilité familiale de leur entreprise, les effets de la création d'emploi et de la distribution de salaires est bien plus dilué et, de ce fait, difficile à évaluer.

Ce premier chapitre contribue à la littérature sur la responsabilité sociale des petites et moyennes entreprises dans les pays en voie de développement (Jamali & Karam, 2018), en montrant comment les entrepreneurs perçoivent leur responsabilité sociale et comment ils y ajustent leurs décisions. De façon plus générale, cette étude montre que les individus, mais aussi les organisations, peuvent se sentir responsable envers de multiples audiences, de la communauté la plus restreinte à la société tout entière. Enfin, ce travail a des implications pour les politiques de développement : il illustre l'influence du sens de la responsabilité individuelle des entrepreneurs sur la distribution des bénéfices économiques tirés de l'entrepreneuriat.

Les multiples logiques de l'institution familiale au Rwanda

Ces premières découvertes me firent questionner pourquoi les entrepreneurs diffèrent dans leur conception de la compatibilité ou de l'incompatibilité de la famille et des affaires. Le second chapitre de cette thèse s'intéresse aux mécanismes sociaux et cognitifs qui sous-tendent ces différences individuelles. Partant du postulat que les décisions d'embauche sont liées à l'interaction entre deux institutions fondamentales, la famille et l'économie de marché, je me penchai sur les logiques institutionnelles (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012) qui pourraient expliquer le phénomène observé.

Je trouvai que les Rwandais diffèrent dans la façon qu'ils ont d'expliquer les structures, normes, et pratiques familiales – ils suivent différentes logiques institutionnelles pour expliquer l'institution familiale. Pour certains, la famille est d'abord une hiérarchie de statut, rigide, dans laquelle le respect de l'autorité est reine. Pour d'autres, la famille est basée sur le partage et l'amour. D'autres encore disent que les caractéristiques de l'institution familiale rwandaise sont

expliquées principalement par la responsabilité qu'a chacun de « grandir » et d'aider les autres à grandir. Les tenants de la logique d'autorité assurent que la famille décourage l'innovation, car les comportements innovants sont le plus souvent pris comme des manifestations d'irrespect pour les anciens, et que ceux qui en sont coupables risquent de se voir dénié l'accès aux ressources familiales. Les tenants de la logique d'amour expliquent que la solidarité familiale n'a pas de limites ; cela permet aux entrepreneurs de bénéficier d'un soutien inconditionnel, mais fait peser le risque que la famille pioche librement dans les ressources nécessaires à leur entreprise, l'empêchant de se développer, voire de survivre. Enfin, les Rwandais qui suivent une logique de responsabilité pensent que le soutien familial est conditionnel à un minimum de mérite et d'effort, et, sur le long terme, dépend de la capacité de la personne soutenue de faire bon usage des ressources reçues. Par ailleurs, on a plus de chance d'être nommé chef de famille si on est obéissant et déférent ; riche et généreux ; ou sage et capable de mener un groupe ; selon que la famille suit une logique d'autorité, d'amour, ou de responsabilité.

Les entrepreneurs qui voient la famille comme une « responsabilité de grandir » voient l'institution familiale comme compatible, et même favorable à la gestion d'une entreprise. Par conséquent, ils tendent à intégrer famille et affaires pour tirer parti du sens des responsabilités et du dévouement qu'ils s'attendent à trouver chez les membres de leur famille. En revanche, les entrepreneurs qui voient la famille comme une lieu de partage ou d'obéissance à une hiérarchie de statut voient généralement la famille comme incompatible, nuisible au développement d'une entreprise. Ceux-là évitent d'embaucher des membres de leur famille car ils craignent d'importer dans leur entreprise la tendance à se reposer sur les efforts des autres, la réticence à innover ou à contester l'ordre établi, et la tendance à tirer la couverture à soi qui vont de pair, selon eux, avec l'institution familiale rwandaise.

Par ailleurs, j'observai que les entrepreneurs qui réussissent et voient la famille comme basée sur un sentiment de responsabilité deviennent souvent chefs de leur famille. En tant que

tels, ils se retrouvent en capacité de promouvoir une logique de responsabilité dans leur famille élargie. Les membres de la famille qui adoptent cette logique de développement des capacités individuelles et collectives, deviennent des employés précieux car extrêmement motivés. Cela favorise l'apparition d'une bulle de prospérité autour de leur entreprise au fil des années, années pendant lesquelles les entrepreneurs-patriarches embauchent, mais aussi conseillent, éduquent, forment, inspirent les membres de leur famille, notamment les jeunes. Les ressources tirées de l'emploi des adultes dans l'entreprise mettent les jeunes de la famille dans une bien meilleure situation que leurs aînés, mais aussi que les autres jeunes Rwandais, au moment de débuter leur vie d'adulte. Bien souvent, ces jeunes privilégiés sont conscient de l'atout qu'a été pour eux le sens de la responsabilité familiale de l'entrepreneur-patriarche, et restent attachés à l'institution familiale comme à un composant clé de leurs vies personnelles – souvent plus que les autres Rwandais aisés. Cela suggère que les entrepreneurs jouent un rôle clé dans l'interprétation des institutions traditionnelles et dans leur maintenance.

Par ailleurs, ces jeunes privilégiés ont une vision particulière de leurs responsabilités sociales : s'ils sont attachés à la famille, ils se sentent un devoir civique envers leurs concitoyens moins favorisés. C'est une observation intéressante, étant donné que, malgré la croissance économique des dernières décennies, une grande part des familles rwandaises est restée à l'écart des retombées de cette croissance (Corry, 2012; Dawson, 2018; Ratzmann, 2018).

Sur le plan théorique, il est intéressant de noter que chacun des trois logiques qui peuvent expliquer la famille peut se trouver également en dehors du Rwanda, et en dehors de l'institution familiale. Cela met en perspective l'idée bien ancrée dans la littérature sur les institutions que la famille, l'Etat, les professions, ou l'économie de marché, obéissent à des logiques distinctes considérées comme fondamentales. En réalité, l'institution familiale peut obéir à des logiques différentes y compris dans un contexte donné. La famille dérive donc son sens de logiques encore plus fondamentales, universelles que l'institution familiale elle-même – la hiérarchie,

l'amour, la responsabilité... Ces logiques, que j'appelle « élémentaires », devraient être bien distinguées des institutions sociales qu'elles gouvernent en des temps et lieux particuliers – par exemple la famille dans le Rwanda du XXIe siècle. Pour cela, il est nécessaire d'identifier, décrire, et nommer les logiques institutionnelles élémentaires, afin qu'il devienne possible d'évaluer leur influence sur les institutions diverses et variées qu'on peut observer. Cela permettrait sans doute de mieux appréhender les évolutions institutionnelles de long terme, et, plus important encore, de faciliter l'analyse des situations institutionnelles complexes en réduisant chaque institution particulière à ses composants élémentaires. Identifier ces composants permettrait d'identifier les dénominateurs communs, plutôt que de partir du principe d'une incompatibilité fondamentale entre institutions de nature (ou de nom) différent (Mutch, 2018). Dans le cas de l'entrepreneuriat rwandais par exemple, famille et affaires peuvent être parfaitement compatibles si on infuse ces deux institutions de la même logique de responsabilité et de contribution à un effort commun. Elles ne sont pas compatibles, en revanche, si la famille est vue comme basée sur principalement sur le partage inconditionnel et l'entreprise vue comme basée sur la recherche de l'intérêt individuel.

De la diversité des normes d'échange social et leur influence sur l'entrepreneuriat

Enfin, j'explore, dans le troisième chapitre de cette thèse, la facette relationnelle des logiques institutionnelles élémentaire (Powell & Oberg, 2017). Je m'inspire de la théorie des échanges sociaux pour essayer de comprendre comment différentes logiques peuvent influencer l'entrepreneuriat. Plus spécifiquement, j'utilise les quatre formes d'échange élémentaires identifiées par Fiske (1991, 1992) : l'échange de marché, l'équilibre égalitaire, le classement d'autorité, et le partage communautaire. Je suggère que ces formes d'échange peuvent influencer les conditions sous lesquelles les entrepreneurs rwandais acquièrent des ressources auprès des membres de leurs familles, et plus généralement comment les entrepreneurs

acquièrent des ressources auprès des gens auxquels ils sont liés socialement. En effet, les entrepreneurs utilisent souvent leur réseau social pour réunir les ressources dont ils ont besoin pour lancer leur projet. Ils dépendent, dans ce cas, des « faveurs » que leur font leurs soutiens. Chaque forme de relation sociale détermine différentes obligations réciproques, ce qui mène à des conditions d'échange différent, et finalement à des résultats différents en termes de management et de performance de l'entreprise naissante.

L'échange de marché correspond aux relations de troc et de commerce : une négociation explicite des termes et des délais permet de limiter l'incertitude et le risque de l'échange. L'équilibre égalitaire permet d'éviter ces négociation complexes, voire impossibles par manque d'information et de capacité de réflexion, en apportant chacun son tour des ressources similaires de manière réciproque. Cela permet l'échange, mais introduit beaucoup d'incertitude quant à la date à laquelle un retour sera attendu ou demandé, une variable pourtant importante quand des ressources sont investies. Le classement d'autorité permet l'échange entre des parties qui n'ont pas accès aux mêmes ressources et ne peuvent donc pas échanger sur la base de l'équilibre égalitaire : une partie « dominante » apporte des ressources rares et/ou précieuses ; la partie « inférieure » doit apporter ce que la partie « dominante » demande lorsqu'elle en a besoin – l'inconvénient est le risque que la partie dominante abuse de sa position. Enfin, le partage communautaire permet à deux parties de mettre leurs ressources en commun. Cela favorise la survie des entreprises peu profitables, qui ont ainsi accès à des ressources gratuites en cas de besoin ; mais limite leurs capacités de croissance, car les bénéfices éventuels ont des chances d'être consommées par les personnes avec lesquelles l'entrepreneur partage ses ressources plutôt que réinvesties.

Ce travail théorique attire l'attention sur la diversité des relations sociales et explique en quoi cette diversité est importante pour les entrepreneurs. La typologie de Fiske peut être un outil pour étudier la relation – encore mal comprise – entre la structure des réseaux sociaux et

le résultat des efforts des entrepreneurs. De façon plus globale, la théorie des échanges sociaux permet de reconsidérer des concepts comme l'altruisme et la réciprocité, mais aussi d'identifier le manque de recherche sur les relations sociales asymétriques qui sont pourtant si cruciales pour bien des entrepreneurs : mentoring, liens avec un parrain politique ou mafieux, influence des chefs de communauté ou de famille… Cela ouvre de nouveaux champs de recherche en entrepreneuriat et, plus largement, sur les réseaux et le capital social.

Responsabilité sociale des entrepreneurs, prospérité familiale, et développement

Finalement, cette thèse montre que la façon dont les entrepreneurs et les PME distribuent les fruits du succès entrepreneurial dépend de normes sociales et de valeurs qui n'ont que peu à voir avec les principes de l'économie de marché. Les décideurs politiques devraient donc prendre en compte ces normes et valeurs lorsqu'ils choisissent et évaluent les effets socio-économiques des politiques publiques de développement basées sur l'entrepreneuriat. Concrètement, les entrepreneurs insérés dans de denses réseaux de solidarité familiale et locale acquièrent et distribuent les ressources très différemment des grandes entreprises, et a fortiori des entreprises étrangères. Les effets sur le développement socio-économique des entrepreneurs et des entreprises bien insérés socialement sont tangibles et facilement observables à l'échelle d'une génération. Ce constat renforce la théorie économique selon laquelle l'équilibre entre la protection du développement économique endogène d'une part, l'ouverture à la compétition étrangère d'autre part, est clé pour qu'un pays rattrape son retard dans la course au développement (Rodrik, 2005; Schumpeter, 1934, 1940).

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The pervasiveness of entrepreneurship discourse as answer to socio-economic challenges

By the end of 2021, the world will never have been richer, despite the Covid-19 pandemic that slowed down the economy in the last two years (IMF, 2021). However, rampant poverty, social inequality, and environmental issues continue to threaten the well-being and even survival of billions of humans inhabiting developing countries (Oxfam, 2021; World Bank, 2020). Considering overall opulence, one might think that these dramatic challenges could be easily overcome (Sachs, 2006). But experts diverge on the way to boost socio-economic development. While some believe that this is a matter for States and international development agencies (Oxfam, 2021; Sachs, 2006), other consider that social issues are better addressed bottom-up by entrepreneurial people working on grassroots, local solutions (Collier, 2007; Easterly, 2006; Yunus, 2009).

Over the last decades, the balance of the debate on development policies has tilted toward bottom-up rather than top-down approaches, as economists progressively acknowledged the role of entrepreneurial individuals in sustainable development (Aoki et al., 2001; Naudé, 2011; North, 1990). An overwhelmingly positive discourse on entrepreneurship has become pervasive not only in development economics, but also in politics, in social work, as well as in management and organization studies (Brandl & Bullinger, 2009): in addition to boost the economy, entrepreneurs would create jobs; answer local needs with locally-designed solutions; and bring positive social change (Easterly, 2006; McMullen, 2011). Consequently, International organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development or the World Bank have been encouraging public policies making venturing easier and more rewarding in developing countries (De Mello & Dutz, 2012; Independent Evaluation Group World Bank, 2013; Lundstrom & Stevenson, 2006; Weiss, 2000).

Often mentioned (Banerjee et al., 2011; North, 1990), but more difficult to understand and change than law and public governance (Naudé, 2011; Welter, 2011), the normative and cognitive conditions that can foster entrepreneurship have received much less attention. For example, in contexts where daily survival often depends on collective solidarity, constant re-allocation of resources to meet urgent needs of relatives and neighbors is generally expected, which contradicts resource accumulation and immobilization implied by investment in a durable enterprise (Geschiere & Konings, 1993). Risky venturing – whose potential failure might ultimately bear on all members of a community – is understandably frowned-upon (Shantz et al., 2018). Furthermore, in socially isolated communities, potential entrepreneurs can be cognitively bounded so that they do not even perceive what they could do differently from what is commonly done (Banfield, 1958).

As a consequence, development through entrepreneurship depends not only on favorable laws and efficient public administration, but also on a change in what people collectively see as possible and desirable (Platteau, 2000). But such change favoring entrepreneurship might disrupt traditional security nets, which could have dramatic consequences without guarantee that it would ultimately lead to an improvement (Baland et al., 2020; Banerjee et al., 2011). The need to achieve positive change without disrupting the social fabric raises a number of questions: What determines what people see as possible and desirable? How does it constrain or enable development? How can entrepreneurship be reconciled with traditional norms of solidarity? To address these questions, I turn to institutional theory, that offers an appropriate lens to study how society orients human cognition and behavior.

Fundaments of institutional theory

The main interest of institutional theory is to take into account the joint influence of laws, social norms, and cognition in shaping human behavior and structuring societies (Baland et al.,

2020; DiMaggio, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2008). Institutional theory is ontologically grounded in social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), which in turn relies on the following premises: first, human action depends on the perception people have of reality rather than on objective facts; second, individuals differ in the meaning they give to what they can observe. Since people differ in how they see reality, they also differ in how they behave. When a group of people agrees on the meaning of certain facts however, their perception and related behavior progressively becomes part of reality, for themselves as well as for others; it must consequently be taken into account along and above individuals to understand society (Durkheim, 1893; Weber, 1946). Reality is thus socially constructed.

The process of social construction, i.e. the emergence and stabilization of shared perceptions of reality and collective behaviors, is called institutionalization (Mutch, 2018; Zucker, 1977). The outcome of a process of institutionalization is an institution, i.e. an observable, stable, relatively widely spread social fact that is not directly related to physical constrains (such as geographical or biological variables) but imposes itself to social actors as necessary or efficient due to the way reality has been socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Greenwood et al., 2008; Selznick, 1957).

From the perspective of institutional theory, society is divided in social fields. A social field is a segment of society that corresponds to a network of social ties binding social actors who behave specifically due to their specific understandings of reality (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Powell & Oberg, 2017). Different understanding of reality, different behaviors, and different networks distinguish fields. Belonging to a field – i.e. to a network of actors behaving similarly – gives access to resources that are only accessible to field members (Bourdieu, 1984). To thrive in a given field, social actors thus need to first gain legitimacy as field member by exhibiting a behavior that fits the field's institutionalized ways of seeing reality and behaving (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

To institutional theorists, the behavioral patterns characteristic of a field are related to constraining laws and regulations that field actors comply with, but also to social norms that they respect, and to cognitive biases and beliefs that they have in common (Scott, 2013). Hence, there would be three different levels of institutionalization. First, the *regulative* layer consists of laws, rules, contracts, by-laws, and the formal organizations developed to enforce them. Regulative elements formalize shared expectations and officially sanction deviance. They are the surface of institutions, their most immediately visible and constraining elements. But beyond this surface, institutions would have deeper although informal layers, which give meaning to what can be superficially observed. The *normative* layer corresponds to social norms, i.e. institutionalized, shared understanding of what is proper, hence expected from and by other members of the field. Institutionalized social norms are not formalized, and no specific organization is in charge of enforcing them. Yet, if field members do not comply with norms, they can be socially sanctioned by others: merely frowned upon, retaliated, or socially excluded from the field. Then, the *cognitive* layer of institution corresponds to beliefs and cognitive biases that make actors unconsciously see the world in a given way. This constrains behavior because it pushes field actors to take for granted that a given behavior is normal or efficient in a given situations, rather than consider other possible options (DiMaggio, 1997). Entrenched institutions are regulatively, normatively, and cognitively institutionalized; other miss one or two layers of institutionalization – for example, the way one greets each other by shaking hands is cognitively and normatively institutionalized, but no law regulates this way greeting.

Society is thus considered to be an inter-institutional system (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), i.e. a patchwork of social fields in which different regulative, normative, and cognitive elements are institutionalized. Small, niche fields whose members have very similar behaviors, agree on fine-grained meanings, and see the world through the same lenses, are nested into higher level ones, whose institutional features are less specific, less homogeneous, but are accepted by larger

segments of society (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Zietsma, Groenewegen, Logue, & Hinings, 2017). For example, it is taken for granted in some professions that the proper way to dress is a suit and tie, a niche institution that is nested in the broader one of dressing "properly" at work. The institutional order that characterizes society as a whole would consequently be complex, formed of multiple institutional fields and multiples layers of institution, only a fragment of which would be made explicit and formally transcribed in laws and regulations (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Thornton et al., 2012).

Social actors are considered to be connected to several social fields governed by different institutions. For example, somebody working in a given industry generally also has a family, and might behave differently at work and at home. Facing different institutions in different domains of their lives, actors can question them, looking for a logical articulation of their different features (Oliver, 1992). To think about institutions, they would follow *institutional logics*. Institutional logics are described as "the rationality of the institution" (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 259), i.e. the ways of thinking that field members follow to give meaning to regulative, normative, and even cognitive elements of institutions.

Institutional complexity, institutional logics, and social change

Importantly, people often follow different institutional logics in different fields – for example, the "sharing without reckoning" typical of family is at odds with the individual profit-seeking logic that characterizes the market economy; the logic of family could not explain the institutions of market, and vice-versa. Furthermore, institutions do not always follow a clear logic, so the meaning of institutions would be debated within fields as well as across fields (Zietsma et al., 2017).

Although institutions are, by definition, a factor of stability and conformity in society (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the multiplicity of institutions across fields enables institutional

change (Greenwood et al., 2011). The institutions characterizing a field can be disrupted by sudden encounter with another field; contested by activists inspired by the institutions of another field; or progressively changed as day-by-day practices evolve (Micelotta, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2017). In any case, the confrontation and comparison of different institutions can trigger questions that are then thought upon in terms of institutional logics (Cloutier & Langley, 2013; Harmon, Green Jr, & Goodnight, 2015). For example, the marriage institution as it evolved in Western countries puts into question traditional family institutions that see marriage primarily as the alliance of two extended families (Shorter, 1975); confrontation between these two models takes the form of an opposition between a logic of love between spouses and a logic of obedience toward elders in charge of leading the family (Padilla, Hirsch, Munoz-Laboy, Sember, & Parker, 2007). Institutional change would thus ultimately correspond to the displacement of a logic by another, the expansion of a logic at the expense of another, the reinterpretation of old institutional elements according to a new logic, and/or the logical realignment of different layers of institution each with another (Micelotta et al., 2017).

When facing such institutional contradictions, social actors tend to make sense of it by referring to broader, more general logics, climbing up the pyramid of nested fields and related logics that are agreed upon by larger and larger numbers of actors (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991; Cloutier & Langley, 2013). Ultimately, field-level institutions and logics derive their meaning from a small number of fundamental, societal-level institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Although the list of fundamental institutional logics is not well established, there is general agreement on at least five of them: the logics of market economy, State, profession, family, and religion (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). Their influence would be felt across fields and levels of analysis, rather than within the boundaries of specific fields like lower-level logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Mutch, 2018).

In modern times, the institutional evolution of Western societies has been characterized by the expansion of State and market logics at the expanse of family and religion (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Thornton et al., 2012). Then, Western dominance has been exposing all societies of the world to modern Western institutions and to their underlying logics (Meyer & Bromley, 2015; Suárez & Bromley, 2016). The consequences of this diffusion for the institutional order of developing countries, and its implications for entrepreneurship, are detailed below.

Institutional complexity in developing countries

Due to colonization and, more recently, to institutional mimicry, the regulative institutions of developing countries have been strongly inspired by those of Western countries (Baland et al., 2020; Meyer & Bromley, 2015). But the transfer of Western institutions is often incomplete. As a result, the institutional environment of developing countries would be characterized by "institutional voids": it would be lacking many of the formal institutions that are essential to the functioning of a modern market economy (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Institutional voids are said to be a hindrance to business activity in general, and to entrepreneurship in particular.

Moreover, normative and cognitive layers of institutions would not be as easily changeable as regulative ones (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Scott, 2013). Copying Western regulative institutions would thus cause a decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) between exogenous laws and regulations on the one hand, dominant norms and worldviews rooted in indigenous institutions on the other (Baland et al., 2020). For example, informal economic activity can be formally illegal, yet cognitively possible and socially accepted (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009). Nevertheless, decoupling does not mean that normative and cognitive layers of institutions are let untouched: norms and beliefs tend to progressively align with regulative institutions (Baland et al., 2020; Scott, 2013); while exposure to Western culture

slowly infuses local norms and cognition with exogenous logics (e.g. Meyer & Bromley, 2015; Padilla, Hirsch, Munoz-Laboy, Sember, & Parker, 2007; Suárez & Bromley, 2016).

As a result, the institutional environment of developing countries is particularly complex. For sure, social actors can compensate formal institutional voids by leveraging robust normative and cognitive institutions (Bothello et al., 2019). In particular, entrepreneurs who master the intricacies of local institutions can venture and operate in environments where actors used to the more consistent institutions of developed countries would be bound to fail (Mair & Marti, 2009). But misalignment between different layers of institutions means that entrepreneurship-friendly laws and regulations can reveal inefficient to boost development (Baland et al., 2020). In particular, social norms of solidarity at the family and community level would hinder investment in entrepreneurial ventures even in presence of robust market institutions (Alby, Auriol, & Nguimkeu, 2020; Baland, Guirkinger, & Mali, 2011; Grimm, Gubert, Koriko, Lay, & Nordman, 2013)

Furthermore, the institutions of developing countries are submitted to several types of change happening simultaneously: displacement of indigenous law and regulations by new ones inspired by Western institutions; expansion of Western logics at the expense of local ones; cognitive reinterpretation of local institutions to realign norms and beliefs with regulations that are obey totally different logics (Micelotta et al., 2017). Moving, chaotic institutions cannot play their role of mitigating complexity and uncertainty (Scott, 2013). Instead, they submit social actors to contradictory injunctions originating in a wide variety of institutions and related logics, whose fields of application are not well delimited.

These contradictory injunctions more particularly hit entrepreneurs. Indeed, from an institutional perspective, entrepreneurs are embedded in institutional fields, so to succeed they need to comply with the institutional requirements characterizing these fields (Hwang & Powell, 2005). In particular, entrepreneurs aiming at building business organizations need to

comply with the regulative and normative elements of the market economy as it is institutionalized in their country and industry.

But when laws, norms, and beliefs contradict each other, when fields are pervaded by competing logics, when their institutional boundaries are blurred, this is no easy task (Mair & Marti, 2009). Entrepreneurs facing institutional voids and institutional decoupling need to gain legitimacy and collect resources in several fields to be able to venture (Ge et al., 2019). When they embrace calls to solve social issues through entrepreneurship (Lee, 2020), they further need to articulate several logics within the organization they build (Mair, Robinson, & Hockerts, 2006), which is particularly difficult when so many local and foreign logics compete in society. In short, whereas entrepreneurship is often presented as the best way toward socio-economic development in countries characterized by weak formal market institutions (Easterly, 2006; McMullen, 2011), weak formal market institutions go hand in hand with extraordinary institutional complexity, which is itself a hindrance to entrepreneurship. Whether and how entrepreneurs can venture and succeed in the complex institutional environment characterizing developing countries is therefore problematic.

Family and entrepreneurship

Instead of tackling the wide issue of institutions in general, this dissertation investigates the role of a specific institution, family, that is known to be particularly crucial for business and entrepreneurship in developing countries (Baland et al., 2020; Ge et al., 2019). Family is arguably one of the most ancient and most universal institutions of humanity (Sahlins, 2011a, 2011b; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Although it has been little studied from an institutional perspective, it is a very well-known institution thanks to almost two centuries of anthropological research on kinship across the world (Holy, 1996; Lévi-Strauss, 1949; Morgan, 1871).

According to this literature, family is a dense network primarily made of filiation, siblingship, and marital ties (Lévi-Strauss, 1949; Sahlins, 2011a, 2011b; Shapiro, 2014). Beyond this core, family encompasses a large array of normatively defined social ties. The number and type of these ties varies a lot across cultures: modern Western societies focus on relationships between close relatives: uncle-aunt/niece-nephew, grand-parent/grand-child, cousin/cousin ties. But family networks are traditionally much more extended (Godelier, 2004): some cultures define and label dozens of different types of family ties depending on gender, generation, age, father vs. mother side, and many other criteria (Héritier, 1981; Murdock, 1949).

Although it is rarely the case in Western cultures, family also commonly encompasses temporary, transient ties between people who are not connected by a chain of filiation and marriage ties: formal and de facto adoptees, dependent workers, or even foreigners who settle in a household for a few years, are often considered part of family (Barnes, 1962; Langness, 1964; Leach, 1954; Lévi-Strauss, 1979). Ultimately, it is the way people interact and exchange resources with each other, rather than biology (blood) or legal status (marriage, formal adoption) that socially defines family (Bloch, 1973; Carsten, 1995). The reality of family as defined in a given culture is thus socially constructed, just as friendship or other kinds of networks (Godelier, 2004; Schneider, 1984).

From this perspective, family is an institutional social field: respecting normative ways of interacting and exchanging with members of a dense network secures membership and gives access to resources. Like any other field, family is characterized by specific cognitive and normative elements, that inform the way people see relationships and how they think family members should behave in relation with each other. Formal family law is supposed to reflect these deeply institutionalized norms and beliefs about family – controversies about the legal opening of marriage and adoption to same-gender spouses recently illustrated how deep these norms and beliefs are. However, the boundaries of the institutional field of family are porous.

Whereas it is generally associated with household intimacy in modern Western societies (Godelier, 2004; Shorter, 1975), family is a fundamental institution that influences society much beyond the limits of this restricted social field. In particular, family ties heavily influences business organizations (Anderson et al., 2005; Bhappu, 2000; Dyer, 2003). Entrepreneurial activity is especially dependent on family dynamics (that motivate or discourage venturing) and family norms of solidarity (that facilitate or hinder resource acquisition – Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Randerson, Bettinelli, Fayolle, & Anderson, 2015). Furthermore, family pervades society as the reference point for building and describing close, trustful relationships (Bloch, 1971). As a consequence, family logics can influence business activities even when business partners are not family related (Dyer, 2003; Fairclough & Micelotta, 2013). Therefore, family is an essential institution for entrepreneurs and business people from developing countries who need to mitigate formal institutional voids (Ge et al., 2019; Karra et al., 2006; Verver & Koning, 2018).

Yet, family norms and beliefs generally differ from those that govern the market economy and, in particular, entrepreneurial activity (Bloch, 1973; Sahlins, 1972; Stewart, 2003). Hence, the family institution does not always benefit venturing (Di Falco & Bulte, 2011; Sam, 2003). Many positive and negative effects of family on entrepreneurial activity have been documented, but the balance is difficult to assess (Di Falco & Bulte, 2011; Gras & Nason, 2015; Khayesi et al., 2014; Mehrotra et al., 2011; Sharma & Sharma, 2019).

It is all the more difficult to assess that family – a universal institution – takes very different forms across time and place (Lévi-Strauss, 1979; Meillassoux, 1975; Verdon, 1982). As stated above, the importance of family in society has been weakening as the formal institutions of the State and the market economy developed (Meyer & Bromley, 2015; Thornton et al., 2012; Weber, 1978). But modernization and globalization do not seem to make the family institution converge toward a single model (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). So, family is challenged by the rise of other fundamental logics and loses its traditional dominance over daily social life, but it remains a very

complex institution (Godelier, 2004) that continues to influence entrepreneurship in various ways depending on the context and situation (George, Corbishley, et al., 2016; Sharma & Chua, 2013; Welter, 2011). How family influences entrepreneurship in developing countries that embraced the global push for entrepreneurship by making their regulative institutions more conducive to venturing is the topic of this dissertation.

In addressing this overarching question, I focus on three issues related to institutional decoupling and institutional change. First, I study how entrepreneurs deal with the contradictory injunctions stemming from the confrontation of traditional family norms on the one hand, recent public policies promoting entrepreneurship on the other. In particular, I try to find an answer to the following question: how do entrepreneurs conceive their social responsibilities toward family vs. the public, and how does it influence the way they distribute employment benefits (p.61)? Then, I look for an institutional mechanism explaining individual variation in perceptions of social responsibility. Building on the concept of institutional logic, I investigate how entrepreneurs make sense of the family institution, when it is challenged by the rise of State and market logics (p.102). Finally, I theoretically explore how the various effects of family on entrepreneurship that have been described in extant literature can be explained by the normative institutions regulating social exchange between entrepreneurs and people they are related to. I try to determine who is likely to support entrepreneurs on the basis of a personal relationship, what these supporters expect in return for their support, and how this influences venture development (p.144).

A RESEARCH GROUNDED IN RWANDAN DATA

To study the articulation of family and entrepreneurship in developing countries, I turned to sub-Saharan Africa, because social, political, and environmental challenges are particularly acute on this continent. It is – by far – the poorest area of the world (IMF, 2021; World Bank,

2020). It was integrated to the rest of the world political economy very late, though slavery and colonization, which disrupted local institutions (Fage, 2013; Wallerstein, 1991). It is today characterized by a sharp mismatch between formal institution modelled on those of former colonial powers on the one hand, cognitive and normative institutions rooted in pre-colonial times on the other (Platteau, 2000). In other words, the institutions of the modern market economy lack deep historical roots, as they have been imposed by colonial powers relatively recently from an historical perspective; while contemporary African family institutions, although strongly influenced by Western ones, are in continuity with ancient ones. As a result, the role of African families in entrepreneurship and business do not seem to be explained by Western theories of business and, more specifically, family business (Bewayo, 2009). More generally, Africa has been little investigated in management, organization, and entrepreneurship studies, so it is likely that African data might provide us with entirely new perspectives on organization, management, and entrepreneurship phenomena (George, Corbishley, et al., 2016).

While there are more than 40 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, I chose to go to Rwanda, in East-Africa, because it is a small nation-State whose population shares a single language and culture (Chrétien, 2000; Newbury, 2009). This ruled out the difficulty of comparing normative and cognitive institutions rooted in different culture, as would have been necessary in larger, culturally heterogeneous African countries. The family institution has been the main institution of Rwandan society until at least the middle of the 20th century and remains central in Rwandan's daily life (Adrianssens, 1954; Pontalti, 2018), which is essentially for the projected study. More importantly, the Rwandan government has been following international development agencies' recommendation by the letter and drastically reformed the country's formal market institution over the last 25 years (Ggombe & Newfarmer, 2017; Porter et al., 2008). In particular, Rwanda has been on the forefront of pro-entrepreneurship policies and

public discourse (Honeyman, 2016). Consequently, the country is widely considered to be the entrepreneurial country by excellence. Rwanda thus seems the perfect setting to collect data on the interplay between informal family institutions, market institutions in their modern entrepreneurial declination, and the influence of the family institution on entrepreneurship. I summarize below the still ongoing institutional change that Rwanda has gone through over the last centuries before describing how I collected data.

Presentation of the research setting

Rwanda is a social and political entity that quickly developed territorially and institutionally between the 17th and 19th centuries as a centralized monarchic State (Chrétien, 2000). The king appointed civil servants all over the country, yet "most people, most of the time, where not preoccupied with […] State norms" (Newbury, 2009: 4). Instead, the institution regulating daily life was family. In fact, the boundary between State and family was blurred, as administrative positions were attributed preferentially to heads of influent lineages (Adrianssens, 1954; Chrétien, 2000; Maquet, 1954). These lineages were extended family networks led by patriarchs who were in charge of managing collectively-held family properties, notably land; arbitrate conflict within the extended family; and embody the family in its relations with other families and with the royal administration (Adrianssens, 1954; Kagamé, 1954). Together, familial and political structures reinforced each other to determine a highly visible, formalized political, social, and economical hierarchy determining the distribution of tangible and intangible resources (Kagamé, 1954; Maquet, 1961; Newbury, 2009). Market economy principles and practices were virtually unknown in the country, only visited from time to time by Swahili traders (Chrétien, 2000; Newbury, 2009 - see figure 1).

Figure 1: political and institutional change in Rwanda in modern times



Rwanda was violently shaken by the arrival of German occupiers, replaced by Belgians after World War I. The kingdom, although superficially preserved, was deprived of most of its power as the traditional administration was replaced by an exploitative colonial bureaucracy. In the process, the family institution lost its connection with political and civic life. More importantly, the family institution was challenged by the emancipation of individuals from family collectives, a process encouraged by the emergence of formal schooling, paid labor, and migration toward emerging cities (Chrétien, 2000; Newbury, 2009; Prunier, 1997). However, extended lineages and their patriarchs remained a key component of social and economic life (Adrianssens, 1954).

When the country gained independence in 1962, the new State inherited both the bureaucracy left by the colonial power and century-old hierarchical socio-economic structures. These formal, normative, and cognitive institutions enabled an authoritarian regime that tightly controlled economy and society to implement a violent pseudo-ethnic apartheid discriminating citizens assimilated to the traditional aristocracy (Prunier, 1997). A system of regional and "ethnic" quotas drastically limited access to secondary and higher education. The happy-few accessing higher education were normally granted high status jobs in the administration or a state-controlled enterprise (Prunier, 1997). In the 1980s however, some political liberalization enabled more and more young Rwandans – mostly men – to access higher education and start their own businesses (an evolution related to a paradigmatical change in development economics and international aid policies – Bewayo 2009, Naudé 2011). Yet, contrarily to public administration at the service of the king, then of the republic, business remained a low-status occupation in Rwanda, predominantly embraced by people belonging to marginalized families who were excluded from political functions and administrative positions (according to Rwandan academics and old businesspeople I interviewed). In 1990, the Rwandan regime was militarily attacked by the RPF, an organization formed in Uganda by members from the discriminated minority who had fled abroad. Under pressure, the Rwandan State organized the 1994 genocide, which ended when the RPF took over. These events violently shook the family institution. As adults, and especially men, were disproportionally killed (De Walque & Verwimp, 2010), many family practices had to be redefined to cope with the education of orphans: children were raised by aunts, uncles, or more distant surviving relatives; maternal families sometimes took over roles that normally belonged to paternal families; in some cases orphans from relatives, neighbors, or friends were de facto

adopted as members of the family that raised them. Thousands of children and teen-agers could not even find a family to welcome them and ended up in orphanages, in the street, or in prison; those had to rebuild families out of nothing (Cantwell, 1997). International migrations related to persecutions between the 1960s and the 1980s, to the civil war and genocide in the 1990s, also split many families who, for some, never reunited.

Since the mid-1990s, the country has been going through rapid modernization and economic growth relying simultaneously on generalized control by a State dominated by the formerly discriminated minority, and individual entrepreneurship (Ggombe & Newfarmer, 2017; Honeyman, 2016; Reyntjens, 2011). The new regime aligned the country's formal institutions with practices advocated by the World Bank and the IMF (Lundstrom & Stevenson, 2006; Porter et al., 2008). Political stability and government's pro-business attitude attracted numerous public and private international organizations specialized in economic and social development, that relayed State's advocacy for entrepreneurship as the way toward socio-economic development. Today, the vocabulary and narratives of business are pervasive in the country (Honeyman, 2016).

Despite these drastic changes, extended families led by powerful patriarchs called "head of family" remain crucial for most Rwandans to access education, jobs, and other opportunities to improve their lives, especially in poor areas (Dawson, 2018; Honeyman, 2016; Pontalti, 2018). Family assets, although legally owned by individuals since the colonial era, are still somehow considered as a common pool to be shared with relatives in case of need, and their allocation is largely influenced by heads of family. Young people are thus extremely dependent and deferent to elders who control resources – and authorities in general (Green, 2011; Ingelaere, 2014; Sindambiwe, 2020). On the other hand, many men strive to become head of their family. As incumbents can appoint any of their sons or nephews as their heir, succession is a source of tensions between men of the same generation: family relationships are loaded with jealousy, status competition, and plagued with political behaviors (National Unity and

Reconciliation Commission, 2008; Pontalti, 2018; Sindambiwe, 2020). According to Rwandan and foreign researchers in family science I interviewed, access to formal education exacerbates these tensions, as it can within a few years put individuals from the same phratry at the two extremes of the social ladder, which challenges family practices that define access to resources according to seniority. In particular, successful entrepreneurship gives access to financial and material resources exceeding by a factor of magnitude Rwandan standards, including those of educated civil servants. As put by a Rwandan researcher in family science, "jealousy in Rwandan families is a problem of incomplete transition to modernity": it is a marker that the family institution is shaken up by social change.

Presentation of the data

Consistently with the socio-constructivist ontology underlying institutional theory (Reay & Jones, 2016), I want to ground my theorical understanding of Rwandan institutions in data collected on the field (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Between August 2018 and June 2019, I interviewed entrepreneurs based in Kigali, capital city of Rwanda. I also interviewed members of their families and employees of their businesses, and "experts" of business and/or family practices to enrich my understanding of the context.

I decided to focus on entrepreneurs because these individuals are simultaneously deeply embedded in the family institution like all Rwandans, and entirely engaged with business-related institutions. Furthermore, contrarily to employees, they lack the framework provided by pre-existing organizations whose established legal status, by-laws, and practices draw boundaries between family and business and filter institutional complexity (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015). Hence, they are likely to experience issues due to the mismatch between business and family institutions and to tell me about these issues.

Figure 2: chronology of data collection and analysis



Data collection was divided in several phases (see figure 2). In-between each phase, I analyzed the data collected during the former trips and, based on this analysis, prepared the following trip by listing and taking contacts with potential future interviewees that could help me go further (Kreiner, 2015; Yin, 2014).

During a preliminary field trip, I visited local libraries and documentation centers to gather secondary data on Rwandan institutions and their history. I met local and Western researchers who confirmed and updated the information I was gathering. With the support of a local consulting company, I was able to interview consultants and business experts about the local entrepreneurial landscape and the influence of family norms on business practices. I took

advantage of these interviews to also ask these educated Rwandans about Rwandan family and business institutions in general, in order to triangulate the academic perspective with an emic perspective. I also leveraged daily interactions with Rwandans from various ages and social backgrounds (office assistants, shop keepers, friends) to check the generalizability of consultants' and researchers' point of view on family. Finally, I was invited to attend workshops and conferences targeted to an entrepreneurial audience, which enabled me to be exposed first-hand to the pro-entrepreneurship and pro-market institutional discourse to which my informants have been exposed since the late 1990s.

During this first stay, I found Rwandans to be quite secretive – a trait that seems to be an enduring characteristic of the local culture (Maquet, 1954; Staub, 2006), and might be encouraged by the succession of authoritative regimes that tightly control people's opinion on social, economic, and political questions (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Ingelaere, 2014; Pontalti, 2018). In particular, entrepreneurs were reluctant to connect me to employees or family members, which made very difficult to cross-check information within cases. I thus decided to triangulate information by resorting to a multiple case study with replication (Yin, 2014). The principle of this method is to obtain robustness by collecting consistent information from a large number of similar, but independent informants, rather than from dissimilar but related informants as in a single case study. From this point on, I thus aimed at interviewing a large number of entrepreneurs, that I selected purposefully to be able to progressively build then check theory (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Yin, 2014). I did not give up on within-case triangulation though I later managed to interview relatives and employees.

During my second stay, I first interviewed young entrepreneur, because 60% of the Rwandan population is less than 25 years old (UNO, 2019). These young entrepreneurs from Kigali were mostly in IT and fashion/tailoring. A preliminary analysis of these interviews showed that young entrepreneurs, like consultants, tended to have a rather negative perception

of family in business. However, many referred to the fact that older entrepreneurs had a very different vision. So, I came back to Rwanda to interview older entrepreneurs, who ventured between the mid-1980s and the early 2000s. Due to the structure of the economy at the time, they all were in the construction industry. I was thus unable to tease out the effects of age vs. industry in comparing young and old entrepreneurs. I also realized that entrepreneurs who worked with partners tended to have a different perspective than lone entrepreneurs. I thus came back for a fourth time, in order to interview young entrepreneurs in construction, or old entrepreneurs in fashion or IT; and more partners. I could find young as well as partnering construction entrepreneurs, but no old entrepreneurs in fashion and IT. During this last stay, I also managed to meet more relatives or employees and triangulate what some entrepreneurs had told me during my previous stays. I stopped data collection at saturation, i.e. when enough disconnected, but similar informants consistently held the same discourse about similar events or practices, so that additional interviews stopped providing me new perspectives.

In the end, I spent around 6 months in the country and conducted 67 hours of interview with 88 informants – excluding informal interviews I conducted to familiarize with the context during my first stay. This large number of quite similar informants enabled me to cope with the difficulty of triangulating information. The data is composed of three sub-parts (see figure 3). First, academic and expert descriptions and interpretations of the family institution, both today and in history. Second, a set of older entrepreneurs that gave me insight into the long-term evolution of family and business since the 1980s and provided me with some insight in the institutional change that happened in Rwandan families and entrepreneurial businesses over the last two decades. Some of these entrepreneurs have been in business since the 1990s, a time where business was still considered a low-status occupation. These older entrepreneurs all are in the construction industry and manage the largest firms. Due to the composition of the workforce in this industry, these entrepreneurs commonly work with skilled or unskilled

relatives. Third, I collected data from the perspective of young entrepreneurs. By contrast with older ones, most of the entrepreneurs are in their 20s or 30s and have been impregnated with pro-entrepreneurship discourse from their teen-age on, especially at school. Because construction firms are now suffering the competition of large local and foreign groups, only a few of these younger entrepreneurs are in this business. I thus completed my sample with young entrepreneurs engaged in fashion, an industry that has been booming in Kigali recently and that also enables to hire lowly-skilled relatives. I contrasted construction and fashion with IT, another booming industry with very different hiring constrains due to the type of employees it needs. The time window of this "contemporary" dataset goes back to the early 2010s.

While older construction entrepreneurs are all men, there is a nice gender balance in the younger generation, although most of those who venture in construction today still are men. Informants vary from self-employed entrepreneurs to founder-owners of large SMEs counting several hundreds of employees. All businesses are formally registered and pay taxes (96% of businesses are registered in Rwanda – The World Bank, 2020).

Interviews were semi-directed, with questions focusing on venturing and business development, entrepreneurs' biography, and influence of family and family members on life course and business. When possible or needed (for example to revive a fading conversation), general questions about family in Rwanda or about the business environment were added.

The national language of Rwanda is Kinyarwanda, which I do not speak, but the schooling system has historically been French speaking, until it switched to English in 2008. Rwandan entrepreneurs I met were thus all fluent in one of these two languages depending on their age, except one who understood English and a bit of French but didn't feel confident doing an interview without an interpret. I did this interview accompanied by a trilingual person. All the other interviews were conducted either in French or English, to the preference of the interviewee. After my first stay, I knew enough about the local family institution and its

vocabulary to identify when French or English words used by informants could be an imperfect translation from Kinyarwanda words – for example, Kinyarwanda has different words for "paternal aunt" and "maternal aunt", while the same word can be used for "brother", "half-brother", and "male cousin on father side". By asking informants which Kinyarwanda word or which precise family relationship they had in mind I could remove ambiguity.

Figure 3: description of the data



[5] I interviewed the two members of a team of two, and the three members of a team of three
[6] In interviewed the two members of a team of two
[7] I interviewed only one member of two different teams of two

Data analysis method

I chose to follow Kreiner's (2015) approach to data analysis. This approach has two peculiarities. First, data analysis was started immediately after the first phase of data collection and continued throughout the data collection process. Second, I embraced theoretical ideas that I could identify in my data very early on, instead of delaying theorization until data collection was finished. Cases were constantly compared with each other, either formally or informally, including during interviews. In fact, interviewees themselves tended to compare their own case to others (e.g. "I know some people think/do this, but I think/do that"). Preliminary findings and ideas were also compared with extant literature on family, family business, entrepreneurship in sub-Saharan Africa, and of course institutions.

Notes and interview transcripts were systematically coded with NVivo. I first focused on family and business practices. I obtained almost 300 first-order codes describing in details family and business practices, that I labeled predominantly with emic labels. I then organized these codes into larger categories (or "parent-codes" – Kreiner, 2015) to carve the landscape of Rwandan institutions out of the mass of data – see figure 4 as an example. Despite the addition of 'levels', all these categories remain "first order" categories, which means that they immediately reflect my informants' ideas (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013).

As I progressed in my understanding of the data, I developed new research questions. Depending on the sensitizing concepts (Charmaz, 2003) of these questions, I then went into further rounds of data analysis. These further rounds of coding led to second order categories, more theoretical (Gioia et al., 2013). The chapters below present the outcome of these successive analyses.

Figure 4: example of 1st order coding: the role of "responsible head of family"



INTEGRATION OF THE THREE CHAPTERS

The first chapter is based on the observation that social discourse on entrepreneurship gives entrepreneurs the responsibility not only to build business organizations, but also to address social issues. Entrepreneurs are thus expected to endorse heavy social responsibilities. But what exactly is their social responsibility, and how to answer calls for responsibility, is ambiguous. In Rwanda, this double ambiguity is made salient by the contradictory injunctions of the State, that calls entrepreneurs to follow impersonal business practices to develop the national economy; and of family members, who expect entrepreneurs to use their business as a tool for helping relatives in need. In a country where jobs are scarce and unemployment means deep poverty, these contradicting calls to social responsibility translate into a choice between preferentially hire relatives even if they do not contribute much to the business, or avoid working with family to maximize business efficiency. In this chapter, I examine how Rwandan entrepreneurs articulate the respective responsibilities they have toward family and the national community, and how their conception of social responsibility influences their hiring practices. I observe that entrepreneurs either nest, balance, or decouple social responsibilities toward these two audiences and hire accordingly. Whereas "nesting" entrepreneurs see family and business responsibilities as two Russian dolls nested into each other, "balancing" entrepreneurs see family and business responsibilities as different, and "decoupling" entrepreneurs see them as contradictory.

This finding makes me wonder why entrepreneurs differ in their conception of family compatibility or incompatibility with business. The second chapter dives deeper into the social and cognitive mechanism underlying these ethical considerations and hiring decisions. Starting from the postulate that individual difference in hiring decisions is related to the encounter of two different institutions (business and family), I take an institutional logic perspective (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012) on the matter to investigate the meaning of

“family” in the Rwandan context. I find that, in Rwanda, the family institution is not governed by one single logic, but can be explained by several, competing logics: compliance to authority; sharing based on love; or responsibility to “grow” oneself and others. This goes against received knowledge on institutional logics, that identifies “family”, “religion”, “State”, “professional” or “market” logics as fundamental logics. My findings show that “the” family logic may not be as fundamental as it has been portrayed to be. Instead, the family institution as defined in a given cultural context can derive its meaning from even more fundamental, *elemental* logics that exist independently from the family institution itself. I further suggest that it is misleading to label institutional logics such as State, profession, or religion, as fundamental. I disentangle their logical components to propose a preliminary list of elemental logics. I label these logical elements based on their content, rather than based on the institution to which they are associated in modern Western societies. That might enable to more easily understand variation within a given institution across contexts; and, more importantly, to facilitate the analysis of institutional complexity by breaking down encountering institutional logics to their common denominators rather than assume incompatibility (Mutch, 2018).

Considering that elemental institutional logics certainly have a relational component (Powell & Oberg, 2017) that might already have been identified, I then look at social exchange theory to understand how different institutional logics might impact entrepreneurship. More specifically, I build on Fiske (1991, 1992), who identified four fundamental norms of social exchange that might correspond to elementary logics. I suggest how these norms of exchange could influence the conditions under which Rwandan entrepreneurs acquire resources from their family members, and more generally how entrepreneurs can acquire resources from people they are socially related to. Indeed, nascent entrepreneurs often leverage their social networks to acquire the resources they need to start-up, and often depend on “favors” provided by benevolent supporters. Yet the mechanisms underlying variations in entrepreneurial resource

acquisition through networks are poorly understood, and important differences in business outcomes remain unexplained. I suggest that each type of social relationship determines different reciprocal obligations for entrepreneurs and their supporters, which imply different exchange conditions and, ultimately, different business outcomes and management decisions. I explain when each form of social exchange is likely to play out in entrepreneurs' networks and develop propositions regarding their effects on resource acquisition and the evolution of entrepreneurial businesses.

Figure 5: logical articulation of the three chapters



TO WHOM ARE ENTREPRENEURS RESPONSIBLE? BALANCING SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD FAMILY AND THE PUBLIC IN RWANDA

Summary

In developing countries, entrepreneurs are expected not only to build business organizations, but also to endorse heavy social responsibilities. But what exactly is their social responsibility is ambiguous. In Rwanda, a poor but rapidly developing country, this ambiguity is made salient by the contradictory injunctions of the State, that calls entrepreneurs to follow impersonal business practices to develop the national economy; and families, that emphasize group solidarity. In a country where jobs are scarce and unemployment means deep poverty, these contradicting calls to social responsibility translate into a choice between preferentially hire relatives, or avoid working with family. In this paper, I examine how Rwandan entrepreneurs articulate the responsibilities they have toward family vs. the national community, and how their conception of social responsibility influences their hiring practices. I observe that entrepreneurs either nest, decouple, or balance social responsibilities toward these two audiences and recruit preferentially relatives or strangers accordingly.

Keywords: social responsibility, entrepreneurship, family business, hiring, development

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s, private entrepreneurship has been increasingly seen as the panacea to the economic and social issues faced by developing countries. International organizations interested in socio-economic development such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development or the World Bank have been pushing for legal reforms facilitating venturing and the development of an entrepreneurial mindset at a global level (De Mello & Dutz, 2012; Independent Evaluation Group World Bank, 2013).

This push for entrepreneurship goes hand in hand with a growing trend to see economic activity as a form of socio-political action with crucial effects on societies (Scherer, Palazzo, & Matten, 2014). From this perspective, business organizations have social responsibilities that go beyond merely creating economic value (Carroll, 1979). Although most of the debate on corporate social responsibility focuses on large firms, especially multinational corporations (Baumann-Pauly, Wickert, Spence, & Scherer, 2013; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), entrepreneurs have also been called to endorse their social responsibility (Lee, 2020). The social responsibility of entrepreneurial ventures is particularly under the spotlights in developing countries (McMullen, 2011; Visser, 2008). However, in such contexts where business resources are scarce, social needs immense, and legal requirement low, social responsibility rarely translates into formalized CSR action (Jamali & Neville, 2011). Instead, it infuses entrepreneurs' daily management decisions that focus on employees' and local communities' basic needs (Brammer, Jackson, & Matten, 2012; Jamali & Karam, 2018). In particular, hiring and human resource management decisions are so immediately impactful and so much loaded with ethical concerns that they can be considered as the predominant mode of social action for entrepreneurs (Amaeshi et al., 2016; Demuijnck & Ngnodjom, 2013).

An important complication is that social expectations rooted in informal mutual support systems characterizing traditional societies are often at odds with what is globally considered

sound business management (Baland et al., 2020; Shantz et al., 2018). Whether entrepreneurs choose to answer immediate social needs of family and community members – potentially diminishing the profitability of their business, hence its direct contribution to the national economy – or focus on business growth – potentially letting relatives and neighbors struggle in poverty – likely depends on their personal understanding of business social responsibility (Basu & Palazzo, 2008). But how do entrepreneurs from developing countries conceive their social responsibility, and how does it influence their business decisions?

In this paper, I study how Rwandan entrepreneurs interpret their responsibility toward family vs. society at large, and how this interpretation influences hiring practices. Rwanda is a country that has been following developmental economic textbooks by the letter for more than two decades now, promoting entrepreneurship as a civic contribution to national socio-economic development t(Ggombe & Newfarmer, 2017; Honeyman, 2016). Exposure to this discourse leads entrepreneurs to view the distribution of business benefits to family members as nepotism, mismanagement, and more generally inefficient practices to be eliminated for the country to go forward (Demuijnck and Ngnodjom 2013). On the other hand, traditional family solidarity remains essential for many Rwandans to get jobs, educate their children, and even find their daily subsistence – it is thus hard for entrepreneurs to simply stop supporting their relatives.

Based on interviews, I identify three main ways Rwandan entrepreneurs comprehend their social responsibility. The distribution of jobs to family can be seen as a local implementation of national goals, which reconciles the two injunctions to social responsibility toward family vs. the nation by *nesting* the family level into the national level. From another perspective, responsibility toward family and society can be *balanced*: entrepreneurs use their business to help family, especially by hiring relatives, but only insofar as it does not deprive other stakeholders – non-family employees and job candidates, business partners, or clients. Finally,

family solidarity can be seen as creating unfair inequality between family members and other Rwandans, so must be limited due to entrepreneurs' social responsibility toward co-citizens. In this case, responsibility toward family is *decoupled* from business activity and limited to the private sphere. Debate about these different ways of distributing benefits stemming from successful venturing is currently ongoing among Rwandan entrepreneurs.

I believe this study contributes to the literature on CSR in SMEs, especially in developing countries (Jamali & Karam, 2018) by showing how, concretely, entrepreneurs think about their social responsibility and adjust their business decisions accordingly. More generally, it sheds light on the fact that individuals, but also organizations, can feel socially responsible toward different audiences, from the most local and closed community to society at large. Finally, this work has implications for research and policy on entrepreneurship-driven development, as it hints at the role of individuals' meaning making and sense of social responsibility in spreading the benefits of entrepreneurial success.

THEORY

The social responsibility of SMEs in developing countries

Although the responsibility of business organizations in creating and solving social issues has been constantly debated since the 1970s (Carroll, 1979; Friedman, 1970), there is growing consensus that firms, especially large corporations, do have an influence on societies that goes beyond the purely economic domain (Scherer et al., 2014; Schwartz & Carroll, 2003). As a matter of fact, CSR engagement has become the norm for large businesses to gain and retain legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Carroll & Shabana, 2010).

The institutionalization of CSR practices on a global level seems to be deeply influenced by Carroll's (1979) conception of business social responsibility as four-fold: contribute to the economy, respect formal law, comply with informal ethical expectations, and engage in

voluntary philanthropy. The balance between each of these pillars is tightly dependent on the institutional context: when governments pass and enforce constraining social and environmental regulation, it mechanically reduces the importance of voluntary CSR action as compared with contexts where governments and societies merely incentivize firms to behave responsibly (Matten and Moon 2008). The form taken by CSR also varies with firm size (Besser & Miller, 2001; Jamali, Zanhour, & Keshishian, 2009; Lepoutre & Heene, 2006): in small and medium enterprises (SMEs), voluntary CSR is generally less formalized and less visible, as concern for various stakeholders is embedded in daily operations rather than strategized and organized as a separate philanthropic activity (Niehm, Swinney, & Miller, 2008; Perrini, 2006; Roberts, Lawson, & Nicholls, 2006).

This specificity of SMEs is reinforced in developing countries (Jamali & Neville, 2011). Indeed, poorer economies are usually characterized by weak formal institutions and strong informal ones (Bothello et al., 2019; Mair & Marti, 2009). In such contexts, legal requirements are low and States often lack the capacity to enforce them, but social expectation are extremely high. As a consequence, businesses' sense of social responsibility generally translates into a special attention given to voluntary action, taking the form expected by local norms and values (Visser, 2008). While multinational companies operating in developing countries often engage in large-scale, almost humanitarian operations (Visser, 2008), local SMEs lack the resources to do so. Instead, they engage in a wide array of small-scale actions that are almost never organized nor conceived as separate CSR engagement, but rather as an implicit, taken-for-granted part of daily business work (Brammer et al., 2012).

Concretely, engaging in CSR from the perspective of small businesses and entrepreneurial founder-owners generally means caring for the well-being, safety, and development of employees and their local community (Jamali & Karam, 2018; Sahasranamam, Arya, & Sud, 2020). Responsible entrepreneurs thus take ad-hoc measures such as giving or

lending money to community members in need, according leaves for employees to be able to meet family obligations, or contributing to the schooling of employees' children and local youth, among others (Demuijnck & Ngnodjom, 2013; Shahnaz, 2014). Creating stable jobs and being faithful to long-term employees, producing safe goods, and offer adequate services for a fair price is also often considered as a moral duty as much as a means to serve one's self economic interest as a capitalist entrepreneur (Amaeshi et al., 2016; Mitra, 2012; Painter-Morland & Dobie, 2013; Shantz et al., 2018). Considering the huge impact a stable job makes for employees, but also for their households and their extended families (Baland, Bonjean, Guirkinger, & Ziparo, 2016; Wantchekon, Klasnja, & Novta, 2015), the decision to create and allocate jobs is thus particularly important for responsible entrepreneurs (Demuijnck & Ngnodjom, 2013; Independent Evaluation Group World Bank, 2013). Whom to offer jobs and pertaining wages, however, is then a tough nut to crack in terms of social responsibility.

Distributing jobs and wages in resource-poor environments

In many non-Western societies and in particular in developing countries, entrepreneurs are deeply embedded in extended family and community networks that provides some kind of security net to the less-able or less-happy (Grimm et al., 2013) and enables to educate and train younger generations (Baland et al., 2016). Furthermore, family gives access to social, material, and emotional resources which are crucial to start and maintain businesses (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Stewart, 2003). Norms of solidarity thus motivate, enable, and constrain entrepreneurial activity (Baland et al., 2020; Gras & Nason, 2015; Johannisson & Nilsson, 1989; Shantz et al., 2018). Resources flowing from successful entrepreneurial ventures are expected to be distributed according to the norms regulating these networks of mutual solidarity (Grimm et al., 2017; Khavul et al., 2009). From this perspective, hiring family and community members is a way for entrepreneurs to support people they are socially related to at lower cost, as the cost of

support (paying wages) is balanced with the contribution of the employees to the business. Not hiring family and community members when it is possible might disrupt these collective solidarity mechanisms aiming at allocating resources in a socially acceptable manner.

However, family and community members are not necessarily qualified or motivated, so hiring them represents a social constraint that can weigh on business development. Indeed, norms of mutual help have been observed to cause scarce resources to leak out from businesses to meet short-term needs of the large networks of entrepreneurs' acquaintances, without equivalent contribution from family or community members to businesses (Alby et al., 2020; Di Falco & Bulte, 2011). The harmful effect of "forced" solidarity on business growth and survival has long been observed and criticized as an important hindrance to Africa's economic development (ben Porath, 1980; Grimm et al., 2017; Phillips & Bhatia-Panthaki, 2007). Today, this perspective on social solidarity vs. business efficiency overlaps with the global debate about the social responsibility of businesses. Indeed, in many developing countries, States and international organizations emphasize the social responsibility of entrepreneurs and businesses to grow the economy and create jobs for the general population (Honeyman, 2016; Mitra, 2012). This obviously resonates with the neo-classical idea that the primary social responsibility of businesses is to be profitable and increase economic welfare (Friedman, 1970). When it comes to recruiting new employees, preferential hiring based on personal acquaintance is thus thought to be economically inefficient (Dyer, Dyer, & Gardner, 2013; Jaskiewicz, Uhlenbruck, Balkin, & Reay, 2013; Mehrotra et al., 2011) and above all unfair to skilled employees lacking social connections (Demuijnck & Ngnodjom, 2013). For such a perspective, avoiding nepotism is perceived as one of the primary markers of socially responsible behavior (Demuijnck & Ngnodjom, 2013; Wang, 2013). By contrast, people who are socially related to entrepreneurs still expect them to take a direct role in answering their social needs, including by being granted preferential access to jobs. As a result, entrepreneurs are stuck between the contradictory

expectation of their family and community members who expect them to behave as responsible members of the community on the one hand; of the general public and political actors who call them to behave as responsible economic agents on the other.

To study how entrepreneurs make sense of this conundrum (Basu & Palazzo, 2008), let us turn to Rwanda, a country whose government has fully embraced the theory of development through private entrepreneurship, becoming the "model student" of international development organizations in Africa (Friederici, 2018; Honeyman, 2016; The World Bank, 2020). At the same time, Rwanda has historically been organized by a rigid family system that remains very influential and crucial for many Rwandans to survive and get an opportunity to improve their lives (Adrianssens, 1954; Kagamé, 1954; Pontalti, 2018). After briefly presenting the Rwandan context, I examine how founders and owners of businesses make sense of whether they are primary responsible toward their extended family, or the national community, and how they take hiring decisions accordingly.

DATA ANALYSIS

After the first round of coding aiming at identifying common business and family practices, I realized entrepreneurs felt responsible both for their extended families and for the development of the country. I therefore refocused on the concept of "social responsibility" and brought in the literature on CSR, trying to understand the antecedents and consequences of the dual sense of responsibility felt by Rwandan entrepreneurs, and identified a link with hiring practices. This second round of coding led to more than 100 first-order codes (Gioia et al., 2013) whose labels and content directly reflected informants' ideas and words. I organized these codes into larger categories (or "parent-codes" – Kreiner, 2015) to draw the landscape of hiring practices and social responsibilities. Coding also led to second order categories, more theoretical (Gioia et al., 2013), related to how entrepreneurs articulate the different

responsibilities they have, and how it influences their hiring practices (see figure 1). The result section below presents the outcome of this 2-rounds data analysis.

FINDINGS

Responsibilities toward nation and family

Interviews confirm that Rwandans, especially those having been schooled in the last 10 or 15 years, are strongly committed to the development of the country through entrepreneurship. Although many are aware of global CSR issues such as global warming, gender issues, or consumer safety, most if not all consider these global issues as important but peripheral by comparison with Rwandan socio-economic urgency. By contrast, they consistently make theirs the national objective to create jobs for unemployed youth and put it at the core of their entrepreneurial project: "I really hope that [my business] is going to […] grow […]. And I would have more employees […] and not only family related but also like other people who are working here who really look at us for the means to help their families. I really hope that is going to grow" says a young entrepreneur, among many others

They also believe that developing new goods and services is a way to solve economic, social, and political issues as much as it is a way to make profit. For example, an IT entrepreneur designing management software explains that he principally aims at fighting corruption and mismanagement: "[my clients] are doing transportation […] to facilitate trade, communication and stuff […]. Simply by not having an electronic way of controlling how much money they are making […] they used to lose up to 30 percent of their revenue. […] In the process many of them could not deliver […] because somebody is eating your money! So now I came up with a solution for them [so that] it's easier to trade and move in the country". Another one helps the

Figure 6: data structure



numerous peasants' cooperatives of the country digitalize to cut the misappropriation of members' subscriptions by indelicate managers. A third one wants to provide drinking water in remote areas, and found a business to be the best way to do so. This resonates with extant literature on entrepreneurship in developing countries, that shows that entrepreneurs are often given – and endorse – the responsibility to enable modernization, foster social change, and offer their co-citizens life-changing opportunities (Demuijnck & Ngnodjom, 2013; Mitra, 2012). At the same time, Rwandans are very attached to family and feel responsible for helping worse-

off relatives. Family solidarity extends at least to first-degree cousins and their children, and can benefit much further relatives, depending on the wealth of the entrepreneur. A better-off Rwandan is expected, above all, to help junior relatives get started in life by paying for their education, advising on career and life choices, connecting to Rwandans also feel responsible to care for their retired parents and other senior relatives. Then, punctual events trigger importance flows of resources: costs incurred because of sickness, accidents, but also weddings and other family ceremonies, are usually shared by the extended family (see table 1).

Varying approaches to hiring

According to our informants, one of the best ways to support family – in continuity with paying for education – is to connect relatives with job opportunities. Indeed, the population is increasing rapidly and jobs are rare. An employed family member is, from this perspective, one less person and household the entrepreneur has to care for. As put by a construction entrepreneur: "If I don't take him, I must help him anyway! Better he works, so that he can help himself". In another family, another generation, another entrepreneur confirms: "Instead of being here helping somebody, offering a job position it's more interesting for the person, and more interesting for the helper too".

Moreover, family can be seen as a pool of cheap workforce: when relatives are hired because they could not find another job, they are ready to accept any salary rather than nothing. So, a business that could not afford paying a full salary can benefit from the work of a relative in exchange of a "helping salary" much below job-market price: "[when it's for being helped] relatives can accept to work for 50000 franks, but you cannot bring somebody from outside to earn 50000 franks". This sheds a different light on this phenomenon, that has been observed in other African countries but generally been analyzed as an exploitation of needy relatives (Geschiere & Konings, 1993; Oya, 2007).

Table 1: data supporting the distinction between 2 targets of social responsibility

Theme	Informant characteristics	Quote
Responsibility toward family	Founder, master degree in Rwanda, 30s Founder, master abroad, 30s Founder's brother, BBA in Rwanda, 20s Founder's son, engineering abroad, 20s Founder, engineering abroad, 20s Founder, engineering abroad, 60s Founder, secondary education, 40s	not only you have to support the family as a daily thing, but you also pay school fees for brother, for sibling's children… my family used to say, you have now graduated from the university, […] you need to start contributing to us you have to pay the fooding, some families they have to pay for house rental, and also if there are kids you have to pay for some school fees Let's say there is a member of the family who had the house destroyed by the rain, we make notice of that, the elder will find out generally how much it costs to repair the house, to help them to go through that period A wedding budget would be like 10 million or something but maybe 10 percent of that is going to come from your […] parents. Everybody else is gonna pitch in. If somebody is sick, he doesn't have the means, he comes here, I give him [My brother] was spending a lot of time at home; I took him as assistant. […] He is not qualified like my younger brother here ; but I thought he can count […] That's a simple job. So I did it, well, as an help to family, because he didn't have a job. I thought, to help him, to help him look forward
Responsibility toward the country	Founder, engineering abroad, 60s Founder, engineering abroad, 20s Founder, master in Rwanda, 30s Founder, BBA in Rwanda, 20s	At this time the government was saying that we should develop the country with tourism. So we invested in that. we want to be profitable, but from the contracts we get, to help people to get some employment and have other people get our services. […] Our company is emphasizing empower young people. […] "[By hiring family members] I'm killing the business and also the future of the country; I can lose the job where I am working, and also you as well. All of us, are losing I have established this business not only to sustain myself, but also to provide the jobs for others

Some entrepreneurs further believe that relatives are particularly committed and trustful employees: “They do more than expected […] I wouldn’t be worried to say ‘OK, let’s add two more hours in the evening’”; “They will take care of it, as if it’s their own business”; “they work well, because they are working for family!” say three different entrepreneurs. For some Rwandan entrepreneurs, hiring relatives is thus clearly a way to fulfill one’s social responsibility as member of the extended family at relatively low cost. One could thus expect entrepreneurs to hire mostly family members.

Yet, according to extant literature on entrepreneurship in Africa, hiring relatives could harm the growth and survival prospects of businesses (Di Falco & Bulte, 2011; Khayesi et al., 2014; Phillips & Bhatia-Panthaki, 2007). Indeed, family employees are also often perceived as difficult to manage and little motivated by Rwandan entrepreneurs. Whereas some family employees work because their work benefits their relatives, others can consider the salary they receive as an entitlement, a mere implementation of normative family solidarity, and do not feel they have to behave and work as employees in return: “Sometimes they call you and they simply say, ‘today I'm not going to work. I simply want to sleep’. And they think, because they are relatives, they will get their way with it!”. That is not all: motivated relatives are not necessarily able to contribute to entrepreneurs’ businesses, especially considering the recent boom of IT in Kigali. So on the whole, hiring family is likely to compromise entrepreneurs’ goals to grow their business and fulfill their responsibility toward the country: “If you're only hiring them because you're family […] you won't actually be able to help because if this business grows it makes me very rich, I’ll be able to meet all their needs. But if I put family in the business and then they destroy it, then we're all going to suffer” explains one. “[By hiring family members] I'm killing the business and also the future of the country; I can lose the job where I am working, and also others as well. All of us, are losing” says another.

Entrepreneurs are aware of the advantages and risks of hiring family, so their hiring decisions is highly dependent on the level of qualification and motivation of unemployed relatives in regard to the needs of their business. Consequently, entrepreneurs in construction or fashion – who need large numbers of low qualified workers – are much keener to employ relatives than IT entrepreneurs – who need highly skilled employees. Even in construction, business needs prime over family relations: "There are positions which are crucial! For example the technical director […], jobs like that, in production, you bring in qualified people, it's much more about being qualified" says the very family-oriented founder-owner of a construction firm. By carefully weighting the needs of their business with family skills and motivation, some entrepreneurs were able to thrive for decades and build large SMEs.

Yet, industry characteristics and family skills and motivation do not explain all the variance in hiring decisions. Some entrepreneurs accept to hire, then train in-house, whereas others are reluctant to doing so. Compare, for example: "[my brother] said 'I'm going to [work on the field] with the others', […] then I was 'let me introduce you to [more technical work]', he was helping doing the [more technical] stuff, and then I was sending him on his own to do it" vs. "one of my cousins was coming here the other day, he was looking for a job and I was 'OK, I really can't hire you, you are not qualified, you don't have the experience'". Some entrepreneurs even take it to invent petty jobs that add little if no value to their business, but are adapted to the capacities of their most unskilled and needy relatives: "You start moving them around. If he can't do this properly, you look for another position, look if he can do this, or that. […] If he is fired, what is he going to eat, he has children, what will they become, so you try to move him, find him a position where… well, where he does no harm to your work, at least".

So, one can distinguish entrepreneurs who think that, all other things being equal, "family are the worst, they are the worst" because of low skills and/or low motivation, from those who think that "if you have two applicants which are kind of equals, you would take the one from

the family". In reality, most entrepreneurs try to hire relatives when it is possible (even the one who repeats that "they are the worst" hired 2 cousins!), but limit family hiring so that it does not harm the business: there must be a position open or work to do; relatives must be qualified for the task; be motivated to work; and respect business procedures and hierarchy. Also, entrepreneurs unanimously agree that family employees should be treated like others in terms of salary, supervision, and sanction when needed, so that business runs smoothly (see table 2). But some entrepreneurs are keener than others to hire relatives, train them in-house, and keep them in the business even when they are not productive. Beyond the question of industry, skills, or manageability of family employees, hiring or not is thus clearly a matter of how different entrepreneurs conceive their social responsibility toward family. I observed entrepreneurs follow different cognitive paths and mental models while thinking about hiring family. In the paragraphs below, I will follow these paths backward, starting with the final decision to hire family or not to follow entrepreneurs' logic up to the source of their decision.

Nesting responsibilities: extended family as subset of the needy Rwandan population

Some entrepreneurs cognitively reconcile their seemingly contradictory social responsibilities towards family and the nation by *nesting* their responsibility toward family within their responsibility toward the nation. For them, hiring a relative is helping a relative as much as it is creating a job in the country: in any case, what matters is that trustful workers can fulfill their potential and send their kids to school (see table 3). They integrate their hiring practices into their private family solidarity activities. Over the years, the older ones finally ended up running family businesses.

The son of such a senior entrepreneur explains: "[my father] has so many family people he helps, but also he has so many other people he is helping, […] he has established companies". According to the son, the father has both contributed to the family by hiring relatives; but doing

Table 2: data supporting the distinction between 3 approaches to hiring family

Prefer hiring family	Founder, engineering in Rwanda, 30s Founder, engineering abroad, 60s Founder's wife, BBA in Rwanda, 60s Founder, engineering abroad, 50s	You are in charge of family; to reduce the burden, better hire somebody whose charge would be on you anyway if they don't have a job Family is much more committed because they find that the firm belongs to them. When you work with family, it's much better. Because in the meantime you help them to develop! […] And also, I can say, 'this month you are not getting your salary because we didn't produce enough'. […] family understands, he will see if you make money or not and you look for a solution together. When you have a position to fill, and a family member who is qualified, you are going to take it of course, you are not going to advertise in newspapers when you have somebody there looking for a job!
Limit hiring family	Founder, engineer abroad, 60s Founder, some higher education in Rwanda, 40s Founder, engineering abroad, 70s Founder, some higher education, 40s Founder, engineering abroad, 60s	If my brother is not an engineer, I'm not going to give him a position as an engineer! Maybe he can look after the trucks, so that fuel is not stolen, or things like that, or check workers off – and that, if he can read and write! There are positions where you can hire anybody. But there are positions where you only hire… because they have knowledge, they have experience. I'm not going to call a cousin when I have a house where I need to set Internet… I need someone who know, who can do, first of all! I tried to limit. I wouldn't like they come here! Well, if he cannot find something else… I'm not going to let them starve. But first they must cope on their own! […] I prefer to send to a colleague, so that they see the rigor of this gentleman's business, and then they can maybe come to me. I had hired a brother […]He did not respect his managers. He said 'oh, I'm the younger brother of the boss'. No no it's not like this, I said 'you leave'". I think, you cannot take a family member as employee for its all life. You know there is a proverb… instead of giving somebody a fish, better teach them how…[…] So I say no, don't come back here, in my office for my business for 10 more years, it's not good. Have a go! Try! If there are 3-4 positions and you have one person [from the family], the 3 others are filled by people who come from further away

		If somebody tells you that somebody from the family joined while there was nothing to do, they are lying to you. You are only bringing someone because there is a need.
Avoid hiring family	Founder, master degree abroad, 30s Founder, master degree abroad, 30s Co-founder, engineering in Rwanda, 20s Founder, BBA abroad, 20s	Family members are the worse people to work with! In any business. They are the worse, they are the worse It kills the business[…] It's very difficult to hold them accountable. […] sometimes they call you and they simply says, today I'm not going to work. I simply want to sleep. And they think, because they are relatives, they will get their way with it! We don't like to hire any other family member. They are not committed, not serious, come late. You will find that people hire relatives. […] But we don't do that. […] It's my personal belief. It don't like it. […] No, I'm not doing it. […] All my friends do not hire relatives. Like in the startup ecosystem in Rwanda.

so, he also contributed to the country. More specifically, these entrepreneurs explain that needy family members precisely are the kind of Rwandans that political and social discourse pushes entrepreneurs to give opportunities to. A construction entrepreneur characterized by his altruistic values and dedication to others is very clear: "I have nostalgia to help a lot of people but I'm always thinking about family first […] because in my family, some have no parents, some have no money and they look for a job. [When I look for workers] I look in my family". A very young entrepreneur who just graduated from a vocational high school thinks the same: "We are a developing country, there are a lot of problems, a lot of issues in the country, a lot of poverty. […] So my contribution is to hire […] my siblings and my younger [cousins]". From this perspective, hiring family is a way to start solving bigger social issues at the local level. It even seems more efficient to address local needs than exhaust oneself to solve higher-level ones: "Of course when you have a position, a job to give, and you have a family member who has the skills and is unemployed, you are going to take him, you are not going to publish an

offer in the newspaper when you have somebody who needs a salary just there" says a senior construction entrepreneur.

Furthermore, these entrepreneurs believe that helping family is a more efficient way to help than hiring strangers. As a matter of fact, many entrepreneurs explain that their criteria to hire is close social relatedness rather than family-relatedness as such, although both are of course highly correlated: "It's not really about being family, it's about relationship. […] You are not going to find someone who arrived just because we are relatives; it's the ones I know who are hired" says an entrepreneur. The basis for hiring people you know is twofold. First, considering the high level of mismanagement and corruption that characterize Rwanda, trust is necessary for business: "I try to help family, but the point is [you need] trustful people. […] you cannot hire a logistician from a village you don't know. You need someone you know, even if it's not family, you need to know them". Second, knowing people enables to be sure that they will make the best of the opportunity given. Two cousins explain how selecting trustful relatives enables to enter a virtuous circle that multiplies the impact of job creation. Each in a different interview, they draw a consistent picture of the family point of view: "One can give money to anybody, but it's not everybody that will succeed. So [the entrepreneur] tries to look at everybody, if they follow guidance, if they are open-minded, if […] you look forward. If you are going in the right direction, then it's easy for him to give you a chance" explains the nephew of the entrepreneur. "We had people in our family who didn't have work. […] [my dad] was hiring some who had potential, so that they get out of unemployment, they get some money, after the project they have the drive and some foundation to start something for themselves, or have a good CV to continue with other companies", explains the son. Bringing the two accounts together, one can see that entrepreneurs preferentially hire relatives who have the potential to use stable employment as a springboard to go further. Today, says the nephew, "[the situation of the family] has really improved. […] [People my generation] are capable of paying their

kids' school fees. Which was not the case before! We are not going to have the challenge of finding jobs or paying school fees, the challenge will be "can we make something bigger", can we help this guy who is struggling in his business to make it grow".

In this family and others, initial focus on family solidarity thus seems to create a bubble of relative prosperity that benefits dozens of related households, then can spill-over in the national economy as well-educated juniors launch new entrepreneurial projects. An entrepreneur in his 20s explains: "[If] family can survive […] and create different businesses, then we can benefit the community". An entrepreneur in his 40s actively works at creating this virtuous circle: "I was paying school fees [for junior relatives], the kid graduated, I found a way to find a job, I was giving him a position. You see, I paid for you, you studied, you were hired, now you must help, you must pay school fees for somebody else, […] Not at your home, but at somebody's else. That's how I work".

The outcomes can be impressive: in families benefiting from the employment of several, sometimes dozens of members in a family business, juniors clearly have a level of education and an average income higher than the previous generation, and also than the average population. In fact, these families are out of poverty. As put by the nephew of one of these entrepreneurs, "it's huge. Compared to other families, the impact [of the entrepreneurs' dedication to family] has had a big impact". At the same time, junior family members are now educated, trained, and ready to get a job or to launch their own ventures.

Balancing responsibilities: family solidarity, as long as it does not harm others

Other entrepreneurs do not manage to reconcile family and broader social responsibilities as smoothly, because they perceive the conundrum as a zero-sum game. Rather than considering that hiring someone is a way to help the community whoever the person who is given a chance, they feel that offering employment benefits to someone risks depriving others who might be as

much or more entitled to employment benefits. These entrepreneurs feel much less comfortable with hiring relatives and are constantly trying to *balance* the opportunities they offer to family members with their other social responsibilities. When justifying their decisions, they generally explain that giving too much preference to relatives would be unfair to other (potential) business stakeholders (see table 3).

First, it is unfair to people who do not have family connections to hire preferentially family members. The son of a nesting entrepreneur clearly hint into this direction when he expresses ethical concerns about the family-first policy of his father: "[The family business] is a place where you know you can hire your family, family can come in, they are able to put their skills to use […] I don't know if it's fair for everybody else who is not part of the family". From this point of view, there is direct contradiction between family solidarity and broader social responsibility. A construction entrepreneur, who can hire large numbers of lowly qualified workers, is very conscious about the issue and explains how, precisely, he tries to remain socially responsible in the broader sense while helping family: "When people see that there is a construction site in the area and nobody gets a job, that's a big issue. […] Because these people are poor too! So you can hire 20% in the family […] and you take the 80 other percent around the construction site. […] I tried to help family […] but the condition was, help people first, I could not hire […] 50 people in the same family, when there is another that struggles… I should share. So I was saying, 'you at Smith's are 2, that's enough, you at Jones' I'm taking 2', I needed to help them all. […] Even my site managers, I was telling '[…] you must balance, take in each family, each family, each family'. If you have a construction site, you are not going to hire […] your whole family, take busses to go work in another province. No, you also must help this province develop!" Although he only attended university for a few months, this self-made man theorizes the economic trickle-down effect of such balancing between family and non-family entitlements to job opportunities. "I was telling myself, at least 30% of the contract

Table 3: data supporting the distinction between 3 ways to articulate social responsibilities

Nest family responsibilities in larger social responsibilities	Son of founder, master degree abroad, 30s Founder, BBA in Rwanda, 20s Founder, secondary education in Rwanda, 40s	[my father] has so many family people he helps, but also he has so many other people he is helping […] he has established companies, he has businesses – he has multiple businesses We are a developing country, there are a lot of problems, a lot of issues in the country, a lot of poverty. […] So my contribution is to hire [family]... Even my siblings and my younger [cousins] [when I look for workers] I look in my family. Then, cousins, it's next to it. […]I have nostalgia to help a lot of people but I'm always thinking about family first […] because in my family, some have no parents, some have no money and they look for a job
Relatives need jobs/opportunities as any poor Rwandan	Son of founder, master degree abroad, 30s Founder, engineer degree abroad, 50s Founder, engineer degree in Rwanda, 50s	We had people in our family who didn't have work. […] we are hiring some, so that they get out of unemployment, they get some money, maybe after the project they will have some foundation to start something for themselves, or have a good CV to continue with other companies. If somebody from your family is skilled and […] you have an opportunity […] why call somebody else? Of course when you have a position, a job to give, and you have a family member who has the skills and is unemployed, you are going to take him, you are not going to publish an offer in the newspaper when you have somebody who needs a salary just there
Helping relatives has tangible effects	Son of founder, master degree abroad, 30s Founder, some higher education in Rwanda, 40s	[People my generation] are capable of paying their kids' school fees. Which was not the case before! We are not going to have the challenge of finding jobs or paying school fees, the challenge will be "can we make something bigger", can we help this guy who is struggling in his business to make it sustainable I was paying school fees, the kid graduated, I found a way to find a job, the kid I was giving him a position. You see, I paid for you, you studied, you were hired, now you must help, you must pay school fees for somebody else, […] at an uncle's, a neighbor's… […] That's how I work. […] They tell me "you taught us well". One got married, the other has a small shop, another has a restaurant […] I answer

		them, one never knows! If I fall, if I go bankrupt, you are the one who will lift me up!
Relatives are people you know deserve help	Founder, engineer degree abroad, 50s Founder, some higher education in Rwanda, 40s	It's not really about being family, it's about relationship. […] Those who work here, they grew up with me. I have been like their father […] You are not going to find someone who arrived just because we are relatives; it's the ones I know who are hired I tried to help family, but the point is [you need] trustful people. […] you cannot hire a logistician from a village you don't know. You need someone you know, even if it's not family, you need to know them.
Long-term employees are like family	Son of founder, engineer degree abroad, 30s Founder, engineer degree abroad, 50s	you can ask for an advance on the salary. It's not only for the family members, it's for everybody. But if you want to ask for a loan from the company, you have to [be family or be with us for a long time]. Family it's not only blood. [the technical director] for example, he has become family! The driver I hired in 1986 […] he is from family too […] we all are brothers. Well, I'm more of the older brother of course!
Balance needs from family with needs of others	Founder, some higher education in Rwanda, 40s	I called first people I know, but […] I couldn't hire 5 people in the same family when there is another family who [is in need]. You should share. […] I was telling my foremen, balance, in each family you hire one or two. […] If there is a work in an area and nobody is hired, it's a problem. So you can hire maybe 20% from our family, or village, and you take 80% around the construction site.
Respect your partners' stakes in the business	Co-founder, engineer degree in Rwanda, 40s Founder, BBA in Rwanda, 20s Co-founder, BBA in Rwanda, 20s	[hiring his son] is not good for the balance of the partnership. That would be two salaries on his side, and I'm the boss as much as him. […] We are sharing the benefits, but at the end of the day, if we fail, the failure is shared too. We need to be cautious with the partner's family, even if we are friends and we trust each other. I do not have the right to go and use the money, our business' money, even if I want. It's ours, not mine. We would be typically sharing [money], it would be me, her, and the company. We are like three people. […] So I would get a salary. I don't care if I get 30 dollars, but that's mine to spend. You might struggle because you're having to share your 30 dollars with some

		family needs. But it's my money, not her or ours.
Be fair to your employees	Founder, master degree in Rwanda, 20s Founder, master degree abroad, 20s	First of all I must pay my employees, because I don't like to work with somebody who is hungry. First I pay them, and then I and my family we come after that. What I explained to family is "if I can take […] money so that you can buy yourselves shirts, what I'm telling is that my team should have the same right. That's all". I cannot have an organization […] where I'm taking money. So, either it's a rule for everybody, or I don't do it.
Provide what you promised to your clients	Founder, master degree abroad, 30s Founder's brother, some higher education abroad, 20s	there is always a mission toward the customers of this service. if we're saying that a hundred people will be having water at the end of the month and then at the end of the month it is only 50 people, then we need to respond to that. […] If it is requiring me to work more extra hours then I will. Because […] we are having more impact here. […] Yeah, we are changing the economy of the country.
Give back to the community you work in	Founder, some higher education, 40s Founder, master degree abroad, 20s	Workers, carpenters, assistant-masons, it's people from the area. […] Because these people are poor too, they need work. […] I'm telling myself, at least 30% of the contract must stay in the area. […] Workforce for one week, they are going to get 3 million… and this access to money, that's something good. […] 50 people who didn't have cloth, whose children couldn't go to school… you are doing something very good. Even in terms of economics, it's good. There is a small restaurant, a bar, people will eat and drink there. What we wanted was to provide water but also sustainable employment
Give a chance to those who don't have family connections	Founder, engineering degree abroad, 20s Founder son, engineer degree abroad, 30s Founder, master degree in Rwanda, 20s	Everybody feels there is this culture of nepotism in hiring within the country, and I'm like, it starts with us. If you feel like you can't get a job anywhere else because you don't have people there, then I wouldn't bring that culture within this company. I don't know if [giving preference to family] is fair for everybody else who is not part of the family I feel if a relative is bringing me losses […] then I'm doing an injustice. […] They're

		making the losses, while a stranger in need is looking [for a job].
Decouple family responsibility from business	Founder, engineering degree abroad, 20s Founder, master degree abroad, 30s Founder, master degree in Rwanda, 30s	Business should remain separated from private life, and I have a salary and I can do what I want for family with my salary. […] Family has nothing to do in business […] I want to separate. I'm a separatist. I am still able to support my family personally. But I don't hire them into the business. […] I can take one hundred or ten thousand from my salary and I can support... help from the salary and not from the business.
No responsibilities toward family	Founder, BBA in Rwanda, 20s Founder, engineer abroad, 50s	I have not been affected so much by the extended family because […] My uncles, my aunts, most of us had the chance to study. […] the family can provide for themselves. My older brother is a consultant too. In the scientific domain. He is a biologist researcher, at a very high level
Conceive business as a separate entity	Founder, master degree abroad, 20s Founder, BBA in Rwanda, 20s	if I personally can help, then I would give him more of my own money. Not on the company. I have a salary as entrepreneur so that salary that's generated from my business is the one I can use to help myself, to help my friends, to help my business.
Mix family and business is stressful	Founder, BBA in Rwanda, 30s Founder, BBA abroad, 20s	If you want to reach me there is this phone, for friends and family there is that one. I just separate thing, work is work, my life is my life. I would like my family to be a place of rest […] What I observe [in family firms] is that there is no life anymore, you meet you uncle at a wedding and it's not the wedding anymore, it's documents, work…

should stay in the province. In supply […] but also in workforce. […] And these people […] they can eat and drink on the spot; there is a local restaurant, it's going to make profit because my workers go eat there, and that's more and more children who go to school".

Balancing between potential family vs. non-family employees also helps entrepreneurs to refuse hiring relatives who are not qualified or not motivated. Indeed, they find unfair to non-family employees to give relatives fake job positions, better pay, or smoother sanctions. A young woman explains: "Here in Africa […] the mentality, it's 'she need a job, hire her', it's

tough because [family members] are calling me, saying just 'your cousin is coming, she is going to work with you' and there is not even a question about what she is going to bring to the business, what she will do, for the family I just have the responsibility to hire her, get a salary for her, and she does not do anything. […] That was not honest for the team, it was going to ruin everything […] So I said no, I really decided it was not going to be that way […] And it's tough, but I separated from family". Without having such a dramatic experience where impossibility to balance led to drastically cut family from business, another entrepreneur followed the same rationale when hesitating firing an unproductive family employee: "If you can't fire a relative that is bringing you losses, then you might have to fire someone else later... OK, it's easier just to fire a stranger. But then I feel if a relative is bringing me losses […] then I'm doing an injustice to the other employees keeping them there". In this story, the relative was first hired to fulfill responsibility toward the family, then fired out of responsibility toward the community of employees and potential applicants.

The very same line of thought is used to balance solidarity with family vs. fairness toward business partners when entrepreneurs are working in teams. Two partners very carefully explain how they support each other finding the right balance in helping family. "He is helping me to control myself, he is chasing my money and I'm chasing his money. […] I cannot bring my father who will say 'work is not good, do it this other way' [while he has no qualification], the partner is playing his money and his credibility as engineer" says one, while the other concurs: "he [tells] me when relatives are not skilled". At some point, the issue was raised to hire the son of one of the two who just graduated from university in a domain that fitted the business' needs. The conclusion was that "it's not good for the balance of the partnership. It would have been two salaries on his side". Finally, the two partners decided to find a job for the son in the company of a friend and hired a promising schoolmate of the son who lacked family connections. Doing so, they balanced the social responsibility to find a job for relatives with

the rights of the partners' respective families to get equal benefits from the business, but also with giving opportunities to worse-off Rwandans.

Finally, some entrepreneurs consider the threat that potentially unskilled or unmotivated family employees represent for the interests of their clients – in a context where most businesses feel that providing high-quality goods and services is an important way to contribute to the development of the country as a whole (see above). An IT entrepreneur explains that he so far never hired family, because in this knowledge-intensive business "there is always a mission toward the customers […] If the quality of services are not as good as the customers expect, then they drop you right away. […] And I don't know where they will find another provider in this country". In a sanitation business, a family manager says: "If we're saying that a hundred people will be having water at the end of the month and then at the end of the month it is only 50 people [because a family employee is not working], then we need to respond to that. We are not answering the dire need of these people". Balancing thus enables entrepreneurs to respond to family pressure by referring to third parties' entitlements (a technic already observed in African entrepreneurship – Baland et al. 2011; Khavul et al. 2009; Warnier 1993), without denying family some rights to benefit from preferential treatment when it does not harm other members of the national community.

Decoupling responsibilities: private family vs. civic business

Whether they nest responsibility toward family in responsibility toward the general public, or balance the two, most entrepreneurs consider that family has legitimate stakes in their business, which must be taken into account when taking business decisions. By contrast, a small set of entrepreneurs contest the legitimacy of their relatives to expect anything from their business. None refuses her or his responsibility toward needy relatives. But they *decouple* their family responsibilities from their role in society as entrepreneurs (see table 3). "As a person,

that's what you want, to help your family! But I think that […] business should remain separated from private life, and I have a salary and I can do what I want for family with my salary. […] Family has nothing to do in business […] I want to separate" explains a young entrepreneur. For another one, "I am able to support my family personally. But I don't hire them into the business […] I have a salary as entrepreneur so that salary […] is the one I can use to help myself, to help my friends". A third one explains: "If I personally can help, then I would give him more of my own money. Not on the company". In other words, these entrepreneurs consider that they have family responsibilities as members of their families; social responsibilities as entrepreneurs; and that the two are to be fulfilled separately.

Instead of preferentially hiring relatives or balancing whether they can be hired without harming other stakeholders, decoupling entrepreneurs are "insensitive" to family as professionals, while respecting family obligations in the private sphere. It is different from merely limiting family hiring to skilled and motivated relatives in that their attitude takes the form of an explicit reluctance to hiring family. As put by a young woman entrepreneur, "everybody feels there is this culture of nepotism in hiring within the country, and I'm like, it starts with us. If you feel like you can't get a job anywhere else because you don't have people there, then I wouldn't bring that culture within this company. […] When you are building a business for sustainability you avoid things like that. It's sort of... indirect corruption". Her brother and partner takes a very moral, even religious perspective on the matter: "We were raised by Christian parents, very Christians and with very Christian values, and […] we learnt to […] be honest and have integrity within ourselves. So part of integrity is […] to always avoid to hire some people because they are from [the family]. […] We treat everybody as equal. […] Of course I love my family more than others, but if it comes to a matter of, I mean, equality, […] I would say I treat everybody as my siblings. Yeah, because that is the Christian values

that tell us that […] we all are brothers and sisters". This shows a strong moral concern for not giving family members any preference in hiring.

Symmetrically, these entrepreneurs are worried that the boundary between their family and their business might be too porous in the other way: as young entrepreneurs, they benefited from family support at start-up; and they know try to end the in-flow of resources just as they try to avoid resources drawn from the business to irrigate the family. The entrepreneur cited above explains: "For example, we were hosting a guest for the company. Well, there's a free room at home so […] I'm like 'okay you can stay at home for free'. […] I slowly realized that I am abusing my family in this regard because the company should pay for itself and its business partners […] You do have to deal with this conflict of interest".

A way to enforce decoupling is to emphasize business rules and procedures and take distance from the hiring process. "I don't want to break the original relationship with [relatives]! […] So […] when they contact me, I say, 'okay, there is a website […], you can go and apply there.' […] I don't want to interfere with the process" explains the brother cited just above. Another entrepreneur from the same generation has the same approach: "When family wants to work here, there is no short-cut".

These entrepreneurs are embracing the legal difference between the entrepreneur and the business, that justifies why the business does not endorse the family responsibilities of the entrepreneur: "With your generosity you can do whatever. But as long as you have a salary, it cannot really harm the business". Another entrepreneur, in partnership with a friend, explains: "Every time we would make sales, we would be typically sharing it, it would be me, her, and the company. We are like three people […] Why should she or the business pay for [the family]?" This clearly contrasts with entrepreneurs who consider business as a tool that can be freely used at the service of family: "[being sole owner] enables to use your money freely to help family! If a kid needs school fees, it's very easy to pay school fees without an advisory

board to accept. […] When you spend for family, it becomes very easy, it just reduces your profit in your balance sheet". This also contrasts with people who balance family with other stakeholders as if all had equivalent entitlements on business proceeds.

Finally, entrepreneurs justify decoupling by a need to separate private from business/public life, so that family remains free of stress. "I would like my family to remain a place of rest […] What I observe [when you work with family] is that there is not private life anymore; you meet your uncle at a wedding and it's not about the wedding, it's about documents, files…" says one; "I just separate thing, work is work, my life is my life" says another.

Evolution of social responsibility perspectives across generations

Several factors might explain why entrepreneurs nest, balance, or decouple their social responsibilities (see figure 2). These factors are related to age, but age does not seem to be the key explanatory variable. Indeed, older entrepreneurs clearly tend to nest responsibility and preferentially hire family, whereas most younger entrepreneurs balance their social responsibilities and quite a few strictly decouple business from family (see figure 3). Older entrepreneurs in my sample tend to have larger, more stable construction firms that certainly enable them to hire more relatives with low qualifications. There certainly is an industry effect: while construction or fashion entrepreneurs often can to hire lowly qualified relatives when they want to, IT entrepreneurs need highly skilled, specialized employees, which obviously pushes them to consider family hiring as contradictory with development. The generational effect is less clear: there are cases of young entrepreneurs who do nest, and relatively old construction entrepreneurs who do balance. This indicates that overall generational differences in hiring practices and in perspectives on business social responsibility are not directly caued

by age, but merely correlated with age. But what are the factors that cause seemingly similar individuals to differ in ethical considerations and behavior (Hafenbrädl & Waeger, 2017).

Overall generational difference is certainly related to the dramatic changes that happened at the country level between the 1990s and today. Older entrepreneurs were educated at a time where business was a low status occupation for discriminated graduates who had no chance to make a career in the public administration, and ventured as the country was undergoing or recovering from civil war and genocide. "To go to university, there was extremely tough conditions. Extremely tough ! […] one was really preselected. […] That was not necessarily to be smarter or have better grades. That was about regional balance, tribal balance, all kind of stuffs that do not exist anymore" explains somebody who had to leave the country to study. "Some regions, including mine, have a long tradition of entrepreneurship for various reasons, because when your family was from there and you had the chance to go to school, you could not really have another way to succeed" explains someone else. These older entrepreneurs ventured out of necessity and build their sense of social responsibility in a context where the State was discriminatory and family or local solidarity vital and politically loaded.

They subsequently have been exposed to government discourse pushing for more inclusive practices, but only after several years that probably had imprinted their sense of responsibility, and at an age where their worldviews and sense of ethics probably already were already established. The same entrepreneur cited above explains the "regionalism" characteristic of his generation: "For an entrepreneur from this generation, help somebody from your region, that's helping somebody who also is kind of discriminated, and also you can expect some kind of possible return one day". "The older way of doing business, it's very communautarist in a way. You deal with people you know, you favor each other" says a middle-aged entrepreneur, rather critical. Several young entrepreneurs express the same critics. Symmetrically, some older entrepreneurs are rather critical with current government business

policy that contrasts with their own way of seeing business contribution to national development: "In Uganda, in Kenya, [in South Africa] they give a preference for local firms […] When you bid, you get a 10% bonus over international groups. […] In Rwanda, it's not the case, because it's against "ease of doing business" principles. But […] developing through doing business, it's somebody who brings money, invests, creates local jobs, cares for the education and well-being of his employees!".

By contrast, younger entrepreneurs have been exposed to these neo-liberal "pro-business" ideas through entrepreneurship classes and pervasive public discourse from their youngest age. They take for granted that impersonal hiring is or should be the norm in business. The intensity and duration of this exposure seems crucial in forming their sense of responsibility: those who have followed specific entrepreneurship and/or management education and training after high school seem particularly likely to decouple family from business responsibilities. Indeed, in Rwanda, entrepreneurship trainers and consultants heavily insist on the separation of personal and business budgets, on the basis that family solidarity tends to weigh negatively on business performance and survival (see above). The microcosm of IT entrepreneurs in particular is infused with a strong normative dislike for family business and family hiring. Comparing old and young Rwandan entrepreneurs, socialization and dominant social discourse prior and at founding thus seems the primary determinant of social responsibility perspectives.

Another important factor might be the socio-economic situation of entrepreneurs' family at the time of founding. As we saw above, nesting seems to favor family well-being. Junior relatives of successful entrepreneurs who privileged their families tend to adopt the same perspective than their older leader, for the obvious reason that the model is proven to work by family history and has benefited them. By contrast, when there is not family business around, young members of better-off families rather balance or decouple, notably because family pressure are lower. As put by a lucky entrepreneur, "I feel I have not been affected so much by

Figure 7: evolution of entrepreneurs' perspective with time of founding and family socio-economic status at the time



the extended family because […] uncles and aunties, they went to school, their children went to school, […] the family can provide for themselves. […] It hasn't been such a huge burden on me". Also, when parents are doing well enough, they can manage family responsibilities without young entrepreneurs feeling concerned: "My dad is the one managing [family issues]" asserts an entrepreneur, who clearly feels more responsible toward non-related needy Rwandans than toward family and strictly decouples. This effect is reinforced by the effect of gender and birth order, two variables that, in the traditional family system, determine the place of individuals in the family hierarchy of status and corresponding responsibilities. As put by a woman entrepreneur – married to an entrepreneur – "being a man changes point of view on family. There is this mentality that men have more responsibilities toward family. On top of that, he is the first-born boy". A young man confirms: "If you are a big brother, you have a particular responsibility".

It thus seems that family socio-economic status reduces family obligations or at least makes them less salient in the mind of young entrepreneurs. Wealthy families thus seem to re-focus on nuclear family relationships, intimacy, and emotional support in contrast to material mutual support in extended family networks characteristic of most Rwandan families. As a result, young entrepreneurs from these (wealthier) families, especially those with international exposure, are the most likely to decouple to protect family as an intimate domain protected from work stress. According to a Rwandan researcher in family science, "today, family ties loosen. […] The role of extended family gets weaker, especially in the middle class". For two senior entrepreneurs, the tendency is just as clear: "Rich people have health insurances now. Family is not a security net anymore" says one. "[My son] does not even try to know about distant family members. We are getting Europeanized" says another. When born in such families, it seems logical that young entrepreneurs focus their sense of responsibility on the poor rather than on family members who do not need their help.

DISCUSSION

My data suggests that, when submitted to contradictory injunctions to either focus on their responsibility as family member, or endorse broader social responsibility toward the nation, Rwandan entrepreneurs differ in the way they articulate these two social responsibilities. Although my study does not allow me to determine exactly what causes these differences, it hints at the role of evolving social and political discourse of course, but also of family socio-economic conditions. These findings have interesting implications for research on corporate social responsibility of founder-owned and family businesses, on individual and organizational imprinting, and on developmental entrepreneurship.

First, my study highlights that not all Rwandan entrepreneurs feel primarily responsible toward the same audience: family for some, the general population or the nation for others. The fact that entrepreneurs' and, by extension, their business' social responsibility can target different audiences, with concrete consequences for hiring practices, might interest scholars concerned with corporate social responsibility. Indeed, the corporate social responsibility of privately-owned SMEs has been attracting more and more attention since the 2000s (Jamali & Karam, 2018; Lepoutre & Heene, 2006; Niehm et al., 2008), but it has been difficult to reconcile contradicting empirical observations. It might be that each organization, especially those controlled and influenced by a single individual or family, feels responsible toward a different audience and behaves accordingly. In Rwanda for example, a firm focusing on an extended family or local community might be perceived as socially irresponsible toward a national or global community; and vice-versa. More generally, there certainly are two types of social responsibility: proximity responsibility, focused on local issues (community development, education, healthcare); and global responsibility, focused on broader, more diffused issues (economic development, but also environmental action, fight against corruption, or consumer

Figure 8: articulating responsibilities toward different publics and hiring preferences



safety). That resonates with what Hofman et al. (2017) described in China. But how to account for and compare these various types or levels of social responsibility?

This also asks the question of which audience businesses are likely to focus on (Luo, Wang, & Zhang, 2017). To whom founder-owners feel responsible depends on several elements. First, it depends on who calls on their sense of responsibility. In the case of Rwanda, both the State and families call entrepreneurs to responsibility; in the more general case States, customers, shareholders, economists, politicians, NGOs might all call for possibly contradictory "responsible" behaviors (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Then, which calls founder-owners or firms preferentially answer likely depends both on institutional and biographical elements – i.e. social norms and personal values or interests (Basu & Palazzo, 2008; Hafenbrädl & Waeger, 2017). Finally, how the sense of responsibility of the organization or founder-translates into action can be influenced by practical constraints – in the case of Rwanda, whether relatives are skilled and motivated enough to be hired. What would be interesting to know is which kind of stakeholders are counting more than the others in the eyes of entrepreneurs and managers from developing vs. developed countries, and maybe also across cultures as each culture probably has its own way to define the social responsibilities people, groups, and organizations have toward different audiences. An interesting finding in this regard is that, whereas some entrepreneurs balance the claims of family with the claims of actual, well-identified stakeholders such as employees, partners, or clients, decoupling entrepreneurs simply oppose family to much more anonymous, conceptual communities such as the nation.

Another interesting finding is that none of the entrepreneurs who started privileging family latter adopted a broader perspective on social responsibility. Businesses founded decades ago seem to adopt more recent perspectives on the role of business in society and business best practices only superficially and sometimes reluctantly. This is a neat case of organizational imprinting by their founder (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013). However, as these

founder-owners are getting close to retirement, some of their children prepare to take-over. All have been immersed in the government discourse promoting more standard business practices; many have studied abroad; and many of their friends are "decoupling" entrepreneurs who overtly claim that family has nothing to do in business. On the other hand, they have been educated and sometimes trained in their fathers' family business. Once in charge, how will these heirs see their responsibility: as stewards of the family, or as stewards of the larger, more impersonal national community (Drakopoulou Dodd & Dyck, 2015; Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Lester, 2011; Lee, 2020)? Their reflection on the matter and their behavior are likely to differ from the reflection of family-business heirs from developed economies where, although institutional pressure for business responsibility exist, dedication to national socio-economic development is not considered a civic duty as it is in Rwanda.

In the end, my study questions the dominant understanding of corporate or business social responsibility and the concept of social business. Except one, none of the businesses I observed are thought as "social businesses" by their founders. None uses the vocabulary of CSR. Yet, all my informants express concerns about the social implication of their business activities and, de facto, integrate these concerns in their hiring practices. So, what is the meaning of "social business" in a developing economy where all entrepreneurs are socially conscious and use their business as a tool for socio-economic development? How does the case of Rwandan SMEs differ from SMEs from other countries? From foreign groups present in Rwanda? And if it is the case, why?

According to my informants, the impact of Rwandan SMEs is primarily related to the production of goods and services and to the distribution of salaries. They would certainly agree with Tobias et al. (2013) proposition that in Rwanda entrepreneurship is a transformative activity even when entrepreneurs are not really "innovative" in the economic or institutional sense: although some of my informant are building ground-breaking IT businesses, most are

simply managing construction or fashion businesses that look very alike each other. Yet they are clearly changing the destiny of their extended family, as well as those of their employees. This reinforces the idea that entrepreneurship in developing countries has an impact by merely creating jobs, even if it is not particularly innovative (Acs & Audretsch, 2006; Shane, 2009).

Nevertheless, resources remain scarce in Rwanda. Some families and communities have so far remained excluded from national economic growth (Dawson, 2018). Inequalities in standards of living and social status trigger a lot of jealousy, including within families (Pontalti, 2018). Jealousy, or in other words, social competition, is certainly a sign that income inequality is becoming a social and political issue (Corry, 2012), and this might well weight negatively on political stability and social harmony in the long term (Ratzmann, 2018).

My study precisely calls into question the conditions under which entrepreneurship can benefit socio-economic development in the long run in Rwanda at least, the social outcomes of a boom in entrepreneurial activity seems to partly depend on the sense of responsibility of entrepreneurs. The example of a handful of Rwandan businesses founded in the 1990s shows that entrepreneurship can have a real, although local, social impact. That is not surprising, as we know that in very poor contexts a single person with a stable income can improve the life prospects of many relatives (Baland et al., 2016; Wantchekon et al., 2015). But it is astonishing because literature on African entrepreneurship almost exclusively focuses on what hinders business growth and survival and gives the general impression that local firms cannot thrive on this continent. Yet there are hundreds of large, decade-old SMEs in Rwanda; probably millions on the continent. How did these businesses manage to grow? Although succession is an issue in Africa even more than elsewhere (Bewayo, 2009; Sam, 2003), many families have a business and entrepreneurship tradition; who are the heirs of successful entrepreneurs, and how do they manage their legacy? My interviews indicate that many become entrepreneurs themselves, and take-on the sense of responsibility of their fathers. Moreover, it seems that increased family

levels of education and standards of living mitigates tensions within extended families, and, furthermore, enables young entrepreneurs from better-off families to turn their eyes toward national-level social issues and the poorest of their co-citizens. That is an encouraging finding that would merit to be investigated further.

This question about the evolution of social responsibility as generations succeed each other is more generally related to the broad social evolution of Rwanda, from a society where family used to be and still somehow is the primary focus of identification and the primary frame of resource exchange, to a society where the State and the impersonal mechanisms of modern market economy organize most of social life. In other words, it is related to a deep institutional change, that influences the logic entrepreneurs follow while thinking about their social responsibility. The root of entrepreneurs' varying perspectives on social responsibility might thus well be the variety of institutional logics to which they are exposed (Thornton et al., 2012).

CONCLUSION

Interested in how entrepreneurs from developing countries conceive social responsibility, I collected interview data in Rwanda. I discovered that entrepreneurs differ in their hiring practices: whereas some preferentially hire family (although limiting family hiring so that it does not harm their business), others avoid hiring relatives. This difference partly comes from a dual sense of social responsibility: responsibility toward extended family out of respect for traditional solidarity norms; or responsibility toward the nation as civic duty to create jobs and modernize the country. While some entrepreneurs solve this duality by nesting family responsibility within civic responsibility, others balance the two, trying to be responsible toward their family under the condition not to be unfair to strangers. Finally, some decouple their sense of responsibility toward family from business activities. I identified possible antecedents of these differences, especially family wealth. I discussed possible implications for research on corporate social responsibility of founder-owned and family businesses; on

individual and organizational imprinting; and on developmental entrepreneurship. Finally, I made a connection between the evolution over time of the way entrepreneurs think about social responsibility, social change, and institutional logics.

COMPLY, LOVE, OR GROW TOGETHER: DECOUPLING FUNDAMENTAL INSTITUTIONS FROM ELEMENTAL LOGICS IN RWANDAN FAMILY ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Summary

Literature on institutional logics identifies "family", "religion", "State", "professional" or "market" logics as fundamental, societal-level logics that inform lower-level ones. While some of these fundamental logics are well-studied, the variability of the family institution across time and space seems to indicate that it is necessary to go beyond currently dominant accounts of this institution in organization studies and to refine our understanding of its underlying logic(s). To do so, I study the family institution and its interplay with business in Rwanda, East-Africa. Based on interview data, I find that, in this country, the family institution is not governed by one single logic, but can be explained by several, competing logics: compliance to authority; sharing based on love; or responsibility to "grow" oneself and others. This suggests that "the" family logic may not be as fundamental as it has been portrayed to be. Instead, the family institution as defined in a given cultural context can derive its meaning from even more fundamental, elemental logics that exist independently from the family institution itself. Labelling an elementary logic based on the institution that it serves to explain in modern Western societies might be misleading.

INTRODUCTION

The institutional logics perspective has flourished since Friedland and Alford's (1991) seminal essay. Grounded in neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), this stream of research analyzes the ways individuals give meaning to institutions (Thornton et al., 2012). Doing so, they would use different logics in each institutional field. The logics used in each social field would derive their own meaning from a small number of societal-level institutional logics, whose influence would be felt across fields and levels of analysis (Friedland & Alford, 1991). The market, professional, and social logics would be such higher-level logics; they have consequently been particularly studied (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012) and are consensually described (Greenwood et al., 2011; Thornton et al., 2012).

Although family is widely acknowledged as a fundamental, universal institution (Friedland and Alford 1991, Thornton et al. 2012, Weber 1978) that considerably influences all sorts of formal organizations (Dyer, 2003; Fairclough & Micelotta, 2013), there has been relatively few studies on family from an institutional logic perspective (e.g. Greenwood et al. 2010, Miller et al. 2017). Among these studies, only a small fraction empirically captured and described the institutional logic giving sense to the family institution (Bhappu, 2000).

As a result, widely cited accounts of the family logic (e.g. Thornton et al. 2012, p. 73) – that draw heavily on Weber's (1946) representation of pre-modern family – do not seem to reflect the richness and multi-faceted nature of the family institution. First, institutions are historically contingent (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) so family has certainly changed a lot since Weber wrote. Second, family business scholars know that contemporary families can be characterized just as well by altruism between members of a nuclear family (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001), desire to preserve and bequeath emotion-laden assets to descendants across generations (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011), or self-regarding

opportunism (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011). Third, research in non-Western contexts has shown that Western conceptions of family were only moderately accurate to explain the influence of family on organizations in other cultures (Bewayo, 2009; Karra et al., 2006; Sharma & Manikutty, 2005; Stewart, 2003). On the whole, the logic underlying family is thus certainly not as monolithic as suggested by the literature on institutional logics (Zellweger, Richards, Sieger, & Patel, 2016).

In fact, more than one century of anthropological research on the diversity of the family institutions across cultures (Godelier, 2004; Morgan, 1871; Murdock, 1949) shows that it is unlikely that a single logic can explain family institutions across contexts (Kronenfeld, 2012; Sahlins, 2011a, 2011b; Shapiro, 2014). To make the institutional logics perspective a useful tool to examine the influence of family on organizations, it thus seems necessary to first identify the logic giving sense to the family institution as it exists in given times and places; then examine how these family logicS influence organizations.

I thus aimed at *empirically identifying the logic of family* (Reay & Jones, 2016) in contemporary business organizations. To counter-balance the cultural bias that characterizes extant organization research (George, Corbishley, et al., 2016), I collect data in Rwanda. Using interview data, I observe how entrepreneurs and their relatives, exposed to State's advocacy for business and entrepreneurship, make sense of the family institution.

My most important finding is that no one single logic can explain the Rwandan family institution. Instead, informants explain consensual family practices by one of *three* different logics: compliance to authority aiming at preserving established order; unconditional sharing based on love; or responsibility to "grow" oneself and others. Each logic has different implications for the enactment of key features of the family institution.

Interestingly, each of these logics also exists outside of Rwanda and outside of family, without being especially associated with any culture, field, or organization – none of these

logics is a "Western", "State", "market", or "professional" logic for instance. This suggests that "family" logics might merely be the transcription in the family field of elemental logics that exist independently from the family institution itself. So, elemental logics should be decoupled from the societal-level institutions that they explain. As the correspondence between a given elemental logic and a given institution can vary over time and space, labelling an elementary logic based on the institution with which it is commonly associated in a given cultural setting might be misleading. I suggest that research should aim at identifying, describing, and labelling "elemental" institutional logics so that it becomes possible to tease out what is their relative weight in what has been labelled professional, corporate, family, or religious logics in the West, then in lower-level, field-level logics.

THEORY

Family, a fundamental, yet understudied institutional logic

The core idea of neo-institutional theory is that individuals and organizations need to legitimate their existence and their behavior to thrive in the social fields they are embedded in. Each field is defined by its boundaries; by specific practices, symbols, identities, values that are understood and accepted within these boundaries; and by a specific "logic" or set of logics that give sense to these field-level characteristics (Zietsma et al., 2017).

Although they are revealed materially and discursively (Jones, Boxenbaum, & Anthony, 2013; Reay & Jones, 2016), I conceive logics as purely immaterial and distinct from institutionalized practices or discourses (Mutch, 2018). For example, Rao et al. (2003) described the practices, identities, and discourse style of French "nouvelle cuisine". By contrast, institutional logics are "the rationality of the institution" (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 259): they are the *ways of thinking* that inform people's reflection on institutionalized boundaries, practices, symbols, identities, or values. Logics enable individuals or groups to justify (as well

as criticize) institutions when needed (Ocasio, Mauskapf, & Steele, 2016; Thornton et al., 2012). Different ways of thinking are perceived as explanatory in different fields. For example, the concepts of creativity and healthiness logically connect and explain all the features of "nouvelle cuisine" that distinguish it from classical French cuisine, which rather follows a logic of luxury and technical virtuosity.

Local, "niche" logics that justify the institutionalized features of specific social fields derive their own meaning from a small set of overarching logics that are pervading the entirety of society (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). The list of fundamental institutions and related logics is not well established but most authors agree that it includes family, religion, State, market economy, and professions (see table 1 – Boltanski and Thévenot 1991, Friedland and Alford 1991, Thornton et al. 2012, Weber 1946, 1978). Following Mutch (2018), I keep the word "institution" to distinguish these higher-level, pervasive, enduring fields and practices from more local, more transient, more quickly changing ones. Because they infuse the entire society, fundamental logics related to societal-level, enduring institutions are essential to understand institutional dynamics across levels of analysis (Nicolini et al., 2016).

Research on fundamental institutional logics relies on two pillars. First, seminal theorical work cited above that defined the concept of institutional logic and suggest a list of fundamental institutions and logics that are central in modern Western societies. Second, an empirical corpus that has been investigating the interplay of several institutional logics at the organizational or field level (Pache & Thornton, 2020). This empirical work on logics has nicely completed and actualized theorical accounts of modern Western institutions: professional, corporate, and State logics (e.g. Cappellaro et al. 2020, Perkmann et al. 2019, Reay and Hinings 2009, Smets et al. 2012); and documented the rise of two logics that did not appear in seminal work on logics: social and environmental logics (Pache & Santos, 2013; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010).

Comparatively, the logic of religion has attracted much less attention (Tracey, 2012; Yan, 2020; Zhao & Lounsbury, 2016). Similarly, little progress has been made on the family front from a logic perspective. Thornton and colleagues (2012) transcribe Weber's (1946, 1978) description of the family logic almost word-for-word, eighty years after it has first been written: family would be based on unconditional loyalty towards members of the family for the sake of family reputation, and intra-family relationships would be characterized by obedience to a powerful patriarch and competition for status in the family hierarchy (Thornton et al., 2012: 73). The only difference seems to be that Thornton et colleagues equate family to households, while Weber was describing extended families or lineages.

This theoretical account seems somehow outdated. As a matter of fact, both Weber (1978) and Boltanski & Thévenot (1991) cautiously introduced their – very similar – accounts of the family logic as an archetype of patriarchal lineages that were already no longer reflecting the European reality at the time they wrote. The fact that their work has not been updated is problematic because many empirical studies rely on a comparison of data with archetypes to identify and analyze logics (Reay & Jones, 2016). Relying too much on inappropriate accounts of the family logic makes researchers run the risk to miss the rationality of the family institution as it is instantiated in context (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Mutch, 2018).

The unsatisfactory description of family in classical references on institutional logics might explain why this perspective has not been used much to study the influence of family on business (Birley, Ng, & Godfrey, 1999; Sharma, Chrisman, & Gersick, 2012). Most family business researchers who referred to institutional logics were interested in the strength of the family institution rather than in its logic (e.g. Greenwood et al. 2010, Miller et al. 2017). Only a handful tried to empirically capture and describe the family logic (e.g. Bhappu 2000). These

Table 4: list of fundamental institutional orders (in bold) and associated logics or principles (in italics)

Thornton et al. 2012	***Boltanski & Thévenot 1991***	***Friedland et Alford 1991 (p.259)***	***Weber 1958***	***Weber 1946***	***Synthesis***
Family *Unconditional loyalty to patriarch*	**Domesticity** *Honor, preservation of social order*	**Family** *Unconditional loyalty to community members*	**Family** *Respect of seniority*	**Kinship** *Belonging*	**Family** *?*
Community *Trust, commitment*					
Religion *Faith*	**Inspiration** *Authenticity, originality*	**Religion** *Truth*	**Religion** *Faith*	**Intellectual** *(religious)* *Truth*	**Religion** *Faith and/or rightness (to gods, to oneself)*
				Aesthetic *Beauty*	
	Reputation *Celebrity, visibility*				
				Erotic *Pleasure*	

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="2">(bureaucratic, democratic) State
Participation/ domination, search for the common good</td><td>Civism
Equality, solidarity, dedication</td><td>Democracy
Participation and popular control through vote</td><td></td><td></td><td>?
Equality</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>State
Rationalization and regulation</td><td>(public) Bureaucracy
Rational efficiency, anonymity</td><td>Political
Power</td><td>Formal political organization
Efficiency, social order</td></tr>
<tr><td>Market
Profit (relative wealth)</td><td>Market
Competition, relative accumulation</td><td>Capitalism
Accumulation and commodification</td><td>Market
Profit</td><td>Economic
Wealth</td><td rowspan="2">Formal business organization
Efficiency and individual profit</td></tr>
<tr><td>(for-profit) Corporation
Size (absolute weath)</td><td></td><td></td><td>(private) Bureaucracy
Rational efficiency, anonymity</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Profession
Expertise, quality</td><td>(Technical and industrial) Expertise
Scientific truth, productive efficiency</td><td>Science
Truth</td><td>Profession
Expertise, ethics</td><td>Intellectual
(scientific)
Truth</td><td>Profession
Rightness (to truth, to rules)</td></tr>
</table>

justly pointed out that our understanding of the family logic needs to be refined for it to become a more useful tool (Zellweger et al., 2016). More importantly, Zellweger and colleagues (2016) expressed doubts that *a* family logic might be found to explain the family institution. Indeed, the monolithic, dated perspective of institutional theory on family and family logics seems at odds with the findings of family business and anthropological research.

The variability of family logics across time and space

Indeed, the outcome of three decades of family business research seem difficult to reconcile with the Weberian archetype of family relayed by literature on institutional logics. Family business researchers have observed that, today, the definition of family membership is malleable (Karra et al., 2006; Verver & Koning, 2018), that family altruism or loyalty are fragile and contingent (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011; Steier, 2003), and that, while family relationships are seen as hierarchical in some cultures, normative equality between relatives is key in others (Bewayo, 2009; Sam, 1998; Sharma & Manikutty, 2005; Wong, 1985). These findings do not match the Weberian description of family as a closed (vs. malleable), unconditional (vs. fragile and contingent), hierarchical (vs. equalitarian or altruistic) family. More generally, literature on family business is full of contradictory insights and assumptions regarding what the logic underlying family is, and how it influences organizations (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012). While it enables some organizations to thrive over decades (Sharma & Sharma, 2019), if not centuries (Bhappu, 2000), it can also precipitate the fall of promising ventures (Jaskiewicz, Heinrich, Rau, & Reay, 2016; Sam, 1998). It is likely, then, that the logic underlying family influence on organizations varies across cultural contexts (Stewart, 2003) and situations (Zellweger et al., 2016). There would not be one, but several family logics.

This idea is in line with the fact that more than one century of anthropological research on family institutions across cultures have not made possible to conclude what family

essentially is about. Anthropologists can recognize family when they see it, but they have a hard time agreeing on what family is in theory and *a priori* (Sahlins, 2011a, 2011b; Shapiro, 2014). Indeed, the family institution is universal but has always been characterized by a great variability across cultures (Holy, 1996; Morgan, 1871; Murdock, 1949). Moreover, the family institution evolves over time: the social revolution triggered by capitalism and industrialization have drastically changed family, first in Western countries, then in all parts of the world, without this global change to converge toward a unique type of family (Godelier, 2004). After having long looked for commonalities in "what participants in different cultural systems consider to be the basic essence of their conception of [family]", anthropologists thus seem to conclude that "there exists no 'one size fits all' interpretation of [family] that fully encompasses the rich range of understandings that have been described in the literature as basic to one or another [family] system" (Kronenfeld 2012, p. 679). In other words, it does not seem that a single logic can do justice to the variety of local instantiations of the family institution.

In fact, this is consistent with institutional theory that holds that the most fundamental and pervasive institutions also are the most diffuse, ambiguous, and fluid (Mutch, 2018; Scott, 2013; Weik, 2019). These institutions are usually declined into local instantiations that influence society and organizations in different ways depending on the cultural context (Greenwood et al., 2010). Family is such a diffuse and fluid institution. It thus seems presumptuous to describe *the* family logic; at best, it is possible to describe family at a given place and time, then to identify *a* logic that explains this instantiation of the family institution. The multiplication of such studies in a number of settings would provide firm, empirically grounded bases on which to build our global understanding of the family institution and its logics. It would be a useful complement to theoretical work on institutional logics, just like empirical studies on specific professions enriched our understanding of professions in general. To contribute to this accumulation of empirical knowledge, I tried to identify the logic

explaining the influence of family on business in contemporary Rwanda, for the reason explained below.

Identifying the family logic in context

Logics are immaterial emanations of culture that are "revealed through language, practices, and symbols" (Reay & Jones, 2016: 442). But they often are hidden: deeply institutionalized ideas are neither commonly talked about nor thought about (Harmon, Haack, & Roulet, 2019; Scott, 2013). It is only when taken-for-granted practices are interrupted or challenged – that is, when social actors need to protect or want to transform the way things are done – that logics emerge from under the surface: a cognitive and discursive process aiming at logically realign behavior, values, and symbols occurs, that can be observed (Cloutier & Langley, 2013; Harmon et al., 2015; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). In such instance, actors elaborate and express their ideas about the practices they follow or want to see adopted (Smets et al., 2012). In other words, institutional logics are expressed as lay theories – whether inculpatory or exculpatory – of the institution at hand. Although it is possible to study institutional logics in any context, it is thus more easily done in a context of institutional disruption, when social actors are conscious of the institution and are actively trying to make sense of it.

When it comes to family and other fundamental institutions, change generally unfolds slowly (Mutch, 2018), so it can go unnoticed until a revealing event happens that forces actors to make sense of the institution as it has become. In modern times, deep, societal-level institutional change has been characterized by the rise of State, then professional, market, and corporate logics at the expense of religious and family logics that previously dominated society (Meyer & Bromley, 2015; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Weber, 1978). Rising logics have attracted much more attention than the two latter, that used to be taken for granted and were thought to lose influence. That is probably the reason why institutional theorists have not been

able to easily actualize their description of the family logics: Weber or Boltanski & Thévenot were aware that the ancient family logic they were describing had been progressively fading away, but they lacked discursive elements on which to base a more updated description. Indeed, change in family had been smooth and continuous (Shorter, 1975) compared to the brutal economic and political changes that triggered tremendous amount of academic and non-academic writing aiming at understanding the modern and post-modern institutional order.

By contrast, in parts of the world that have been hit later by the wave of modernization triggered by the industrial revolution, family remained until recently or still remains one the core institutions of social life. Yet, even there, family has been challenged by the rise of new logics, as States and international organizations push for the alignment of local institutions with Western templates (Meyer, 2010) and globalization exposes people to the Western family model and its logic (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Social change triggered by the powerful influence of Western institutions is rapid. It likely triggers intense institutional work aiming at making sense of the traditional institutions whose role in social life is suddenly challenged. To identify what is the logic explaining family, and how this logic influences organizations, it would thus be easier to focus on these contexts characterized by such recent, rapid social change impacting the family institution and its place in society. In addition, focusing on a non-Western country would counter-balance the current Western bias of institutional theory and family business studies (George, Corbishley, et al., 2016; Sharma & Chua, 2013).

As explain in the general introduction, Rwanda precisely went through dramatic institutional change over the last century. Family remains central in Rwandans' lives, but the family institution is clearly under pressure due to the rise of State and market logics. That probably triggers reflection on the logics underlying family institution. Rwanda thus seems the perfect setting to collect an account of the family logic differing from the dominant perspective.

DATA ANALYSIS

As institutional logics were the sensitizing concepts (Charmaz, 2003) of this second study, I then focused on the explanation, evaluation, and justification interviewees gave of the institutions and events they described (Reay & Jones, 2016). Interestingly, while interviewees agreed on the main features of family in Rwanda, I observed a great variation in their interpretation of these features. Furthermore, interviewees often juxtaposed different, sometimes contradictory interpretations of family and its articulation with business. I was therefore unable to identify "a" family logic. I embraced this issue, and I mapped the various explanations, justifications, and evaluation of family and business practices, then went through a second round of coding focused on the way people related these various perspectives on family and business each with another. This second round of coding led to second order categories, more theoretical (Gioia et al., 2013). The result section below presents the outcome of this 2-round data analysis.

FINDINGS

The family institution in contemporary Rwanda

The Rwandan family institution was consistently described by interviewees. They first emphasized the collectivist dimension of family in Rwanda. People having lived in Western countries were particularly vocal about this dimension. According to an IT entrepreneur, "you, as a child, are a representation of your parents in society. […] The way I carry myself, the way I talk, represents my background, my family" (52-EfM3H). A consultant used almost the same words: "[if you misbehave] it does not look good on your family because […] you are representing the family. So for example [at weddings] I'm representing my mother and father and our branch of the family" (73- CoF3H). The IT entrepreneur's father further explained: "We are still much more related to the family than to the individual itself. […]" (56- EnM6H).

Collective identification goes hand in hand with a strong sense of common interest. In fact, family collectivism somehow extends to properties. For many Rwandans the boundary between individual and familial, private and business assets is blurred. The son of a successful entrepreneur seemed to equate individual and family property: "The company belongs to the family. To my parents. [researcher: 'to your family, or to your parents?'] Well, officially to my parents. But as I said, working for the family, it's like working for yourself. Well, it's a family company" (36-WfM2H). (56-EnM6H) explained more in details how he sees the relationship between legal and psychological ownership of the family business: "I'm the only shareholder. […] But [family members] benefit from it. When I make money, they make money too! Yes. It's not like in Europe! Here, we are conscious that the family belongs to everybody […]. [Family employees] are working like for themselves, because through me, benefits flow to the whole family, even those who do not work here". (57-EnM6H), legally sole owner of his business with his spouse as minority shareholder, had the same impression: "[Family employees] work well, because they are working for the family". This blurred boundary was confirmed by less happy accounts. (52-EfM3H) explained: "Say you've earned 100 000$, and you have a brother who is in office […], they will see the money coming in and they will be 'hey, this is our money'".

Family collectivism practically translates into constant flows of material resources that relatives exchange to cover the cost of children's education, housing, healthcare, and unhappy events. Family ceremonies also trigger important resource exchange. Weddings in particular are opportunities to display the socio-economic status and cohesion of the extended family, so all family members are called upon to give a hand in the organization and help cover the (significant) costs. They are organized well in advance during planning and fund-raising meetings gathering dozens of family members. Finally, relatives are expected to help each other

with connections, advice, money, and time to find jobs. These practices are common to virtually all families and are little, if ever, contested by interviewees.

A "head of the family" is somehow trusted with family well-being and oversees resource flows between family members. The head of the family is an elder male appointed for life by the previous role holder. According to informants, first sons generally succeed their fathers, but incumbents can choose any of their sons, younger brothers, and nephews – which was already in the case in the early 20th century (Adrianssens, 1954). Indeed, the role of the head of family today is a remain of his traditional role as steward of collective family assets, especially land. The son of a head of family made this connection clear: "In the past, the head of the family was the one who had, I would say, almost all the family property! So he influenced all the decisions to be made" (72-WfM3H). The wife of another one explained that her husband is "in charge of the [family] assets, especially real estate. It's not that it's his, but he is going to manage, to follow the properties" (84-EfF4H). This elder is also in charge of arbitrating conflict between family members. Finally, heads of family do not legally embody the family collective as it was the case in pre-colonial times, but they still represent the family during ceremonies, or when a family member enters in conflict with another family and asks for support. For example, a consultant recalled that, when the two partners of one of her client firms got into a fight and closed their business, the liquidation process was supervised by the heads of their respective families (34-CoF5H).

Below the dominant figure of the head of family, Rwandan families are characterized by a strict hierarchy based on age and gender. Generally, "the parent is gonna be a parent, and the child is gonna be a child. Even if I'm 55 and my dad is 80, I have to respect him, […] everything he tells is correct, everything he wants me to do I must do […]. In our culture, the young and the old never collide" (52-EfM3H). Similarly, in private life, men have precedence over women: "When we're at home, if we don't agree, you're the brother, I'm the sister. So you win"

(33-EnF2H). This latter point contrasts with the fact that Rwanda has been doing very well on gender equality in business and politics (Abbott & Malunda, 2016; Kagaba, 2015).

Tensions between the family institution and the logic of business

All these features of the family institution were rarely contested in principle by informants. But they were a source of concern and reflection for entrepreneurs. Indeed, they often are at odds with the logic of business. Most entrepreneurs I met were clearly making the point that they aimed for profit, and almost all were vocal about their desire to grow their company. They expressed a desire to plan for growth and, in particular, to save and accumulate capital to be able to invest. Many insisted that business relationships (including with employees) should be impersonal, although trustful relationships based on mutual interest. Within their firm, they wanted to establish a hierarchy of responsibility and wages based on employees' skills and merit rather than personal acquaintance or liking. So, Rwandan business principles clearly correspond to the description of formal business organizations in literature on logics: impersonal, efficiency-driven organization aiming at profit accumulation (see table 1 above).

My informants further believed that the family could draw on resources that the business logic would want to be saved and invested for growth. Indeed, in sub-Saharan Africa, family solidarity often cause scarce resources to leak out from entrepreneurial businesses to meet the needs of entrepreneurs' extended families (Grimm et al., 2017; Khayesi et al., 2014; Platteau, 2000). In Rwanda, "it's small amounts each month but in the end, it basically kills the business because [you] cannot invest in it. Many entrepreneurs I know faced a similar situation. There is always a sick relative whom you need actually to […] take care of and everybody [in the family] knows that you are the only one who can get access to money and sometimes you even take loans, and then you need time to pay back before you engage into something which is substantial [to grow your firm]" explained (12-EnM2H). For a business development

consultant, the mechanism was just as clear: “Families are very interconnected here, interdependent somehow. You can find some businesses go bankrupt because some family members are in trouble and [entrepreneurs] want to really give a hand” (47-CoM2H).

A common way to help relatives in need is to hire them, so that they receive a stable income, while they contribute to the business: “If I don’t hire him, I must help him anyway. So better he works, so that he can help himself!” said (57-EnM6H). However, hired relatives are not always as committed as entrepreneurs would like: “Some want to earn without doing anything!” (57-EnM6H). In addition, the hierarchy of age and gender interferes with impersonal business relationships and does not necessarily match the hierarchy of skills and merit that entrepreneurs wish in their business: “You can't just hold older people accountable […] It's inappropriate to ask your elder what's happening, where is the money” says (4- EnF2H). Although he is much higher in the hierarchy of gender and age, (87-EnM4S) confirms: “When one works with relatives older than oneself, that creates conflicts […]. You hire relatives older than you, and you cannot manage them. […] So my father, because he is even older, sometimes he helps me”. Furthermore, family hierarchy can directly mingle in business management, and particularly in hiring decisions. (45-EnF2H) told me how she had to hire an unproductive sister under family pressure. A consultant confirmed that this is extremely common: “Senior relatives can invest in your business. That’s where the issue begins! They ask for jobs for their children. […] Family investment comes with threat: if you don’t take my son, I pull out my investment”. Again, this issue is specific neither to Rwanda, nor to Africa (Au & Kwan, 2009).

On the other hand, family gives access to resources that are crucial to start and grow businesses. Relatives often provides start-up money and equipment, as well as housing and daily cash for the youngest entrepreneurs. In particular, family hierarchical structure enables to mobilize resources efficiently when one gains elders’ support. “Let's say your dad is the first

born[1] in the family, then definitely he will influence […] uncles and aunties to come in and help financially" explains (82-EnF2H). Family also is a pool of cheap, dedicated labor: "There is a lot of unemployment. […] So […] you can call on your sister, who can accept to work for minimum wages or can accept to work for a whole year without being paid, until money comes, and then you call on a brother, and progressively the business grows" explains (56-EnM6H).

On the whole, the issue for entrepreneurs is thus to put a limit to resource sharing and elders' influence to protect their business, without losing family support. From a more theoretical perspective, they need to draw a boundary between the field in which family practices will apply and the field where they will follow a business logic. They need to decide where this boundary will be and whether this boundary will be porous or impermeable (for example, whether they will hire relatives or not).

But whereas the logic of business is relatively clear, there seems to be no clear logical explanation of the family institution in Rwanda. As bemusedly written by a young Rwandan social scientist, "I do not know (1) why I still respect the uneducated brothers and uncles. Having a Ph.D. does not mean that I can contradict them. I do not know (2) why I still have to give money to my relatives even when they will not say thank you. As I grow older, I am doing it more and more. […] And I do not know (3) why I still have the responsibility to pay school fees of kids of my brother (and [to a lesser extend] for kids of my sisters). […] That is my personal and current situation […]. Hard to explain" (71- CoM2H). So, it is difficult for entrepreneurs to assess the cost-benefit balance of family influence in business. Pushed by the necessity to articulate family practices with the business logic, entrepreneurs engage in a meaning-making work aiming at identifying the family logic. Surprisingly, three different logics were commonly used by informants to explain the family institution: family is about

[1] Hence assumedly head of family

respect of a hierarchical order; about love and sharing; or about individual responsibility toward the collective. I present these three logics below.

Giving sense to the family institution: the three perspectives

Logic of hierarchical order. According to both ancient (Kagamé, 1954; Maquet, 1954) and recent (Newbury, 2009; Pontalti, 2018) literature, Rwandan family is essentially about hierarchy. This analysis reflects Weberian accounts of pre-modern lineages as following the logic of patriarchal domination (see tables 1&2). From this perspective, family is primarily a hierarchy based on the traditional, even "natural" order. The father of a young entrepreneur explained me that he does not fear his son to let him down in his old age, because "when you go see [your parents], you bring something to give. You don't go see your parents empty handed. It's an appreciation because they have carried you, they gave you life. You cannot be too thankful for that. […] You do give even if they don't ask" (42-EfM6S). Reciprocally, being a good son or daughter is rewarded as it gives access to material support and guidance from the elders (Pontalti, 2018). This way of thinking resonates with research showing that asymmetrical exchange relationships are often legitimized by the idea that one party once gave the other a resource so precious that it can never be compensated (Kopytoff, 1971; Warnier, 2009).

Because family hierarchy is grounded in the natural order of generations, "you cannot become head of the family as long as you have older brothers" (15-EnM3H). For sure, incapable sons can be dismissed, as was already the case in the past (Adrianssens, 1954). Incapacity can be physical or intellectual, but also moral: a first son who rebels against the head of the family is likely to be replaced in the line for succession by a more respectful junior (Pontalti, 2018). But first sons who do not contest the established order are normally designated as successor by the head of family. More generally, this logic means that hierarchy primarily ensues from birth order, hence is very rigid.

Table 5: alternative logics underlying family practices

	Accepted literature on institutional logics Thornton et al. (2012)	Logic of order/hierarchy	Logic of love/sharing	Logic of responsibility
Root Metaphor	Family as firm	Be a good, obedient child	Share as siblings	Be(come) a father
Sources of Identity	Family reputation	Family reputation	Family reputation	Family reputation
Basis of Norms	Membership in household	Respect of traditional order	Well-being of relatives	Collective achievement
Basis of Strategy	Increase in family honor	Maintenance of traditional order	Distribution of material resources	Development of moral and material resources
Motivation of resource exchange		Reward compliance	Share excess resources out of love	Enable and push relatives to express their potential
Condition of resource endowment		Birth order	Belonging to the family	Displaying potential to thrive and willingness to give back
Limit to help		Disobedience/disrespect	Non availability of resources	Irresponsibility, squandering
Role of head of family		Maintain family honor and values	Distribute resources according to needs	Build capacities, grow responsible adults

Source of Authority	Patriarchal domination	Seniority	Wealth and family orientation	Leadership skills and family orientation
Source of Legitimacy	Unconditional loyalty	Capacity to embody order	Capacity to provide	Capacity to bound and mobilize
Basis of Attention	Status in household	Conformity with expectations	Relative resource endowment	Skills and sense of responsibility
Sources of tension		Competition for succession	Reach of entitling ties, assessment of resource availability	Pressure to meet implicit expectations
Informal Control Mechanism	Family politics	Family politics	Peer pressure	Sense of responsibility

From a critical perspective (e.g. Maquet 1961), this logic is extremely exploitative, as it forces young people to comply with seniors' wishes under the threat of being deprived from essential family support. Honeyman (2016) and Pontalti (2018) recently described how access to family resources depends on juniors' compliance with elders' expectations. They showed how it constrains young Rwandans' life choices and success, as initiatives that do not fit with elders' expectations are taken as rebellion and sanctioned. Many young Rwandans indeed explained me that they suffered from the extremely hierarchical, rigid structure of society and

family: “[in Rwanda] it’s ‘respect your elder’, ‘don’t do that’, ‘don’t speak like this to [high ranking people]’… we respect titles” says (1-EnF2H); “People older than you they tend to control you” says (4-EnF2H). (52-EfM3H) explained how he had to comply with elders’ plans: “I always had to do what my parents wanted me to do, or society wanted me to do […]. Going in front of your dad and tell him: ‘hey, I’m going to do something which is different from what you want me to do or what you thought I should be doing’, then it becomes scary. And if you talk to the kids, you will find a lot of the same story, they got answered ‘what, you think you are big now, you think you know everything, why do you think your ideas are better’”.

So, when the logic of family is perceived to be respect for established order, family is seen as hindering innovation and discouraging venturing. (2-EnM3H) explains that families expect kids to follow well-known professional paths rather than explore: “You have to be an accountant, an electrician you know the traditional [professions]. So you don't tell your family that you're going to venture”. (1-EnF2H) is clearly critical of the Rwandan family institution, that he interprets mostly in terms of rigid hierarchy: “It’s really not possible to bloom when you always are the child somehow. […] As soon as you are born, I don’t know how but you are told that ‘it’s this way’. […] Uncles and aunts establish this law”. (68-EnM2S) complained too: “Creative people, entrepreneurs, if you talk to them, a lot of them will tell you ‘I wanted to be […] a musician, but I had to hide to even play an instrument at home, I had to hide to listen to music because my parents would get mad”. Those who are low in the family hierarchy are particularly constrained: “Not all parents would let their daughter go and do business […]. They don't believe in your dream” (82-EnF2H); “If you are the first in the family, and you want to start your business, […] they are most likely to support you. But if you are in the [younger siblings], and want to start a business, most likely they won't support you” (75-EnM2H).

In addition to discourage innovation and venturing, this interpretation of family increases the risk that family forces entrepreneurs to hire relatives against their will. (1-EnF2H) recalled

that "there is a younger cousin who needs a job, 'hire her'! There was not even a question about 'what will she bring [to the business]', […] it was my duty to have a salary for her, and she wouldn't do anything". The same happened to (45-EnF2H), who had to give a salary to a jobless sister although she knew this sister would not be a valuable employee. On the whole, the interpretation of the family institution in terms of rigid hierarchical order thus seems to severely contradict venturing, innovation, and skills-based management implied by the logic of business.

Finally, interpretation of the family institution in terms of order that emphasizes hierarchy and compliance triggers competition between family members to gain the goodwill of the head of family controlling resources. According to (50-EnM4S) "there is a lot of family jealousy […]. When you begin to have something, to be rich, family, instead of coming to support and grow with you, they begin to be jealous, and they start putting spokes in your wheels". (73-CoF3H) explained that Rwandan entrepreneurs indeed hesitate to partner with relatives because "there is a lot of... I don't know if I can call it competition or... jealousy? That's embedded in the culture. It's I think […] the fear to see a relative do better than you. […] It's competition for parents' preference. People strive for dominance among siblings and get land from the parents".

Logic of love. Strongly contrasting with this logic of hierarchical order, family is sometimes presented as a group where love is the cardinal value. "It's love really. […] And this love, you must give it back" said (29-WnM5H). Consequently, resources are expected to be shared unconditionally. If someone has resources – as it is the case for entrepreneurs who control business assets – all family members can expect to benefit. (52-EfM3H) explained: "[Relatives] feel like, if the company is making X amount of money, everybody has to get a percentage of the earnings". From this perspective, hierarchy does not matter much; instead, equal sharing between family members is expected: "[Relatives] say, if he has 10 millions, […] he should give me 5 […] we must share" (50-EnM4S); "they feel like 'hey, if I've made 100$,

we are going to split it equally'" (52-EfM3H). If people do not share, "family will say, 'oh, well well, you are egoïstic, you let your brother starve'" (57-EnM6H).

A young entrepreneur explained how this vision of family enabled him to raise resources from his extended family: "They are giving some cash, they are not really [buying] shares. […] When I mention that we are stuck […] because we don't have this or this, they say 'OK how much?' I just need to explain '[…] we need to travel from here to this community […]'. Maybe if I want 10 000 so if my parents can only get 5000 […] I go to my uncles and aunts […] And when we started […] we wanted […] laptops, phones… […] Some of my uncles had some devices at work or at home so, they shared them. We used them to work, to start" (41-EnM2H). Another had the same experience: "All the family members, when you go back, they will welcome you. A little cash, 2000, whatever" (75-EnM2H).

A much older entrepreneur goes more into the underlying logic when he explained: "Here in Africa, if you are a member of the family and you have anything, you must share with the whole family […] If you have some means, everybody arrives to your house. That's why we build large houses, everybody gathers around you!" (56-EnM6H). Another, much younger entrepreneur also said: "If I earn something, we share; if there are needs in my family, I say 'I can share this', it's not a issue […] My salary and my brothers', they are kind of shared anyway. If I don't have, I tell my little brother we need [to share] because for the moment I don't have" (87-EnM4S). An old man specified it's a logic of altruism, rather than a social obligation: "It's not an obligation to help, it comes from the heart" (42-EfM6S). In the end, the logic of sharing out of love seems to strengthen the collectivist dimension of Rwandan families.

It also seems to mitigate the hierarchical dimension. From this perspective, the head of family is seen as *primus inter pares* rather than as a dominant figure. He is expected to be the one who shares more, helps more. Hence, the wealthiest potential heir is logically appointed – rather than the oldest or more compliant. According to the son of a successful entrepreneur, his

father became head of family because "he had the material capacity to help the family […]. Because he controlled a business, he had means to help" (30-WfM3H). The head of another family had the same perspective: "Tradition is, you care for everybody. For example, I studied, in the family I'm the one having resources, so everybody runs after me, they come to see me, they bring issues, and I feel responsible to solve them. I pay school fees for a lot of young relatives […], if somebody is unemployed, I have to take care of it, if somebody is sick, he comes here to say he cannot afford it, I give him. […] That's maybe what determined why I have been designed as head of family […], I was the support of the family so [my parents] said, 'well, let's give him the responsibility, because he has the resources'" (56-EnM6H).

The drawback of this interpretation of family from a business perspective is that it seems to encourage passivity and opportunistic free-riding on solidarity norms: "You feel like you are entitled to things" (52-EfM3H). (87-EnM4S) complained that "[some of his brothers] see that it's compulsory that I help them. I say, I can help to look for a job, but I cannot give money for free, because even myself, when I earn something, I work for that". (51-WfM3H) emphasized how this sense of entitlement coming with the vision of family as altruistic, collectivist group made difficult to manage family employees: "They think [the business] is their own and they can do whatever they want". (50- EnM4S) also thought the logic of love made it impossible to manage family employees: "Often I tell people off. But family member, they are not afraid. Somebody else says 'if I steal, he will send me in jail', but family, they think 'if I take something, he cannot put me in jail […]. He loves us […]. He is our brother, even if we make mistakes, he's not going to put us in jail'". So, whereas the logic of order hinders innovation and venturing, and makes it difficult to manage senior relatives, the logic of love increases the tendency of business assets to leak out, especially when relatives are employed in the business.

Logic of responsibility. Family solidarity can also be interpreted in terms of individual responsibility to make the family collective thrive. From this perspective, everyone is

responsible to contribute according to one's abilities, but family support beyond basic needs is conditional to the ability of receivers to use them wisely. According to a Rwandan researcher in family science, "you support, according to possibilities, on the basis of the behavior of the person helped, of her commitment, of her projects. But not assistance. […] [To be supported] one must show one does one's part, that one puts help to good use. One must not have to take care of you. […] There is this idea that you help family, under the condition that the person shows drive, shows capacity to improve one's life. The objective really is that everybody gets the chance to have a 'good' life […]. Family members have an obligation of solidarity, of mutual support. But there is no obligation of sharing, of equal standards of living" (23-CoM6H). An entrepreneur was more direct: "Social standing, it's for you. Others, it's just survival. Give a bit of money to supplement food. [Keeping family] it's rare. […] They prefer to stay on their own anyway […]. 'Help me, but respect my independence'" (57-EnM6H).

Indeed, the "learn someone how to fish rather than give a fish" (25-EnF4S, 50-EnM4S) metaphor was often mentioned or referred to by Rwandans. A Western woman married to a Rwandan explained how it works: "[my husband's] sister kept asking for money […]. Then […] there was this woman closing a shoe store and he […] said: 'I'm buying you all these shoes and you start your own thing'. And […] it kind of failed for her, but she never asked again. This was like 'OK, he's done what he could'. […] Instead of someone always coming asking every week, […] you can do something that can make this person grow themselves. So that's why people do pay for school, even university, […] so that relatives can create their own lives; if someone has an idea for a business, we can also pay for that" (6-CoF3H).

Consistently, the head of family is not simply a provider sharing his wealth; his role is rather to foster and organize solidarity between independent, responsible family members. The head of a rather poor family explained: "Someone can forget the things of family. If there is a head of family, he can try to coordinate, to avoid people forget their relatives. […] I'm the head

of the family, I'm leading and the other help me. […] There are those I appointed for tax things, those to help my mother, […] if there are issues, I check that someone brings her to the hospital" (87-EnM4S). The son of a much wealthier one confirmed: "Let's say there is a member of the family who had the house destroyed by the rain. […] The elder will […] make family members know what happened, and then it works like a fundraising thing. If you can afford to buy, let's say, three bags of rice […], the other persons will say 'I will give them the oil they need to cook', 'I will give them the tools for the house', 'the corrugated iron for the roof'. […] Or even he would appoint someone who knows well the people who got the house destroyed and tell him to make sure the family does what needs to be done" (36-WfM2H). In short, "it's not that [the head of the family] must take everything in charge! But centralize needs, organize, inform… Then people can take their responsibilities" said an elderly woman (61-EfF6H).

For such collective mobilization to be possible, family members must feel responsible toward each other, but also have enough resources to help each other. That is the role of the head of family to maintain and develop these two family assets. Like a father for his children, he is expected to "make people grow" (29-WnM5H), i.e. push them to become able and willing to contribute to family solidarity. A young entrepreneur explained how his grand-uncle allocates resources: "One can give money to anybody, but it's not everybody who is going to succeed. So he tries to look at everybody, if they use advice wisely, if you are openminded, if you see things beyond your own life… if you look forward for the family […]. If you are going this way, then it's easy for him to finance you" (69-WfM3S). A head of the family explained how he guides and educates his relatives: "[one of my brothers] is older but […] sometimes I see he is not looking forward […]. So I give him a speech, because he is like my little brother […] I tell him he should grow" (87-EnM4S). The employee of a family business praises his boss: "He is like a father to everybody […] He does not want you to stay small, he pushes you, he makes you grow up" (29-WnM5H). On the whole, the role of a good head of family is to

"build capacities. That's it, in the way that, everyone sees the possibility to help your brothers, your sisters, see? There is a sense of responsibility for everyone to help. You can't just sit there, waiting for the chief to… no, if there is a chief of the family who is doing the job well, if I can say, he doesn't make everything, he lets people see that, 'OK I can take my responsibilities'" (69-WfM3S).

Ultimately, the family hierarchy reflects ability and willingness to contribute, rather than birth order or wealth. According to the logic of responsibility, seniors' authority comes from the fact that older people are normally more advanced in life, wealth, and maturity than their juniors: "Parents used to die early in the old times, so older sisters and brothers often took care of the young ones" explained (63-CoF4H). But birth order is not what fundamentally matters. The case of a family where the second son was elected as future head of family by his siblings is illustrative. A younger brother explained: "[the future head] is not the first born. [My dad] said we [siblings] had to sit and like, vote, for who we think can be the next leader. Then, all the votes go to [the future head] […]". The reason is that the head-elect had already shown his capacity to solve family conflict among cousins: "He knew everything that was going in this family, so […] when the conflict had raised, then they called him to come, […] I'm not sure how he managed that, but later on we had a good feedback that it worked well. […] That's why we trust him. […] If he has done that in other families, he can also do that in our family". Similarly, the older brother of a head of family recalled when his younger brother progressively emerged as a leader: "[he] always cared for family. […] Once he fired a brother [from his business]. But he explained well to the family. We know he has the interest of family in his heart, so we trust him. […] We knew it was in the interest of family. That's about this time that I thought he would be a good head of family" (88-EfM6H).

This interpretation of family hierarchy apparently triggers much less jealousy between relatives than the logic of order. "People don't like it […] It's too much responsibilities. You

cannot be somebody who lets go, you must always think about the whole family. You are somebody important, who shows the values, you have to do everything for the family to stay strong, for people to stick together […]. But it's family receiving the benefits, it's not the person. It's a big responsibility and there are no benefits" explained (69-WfM3S), nephew of a head of family. Anyway, a responsible head of family would not let conflict between potential heirs endanger family cohesion: "In other families, there are conflict over land and other family issues that can happen […] but it does not exist here, it's well structured, well organized" (69-WfM3S). In another family, (77-WfM2H) is confident as well: "When the head of family dies, for some families there is what we call a conflict. For fortune, you see? […] I think his [the head of family] main role is for organizing all those things […]. [In our family] nothing could happen because we have already set what will happen latter on": the current head already asked his children to choose the future leader of the family, and has been involving them and their first degree cousins in the preparation of his testament.

In the end, for entrepreneurs who see family in terms of responsibility, family would benefit business. (56-EnM6H), entrepreneur and head of family, clearly says that "for a family business to work, everybody must be solidary, everybody must be made responsible […] Every employee, family member or not, must feel responsible for all the others. […] If people don't behave responsibly, they must be sanctioned, fired". (69-WfM3S) expressed the same idea: "When a head of family does the job well […] people will see that, 'OK, I take my responsibilities', and it benefits business too. […] [Family employees] feel they need to do well, that if I do my job well it's my child who grows, it's my son-in-law, it's everybody". So, the logic of responsibility seems to be compatible with, even beneficial to business.

Contradictions between the three logics. Three different logics can thus explain the family institution. It is important to note that each logic leads to a different interpretation of consensual family practices such as mutual support or respect for hierarchy. In some cases,

following different logic can even lead to very different outcomes. The three ways to explain the family institution are thus not just different ways of speaking about family; they are three different, sometimes contradictory ways of thinking and consequently living the family. Furthermore, none really reflects the logic of family described by literature on institutional logics, although the logic of hierarchical order is relatively close to what transpires from extant theory (see table 2 above).

For example, a loving and sharing logic makes people expect that richer relatives' share their wealth so that poorer relatives equal their standards of living: they would share the business proceeds; they would host them in their house: "If you have some means, everybody arrives to your house. That's why we build large houses, everybody gathers around you!" (56-EnM6H). By contrast, according to a logic of hierarchical order or to a logic of responsibility, "[keeping family] it's rare. They prefer to stay on their own anyway". Sharing stops when family members have a decent life ("Social status, it's for you; the others, it's just survival"); or have the means to build a decent life on their own ("Learn people how to fish, rather than give them a fish everyday"). Additional support is conditional: it is based on rank in the family hierarchy and compliance with elders' expectations; or depends on the perceived ability of the recipient to use resources wisely for the family, respectively.

Similarly, who becomes head depends on the logic. Whereas age is the main explanatory variable following a logic of hierarchical order, age is merely correlated with the explanatory variable of the other logics: if the role of the head of family is primarily to share and distribute, the main variable is wealth; if the role of the head of family is primarily to "build capacity", the main variable is leadership skills. Different logics determine different lines of succession.

The coexistence of three logics thus introduce institutional complexity within the family institution (Greenwood et al., 2011). This intra-institutional complexity is added to the complexity to articulate business and family logic. For example, I met a successful, also very

family-oriented entrepreneur that did a lot for his relatives, including by hiring many of them, but was not the official head of his family. He said that he constantly needed the head's "permission" to help or coordinate family. A younger entrepreneur – not from the same family – explained how careful rich, family-oriented people who are not officially heads of their family must be when some family members consider them as the de facto head of family. "Sometimes when [the head of family is not the richest], there can be crushing things […] between the head of the family and [the one] who is becoming more successful. The one becoming more successful, most people will go directly to him before they go to the elder one[2], then the elder one will feel left out, which starts to be a war, family war… […] Let say, somebody comes ask for the help of the successful one, he needs to just call the elder one, say 'OK this person and this person came through, asking for help, I'm thinking of doing that and that, what do you think' […]. I think it's a matter of communication […]. It's a matter of… ego? […] The head of the family would feel disrespected actually. And it's even more hard for him to go ask for the help of the other one (laugh)!" (36-WfM2H).

The difference between the three logics has direct consequences for the articulation of business and family. Venturing, growth, innovation are particularly at odds with the hierarchical logic. This logic also makes almost impossible for entrepreneurs to manage family members that are higher than them in the family hierarchy. On the other hand, the logic of sharing seems to contradict the logic of accumulation and investment, as it does not put limits to sharing expectations; when family members are hired, this logic even encourages the misappropriation of business assets seen as collective, up-for-grabs family assets. Consequently, entrepreneurs who describe family in terms characteristic of the hierarchical or sharing logics often want to strictly separate business from family. For them, the logic of family is contradictory with the logic of business. On the contrary, entrepreneurs who see family as an institution where

[2] Literal translation for the Kinyarwanda expression meaning "head of family"

individuals take their responsibilities for collective interest see family as rather compatible or even clearly beneficial to business. Entrepreneurs who interpret the family institution in terms of responsibility are thus likely to preferentially hire family members.

Struggle over logics in entrepreneurs' families

The three logics coexist not only in society, but also within families, as relatives disagree about each other's behavior, claims, or expectations. There thus is a gnawing struggle in Rwanda about the meaning of institutionalized family practices, and the way the various features of the family institution should be enacted. Tensions about the family hierarchy are particularly common. They often transpire through sentences such as "who do you think you are" (72-WfM3H) or "you need to know your place" (51-WfM3H). Not knowing one's place, one's rank in the hierarchy, is frowned upon, but what is one's place, one's rank, varies depending on which logic people have in mind.

Entrepreneurs are particularly engaged in these struggles considering the influence of family logics on business. Entrepreneurs refusing to help or even sanctioning relatives who do not behave "responsibly" face protests: "There'll be some relatives that will support you, and other will think you are just selfish and self-centered" (82-EnF2H). Conflict often arise, that must be settled by the family collective: "At the end of the day it's family. You have to sit and talk to one another" says (51-WfM3H).

The head of family has a specific role in arbitrating conflict: "It's [his] responsibility to come and calm the situation down" (51-WfM3H). Heads of families control which claims to family solidarity are fair and which are abusive. (57-EnM6H), rich entrepreneur, explained: "It always goes through the head of family […] It's not like everybody comes […] 'eh, I'm going to X to enjoy', no […] it's the head of family who says 'there is a kid here who needs help, […] do what is needed' and I do".

Who is the head of family, and which logic he follows is thus key. But entrepreneurs have the opportunity to plead their cause. “In my wife’s family, there is this old guy who solves the problems of others. And every time he intervenes, he comes to me, ‘listen, what happened, I have heard this and that…’, so you explain your point of view, he takes a decision” (66-EnM6H). (45-EnF2H) has a similar story: having hired a sister under family pressure, she made the head of family come to Kigali to “show my reality”, i.e. have the head witness that the sister did not show up at work. She was then authorized to fire the lazy sister. (50-EnM4S) also pro-actively called on family hierarchy: “I called […] the wise people of the family. It’s stronger than the courts! I called the little brother of my father[3], with him I called my paternal aunt and seven others. Then, I said “look, this is my brother. I hired him, he stole me [inventory] […]. I wanted you to know that I fired him for one year. […]. Then [the brother] comes and wants to ask forgiveness. The head of the family said, ‘no, we need something written. That you will not work for one year, and you will not steal again’”.

As explained in the theory section, logics are elaborated mostly when practices are problematic (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991; Reay & Hinings, 2009), so heads of family do not necessarily have a logic in mind before conflict arises. Consequently, entrepreneurs can not only elaborate their logical interpretation of family practices, but also lobby their relatives and diffuse their interpretation in the family. This is time and energy consuming though: “It's very easy to solve the conflict, but in some of the ways you lose time and some money” says (47-CoM2H). “It's a long time […]. [When you are an entrepreneur] it's difficult to find time for all that” (12-EnM2H).

Yet, this can be worth the time, as shown by the example of older entrepreneurs. For example, (52-EfM3H)’s sons recalled that there had been conflict between their father and his brothers: “When he started at the beginning […] his brothers were working with him and they

[3] The head of his family

were not even educated. […] They felt like, if the company is making X amount of money, everybody has to get a percentage of the earnings" (52-EfM3H); "They would like to have money from him like, give me 10 million Rwandan francs, like for what, why should I give you […]" (51-WfM3H). (50-EnM4S) is very proud of having overcome the same kind of issues in his family. Both (50-EnM4S) and (52-EfM3H) not only protected their business assets but took this as an opportunity to gain status in the family by showing their mastery of the family institution and their commitment to it. (52-EfM3H) ultimately became head of family. His older brother admits that an episode of conflict was key in (52-EfM3H) supplanting him as heir: "He explained well to the family. […] He knows how to speak. […] So, nobody was offended […]. That's about this time that I thought he would be a good head of family" (88-EfM6H). (52-EfM3H) will likely become head of his family after his older half-brother.

Indeed, entrepreneurs who play the game of family institutions get opportunities to display their social and discursive skills to elders, which increases their chances to be appointed as heir. If the current head has a rather hierarchical perspective, he can be seduced by an entrepreneur who calls to him as arbiter, as it respects the tradition. If the current head has a responsibility perspective, he can be seduced by an entrepreneur who is able and willing to manage family relationships. Either way, "in the Rwandan culture the ability to speak well and cleverly and to play with words is held very highly […] Any elder male in the family who has this ability to speak well is generally the one who is [chosen as head]" (63-CoF4H). This is a neat case of the importance of intra-field rhetoric in institutional dynamics (Harmon et al., 2015).

When they manage to become heads of their families, successful entrepreneurs can continue to push their interpretation of family forward. (50-EnM4S), currently first in the line of succession, explains how he encourages junior relatives so see family solidarity in terms of responsibility: "I take a child, I paid her school fees, […] the kid graduated, I made sure she founds a job, then I said, 'see, I paid you, you studied, you were hired, now you must help

family. […] Not in your household but at this uncle's, at the younger brother of your cousin… That's how I work". (52-EfM3H) explained that he promotes a mindset of responsibility both among his employees and among his relatives. (69-WfM3S) explained that his uncle made sure that "everyone sees the possibility to help your brothers, your sisters. There is a sense of responsibility among everyone to help".

So, on the whole, entrepreneurs facing practical issues related to the influence of family institutions on their business activities seem to find a way to reconcile family with business if they interpret the family institution according to a logic of responsibility. However, other interpretations of the family institution are contradictory or incompatible with business. To protect their business from the drawbacks of the family institution, some entrepreneurs consequently promote the logic of responsibility in their families by engaging with hierarchy and traditional conflict resolution procedures. Doing so, they often gain influence in their families – older entrepreneurs I interviewed were all heads of their family or first in the line of succession – and increase their chances to turn Rwandan family institutions to their advantage.

DISCUSSION

Logic complexity and institutional change

The logic struggle that I observed in Rwandan families might merely be an example of temporary institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) related to modernization. The logic of sharing out of love expressed by my informants could be the transcription in the Rwandan context of the logic that is said to govern relations between the members of Western, modern nuclear families (Padilla et al., 2007). From this perspective, family would be an issue field (Zietsma et al., 2017) where the traditional logic of order informing the traditional, hierarchical extended family would be challenged by a logic of sharing out of love more

common in modern families centered on nuclear families (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Weber, 1978).

Indeed, several of my young informants did not feel very concerned by the hierarchical structure of their extended family. For example, “there used to be the things like your dad your uncles blablabla they all come together and it's huge with the head of the family etc. but I don't think it exists anymore. […] If there is a wedding then yes but it does not change your life. […] Today, the dad is the head of the family” (75-EnM2H). Older informants are aware of this evolution: “[My son] does not even try to know about distant family members. We are getting Europeanized” said (57-EnM6H). According to academic experts of the Rwandan family, modernization has indeed been weakening family ties, especially in rich families whose members do not depend on each other for survival. An older man confirmed: “Rich people have health insurances now. Family is not a security net anymore” (67-EnM6H).

However, this interpretation would not explain the difference between the logic of order and the logic of responsibility, as both give a great importance to extended family and to family hierarchy while being distinct. Moreover, the interpretation of family hierarchy was already ambiguous in the mid-20th century: while most research on Rwandan traditional society emphasized the authoritative dimension of social structures and family in particular (Kagamé, 1954; Maquet, 1954), Adrianssens (1954) was seeing heads of family as steward of family in charge of educating and coordinating family members rather than ruling them.

One can also note that the logic of responsibility conditions what one receives from family to the efforts one makes to improve ones’ life and to one’s capacity to contribute to the family collective. In addition, it aligns family hierarchy with a differential in social skills and commitment to family. These principles are similar to the logic of proportionality between retribution and contribution characteristic of paid labor, hence close to the logic of business. As a matter of fact, entrepreneurs who see family this way consider family and business to be

compatible So, it might be that the interpretation of family practices in terms of responsibility signals that the business logic has been infusing the family institution.

Yet, entrepreneurs following a responsibility logic are not subsuming family to economic interests. On the contrary, they tend to see business as a means to develop and grow family as agriculture once was, comforting Adrianssens (1954) analysis: "In the past, when the family had large fields, everybody would work together" (52-EfM3H). Furthermore, most entrepreneurs that interpret family institution in terms of responsibility managed to simultaneously gain status in their family and build successful family businesses; as a consequence, their junior relatives seem much more attached to the family institution than people from the same generation. By contrast, entrepreneurs who see family as a rigid hierarchy based on seniority and compliance; or as a sharing group; tend to be critical about the family institution and take distance from their families to protect their business. On the whole, the logic of responsibility thus seems to be a persistent, strong family logic that remains independent or even infuses the field of business, rather than being an interpretation of the family institution influenced by the logic of business.

On the whole, I thus think that considering the three ways to give meaning to the family institution as three different logics is a more parsimonious and more robust interpretation of the data than considering that they are hybrids of the family logic with other logics coming from other fields, whether the Western family or the market economy. I consequently believe that the Rwandan family institution is not attached to a specific family logic. This has important implications that I discuss below.

The disconnect between family as fundamental institution and explanatory logics

Interestingly, none of the logics described by my informants rules alone in any given family. Some informants are not even always consistent in their interpretation of the family institution, alternating references to love and sharing with one of the two other logics. This is

in line with Yan's (2020) description of another fundamental logic, religion, as composed of "multiple interdependent dimensions […] that can interact in different ways with other societal logics". In the case of Rwandan family, the hierarchy, love, and responsibility dimensions of the family institution are latent; they become more or less salient as entrepreneurs make sense of the business/family boundary. "The" Rwandan family logic, if it exists, thus seems to be a blend of responsibility, hierarchy, and love, rather than any of the three. But what are these latent dimensions, theoretically speaking?

The three logics I identified in Rwandan families are not restricted to family, nor to Rwanda. The logic of responsibility pushes individuals to commit to collective interests, which favors families but also firms. Similarly, the logic of hierarchical order can certainly be found outside family, including in business: corporate logics can be said to be a blend of market and hierarchical logics (Williamson, 1985). The logic of sharing out of love is typical of household relationships but can be found in friendship, extra-familial romantic ties or religious communities as well (Bell & Coleman, 1999; Sahlins, 1972; Shorter, 1975). As discussed above, the logic of responsibility might be related to balance between contribution and retribution associated with job markets and market in general. These different logics are in fact pervasive, across cultures and institutions. Not only can a single institution (Rwandan family today) be explained by different logics, but a single logic can explain different institutions.

So, the list of fundamental institutions does not necessarily correspond one-for-one with a set of fundamental institutional logics (market with market logic, family with family logic, etc.). Labelling pervasive logics with the name of one institution – for example, a logic of family – hides the fact that a logic of love is not necessarily a family logic, just as a family logic is not necessarily a logic of love. Moreover, it is unlikely that family, religion, or friendship can be reduced to love. Similarly, the State and the corporate logics as described in the literature share a hierarchical dimension aiming at organizing efficiently, either for the sake of individual profit,

or of social order. The logic of proportional retribution is typical of the market economy, but can also inform reciprocal give-and-take (Uzzi, 1997) or vengeance (Gould, 2000).

Moreover, as what is happening in modern Rwandan families and businesses shows, which logic explains which institution can vary over time. Various authors (Harmon et al., 2015; Mutch, 2018) wondered whether the persistence of some institutional fields across centuries really corresponds to institutional stability, when one considers how different the "same" institution is a few centuries or millennia apart. When one releases the assumption of one-to-one correspondence between fundamental institutional logics and fundamental institutions, it becomes easier to conceive that an institution such as family can persist, while its logic as well as its boundaries vary drastically: the container and its label can remain, while its size and content changes. Variation in boundaries and logical content would depend on the appearance and disappearance of new fields around. Modern Western families certainly do not follow the same logic as Western families of the 17th century or of the Antiquity, because in the meantime States disappeared and were reinvented, market economy failed and rose again, religion changed… For the same reasons, contemporary Western families do not necessarily follow the same logic as contemporary Rwandan or Japanese families.

Consequently, families certainly do not interact with business, religion, or States the same way across contexts (Greenwood et al., 2010). in some cases, family can be at odds with another field, while in other cases it can follow a similar logic and reinforce or even merge with this field, as when the economy was mostly organized at a familial scale. This does not mean that the economy follows a family logic, nor the reverse; but that in some contexts both family and the economy follow the same fundamental logic; whereas in other contexts, they follow a different logic and are considered separate institutions. Also, when a given society is dominated by a logic, all the institutions of this society, including the most fundamental like family, market, or State, are likely to be imbued with this logic (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015). In societies

dominated by market logics, family and religion alike are likely to come closer to this logic: parents would retribute children' housework with pocket money rather than take it for granted; priests would trade indulgence to sinners...

So, as suggested by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), logics can in principle be used in any social field even if each is more or less legitimate in different fields. These logics are deeply institutionalized ways of thinking about institutions in general, not about one institution in particular; they should be understood as basic grammatical elements that can be combined to reflect on any institutionalized practices. It follows that the social fields that have been presented as fundamental institutions – family, State, religion, market etc. – might not be as fundamental as logics, since they change over time. Their emergence and maintenance depend on how actors use elemental logics to think about the institutions of their time.

Consequently, institutional scholars should aim at identifying, describing, and labelling elemental logics. This will not be easy, as elemental logics are likely to be even more taken for granted than fundamental institutions. Based on my study of the Rwandan family institution, love, hierarchy, and fair contribution/retribution are three potential candidates to the list of "elemental institutional logics". Interestingly, this resonates with other works highlighting the diversity of family. For example, Todd (1999) distinguished "vertical" from "equalitarian" family systems, which corresponds somehow to the logics of hierarchical order vs. sharing. Todd claimed that this distinction is instrumental in explaining societal-level long term economic and political development. At a lower level of analysis, Todd's typology has been successfully used to explain family business behavior (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005). Also, the way some of my informants contrasted the limits of mutual help expectation in Rwanda vs. other sub-Saharan African countries reminds of Bayart's (1994) work, which showed that cultural differences in how much wealth and status inequality between relatives is accepted or even expected has an impact on the capacity of African entrepreneurs to accumulate capital.

The three logics I identified in Rwandan families also resonate with Fiske's (1991) typology of elementary forms of social exchange: communal sharing; authority ranking; equality matching; and market pricing. The logic of sharing obviously fits with communal sharing, while the logic of order might correspond to exchange based on authority ranking. The logic of responsibility however does not seem to fit with any of the norms described by Fiske.

A rapid analysis of extant literature on logics also gives some hints at which dimensions of what are for now presented as societal-level logics could be elemental (see table 1). For example, the logic of the for-profit corporation can be split into two components, market exchange and rational, mechanical-like efficiency. The former is certainly elemental and corresponds to Fiske's market pricing. The latter is characteristic of formal organizations; it can be combined with a logic of order and domination to give the logic of States. Blending this hybrid State logic with the elemental logic of equality found in Fiske and Todd leads to the – already very complex – logic of democratic State. Likewise, the logic of religion is certainly not elemental. It probably has a universal component that could be labeled as authenticity, truth, or rightness. That elemental logic whose implementation depends on subjective believes in what is right or true can be found in science as well as in religion, art, professional ethics, or honor codes. Each specific religion, however, would blend this element with others: for example, with love, with order and domination, or both. That would explain the variety of influence that different religious denominations have on organizations (Yan, 2020). Even the logic of market economy could be split into more fundamental components: on the one hand, a logic of accumulation; on the other, a logic of negotiated exchange corresponding to what Fiske calls "market pricing", that distinguishes market capitalism from violent capture of resources.

This theoretical discussion shows that a lot of work needs to be done to identify the elemental institutional logics on which people build their understanding of institutions. Considering that logics are principally elaborated in times of disruption, confrontation, or

merely disagreement, empirical work would benefit from bringing in the various theories of exchange (Fiske, 1991), conflict resolution (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991), and organization (Williamson, 1975) to shed light on institutions and their justification.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I presented qualitative data collected in Rwanda on how the logic of deeply institutionalized, taken-for-granted family practices is elaborated when they are challenged by the logic of business. I showed that the logical meaning of family structures and practices was ambiguous and debated, so that it was difficult, if not impossible, to identify one family logic. I concluded that, in Rwanda, the family institution is not attached to a single institutional logic. I suggested that this is certainly the case for other fundamental, taken-for-granted institutions, and that institutional scholars should stop assuming there is one single, fundamental institutional logic associated with each fundamental institution of society. Instead, there would be elemental institutional logics that would be even more deeply institutionalized than societal-level institutions such as family, religion, or the State. The correspondence at a given point in time and space of one elemental logic with one societal-level institution would be contingent to the historical evolution of societies. I urged to look for the list and description of elemental institutional logics that are the building-block of societal-level as well as lower level logics. I identified social exchange theory, and specifically Fiske's typology of norms of social exchange, as interesting to look at to identify elemental institutional logics. In the rest of this dissertation, I will consequently try to understand how various norms of exchange – that can be considered as different logics – can influence entrepreneurship.

WHAT DO FAVORS COST? ON THE DIVERSITY OF NORMS OF SOCIAL EXCHANGE AND THEIR EFFECTS ON ENTREPRENEURIAL RESOURCE ACQUISITION

Summary

The previous chapter indicates that fundamental institutional logics might influence the relationship between founder-owned businesses and entrepreneurs' families. It seems that this influence is related to the way entrepreneurs and their relative balance resource flows between the family and the business. Building on this observation, I remember that entrepreneurs commonly leverage their social networks to acquire the resources they need to start-up, and often depend on "favors" provided by benevolent supporters. Yet the mechanisms underlying variations in entrepreneurial resource acquisition through networks are poorly understood, and important differences in business outcomes remain unexplained. Rather than taking a structural perspective to social exchange in networks, I examine these mechanisms and outcomes by focusing on the normative dimension of social relationships through which resources flow. Building on Fiske's typology of forms of social exchange, I suggest that each type of social relationship determines different reciprocal obligations for exchange partners, which imply different exchange conditions and, ultimately, different outcomes. I explain when each form of social exchange is likely to play out in entrepreneurs' networks and offer propositions regarding their effects on resource acquisition and the development of entrepreneurial ventures.

INTRODUCTION

Research has long shown the importance of social networks for entrepreneurs seeking start-up resources (Birley, 1986; Clough, Fang, Vissa, & Wu, 2019; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Zimmer & Aldrich, 1987). We know that the effectiveness of entrepreneurial resource acquisition depends on the position entrepreneurs occupy in their network and on structural network features, such as size, density, composition, or closure (Arregle et al., 2015; Burt, 2019; Shane & Cable, 2002; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). We also know that non-structural variables matter. Entrepreneurs' ability to build narratives and manage relationships influences whether and how much resources they can obtain from their supporters (Hite, 2005; Huang & Knight, 2017; Zott & Huy, 2007). Moreover, research on entrepreneurial finance has shown that contingency-based contracts facilitate resource acquisition by mitigating uncertainty (Gompers, 1995; Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan, & Strebulaev, 2020; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). But we lack a general understanding of how non-structural features of social networks influence resource acquisition, given a network structure.

The relational dimension of networks seems crucial: entrepreneurs often receive resources under preferential conditions from people they have good relations with, including from people acting on behalf of organizations (Bygrave & Bosma, 2011; Starr & MacMillan, 1990). Resources received can then be considered "favors" – "acts of kindness beyond what is due or usual" (*Oxford English Dictionary*, 1989). Entrepreneurship scholars often assume such "favors" come from altruism or love (Klyver, Lindsay, Suleiman, & Hancock, 2017; Maula, Autio, & Arenius, 2005; Riding, 2008). Yet "favors" can convey expectations of benefit from future profit, reciprocal favors, or influence over entrepreneurs' future decisions (Khavul et al., 2009; Starr & MacMillan, 1990; Steier, 2003). These expectations sometimes are so burdensome that they lead entrepreneurs to refuse resources (Au & Kwan, 2009; Birtch, Au, Chiang, & Hofman, 2018; Steier, 2009; Webb, Morris, & Pillay, 2013). These costly

expectations determine whether entrepreneurial networks characterized by similar structural properties translate into valuable inflows of resources (Khayesi et al., 2014; Xiao & Tsui, 2007), but we do not know how to predict them (Clough et al., 2019; Gedajlovic, Honig, Moore, Payne, & Wright, 2013; Hoang & Yi, 2015; Kotha & George, 2012).

A better understanding of these mechanisms is greatly needed: from Indian neighborhoods to American start-up hubs, from Chinese villages to African cities, nascent ventures primarily depend on resources provided as favors by "friends, family, and fools" (Au & Kwan, 2009; Edelman et al., 2016; Gras & Nason, 2015; Khayesi et al., 2014). Investors such as banks, venture capital funds, or professional business angels only get involved at later venture stages (Mason, 2006; Paul, Whittam, & Wyper, 2007), if at all (Aldrich & Ruef, 2018). As a result, the value of resources acquired from informal supporters would be threefold what is invested by professional business angels, and sixfold what is invested by venture capital companies (Riding, 2008); it could represent up to 1,1% of the world's GDP – without accounting for intangible resources such as information, advice, or emotional support (Bygrave & Bosma, 2011).

This chapter aims to better explain resource acquisition through social networks by answering several questions. First, from which potential supporters can entrepreneurs expect to receive favors? Second, what do supporters expect in return for their favors, and how do these expectations influence whether or not entrepreneurs seek or accept their support? Third, how do the hidden costs that come with supporters' expectations influence venture development?

To answer these questions, I shift my attention from the structural dimension of social networks to the norms that govern the ties of which networks are composed. Inspired by social exchange theory (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Emerson, 1976), I explain that what can be considered as a "favor" at time T is in fact embedded in a series of exchange that must be considered in its entirety, in the long term. I note that these series of exchange are influenced,

loaded by social norms that prescribe specific exchange conditions for each type of relationship. The normative load of social ties is independent of network patterns and tie strength. I consequently propose that *conditions of resource acquisition depend on the norms governing the social ties that link entrepreneurs to their potential supporters.* More specifically, I build on Fiske's (1991, 1992) typology of forms of exchange – communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. I suggest when exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is likely to be informed by each of these norms. I then develop propositions about how these forms of exchange condition resource acquisition not only from informal supporters, but also from professional supporters to whom entrepreneurs are personally connected (Starr & MacMillan, 1990; Uzzi, 1999). Finally, I examine the returns supporters expect based on the form of exchange and how these expectations influence entrepreneurial ventures.

Adopting a social exchange perspective toward entrepreneurial resource acquisition enables us to make two important contributions. First, I draw attention to the diversity of norms of exchange operating at the dyad level, which mediate the effect of network structures on entrepreneurial resource acquisition. Second, I suggest a robust classification of the immense array of normative social relationships existing across cultural contexts. This enables us to go beyond "lay" categorizations such as "fool, family, and friend vs. professional investors" or "informal vs. formal supporters," which hide very heterogeneous sets of relationships, with different implications for resource acquisition and business outcomes (e.g. Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Bird & Zellweger, 2018; Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012 in the case of family networks). Beside these two main contributions, I believe our work has implications for research on social capital (Kwon & Adler, 2014) and stakeholder theory (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016).

RESOURCE ACQUISITION FROM A SOCIAL EXCHANGE PERSPECTIVE

Resource Acquisition from Formal and Informal Sources

To successfully launch a start-up, entrepreneurs need financial, material, human, informational, and even emotional resources (Florin, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2003; Harrison & Mason, 2000; Renzulli & Aldrich, 2005). If they lack resources, entrepreneurs must acquire them from others. Resource acquisition has three facets: search, access, and transfer (Clough et al., 2019). Entrepreneurs need to *search* for resources and the people who control them. They need to *access* resources by attracting resource holders' attention and obtaining their support. And they need to ensure that resource holders actually *transfer* resources to them, which often implies bidirectional resource flows over time. Each of these facets has been explored by different streams of research.

The first corpus, implicitly focusing on *search*, has explored how network structures influence resource acquisition. It has been argued that the larger the network of entrepreneurs, and the more resource-rich their acquaintances, the more resources potentially flow into their ventures, boosting business survival and growth (Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 1998; Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Hallen, 2008). Network theory also suggests that more diverse network ties connecting to different social groups give access to a larger array of resources, which would be beneficial (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011; Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973). However, the relation between network size and business outcomes is not unequivocal (Aldrich & Reese, 1993). This might be due to the difficulty of effectively comparing network sizes, as many social relationships are unobservable latent or dormant ties (Levin, Walter, & Murnighan, 2011; Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012). Also, being connected to numerous people – regardless of a network's structural properties – does neither guarantee that resource holders will give access to resources they control nor that they will give access under beneficial conditions (Gedajlovic et al., 2013; Kwon & Adler, 2014). The ability to benefit from their network might depend on

the position entrepreneurs occupy in the larger network in which their personal network is embedded (Burt, 1992). Furthermore, similar network patterns do not seem to yield similar outcome when situated in China or in Western countries (Burt, 2019; Xiao & Tsui, 2007); in a traditional countryside or a modern city (Rooks, Klyver, & Sserwanga, 2016); or when used by individuals with different personalities (Soda, Tortoriello, & Iorio, 2018). The question of why entrepreneurs do or do not access resources from people they are connected to thus cannot be answered by structural analysis only (Kwon & Adler, 2014; Tasselli, Kilduff, & Menges, 2015).

A second stream of research precisely explores non-structural factors that influence how entrepreneurs obtain *access* to money, advice, referrals, or other resources from professional investors – venture capitalists, business angels, bankers – to whom they are connected (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Shane & Cable, 2002; Zott & Huy, 2007). An interesting finding is that, although professional investors are supposed to provide support based on the expected profitability of ventures (Manigart et al., 2002), resource access often depends on criteria other than sales or value predictions. Given the notorious lack of track record and unpredictable profitability of start-ups, entrepreneurs capable of building a good image (Navis & Glynn, 2011; Zott & Huy, 2007), telling stories (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001), showing personal commitment (Prasad, Bruton, & Vozikis, 2000), and displaying good social credentials (Burton, Sørensen, & Beckman, 2002; Shane & Cable, 2002) have a higher likelihood of acquiring resources.

A last stream of work has focused on the terms and conditions of formal resource *transfer*. The financial literature has explored the ways in which professional investors address the challenge of uncertain returns on investment through sophisticated contracts and milestone-based investing (Gompers, 1995; Gompers et al., 2020; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). Such formalized agreements are concluded at the moment of the resource exchange to establish how and when entrepreneurs will have to compensate supporters for their contributions and how supporters can influence entrepreneurs' decisions to secure their investment.

This stream of research has not paid much attention to the negotiation of the terms of resource transfer. Recent research, however, shows that formal exchange is heavily influenced by the quality of interpersonal relationships between entrepreneurs and investors (Huang & Knight, 2017; Huang & Pearce, 2015; Paul et al., 2007). For example, exchanging tokens of trust (Maxwell & Lévesque, 2014; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2001) and fairness (Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996) increases the odds of a financial deal and influences its conditions. Consequently, people acting on behalf of profit-driven organizations often provide resources as favors to entrepreneurs with whom they have good relationships (Starr & MacMillan, 1990; Uzzi, 1996). Although it is generally thought that these favors are motivated by a mechanism of reciprocation (Granovetter, 1992; Kwon & Adler, 2014; Uzzi, 1996), we do not know why, when, and to what extent relational factors mix with profit motives to motivate resource holders to support entrepreneurs (Clough et al., 2019; Gedajlovic et al., 2013).

We know even less about the mechanisms underlying favors received from informal supporters. These are often grouped under loose categories, such as "family and friends" (e.g. Lee & Persson, 2016), and portrayed as altruistic benefactors who provide resources without expecting returns (Klyver et al., 2017; Sullivan & Miller, 1996). Research has shown, however, that some informal supporters expect a financial reward for their contribution to a business (Maula et al., 2005; Steier, 2003). It has been argued that whether profit is expected depends on the degree of social proximity between entrepreneurs and supporters. For example, close family members would then be less likely to ask for a return on investment than more distant relatives. However, it seems that proximity far from explains all the variance (Bygrave & Bosma, 2011; Chua et al., 2012; Erikson, Sørheim, & Reitan, 2003; Klyver et al., 2017; Sullivan & Miller, 1996). Indeed, supporters who do not ask for a financial return for their support may expect to benefit from the venture in other ways: to be offered employment opportunities, discounts, or access to equipment or inventory (Jaskiewicz, Uhlenbruck, Balkin, & Reay, 2013;

Webb et al., 2013); to be included in business decisions (Birtch et al., 2018; Sharma & Manikutty, 2005; Steier, 2009); or to gain status as a powerful and generous "boss" (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). Supporters' expectations can be so constraining that some entrepreneurs may even turn down support to avoid the corresponding economic and social constraints (Au & Kwan, 2009; Khavul et al., 2009; Sieger & Minola, 2017).

In sum, what entrepreneurs might be expected to give in return for receiving resources can vary greatly. Since this variation cannot be explained by variation in network structure (Hoang & Yi, 2015; Kwon & Adler, 2014), I suggest taking a closer look at the diversity of social relationships, and particularly at the norms that govern how expectations related to resource exchange along various types of relationships are formed.

"Favors" from a Social Exchange Perspective

To identify and study these norms, I turn to social exchange theory. Social exchange theory is concerned with understanding why and how people willingly exchange with one another (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Emerson, 1976). Its fundamental tenet is that social relationships are based on bidirectional exchange of tangible and intangible resources, including symbolic ones. When people give something, they expect to be given something back. If they receive back, social relationships develop as exchanges unfold. On the contrary, people who do not conform to the expectation of their exchange partners to receive back are soon ignored or socially sanctioned (Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961). A central concern of social exchange theory has thus been to understand how expectations are built and how they are met.

The respective expectations of exchange partners can be made explicit and negotiated. Social exchange then takes the form of barter and trade (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Fiske, 1992; Molm, 2003; Sahlins, 1965). However, terms of exchange often are neither negotiated

nor explicitly agreed upon. Instead, initiation of exchange by the party who does a favor might merely create for the other party an implicit obligation to return the favor (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1958; Lévi-Strauss, 1949; Mauss, 1924). When initiating social exchange, one thus does not always know what one will get in return, if anything, and when. Conversely, when receiving something, one does not necessarily know what others expect to be given back.

While the role of norms of social exchange is well established in management and organization theory, methodological challenges make it very difficult to study these norms (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Gedajlovic et al., 2013; Kwon & Adler, 2014; Mouw, 2006). First, social exchange implies a delay, sometimes very long, between giving and receiving (Emerson, 1976; Malinowski, 1922). Differentiating "favors" from "returns for ancient favors," not to mention assessing the value of ancient favors, is often impossible. Furthermore, because social relationships commonly develop in various life domains, some resource flows go unobserved (Kuwabara, Luo, & Sheldon, 2010). As a consequence, normative expectations on which social exchange relies remain generally hidden under the label of "reciprocity" (Baldassarri, 2015; Granovetter, 1992), which is ambiguous (Gouldner, 1960; Meeker, 1971).

Indeed, the meaning of "reciprocity" depends on the relationship that ties people (Adams, 1965; Emerson, 1976). For example, "friend," "sister," "boss," "mentor" are social roles (Biddle, 1986, 2013) associated with "friend," "sibling," "subordinate," and "mentoree" roles, respectively. Holders of paired roles all have reciprocal expectations toward each other, but these expectations obey different social norms: sisters may not exchange in the same way as bosses and subordinates. Reciprocal expectations follow normative relational models describing how role holders are supposed to exchange (Baldwin, 1992; Fiske, 1991). To entrepreneurs looking for resources, relational models are clues about who is likely to provide support, what one can expect from them, and what they will expect in return. In other words, if

social ties are pipes through which resources flow (Podolny, 2001), tie strength is the pipes' diameter, but norms of social exchange attached to relational models are taps, valves, and filters.

A complication for researchers is that norms of exchange do not uniformly correspond to the "labels" of relationships: being "friends," "neighbors," or "colleagues" does not convey the same normative expectations across cultures (Hsueh & Gomez-Solorzano, 2019; Khayesi et al., 2014). Furthermore, even in a given cultural context, friends, neighbors, or colleagues do not exchange the same way all the time. When shifting the focus of attention from the structure of entrepreneurs' networks to the relational role people hold toward each other, we must also embrace the fact that there is a huge array of relational models and ways to implement them.

Social exchange theorists, however, have observed that this diversity can be reduced to a small set of principles that do not vary across cultures. They first proposed that resources can be allocated according to either *equity*, *equality*, or the *needs* of exchanging parties (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976). Fiske (1991, 1992, 2004) then suggested that the vast array of normative ties could be reduced to four fundamental forms of exchange, or "mods," that would be the universal "building blocks" of culture-dependent relational models: market pricing, equality matching, authority ranking, and communal sharing. *Market pricing* characterizes self-interested exchange based on cost-benefit calculations. This mod "reduce[s] all the relevant features and components under consideration to a single value or utility metric that allows the comparison of many qualitatively and quantitatively diverse factors" (Fiske, 1992: 692). *Equality matching* informs exchange where contributions are balanced by "one–for–one correspondence, [...] turn taking, […] in–kind reciprocity, tit–for–tat retaliation" (Fiske, 1992: 694), regardless of individual needs or capacities. In *authority ranking*, people exchange resources according to their relative status position. Exchange is intrinsically asymmetrical, as "people higher in rank have prestige, prerogatives, and privileges [...], but subordinates are [...] entitled to protection and pastoral care" (Fiske, 1992: 691). Finally, in *communal sharing*,

Table 6: the four elementary forms of relationships (adapted from Fiske, 1992: 694-696)

	Market Pricing	**Authority Ranking**	**Equality Matching**	**Communal Sharing**
Distribution of Resources	Each gives in proportion to what they contribute, and reciprocally, as a function of market price and utility.	Superiors preempt what they wish or receive tribute. They have pastoral responsibility to provide for and protect subordinates.	Everyone gets identical shares, regardless of need, desire, or usefulness. Each gives back what they received/what others gave.	Resources are regarded as a commons; individual shares and properties are not marked. People give what they can and freely take what they need.
Contribution and Reward	Contributions rewarded according to an agreed-upon ratio.	Superiors give beneficently; subordinates pay tribute.	Each contributor matches each other's donation equally.	Each gives what one has, without keeping track of what each contributes.
Work	Work for a wage is calculated at a rate per unit of time or output.	Superiors direct and control the work of subordinates, while often doing less of the arduous or menial labour.	Each person does the same thing in each phase of the work, either by working in synchrony, matching tasks, or taking turns.	Everyone does what he or she can without keeping track of inputs. Tasks are a collective responsibility rather than individual assignments.
Decision Making	Rational costs / benefits analysis.	By authoritative fiat or decree.	Election, rotating offices, lottery.	Group seek consensus, unity.

"people simply take what they need and contribute what they can, without anyone attending to how much each person contributes or receives." (Fiske, 1992: 693).

In the rest of this chapter, I build on Fiske's typology to show when and how each form of exchange is likely to influence resource acquisition from informal or formal supporters who do them "favors." I develop propositions about five issues: What determines which mod will govern exchange? What convinces supporters to give access to resources they control? Which quantity can be transferred? What are entrepreneurs expected to give back? And, finally, what is likely to lead to tensions between entrepreneurs and supporters?

FUNDAMENTAL FORMS OF EXCHANGE AND RESOURCE ACQUISITION

The four "mods" are archetypes that are rarely, if ever, found in pure form in society. Most ties are combinations of these building blocks. For example, parent–child relationships normally mix communal sharing and authority ranking. Besides, many relationships are multiplex (Kuwabara et al., 2010): a colleague can also be a friend. Furthermore, the respective weight of each mod can vary over the course of a relationship: apprentices can become peers; business partners can become friends (Hite, 2005; Huang, Chen, Xu, Lu, & Tam, 2019; Larson, 1992). Attention to this complexity is important, as it can be a source of tension: how many altruistic supporters become greedy "market-pricers" or picky "equality-matchers" if the entrepreneur gets rich? More generally, when a relationship is complex, entrepreneurs and supporters need to negotiate, usually implicitly and even unconsciously (Fiske & Haslam, 2005; Haslam, 2004), which facet of the relationship to activate, which determines which "mod" will govern exchange. For example, relations between entrepreneurs and business angels include components of equality matching (between peer–entrepreneurs), authority ranking (between an experienced, successful entrepreneur and a younger, less experienced one), and, of course, market pricing. When approaching business angels, young entrepreneurs might thus play on

peer-to-peer mutual understanding, show deference as inexperienced entrepreneurs seeking guidance, or emphasize the potential profitability of their project.

It is impossible to offer a full overview of the wide array of possible relational models here. However, I think that it is possible to predict which mod is likely to be activated in exchange, based on four factors. First, the degree of proximity and similarity between parties seems to influence the definition of relational models in the same ways across cultures – for example, exchange between people similar in age and gender tend to be governed by equality matching (Fiske, 1992). Second, when the normative definition of a relationship is complex, the "mod" most likely to be activated depends on the resource exchanged. Third, it might be that individuals differ in their disposition to preferentially use each of the four mods (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016; Haslam, 2004). Finally, I agree that the relative weight of the four mods vary across cultures (Fiske, 1991; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2005). I develop this idea, building on the fourfold classification of societies by Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand (1995): "horizontal collectivist," in which the boundary between individual and collective identities and properties are blurred; "vertical collectivist," where individuals strongly identify with collectives, but the latter are hierarchically differentiated; "horizontal individualist," with strong attachment to independence and normative equality; and "vertical individualist," characterized by individualism without particular attachment to equality.

Market Pricing

Market pricing corresponds to a weighting of the respective contributions and retributions of the parties. A deal is made when both parties calculate that the exchange adds to their utility. This implies calculating complex value ratios or reducing resources that are difficult to compare to a single standard (typically money).

Situational triggers. By enabling different resources and utility scales to be brought together, market pricing facilitates the explicit negotiation of exchange: it is the mod underlying barter and trade; hence, it normally informs business ties. The literature showing that networks facilitate access to formal investors indeed shows that it is ultimately the calculation of costs and benefits that convinces bankers, venture capitalists, or professional business angels to transfer resources to entrepreneurs (Clough et al., 2019; Manigart et al., 2002). More generally, market pricing enables exchange between people who do not share the same implicit expectations about exchange or with whom one does not exchange regularly, because payment is made or agreed upon when exchange is initiated rather than being based on the goodwill of recipients (Molm, 2003). On the other hand, it can be seen as cold and instrumental, because it focuses on individual outcomes rather than on the underlying relationship (Leventhal, 1976). Market pricing consequently is the common way to exchange with strangers (Sahlins, 1972).

Market pricing, however, is compatible with strong social ties. As a matter of fact, most informal supporters prefer to invest in businesses they believe will bring them a return (Birtch et al., 2018; Bygrave & Bosma, 2011; Klyver et al., 2017; Maula et al., 2005), whether financial or not. In fact, lack of shared expectations might push close acquaintances toward market pricing ratio calculations even if their relationship is normally governed by another mod, especially when they exchange a type or a quantity of resource that does not match what they are used to or socially expected to exchange (Foa & Foa, 1974). Typically, members of a household constantly exchange love, food, and small amounts of money without engaging in cost-benefits calculations, but market pricing might be activated if a household member asks for a large sum of money to start a business. The study of cost-benefit ratios calculation, valuation, and the exchange of financial and non-financial resources has been a notable subset of family business research (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Zellweger et al., 2016).

It might also be that individuals have predispositions to market pricing. Bridoux & Stoelhorst (2016) explain that this mod is more likely to be used by individualist, self-regarding people, and that exchanging with individualists pushes other people to also switch to market pricing. Finally, market pricing does not imply any consideration for normative equality. Consequently, it is likely to be a common way to exchange in societies characterized by high levels of individualism and high tolerance for inequality (Singelis et al., 1995).

Proposition 1a: The relationship between an entrepreneur and a supporter is more likely to be governed by market pricing when: (1) they are tied by a weak tie or a business relationship; (2) what they exchange differs in nature or quantity from what they usually exchange; (3) at least one of them is particularly individualistic; (4) they are embedded in a culture characterized by vertical individualism.

Conditions of resource transfer. Literature shows that entrepreneurs need to signal their ability to bring value to professional investors to obtain resources from them (Navis & Glynn, 2011; Zott & Huy, 2007). Once they agree to provide access to their resources, these investors are capable of determining very specific terms of exchange based on an assessment of possible returns as well as the risk of failure, their ability to influence and control entrepreneurs' decisions to limit this risk, and the possibility of minimizing loss in case of failure (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). By contrast, Kotha & George (2012) show that informal investors are incapable of evaluating what value the resources they provide bring to a venture and which reward their unclear contribution deserves. This incapability would limit the number and amount of transfers (Riding, 2008; Shane, 2009) and lead to inefficient investing (Aldrich & Ruef, 2018; Kotha & George, 2012; Mason & Harrison, 2010). This points at the importance of valuation skills in transferring resources on a market pricing basis. Entrepreneurs and supporters that are unable to make secure deals might prefer not to exchange resources or might resort to another mod.

Proposition 1b: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by market pricing, the likelihood of the former receiving resources depends on his or her ability to signal a capacity to bring value to the supporter and on their ability to agree on the value and timing of exchange.

Maximal amount acquired. Once they have decided to support an entrepreneur, potential supporters providing resources on a market pricing basis continue to apply a rational cost-benefit analysis. They thus are likely to provide as much resources as they believe will benefit them: the greater the foreseeable financial or non-financial returns, the more resources the entrepreneur is likely to receive.

Proposition 1c: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by market pricing, the amount of resources acquired from the supporter is likely to be proportional to the returns offered by the entrepreneur.

Expected reciprocation. When terms of exchange are explicit, what supporters can expect in return for providing resources is simply what has been agreed upon. Terms of exchange are likely to remain implicit only if there is a shared understanding of what can be expected from the exchange — i.e., if there is an established market for the resources provided. Once return is received, the transaction is terminated. Any further exchange is subsequently considered an independent transaction. Market pricing does not imply long series of reciprocal exchange, as illustrated by the fact that high–growth ventures negotiate each funding round separately. Of course, repeated exchange facilitates negotiation. Negotiation can even be simplified to a simple agreement to reconduct habitual terms of exchange.

Proposition 1d: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by market pricing, the supporter will expect to receive what was agreed upon at the moment agreed upon, or a return corresponding to the market price of the resource acquired.

Sources of tension. Because of the many variables that can play out in business, market pricing is complex. In addition, when there is no established market, parties can have different beliefs about the relative value of resources and the causal relationship between inputs and outputs (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Kirzner, 1979; Schumpeter, 1934; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Thus, tensions related to market pricing are well known. Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 2005) and transaction-cost economics (Cuypers, Hennart, Silverman, & Ertug, 2021; Tadelis & Williamson, 2012) ask: How detailed should contracts be? How can parties ensure compliance with agreed-upon terms? How should parties handle deceit?

Proposition 1e: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by market pricing, tensions are likely to arise about resource valuation, information asymmetry, and respect for the terms of agreement.

Equality Matching

Equality matching avoids the challenge of valuing and comparing different resources by exchanging on a quid-pro-quo basis. A looser application of this norm is the matching of a favor with a favor (e.g. Uzzi, 1996). As such, equality matching is what comes closest to "reciprocity" and, more generally, "social exchange" as they are typically conceived in management studies (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Blau, 1964). Equality matching more precisely refers to a strict accounting of resource flows that ensures that each party gives exactly what he or she received in the past or expects to receive in the future (Fiske, 1992). This quid-pro-quo balance contrasts with the value ratios characterizing market pricing.

Situational triggers. Equality matching is impervious to individual differences in need or capacity. This mitigates competition and encourages good relations between potential adversaries (Deutsch, 1975). Equality matching is thus typical of relations between siblings, structural equivalents of a social network, and peers more generally – cousins, colleagues,

fellow citizens (Fiske, 1991). In business contexts, equality and siblinghood are particularly emphasized in interactions between professionals, such as lawyers or medical doctors (Abbott, 1988). By extension, one can expect equality matching to play out between colleagues or partners who share a sense of sameness due to similar training and/or occupation.

Equality matching implies that the receiver of a favor will be able to reciprocate quid-pro-quo in the future and thus that both parties have more or less equal access to equivalent resources (Homans, 1958). Quid-pro-quo reciprocation is also a good way to exchange resources that are difficult to value. This mod is consequently well-suited to the exchange of widely available, lowly specific resources being exchanged frequently (e.g. work time) or resources whose value is unclear or uncertain, such as advice and information.

Bridoux & Stoelhorst (2016) suggest that equality-matching relationships are characteristic of people who try to maximize collective outcomes rather than compete to maximize their personal interest, as long as their exchange partners also cooperate (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001). From a macro perspective, balance implies individual accountability. Equality matching is thus is likely to be particularly common in contexts characterized by high levels of individualism and strong attachment to equality (Fiske, 1991; Singelis et al., 1995).

Proposition 2a: The relationship between an entrepreneur and a supporter is more likely to be governed by equality matching when: (1) they hold similar positions in a familial, local, or professional community; (2) what they exchange is difficult to value, distributed equally between them, and/or exchanged on a regular basis; (3) both are prosocial reciprocators (4) they are embedded in a culture characterized by horizontal individualism.

Conditions of resource transfer. On an equality matching basis, entrepreneurs are entitled to receive what they gave to potential supporters in the past. If the balance is at equilibrium or if it tilts unfavorably, entrepreneurs are less likely to receive support. However,

this does not mean that potential supporters will not provide resources: In social exchange, the flow can go one way repeatedly before reciprocation occurs (Malinowski, 1922; ben Porath, 1980). However, parties always keep balance in mind, and it conditions exchange. The likelihood of receiving favors depends on whether the supporter and the entrepreneur believe the latter will reciprocate. This, in turn, depends on past behavior: entrepreneurs who matched what they received and did so rapidly and repeatedly are more likely to be trusted resources.

Proposition 2b: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by equality matching, the more often the former has received resources from (given resources to) the latter without giving (receiving) them back, the less (more) likely the entrepreneur is to receive resources.

Maximal amount acquired. An equality matching relationship generally starts with the exchange of small amounts of resources (Molm, Collett, & Schaefer, 2007). Amounts can slowly increase, as exchanging parties sometimes purposefully give back marginally more or less than what they owe, in order to preserve an opportunity to adjust this slight disequilibrium in the future, thus keeping series of exchange open (Fiske, 1991; Hite, 2003; Mauss, 1924). But favors and counter-favors remain of the same order of magnitude to ensure they are unambiguously seen as compensation for what has been exchanged before. Much larger amounts can be exchanged only if trust becomes strong enough for a party to risk offering a "big thing," which opens a second balance of exchange parallel to the one for "small things" (Malinowski, 1922). This second account can be open only if the recipient accepts—i.e., believes she or he will be able and willing to reciprocate at this level in the future.

Proposition 2c: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by equality matching, the amount of resources acquired from the supporter is likely to be of the same order of magnitude as they exchanged in the

past or the amount they think the entrepreneur will be able to reciprocate in the future.

Expected reciprocation. Contrary to market pricing, equality matching implies a long series of interdependent exchanges. The archetype of resource acquisition based on equality matching (Fiske, 1992) is the functioning of rotating saving-and-credit associations, which play a crucial role in developing economies (Geertz, 1962): all members bring exactly the same amount of money to each meeting; one of them takes the common pot and invests it; and each member takes turn receiving the funding pot over a cycle, which lasts as many meetings as there are members in the association. In the end, everyone had contributed exactly what she or he received; resource acquisition is one link in a long chain of exactly balanced give–and–take.

Importantly, this chain is focused on entrepreneurs, not their ventures. When one focuses on ventures, the timing of exchange matters: sometimes resource acquisition equates to recovering a debt; sometimes it equates to taking one. If resources are acquired when the balance of exchange is at equilibrium or tilts toward supporters, they are a liability, so the business will incur a delayed cost corresponding to what has been received. If resources are acquired when the entrepreneur is a net creditor, there is no obligation to give back. In this case, support takes the form of a repayment for the entrepreneur, while it is a gift for the business.

Proposition 2d: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a potential supporter is governed by equality matching, and the entrepreneur has given resources to the supporter in the past without receiving back, the supporter will provide resources up to what he or she has received in the past without expecting reciprocation.

Proposition 2d': When exchange between an entrepreneur and a potential supporter is governed by equality matching, and the balance of exchange between them is at equilibrium or tilts toward the supporter, the supporter will expect to receive back what he or she has provided.

Sources of tension. Quid-pro-quo reciprocation is rarely as smooth as rotating saving-and-credit associations. Oftentimes, matching is delayed until an opportunity to give back what has been received arises (Malinowski, 1922). In an ideal situation, reciprocation occurs when the supporter needs to be given back resources and the entrepreneur has resources available. However, reciprocation might be expected when the business is unable to sustain a cost or when available resources could be used to seize a new opportunity. Uncertain timing can thus lead to heavy opportunity costs and/or tension with supporters. This points to the potential for conflict of the uncertain timing of social exchange (Blau, 1964), and equality matching in particular.

Furthermore, expecting exactly what has been given implies that there will be an opportunity to give back. That might not be the case: if an entrepreneur who received venturing-related advice from a friend can only "pay back" by returning venture-related advice, the debt cannot be erased unless the friend engages in business and needs advice. Tension is likely to arise if the impossibility of reciprocating lasts. Either the quid-pro-quo principle is relaxed, or parties must accept that one stays perpetually in debt. In the first case, tension arises regarding which resources are similar enough to bring the balance of exchange back to equilibrium. This comparison of different resources is more about categorization than about the relative valuation characterizing market pricing, but it is no less complex. If parties decide to wait until quid-pro-quo becomes possible, lasting disequilibrium between the creditor and the debtor might damage relationships based on normative equality (Homans, 1958; Mauss, 1924; Stewart, 1990).

Proposition 2e: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a potential supporter is governed by equality matching, tensions are likely to arise regarding the timing of reciprocation and the equivalence, or lack thereof, of different resources.

Authority Ranking

Authority ranking precisely governs exchange between parties who differ in social standing. Higher–ranking individuals are free to decide the terms of exchange, so generally "get more and better things, and get them sooner" (Fiske, 1992, p. 691). In return, they are expected to meet their status – *noblesse oblige* – and protect their subordinates.

Situational triggers. Normative asymmetry in exchange implies that parties differ in what they can bring to each other. Authority ranking can thus inform relationships as soon as there is a differential in material or symbolic endowment between parties. This mod is typical of senior-junior relationships: experienced people advise, guide, and allocate resources, while younger ones learn, implement guidelines, and are cared for (Fiske, 1991). By extension, this mod is the substrate of a wide range of paternalistic relationships between people differing in gender, race, social class, wealth, or any other status-laden categorization as defined in context.

Authority ranking is also likely to be triggered when entrepreneurs depend on a potential supporter to acquire a rare, valuable resource (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and the resource cannot be bought: because the entrepreneur is unlikely to be able to reciprocate quid-pro-quo, equality matching is not possible. For example, advice received from a mentor can rarely be given back (Homans, 1961). Recommendations from a well-connected sponsor are also likely to be acquired on an asymmetrical basis (Ge et al., 2019). In a resource-poor environment, even material resources and money can be acquired on an authority ranking basis because of their rareness: wealthy patrons provide start-up capital and expect disproportionate material and social returns from their dependent clients (Warnier, 2009).

Individuals who are recognized as superiors by several people – higher rank tends to correspond to central positions (Emerson, 1962) – end up centralizing resources, then redistributing them to comply with their obligation to care for subordinates. This pattern of resource centralization/redistribution establishes an indirect exchange between subordinates

through their common superior (Fortes, 1969; Polanyi, 1944; Sahlins, 1965). In such cases, resources can be considered as pooled, then trusted to those higher in authority (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991; Cook & Emerson, 1978). Authority ranking is thus related to collectivism. But because it implies that some members of the group have preferential access to resources, it is related to vertical rather than horizontal collectivism (Singelis et al., 1995).

Finally, authority ranking can emerge from an implicit competition between parties. Those who can provide more or more useful resources receive higher status, and thus the privilege to initiate exchange and determine its terms (Homans, 1961; Mauss, 1924; Park & Kim, 2017). Such status competition is likely when at least one party is a "competitor" seeking to maximize the differential with the other rather than to maximize one's payoffs (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016).

Proposition 3a: The relationship between an entrepreneur and a supporter is more likely to be governed by authority ranking when: (1) they differ in seniority, gender, or other status-laden dimension as defined in context; (2) at least one resource they exchange is distributed unequally between them; (3) one of them seeks to maximize endowment differential; (4) they are embedded in a culture characterized by vertical collectivism.

Conditions of resource transfer. Entrepreneurs higher in rank can seize subordinates' resources under the condition that they show their ability to protect them. For example, parents can ask children to help with the family business but must provide for their daily needs. Conversely, lower-rank entrepreneurs must show their deference to higher-rank supporters. In many countries, business venturing implies deferring to family seniors, community leaders, mafia bosses, or political barons (Hamzeh, 2001; Honeyman, 2016; Peng, 2004). These sponsors provide connections (i.e., proxy for protection) and finance (to cover material needs) to their followers. Superiors who are not able to help or protect those who defer to them lose

their allegiance (Fiske, 1992). In other words, to exchange on an authority ranking basis, parties need to comply with what is expected from their rank: superiors must display richness in rare resources (wealth, wisdom, connections) and a willingness to guide and protect; subordinates must display deference and a willingness to follow guidance.

Proposition 3b: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by authority ranking, the likelihood of the entrepreneur receiving resources from the supporter will be proportionate to the ability of the former to display the behavioral expectations associated with her or his rank.

Maximal amount acquired. When social exchange is governed by authority ranking, rank determines the amount of resources potentially acquired by entrepreneurs (De Clercq, Lim, & Oh, 2014). There are two mechanisms. First, high-ranking entrepreneurs are likely to have a central position and have several direct subordinates (Cook & Emerson, 1978). In addition, they can ask for resources from their subordinates' subordinates (Fiske, 1991). Second, higher rank generally implies more social obligations (i.e. more responsibilities toward more subordinates) that can be considered as (social) needs, so higher-ranking people are likely to be entitled to receive more resources from their own superiors (Martínez, 2003). The idea is that "to whomsoever much is required, to him shall much be given."

Proposition 3c: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by authority ranking, the higher (lower) the entrepreneur ranks in the social hierarchy as defined in context, the more (less) resources she or he is likely to receive to start or sustain a business.

Expected reciprocation. Higher–ranking entrepreneurs who have raised resources from lower-ranking supporters can choose freely when and how to give back, as long as the latter can cover their needs and fulfill the obligations of their rank (Fiske, 1991). A common practice is to hire dependents for a wage that just covers their needs. Entrepreneurs benefit from a cheap

and dedicated workforce, while subordinates have job security and, potentially, perks when the business does well (Oya, 2007; Warnier & Miafo, 1993; Wong, 1985). But the obligation to attend to subordinates' well–being has downsides: Sharma & Manikutty (2005) showed how the divestment decisions of Pakistani patriarchs were limited by the obligation to bequeath all of their sons with a branch of the family business; Redding (2013) explained that the relative risk aversion of Chinese businesspeople might be related to their fear of endangering the source of income of the family they are in charge of; and Schenkel et al. (2016) showed how the burden of being entrusted with their father's legacy leads the first-born sons of Korean business families to be less able than their younger brothers to pursue new opportunities.

Authority ranking can lead to high long-term costs for lower-ranked entrepreneurs, as well. When they accept support from superiors, the latter may have the privilege to determine the terms of reciprocation – i.e., to seize what and when they wish. The authority of high–ranking supporters might thus prevent entrepreneurs from managing their business freely (Au & Kwan, 2009). While this phenomenon is understudied, authors have observed nepotism motivated by the obligation to give back to higher-ranking supporters by hiring their offspring—i.e., people the higher-ranking supporters are in charge of (Jaskiewicz et al., 2013). A more studied phenomenon is women entrepreneurs being expropriated by their male relatives in many societies (Aterido & Hallward–Driemeier, 2011; Khavul et al., 2009).

Proposition 3d: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by authority ranking, and the latter is higher in rank, the supporter has the discretionary power to seize resources from the entrepreneur she or he supported.

Proposition 3d': When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by authority ranking, and the latter is lower in rank, the supporter

receives back only what the entrepreneur believes the supporter needs to fulfill her or his needs and the obligations of her or his rank.

Sources of tension. Exchanging resources on an authority ranking basis implies a shared perspective on the respective status of entrepreneurs and supporters. This might be problematic, as different criteria can determine different orderings: seniority (whether based on age, generation, or "life stage" – being married, financially independent, etc.), gender, race, wealth, education, and political influence. Further, different scales might apply in different domains of life (Emerson, 1962), and the relative position of parties on any of these scales might not be obvious (e.g., generation vs. age among descendants of large phratries). This can trigger competition through exchange (Homans, 1958; Landis, Fisher, & Menges, 2021; Mauss, 1924; Park & Kim, 2017; Stewart, 1990).

Even when relative positions are clear, they might change over time. In particular, the accumulation of resources by successful entrepreneurs might threaten the established order. To counter this risk, higher-ranking individuals might seize business resources controlled by lower-ranking entrepreneurs and redistribute them according to the social hierarchy. They are all the more entitled to do so if they can claim resources as repayment for past support. The right of high-ranking individuals to ask what and when they want as reciprocation for support can thus turn into expropriating entrepreneurs whose success challenges their dominance. Anticipating this reaction, entrepreneurs might self-limit their activity to "keep their rank" rather than destabilize the social hierarchy (George, Kotha, Parikh, Alnuaimi, & Bahaj, 2016; Zhou, Ge, Li, & Chandrashekar, 2020). The common observation that women often seem less motivated than men to grow their business might be an effect of such "rank-keeping" mindset (Edelman, Brush, Manolova, & Greene, 2010; Morris, Miyasaki, Watters, & Coombes, 2006). Low-ranking entrepreneurs might also try to balance the discretionary power of superiors by seeking support from partners who are not submitted to the same authority (Khavul et al., 2009).

Finally, Au & Kwan (2009) showed that the risk of senior relatives interfering in business encourages low-status entrepreneurs to decline family support altogether.

Proposition 3e: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by authority ranking, tensions are likely to arise about their respective rank and the excessive demands of superiors.

Communal Sharing

Communal sharing corresponds to the principle of sharing-without-reckoning characteristic of altruism. Individuals tend to consider others' needs as their own and provide resources they control to cover these needs, regardless of present or future rewards.

Situational triggers. Allocating resources according to individual needs is an efficient means of ensuring individuals' survival and minimal well-being, despite inequal abilities (Fiske, 1992). This also enables individuals to learn and develop without suffering too much from failure (Leventhal, 1976). Consequently, communal sharing is generally the norm informing resource exchange in households with dependent children, as well as in close-knit groups in which everyone highly values each other's well-being, especially if group members are interdependent and collocated (Fiske, 1992; Lévi-Strauss, 1979). In other words, communal sharing is more likely when parties are united by a strong collective identity (Haslam, 2004). So, entrepreneurs would be more likely to obtain resources on a communal sharing basis if they manage to make a common identity with their supporter salient. Consequently, communal sharing would be more frequent in societies characterized by high levels of collectivism, and particularly horizontal collectivism (Singelis et al., 1995).

Regardless of the cultural context, however, only particularly altruistic people are likely to exchange on a communal sharing basis with strangers (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016). Altruists are rare (Liebrand & Van Run, 1985), and most people's altruistic giving is limited: typically,

people who crowd-fund entrepreneurs they do not know contribute small amounts relative to their wealth. Communal sharing is most likely to be activated to provide resources covering basic needs (food, shelter), or corresponding small amounts of resources, rather than costly resources corresponding to higher-level needs, such as wealth or prestige (Maslow, 1943).

Proposition 4a: The relationship between an entrepreneur and a supporter is more likely to be governed by communal sharing when: (1) they belong to the same household or share a strong common identity; (2) what they exchange corresponds in nature or quantity to basic needs; (3) one of them is altruistic; (4) they are embedded in a culture characterized by horizontal collectivism.

Condition of resource transfer. Communal sharing gives entrepreneurs access to resources under the sole condition that they need them. Assessing needs is a complex matter (Maslow, 1943), but entrepreneurship scholars are familiar with the distinction between necessity and opportunity-driven entrepreneurs (Langevang, Namatovu, & Dawa, 2012; Reynolds, Camp, Bygrave, Autio, & Hay, 2001): whereas the former starts a business because they have no other means of making a living, the latter already has a comfortable existence and venture, and is aiming for better. In the first case, venturing is aimed at covering needs, so using communally shared resources is justified. On the contrary, communal sharing is unlikely to enable the acquisition of resources to answer a desire to accumulate wealth. Instead, resources might have to be kept to cover others' needs. Indeed, a limitation of communal sharing is that an entrepreneur can only acquire resources that the supporter, or those the supporter shares with communally, does not need.

Proposition 4b: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by communal sharing, an entrepreneur is more likely to receive resources if he or she is necessity driven rather than opportunity driven.

Proposition 4b': When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by communal sharing, the likelihood of the entrepreneur receiving resources from the supporter will be proportionate to the amount of resource they collectively control, relative to their respective needs and the needs of other people with whom the supporter shares communally.

Maximal amount acquired. What entrepreneurs can acquire based on communal sharing depends on the balance between the quantity of resources available and the needs of the exchanging parties and others with whom they share communally. Entrepreneurs might not receive resources if others need them more. Conversely, venturing might occur simply to use available resources. For example, Alsos, Carter, & Ljunggren (2014) showed how members of farming communities opened and closed small businesses in the food and tourism industries depending on variation in needs, but also in material and human resources available in the community following births, marriages, deaths, adult children leaving, and other life events.

Proposition 4c: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by communal sharing, the entrepreneur can receive as much resources as the needs of the supporter, and others with whom the supporter shares communally, can be satisfied with remaining resources.

Expected reciprocation. Although resources drawn from a common pool come without obligation to give back, communal sharing nevertheless supposes reciprocity: while entrepreneurs can use others' resources to start a business, people they share with communally are entitled to use entrepreneurs' resources. As a consequence, supporters might use resources needed for business to cover their own needs. The prospects of businesses started thanks to communal sharing are thus extremely dependent on the evolution of supporters' needs and capacities to contribute, for better or for worse (Olson et al., 2003).

An entrepreneur acquiring resources on a communal sharing basis may consequently have significant difficulty growing their business. When the business is profitable, extra resources are free for all who share resources communally with the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs are thus expected to extract resources from the business to help worse-off group members (Grimm et al., 2017). A typical example would be hiring unemployed family members to give them an income, even if the business does not really need their contribution (Dyer et al., 2013). Furthermore, as communally shared resources are normally supposed to cover needs, risking them in an uncertain venture might have severe consequences (Birtch et al., 2018; Sieger & Minola, 2017). Communal sharing would thus inhibit the accumulation and reinvestment of profit, but also risk taking, and hence hinder business growth (Phillips & Bhatia-Panthaki, 2007). On the other hand, communal sharing may act as a safety net when failing entrepreneurs are at risk of going bankrupt. Communal sharing gives free and timely access to supporters' resources when needed, which contributes considerably to the resilience of family farms and "Mom and Pop" businesses (Alsos, Carter, & Ljunggren, 2014; Baines & Wheelock, 1998; Glover & Reay, 2015). Thus, while communal sharing may hinder growth, it encourages survival.

Proposition 4d: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by communal sharing, the supporter is likely to use business assets to cover his or her needs and those of people with whom he or she shares communally.

Proposition 4d': When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by communal sharing, the business is less likely to grow but less likely to fail.

Sources of tension. As "[no]one attend[s] to how much each person contributes or receives" (Fiske, 1992: 693), assessment of needs, capacity to contribute, and sustainable consumption of communally shared resources depends on people's goodwill and intimate knowledge of each other. The highly subjective assessment of what is needed, possible to give,

and available can obviously lead to conflict between an entrepreneur and a supporter. Individual differences are likely to lead some to be net contributors and others net users of resources. Communally shared resources are thus subject to the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968): when too many people share communally, the pool of shared resources tends to be exhausted, net contributors leave, or control mechanisms that do not correspond to the principle of sharing without reckoning are put in place (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). That might happen because some might tap into the common pool without contributing, despite their capacity to doing so. Conversely, net contributors might falsely perceive net users to be free-riding when they might actually just be unable to contribute. Transitivity worsens the issue: an individual A sharing communally with B, who also share communally with C, might not be willing to cover C's needs. Entrepreneurs, in particular, might worry that people in need might consume their working capital and the profit they intend to reinvest, as is commonly observed in sub–Saharan Africa (Di Falco & Bulte, 2011; Grimm et al., 2017). To mitigate this risk, entrepreneurs are likely to take and hide resources from the common pool and share only part of the proceeds. Discua Cruz et al. (2013) described similar efforts in Latin America.

> *Proposition 4e: When exchange between an entrepreneur and a supporter is governed by communal sharing, tensions are likely to arise regarding the extension of the communal sharing relationship to other people and the evaluation of individual needs and capacities to contribute.*

Table 7: effect of elementary forms of relationships on resource acquisition

	Market pricing	**Equality matching**	**Authority ranking**	**Communal sharing**
Situational Triggers	Between strangers or business partners; resource differ in the nature or amount of what is usually exchanged; one party is individualistic; vertical-individualist culture.	Between peers; resources are equally distributed, commonly exchanged, difficult to value; parties are reciprocators; horizontal-individualist culture.	Between people differing in status; resources are rare, unequally distributed; one party is competitive; vertical-collectivist culture.	Between household members or people sharing an identity; resources correspond to basic needs; one party is altruistic; horizontal-collectivist culture.
Conditions of Resource Transfer	Entrepreneur's ability to signal capacity to bring value and ability to agree on the value and timing of the return, as a ratio of the value of the resources provided and expected outcomes.	Balance of exchange at time T, plus belief in entrepreneur's ability and willingness to match favors received.	Respect shown to the principle founding the social hierarchy and compliance with behavioral expectations associated with social rank.	Quantity of resources collectively controlled, relative to what is collectively needed.

Maximal Amount Acquired	Proportional to the return offered by the entrepreneur.	Of the same order of magnitude as what has been exchanged in the past between the two parties.	According to rank in the social hierarchy and corresponding social obligations.	As much as the needs of supporters and other people sharing resources can be satisfied with what is left.
Expected Reciprocation	What was explicitly agreed upon, at the moment agreed upon; or the market value of the resource acquired.	If balance of exchange is at equilibrium or tilts toward the supporter, give back quid pro quo. If balance of exchange tilts toward the entrepreneur: nothing.	If supporter is higher in rank: what she or he wants. If supporter is lower in rank: what the entrepreneur wants.	Proceeds of the business, sometimes inventory and working capital, are free for the supporter to use to cover one's needs.
Sources of Tension	Valuation, information asymmetry, and the respect of the terms of agreement.	Timing of reciprocation and equivalence or not of different resources.	Respective rank, excessive demands of superiors.	Boundaries of the sharing group, evaluations of individual needs and capacities.

DISCUSSION

In this chapter, I set out to determine the conditions under which entrepreneurs acquire resources. Drawing on social exchange theory, I have complemented extant knowledge by explaining how culture-dependent relational models and underlying norms of exchange determine the conditions of resource exchange. Our perspective has two main implications for research on entrepreneurial resource acquisition. First, it improves our understanding of the cost of reciprocating favors received, which have remained unexplained in network and social capital theory for decades (Granovetter, 1992; Kwon & Adler, 2014). This refined understanding of the cost of reciprocity questions the analytical relevance of commonly used categorizations of supporters, such as "family and friends," and poses practical questions: How can we determine which norm applies when exchange occurs along complex social ties? How does the evolution of ties over time impact exchange? Second, enlightening the role of social norms in the functioning of networks raises questions about the relation between network structure and tie content, the emergence and evolution of networks, and the impact of norms of exchange at higher levels of analysis.

Studying Norms of Exchange in Entrepreneurship

From categories of supporters to norms of exchange. Our first contribution to is to direct attention to the diversity of norms of exchange that may distinguish structurally similar networks by constraining resource flows along social ties. Paying attention to these norms enlightens the costs associated with building and using network ties. While opportunity costs associated with network-building efforts and over-embeddedness are well studied (Ozdemir, Moran, Zhong, & Bliemel, 2016; Uzzi, 1996), the direct costs of reciprocating favors have been largely overlooked (Granovetter, 1992; Kwon & Adler, 2014).

Researchers thus might investigate how people interpret exchange, rather than merely measuring resource flows over short periods of time and assuming reciprocity, altruism, free-riding, or something else. To anticipate tensions, entrepreneurs and potential supporters might also want to think about which norms of exchange they are going to refer to when engaging in business together. This would make it possible to distinguish between resources that are free (based on communal sharing) from those associated with past or future "equality matching costs" that are unobserved or unreported. Furthermore, the asymmetrical relations characteristic of authority ranking are virtually absent from the literature on entrepreneurial resource acquisition, though entrepreneurship scholars are aware of the importance of mentors, sponsors, and business angels (Harrison & Mason, 2000; Memon, Rozan, Ismail, Uddin, & Daud, 2015). In many countries, one cannot even embark on a new business venture without the support of powerful community or political patrons (Ge et al., 2019). Conversely, many success stories can be read as the leveraging of traditional social hierarchies to exploit powerless dependents (Oya, 2007; Warnier & Miafo, 1993). To better understand entrepreneurship in non-Western contexts (Bruton, Zahra, & Cai, 2018), while also refining our understanding of mentoring and business angel activity, we need to know more about authority ranking, which can be empowering as well as exploitative.

Investigating norms of exchange implies sorting ties according to their underlying norm rather than based on "lay" labels and arbitrary categorizations. For example, it makes sense to blend "family and friends" on the one hand and "colleagues and professional acquaintances" on the other when the former provide resources on an equality matching basis and the latter provide resources on, say, a market pricing basis. But it might be that ties with coworkers are informed by equality matching, such as family and friendship ties, whereas ties with former clients and suppliers are informed by market pricing. It could also be that an entrepreneur gets support from close relatives on a communal sharing basis; from distant relatives, friends, and

same-age colleagues on an equality matching basis; and from former bosses on an authority ranking basis. The categorization of supporters should thus be carefully considered.

Switching the focus of attention from "label" to "normative content" of relationships has strong implications for research on family entrepreneurship and family business. Indeed, families are networks (Godelier, 2004; Holy, 1996; Sahlins, 2011a, 2011b). From the perspective of social exchange theory, the fact that family relationships are defined by normative ways of interacting and exchanging resources (Carsten, 1995) is crucial to understand their influence on business, especially considering that family networks are made of different types of ties (Fiske, 1992; Héritier, 1981; Holy, 1996): for instance, a grand-uncle might not provide resources to an entrepreneur under the same conditions as a mother. Fiske's typology might help sort out which family ties are likely to be activated by entrepreneurs looking for support, which type of family support is likely to lead to long-term family influence, and, of course, how this influence is likely to impact businesses.

Embracing relational complexity. Identifying which norm governs a relationship is no easy task, especially in contexts where formal business practices and vocabulary are expected. One should thus pay attention to the decoupling between formal vs. informal and explicit vs. implicit agreements. For example, Starr & MacMillan (1990) tell the story of an entrepreneur using the meeting room of a friend's business. They formally agree that the entrepreneur will pay pro–rata for the use of the room, as if the exchange were informed by market pricing. However, the friend never asks for nor accepts payment, which might be a sign that a communal sharing logic is at play, despite the market pricing appearance of the deal. In such cases, we should look beyond the surface to grasp the real driver of exchange. Identifying authority ranking exchange, whose asymmetry is sometimes emphasized by the vocabulary of senior–junior relationships, but sometimes hidden by the vocabulary of friendship and reciprocity (Briquet, 1999; Wolf, 1966), will be particularly challenging.

More generally, identifying the norm underlying an exchange may face the obstacle of complex relational models and multiplex relationships. As I explained above, most relational models combine several of the fundamental norms of exchange. This makes terms of exchange ambiguous. The multiplexity that accompanies using social ties for business makes the issue even more difficult. Some consider business advice provided by relatives to be free (e.g. Anderson, Jack, & Drakopoulou Dodd, 2005). But if it needs to be reciprocated, should it be with a business-related counter-favor (money, business advice) or a family-related counter-favor (diner, childrearing advice; Kim, Longest, & Aldrich, 2013)? We know a lot about how entrepreneurs convince professional investors to exchange on a market pricing basis (Huang & Knight, 2017; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zott & Huy, 2007), but how norms of exchange are perceived, negotiated, and manipulated by people engaging in business together is largely unexplored territory. As relational models correspond to relationships between social roles (Biddle, 2013), entrepreneurship researchers could build on the literature on interaction orders (Goffman, 1967) and interactional scripts (Barley, 1986) to investigate how different scripts relate to different roles, or identities activate different norms of exchange.

I further propose that the negotiation of exchange can be constrained by normative spheres of exchange (Barth, 1967; Bohannan & Bohannan, 1968; Foa & Foa, 1974) that determine which resources can be exchanged with whom, in which context. Norms of exchange attached to social spaces (private vs. public; leisure vs. professional space) and types of resources (asking for money vs. worktime; money vs. material resources) would thus complement norms of exchange attached to relationships to explain which facet of which tie entrepreneurs activate, depending on which resources they need and how much it will cost to acquire them according to this or that norm (Clough et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2013). In short, I advocate for investigating what is an "appropriate" exchange not only in terms of balance, but also in terms of which resources can or cannot be exchanged along a type of tie and/or in which

context, which can or cannot cross boundaries between social fields, and how this influences the spillover of social ties into business (Kuwabara et al., 2010; Li & Piezunka, 2020).

The combined effect of relational models with spheres of exchange might be key when entrepreneurs want to decouple resource acquisition from an underlying relationship. Indeed, exchange might be either appropriate or not depending on whether the focus of exchange is on the entrepreneur or on the business as a distinct, impersonal exchange partner. In the first case, exchange is embedded and constrained. In the latter case, it is free to be negotiated anew. Typically, an entrepreneur's friends could agree to exchange, say, work or money on a market pricing basis with the business while continuing to exchange, say, drinks and emotional support with the entrepreneur on an equality matching basis. This would avoid hard feelings if the business fails and resources are lost. To our knowledge, how exchange partners manage or fail to decouple parallel flows of resources has not been investigated.

Normative tie content over time. Our perspective sheds light on the delayed costs of resource acquisition. In parallel, Bridoux & Stoelhorst (2016) showed that Fiske's typology can help analyze stakeholder relationships. This suggests that relations between entrepreneurs and supporters can last far beyond the venture stage. As relationships continue, however, they evolve. How changes in ties' normative content influence resource flows between entrepreneurs and supporters, and then between businesses and stakeholders, is worthy of study.

Family business research is particularly likely to benefit from the bridge that social exchange theory builds between entrepreneurship and stakeholder theory (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Bettinelli, Fayolle, & Randerson, 2014). Normative relationships between relatives who take over a family business generally differ from those that existed among members of the previous generation. For example, a mix of authority ranking and communal sharing between parents and children may be replaced by equality matching between grown–up siblings; authority ranking might play out; and some heirs might prefer to switch to market pricing as

family ties distend. How the shift in the norm of reference (Nason, Mazzelli, & Carney, 2019) is negotiated, and how resources flow between business and family in accordance with this shift, would be a promising way to look at succession. The fit between equity distribution, business structure, and norms informing relations between the passing generation and the new one, or within the new one, might complicate (Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak, & Schoar, 2008) or smooth (Verver & Koning, 2018) this renegotiation of resource flows.

The study of conflict is a related avenue for future research. Given the ambiguity of real-life relationships, three levels of conflict, each with different implications, can be distinguished: conflict about which relational model is relevant to determine terms of exchange, about which facet of this model is activated, or about how the norm corresponding to this facet is enacted. Identifying the norms that each conflicting party refers to might help clarify the stakes and aid conflict resolution (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991).

Implications for network theory

While focusing on entrepreneurship, what I propose in this chapter is adding culture-dependent norms of exchange defined at the level of society to the dyad-level perspective on social networks. These norms are an essential component of "tie content," one that is qualitative rather than quantitative like "tie strength." This perspective highlight the normative embeddedness of social networks (Battilana & Casciaro, 2012; Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Powell & Oberg, 2017) and contrasts with research looking for micro-foundations of network theory from individual and structural perspectives (Tasselli et al., 2015).

Network dynamics and agency. A normative perspective enables us to revisit the interdependence between network structure and tie content. The case of authority ranking is particularly interesting: power and status are group-level phenomena as much as they are relational (Emerson, 1962). But whether asymmetry in dyads leads to centralized network

structures (Homans, 1958), or centralized network structures give power to actors in favorable structural positions (Burt, 1992), is an unsettled debate. It would be interesting to investigate cases where tie content varies without structure being impacted, or vice versa. Indeed, ties can change in content independently from structure (Hite, 2003, 2005; Li & Piezunka, 2020), as when relationship between parents and children, or mentors and apprentices, are progressively replaced through education by more equalitarian relationships. But how do such ties informed by authority ranking become more egalitarian? Does this depend or have an impact on network patterns? Likewise, when asymmetry emerges between peers because one is incapable of matching what the other gives (Mauss, 1924; Park & Kim, 2017), does this leave adjacent ties untouched? Conversely, can normative equality between peers persist at the dyad level when a network becomes more centralized? Under which conditions?

The emergence or disappearance of asymmetry in relationships is certainly influenced by norms defining how a socially defined relationship is supposed to evolve. The case of fostering and coming of age is illustrative. The same kinds of norms might influence the emergence of a relationship by determining which kinds of ties can be created, or not, between which individuals. But what is the relative importance of norms defining which exchange is appropriate versus agentic tie creation and (re)negotiation? Consider that social relationships are normatively defined points at the question of agency in the emergence and evolution social networks (Tasselli & Kilduff, 2020). Relational models are institutionalized at the level of large social groups and societies, so the question of agency would be related to the broader question of embedded agency in institutional theory (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009; Cardinale, 2018; Harmon et al., 2019). I consequently believe that researchers interested in the evolution of entrepreneurial networks over time (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012; Hite, 2005; Larson, 1992; Vissa, 2012), who for now have mostly taken a structural perspective on the matter (Hallen,

Davis, & Murray, 2020), should pay attention to institutionalized norms of exchange facilitating and constraining agentic networking.

Norms of exchange at higher levels of analysis. Studying network dynamics might imply taking our normative perspective on networks from the dyad level of analysis to a higher one. In addition to being defined at the group or societal level, relational models often are interdependent: several normative relational models often come together to draw a coherent set of ties, or "metarelational model" (Fiske, 2012). For example, marrying someone creates a normative spouse/spouse tie, but also a set of normative ties with various in-laws. Normative "templates of network" are likely to constrain agentic networking considerably. For example, it seems difficult to discriminate between structurally equivalent relatives – e.g., to engage in business with one sibling but not the others (Discua Cruz et al., 2013; Kotha & George, 2012). Investigating when members of a network or group are expected to treat each other according to the same norm of exchange and when can they discriminate might clarify why entrepreneurs resort to certain networks or ties rather than other.

An additional complexity is that entrepreneurs' networks are made up of different types of ties (Hite, 2003). The case of family is particularly illustrative of a complex relational model: an entrepreneur may be expected to exchange resources under different conditions, depending on relatives' age, gender, genealogical distance, etc. Complex relational models pose the question of generalized reciprocity (Lévi-Strauss, 1949; Sahlins, 1965): When social networks are dense and exchanges numerous, individuals often expect that what they give will be compensated by resources received from someone else rather than from the person they gave to. How does this work in a network in which relationships differ? Does providing resources to an entrepreneurial great-aunt on an authority ranking basis level up one's debt to a cousin with whom one interacts on an equality matching basis?

The concept of generalized exchange is related to the concept of bonding social capital (Coleman, 1988). I know that bonding social capital – i.e., dense social networks – fosters entrepreneurship and, more generally, economic and social development (Kwon, Heflin, & Ruef, 2013; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994). But our theoretical lens points out that the effect of social networks depends on the norms that inform the ties they are composed of: communal sharing would foster survival but hinder growth; authority ranking might ease the accumulation of resources by high-ranking individuals while discouraging low-status individuals to venture; equality matching, as the example of rotating saving-and-credit associations shows, seems to foster venturing, but perhaps at the price of distracting investment in high-potential ventures to equally support less promising ones. So, norms of social exchange are important to improving our understanding of community entrepreneurship (Johannisson, 1990; Johannisson & Nilsson, 1989; Peredo & Chrisman, 2006) and entrepreneurship at the group or societal level (Hayton, George, & Zahra, 2002). It would be worth checking the links between levels of bonding social capital, the relative importance of each norm in corresponding cultures, and entrepreneurship at the national or regional level (Hayton et al., 2002; Tiessen, 1997). Since each norm has different implications for reciprocation – and, hence, for redistribution of resources created by entrepreneurial activity – norms clearly moderate the relationship between entrepreneurship, economic growth, and social development (Johannisson & Nilsson, 1989).

CONCLUSION

Investigating the mechanism underlying entrepreneurial resource acquisition through social networks, I build on social exchange theory to suggest that entrepreneurial resource acquisition depends on the normative content of entrepreneurs' relationships, in addition to the strength of these relationships and the structure of their networks. I draw attention to four norms

of social exchange that reflect the variety of relationships beyond their culture-dependent labels and can explain the diversity of conditions under which entrepreneurs receive resources from their supporters. I suggest that entrepreneurs do not acquire resources under the same conditions from someone they exchange with on a market pricing, equality matching, authority ranking, or communal sharing basis. I believe this typology can be a useful tool for investigating the unclear relationship between network structure and entrepreneurial outcomes. This new perspective on resource flows along network ties allows us to reconsider concepts such as altruism and reciprocity. It opens new avenue for research in entrepreneurship and, more generally, social networks and social capital.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Beyond the implications discussed at the end of each chapter, my research work over the last years made me further reflect on empirical and theoretical questions that I believe will continue orient my work in the future, and, in my opinion, deserve the attention of other scholars as well. I discuss these more general implications of my work below.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INEQUALITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

First, the SMEs I studied in Rwanda are, for most of them, not the kind of highly innovative businesses Schumpeter and his contemporary followers theorize about. Their impact on socio-economic development is primarily related to the production of rather simple goods and services and income distribution. My study thus reinforces Tobias et al. (2013) proposition that entrepreneurship is a transformative activity even when entrepreneurs are not really "innovative" in the economic or institutional sense (McMullen, 2011).

I observed that young Rwandans having benefited from their parents', uncles' and aunts' jobs in a family business clearly have a level of education and an average income higher than the previous generation, and also than the average population. Entrepreneurs adopting a relatively common business model can clearly change the destiny of an extended family counting hundreds of relatives. The sense of responsibility of these entrepreneurs toward their families creates a bubble of well-being and human development around their firm. By contrast, when entrepreneurs give no or less preference to family candidates to work in their business, the effect of job creation and income distribution is much more diluted and difficult to assess. In this case, the argument that this effect is too diluted to be socially meaningful (Shane, 2009) might hold.

Moreover, within business families, offspring of founders are much better-off than more distant relatives, not to speak about average Rwandans. Concretely, some Rwandans are able

to send their children to European and American universities, while other struggle sending theirs to the local primary school. Some might be able to import fancy European wine while others cannot eat three meals a day. Can such inequality be erased over time, as the number of successful entrepreneurs increases; or have first movers from the 1990s to 2010s created a hereditary class of happy-few who will benefit from better education and easier access to human, social, and financial capital over generations?

My data does not enable me to check. But other studies have shown that some Rwandan families and communities have so far remained excluded from national economic growth (Dawson, 2018). I have not collected testimonies from unhappy relatives and strangers who might suffer from unequal distribution of entrepreneurship benefits. Yet, latent conflict over rare resources seem to be an issue in many families, including between grown-up siblings (Pontalti, 2018). Such a weight of jealousy or, in other words, social competition between members or branches of families, is certainly a sign that income inequality is an unresolved social and political issue. It might well weigh negatively on political stability and social harmony in the long term (Ratzmann, 2018).

Fortunately, there are encouraging hints that bubbles of development blown by successful entrepreneurs around their businesses and families might expand, as young Rwandans who grew up in these bubbles of well-being and are now well-educated and in age to venture seem to embrace their social responsibilities toward the general public.

In any case, the case of Rwanda shows that local entrepreneurs have a key role in distributing the fruits of economic growth in the population. One should thus take their sense of responsibility into account to understand the macro socio-economic effects of entrepreneurship-oriented development policies. While the effects of self-employment on development through income distribution is well-studied (Banerjee et al., 2011; Yunus, 2009), how founders of large businesses – with at least a few, up to a few hundred employees –

contribute to development through income distribution has, to my knowledge, not been empirically investigated yet. This would imply quantitative studies on the socio-economic impact of micro, medium, and large businesses depending on the sense of responsibility and CSR practices of their owner-managers.

THE ROLE OF INCORPORATION IN PROTECTING BUSINESS ASSETS

I have been particularly intrigued by the "decoupling" approach to multiple social responsibilities. This approach has potential drawbacks: while refusing to use their business' assets to help family, entrepreneurs assert their freedom to use or not use resources they control to help their relatives. Not only do they limit it to their personal vs. their business assets; but many also want to be able to choose when to help and when not, rather than merely answering calls to help from relatives. In fact, decoupling entrepreneurs deny family solidarity its compulsory dimension. The risk is obviously that decoupling considerably decreases the significance of family solidarity, as entrepreneurs, and wealthier individuals in general, want to become the only judge of what they should share or not.

On the other hand, separating personal from business responsibility protect nascent businesses from the risk of seeing business assets leak out in extended family networks, as has been so often observed in sub-Saharan Africa (Di Falco & Bulte, 2011; Khavul et al., 2009; Phillips & Bhatia-Panthaki, 2007). In Rwanda, business experts and consultants actively push entrepreneurs to cognitively separate their personal assets from their business'. To do so, they build on the legal fiction (Lawson, 2015; Millon, 1990) that considers business as separate entity, a body corporate.

From this perspective, incorporation is a tool to protect working capital from social networks of solidarity in which entrepreneurs are embedded. This process of normative and cognitive institutionalization of the legal concept of corporate body resonates with recent

research on the personification of organizations (Ashforth, Schinoff, & Brickson, 2019). The Rwandan case suggests that the institutionalization of the personification of organizations might be essential to the development of stable businesses.

This sharply contrasts with dominant scholarly discourse on the history of incorporation legislation, according to which the progressive enlargement of the corporate status from large organization down to the most petty ventures over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries was primarily motivated by the need to protect entrepreneurs' personal assets from the risk of bankruptcy (Butler, 1985; Dunlavy, 2006). In Rwanda today, its main effect is to protect business assets, rather than personal assets. That sheds a new light on the role of corporate law in the emergence and development of modern organizations.

To investigate this phenomenon, it would be necessary to follow entrepreneurs over several years to see if the way they perceive their business (either as a network of people they are personally connected to, or as a separate entity that has its own social relationships) determines success and growth. I figure that this effect could be transgenerational, as conceiving business as a separate entity certainly benefit survival after the founder leaves – whether the business is transmitted to heirs or sold to foreigners. Such study would contribute not only to the theory of the corporation (Lawson, 2015), but also to our understanding of the interface between entrepreneurial and organizational identities (Gioia et al., 2013; Hoang & Gimeno, 2010).

BRIDGING NETWORK AND INSTITUTION THEORIES

Although I focused on entrepreneurship, what I essentially propose in the third chapter of my dissertation is to add culture–dependent norms of exchange defined at the level of society to the dyad-level perspective on social networks. This points at the normative and cognitive institutional embeddedness of social networks (Battilana & Casciaro, 2012; Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Powell & Oberg, 2017), and contrasts with the stream of research looking at

individualist micro–foundations of network theory (Tasselli et al., 2015). The question of agency in social networks (Tasselli & Kilduff, 2020) would thus be related to the broader question of embedded agency in general (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009; Cardinale, 2018; Harmon et al., 2019).

In the third chapter of my dissertation, I suggested that Fiske's typology of norms of social exchange could inspire a typology of elemental institutional logics. Indeed, norms of social exchange would be the relational declination of elemental logics: a logic of power would lead to authority ranking relationships; a logic of love to communal sharing relationships, etc. Fiske only found four fundamental norms of exchange; would this mean that there are only four elemental logics? That is not sure, as the logic of truth, or rightfulness, that seems to be so important in professional or religious logics, does not seem to match with any of Fiske's norms of exchange. In fact, I do not see how this elemental logic could translate into relationships. Boltanski et Thévenot's opinion on what they call "inspiration", which they associate with rightfulness to self, is that it is by essence self-centered, hence a-relational. Other elemental logics that I did not identify yet might also be disconnected from exchange.

However, the idea that network effects are conditioned by institutionalized way to relate to each other is promising. As templates of social relationship would be institutionalized at the societal level, they could play out even if relationships are not inscribed in stable, densely connected networks. As a matter of fact, when meeting a new person, people define their relationships according to socially–defined templates (e.g. being "friend", "colleague", or "supervisor") and are likely to behave accordingly even if nobody is likely to retaliate in case of non–compliance (Constant, Sproull, & Kiesler, 1996; Flynn & Lake, 2008). It might be worth considering how the building over time of relationships between entrepreneurs and supporters is influenced by these socially defined templates (Hite, 2005; Huang et al., 2019; Larson, 1992). Using socially defined templates of relationship as archetypes might also help researchers

analyze dyadic exchange when it is impossible or too difficult to draw the network in which it is embedded, either because of the multiplicity, multiplexity, or dormant character of the social ties networks are so often made of (Kuwabara et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2011; Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012). Institutional theory might thus be a useful complement to structural approaches in studying cross-cultural variation in network effects and networking behavior.

The first task to bridge networks and institutions would be to establish the list of elemental institutions, then to identify how they are declined in relational terms. It is certainly possible to develop quantitative tools enabling to capture the normative content of ties. Then, the institutional theory of networks would enable to cross normative content with structural network features to refine our understanding of network effects. Furthermore, reference to institutionalized templates of relationship would thus certainly benefit research on network dynamics and networking styles, especially in a cross-cultural perspective. For example, qualitative study inspired from interactionism could investigate how people negotiate which relational template they will follow when the first meet, then how they renegotiate the norm informing exchange. This process of "template activation" would certainly be influenced by network structures (Fiske, 2012); again, empirical studies would need a tool to identify which norm governs which tie.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I turned to Rwanda, East-Africa, to investigate how the global push for entrepreneurship interacts with the family institution in a developing country. In the first chapter, I showed that governmental calls to follow business best practices contradict family expectations to receive preferential access to business proceeds. I used the concept of business social responsibility as a lens, and observed that entrepreneurs can feel responsible for several audiences at the same time. I showed that they could articulate their multiple responsibilities

either by nesting them into each other, by balancing the entitlements of each stakeholder, or by strictly decoupling personal responsibility from business responsibility.

In the second chapter, I adopted an institutional logic perspective to investigate individual difference in how entrepreneurs see family. I showed that the family institution in Rwanda does not obey a clear institutional logic; instead, the logical meaning of institutionalized family practices is ambiguous and debated. This led me to suggest that the family logic is neither as monolithic nor as fundamental as it is presented in the literature. I proposed to disconnect logics from fundamental, yet contingent institutions, and explained how this would help understand change and stability in fundamental institutions over long periods of time.

In the third chapter I pushed this idea forward and used social exchange theory to explore how different elemental logics, here declined into norms of social exchange, can influence entrepreneurship and business development. I suggested that network theory should take into account the diversity of norms of exchange to better understand tie content.

My work in Rwanda thus contributes to the literature on corporate social responsibility of SMEs, especially in developing countries. It illustrates the relationship between individual values and CSR, and sheds light on the need to consider the values and sense of responsibility of entrepreneurs, and more generally of economic actors, in the relationship between public policies aiming at development and their social outcomes. On a more theoretical level, my work also contributes to the theory of institutions: my observation that there is no "family logic" in Rwanda hints at the cultural and temporal bias of extant literature on institutional logics and calls for more rigorous, deeper conceptualization and labeling of elemental logics. Finally, the case of Rwandan entrepreneurs and their families led me to bridge institutional and network theory through institutionalized norms of social exchange. I believe this has potential to push our understanding of network effects and networking behavior across cultural contexts further.

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