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Allocation des terres agricoles et gestion des risques de subsistance

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A Jack et Damissa
Au peuple Thaï, dans son chemin vers l'avenir

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Résumé

Cette recherche de doctorat étudie la relation entre la gestion informelle des risques de subsistance et l'allocation des terres agricoles. La gestion informelle des risques de subsistance est analysée ici comme explication potentielle de l'échec des politiques foncières de marché, et de la persistance de modes d'échange 'non-marchands'.
En particulier, nous montrons que la vision bipolaire de l'allocation des terres opposant marchand et non-marchand n'est pas toujours pertinente pour l'analyse de la gestion des risques dans les pratiques foncières. Deux hypothèses sont analysées: en l'absence de moyens d'assurance publique ou privée, la terre prend une valeur de sécurité sociale qui peut détourner les ménages de la vente et leur faire préférer des transferts non-marchands ou temporaires, protégeant mieux la valeur assurance de la terre. Ensuite, des pratiques foncières hybrides, ni purement marchandes ni non-marchandes, se développent pour combiner la gestion des risques de subsistance avec d'autres motivations économiques.
Ces hypothèses sont étudiées dans deux contextes: au Vietnam d'abord où les ménages les plus stables ou subissant des chocs sévères vendent leur terre. En Thaïlande ensuite où, grâce à des données collectées sur le terrain, nous confirmons le rôle des stratégies de gestion des risques de subsistance dans l'activité ralentie des marchés de vente, et identifions ces fameuses pratiques foncières hybrides (ici des locations déguisées). En conclusion, le développement de la protection (privée ou publique) des moyens de subsistance pourrait jouer un rôle privilégié dans l'évolution des modes d'allocation foncière.

Mots clefs : Développement économique, Marchés fonciers, vulnerabilité, pauvreté, risque, agriculture de subsistance, migration, droits de propriété.

Abstract

Informal risk-coping and the allocation of farm land

This PhD research proposes to study the relationship between informal risk-coping strategies and the nature of land allocation. Informal risk-coping mechanisms are studied here as one potential factor in the failure of land market reforms and the persistence of 'non-market' exchange -gifts or free loans. In particular, we show that the bipolar view of land tenure, which opposes 'customary' to 'market' transfers, does not adequately approach informal risk-coping motivations in land transfers. Two hypotheses are analysed: fi rst, in the absence of insurance markets and public social protection, land has a 'safety net' function and households do not sell land but prefer other types of transfers (which retain part of the land's 'safety net' function). Secondly, informal risk-coping leads households to participate to hybrid forms of transfers (neither market nor non-market) allowing to combine risk-coping motives with other types of economic necessities. Those two hypotheses are then looked at empirically in two case studies: in Vietnam, where households sell their land only if they are economically stable or have suffered income shocks (distress sales); and in Thailand, where a survey has been done among permanent rural-urban migrants. This survey confirms that informal risk-coping slows down land sale markets and sustains transfers such as free-loans. Finally, the Thai data identify traditional risk-sharing institutions in the allocation of land, especially through intra-family free-loans or 'disguised rentals'. As a main conclusion, insurance and public protection policies could have a key role in the evaluation of land allocation systems in Thailand and Vietnam.

Key Words: land market, vulnerability, poverty, income shocks, subsistence agriculture, migration, property rights.

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Introduction générale

"*It is this 'safety-first' principle which lies behind a great many of the technical, social, and moral arrangements of a precapitalist agrarian order. The use of more than one seed variety, the European traditional farming on scattered strips, to mention only two, are classical techniques on avoiding undue risks often at the cost of a reduction in average return. Within the village context, a wide array of social arrangements typically operated to assure a minimum income to inhabitants.*"
James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, 1976, p.5.

" *In many instances, households are reluctant to give up agriculture, or at least their land, even when they have access to better-paid, and possibly higher-status, non-farm work. It seems that rural people, inured over the years to the risk of instability and collapse, continue to value diversity for the stability it can bring to household livelihood.*"
Jonathan Rigg, Evolving Rural-Urban Relations and Livelihoods, 2003.

James Scott est l'un des premiers auteurs à avoir souligné le rôle de l'instabilié des moyens de subsistance dans les décisions prises par les ménages des pays en développement. Ces derniers organisent leur vie économique de manière à réduire le risque de chocs économiques graves qui affecteraient leur consommation, et contre lesquels ils ne sont assurés ni par l'Etat, ni par le marché. En sciences économiques, cette perspective a été traduite par le concept d'aversion au risque puis de vulnérabilité; et a apporté une vision renouvelée de la pauvreté et de sa résilience dans le temps. Le concept de vulnérabilité à la pauvreté s'apparente à une évaluation *ex ante* de la probabilité d'être pauvre qui tient compte de la variabilité des ressources ainsi que du

seuil de pauvreté. Les ménages passant en dessous de ce seuil risquent d'adopter des solutions d'urgence avec des conséquences parfois lourdes sur le long terme, notamment lorsque se créent des trappes à pauvreté. C'est donc la crainte d'évènements catastrophiques et difficilement surmontables qui contraint les ménages à mettre en place des stratégies économiques et sociales conservatrices, parfois coûteuses, et interdisant des opportunités plus profitables (Dercon, 2002, 2004). En l'absence d'un marché de l'assurance ou d'une sécurité sociale publique performante, on peut alors interpréter certains phénomènes à priori irrationnels (Chayanov, 1966) ou non efficients comme des stratégies *'second best'* visant à maintenir un niveau minimum de subsistance et éviter les évènements catastrophiques.

Les concepts de vulnérabilité et de chocs de subsistance ont été appliqués à de nombreux domaines de l'économie du développement. Le choix des variétés en agriculture (Dercon, 1996; Ghadim et al., 2005), le type d'activité économique entreprise par un ménage, la migration économique (Ellis, 1998; Halliday, 2006), l'assiduité des enfants à l'école (Rosati et al., 2003), les pratiques de don et contre-don (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), ont tous été analysés à la loupe de l'aversion au risque et de la réaction face aux chocs de subsistance. Bien que très médiatisée et étudiée, l'allocation des droits de propriété sur les terres agricoles a pour sa part été rarement lue à travers le prisme du risque et de la vulnérabilité. Les quelques études existantes manquent de validation empiriques ou ne portent que sur des applications très spécifiques. Selon Rigg (2003), l'accès à la terre semble pourtant jouer un rôle essentiel dans la stabilité économique des ménages et leur résilience face à des chocs potentiels.

La question foncière: des marchés fonciers inefficients ou des marchés fonciers manquants?

Depuis la fin des années 1980, la recherche sur la question foncière a ainsi identifié le marché comme un moyen efficace de redistribution des terres (Deininger and Feder, 2001). Pour encourager la formation de ces marchés, les politiques foncières se sont orientées vers la privatisation et la formalisation des droits de propriété, dans l'objectif de réduire les coûts de transaction et de promouvoir les incitations

productives. Ces politiques n'ont cependant pas toujours eu les effets escomptés. Les marchés fonciers ont parfois eu des effets distributifs dommageables, par exemple en consolidant une distribution initiale inefficace ou inéquitable (Carter and Mesbah, 1993; De Janvry et al., 2001). On peut parler d'un effet 'inefficient' des marchés fonciers. Ensuite, les politiques foncières n'ont pas nécéssairement permis de développer l'activité des marchés fonciers (Migot-Adholla, 1991; Platteau, 2000). Des pays sans droits de propriété privée légalement établis peuvent connaître des marchés dynamiques, tandis que d'autres peuvent avoir des marchés fonciers à l'arrêt malgré des programmes de titrisation de grande ampleur. On peut parler d'un effet 'marchés manquants'. Ce dernier phénomène est encore plus flagrant sur le marché des ventes, généralement peu utilisé comme moyen d'échange des terres. Dans les faits, la littérature a passé plus de temps à expliquer l'effet 'inneficient' des marchés fonciers que celui des 'marchés manquants'.

Au delà de la question du contexte politique et institutionnel, les effets mitigés des politiques foncières de marché ont été interprétés comme une propagation des défaillances d'un marché vers d'autres marchés. Selon cette perspective de *marchés interconnectés*[1] (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982), les imperfections des marchés du crédit ou du travail peuvent occasionner des effets secondaires sur les marchés fonciers, soit en instaurant des équilibres inefficients (effet 'inefficient'), soit en détournant l'allocation foncière vers des modes d'échange non-marchands tels que les prêts, les dons, ou une organisation communautaire de l'allocation des terres (effet 'marchés manquants'). La littérature a notamment analysé avec attention l'effet d'une défaillance du marché du crédit sur les marchés fonciers: la terre prend alors valeur de collatéral, ce qui peut enrayer la convergence de la demande et de l'offre de terres, et favoriser l'accès aux terres des plus gros propriétaires (Binswanger et al., 1995; Carter and Zimmerman, 2000).

[1] traduction du terme anglais *interlinked markets*

Selon cette même perspective, l'echec des marchés assurantiels et une protection sociale inexistante pourraient aussi perturber le développement des marchés fonciers. En effet, en l'absence de garanties privées ou publiques des moyens de subsistance, l'accès à des terres cultivables peut être compris comme une stratégie 'assurantielle': la terre participe d'abord au lissage de la consommation par un accès privilégié au crédit ou à sa valeur liquide -on parle alors de vente de détresse. Ensuite, la terre fournit un filet de protection sociale grâce à la production de nourriture ou à une génération indépendante de revenus par la production agricole.

Le poids potentiel de la vulnérabilié et des chocs de subsistance n'a cependant pas totalement échappé à l'attention de la recherche sur les questions foncières. Deux courants majeurs l'ont notamment intégré dans leur étude des comportements fonciers. Le premier courant reprend l'idée des marchés interconnectés à la Braverman and Stiglitz (1982): la nécessité de se protéger contre les risques de subsistance y est alors interprétée comme une défaillance du marché de l'assurance perturbant le marché de la terre. Deux effets de transmission du marché de l'assurance vers le marché foncier ont éte identifiés: sur le marché de faire-valoir indirect -locatif- c'est d'abord le choix de contrats de métayage plutôt que de fermage, dans une logique de partage du risque entre locataire et propriétaire (Newberry and Stiglitz, 1979; Otsuka et al., 1992). Sur le marché de faire-valoir direct, ce sont ensuite des ventes de détresse que les ménages adoptent pour lisser leur consommation suite à des chocs économiques récurrents ou de grande ampleur (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; Ruben and Masset, 2003). Cette interconnexion entre marchés de l'assurance et foncier a été plus fréquemment appliquée à l'effet 'inefficient' du marché. Et même si une extension analytique à l'effet 'marchés manquants' pourrait facilement être mise à jour, il existe peu d'articles théoriques ou empiriques pour en vérifier l'intuition. Ensuite, cette analyse ignore la question des droits de propriété et de leur complexité, en prenant pour hypothèse implicite l'existence de droits de propriété privée au sens de Demsetz (1967), c'est-à-dire constitués d'un faisceau complet de droits de propriété dans les mains d'une entité de décision individuelle.

Le deuxième courant consiste en une analyse institutionnelle des droits de propriété,

qui explique l'émergence d'institutions non-marchandes d'allocation des terres par la nécessité de garantir les moyens de subsistance des ménages. On peut par exemple citer la propriété communautaire qui fournit un accès minimum et égalitaire aux ressources foncières, et peut être interprétée comme un filet de sécurité sociale (Fafchamps, 1992; Platteau, 2005). Peu d'études empiriques ont cherché à confirmer ces intuitions. Par ailleurs, cette lecture institutionnelle dans une perspective de droits de propriété s'est souvent concentrée sur les modes d'allocation foncière traditionnels, en faisant abstraction de l'influence de la gestion des risques de subsistance sur le fonctionnement des marchés fonciers eux-mêmes.

Objectif général de la thèse

L'apport principal de cette thèse de doctorat est de concilier à la fois une analyse institutionnelle des droits de propriété (inspirée de travaux tels que Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Colin, 2008), et des interconnexions entre différents marchés, dans le but de faire apparaître la garantie des moyens de subsistance comme un élément crucial des pratiques foncières marchandes et non-marchandes. Le résultat d'une telle approche pourrait permettre de jeter un nouveau regard sur les politiques foncières de marché dans des environnements où ni assurance privée ni sécurité sociale publique n'offrent de garanties de survie aux ménages subissant des chocs économiques graves. Si l'accès à la terre est bien un moyen d'assurance face à des chocs économiques potentiels, les conséquences pourraient alors être significatives. Cette perspective pourrait en effet permettre à la fois de comprendre les inefficacités observées sur les marchés fonciers existants, et l'effet 'marchés manquants'. Au final, la question des stratégies mises en place pour faire face aux risques de subsistance pourrait aussi offrir de nouvelles perspectives, surtout lorsque leur succès dépend de conditions institutionnelles, économiques et sociales souvent inéxistantes.

Chapitre 1. Aversion au risque et allocation foncière: une revue de la littérature

Le premier chapitre de la thèse revient sur une littérature morcelée et inspirée d'un cadre Demsetzien (1967, 2002) des droits de propriété pour analyser les risques de subsistance dans les pratiques foncières. Ce cadre Demsetzien propose une vision biaisée des droits de propriété qui sépare le monde en deux pôles: le monde de la propriété communautaire et le monde de la propriété privée. Les droits de propriété communautaires sont gérés collectivement et produisent de l'échange non-marchand basé sur des normes de réciprocité plutôt que sur des incitations productives. Les droits de propriété privée sont quant à eux détenus par des entités individuelles et défendus par une autorité centralisée (l'Etat), ce qui favorise le développement des marchés et une allocation efficace de la ressource foncière. On a donc la confrontation de deux organisations foncières: la première est marchande, et la deuxième non-marchande. La théorie évolutionniste des droits de propriété (Demsetz, 1967; Boserup, 1965; Platteau, 1996) prédit une évolution linéaire et endogène vers un régime de propriété privée, si certaines conditions sont réunies (dont la rareté de la terre, l'évolution des technologies et la commercialisation des cultures). Les études considérant le risque comme un facteur important de l'allocation foncière ont alors souvent analysé chacun de ces deux pôles séparément: soit en associant partage des risques et réciprocité non-marchande; soit en soulignant le rôle des marchés de l'assurance sur le marché foncier, sous une hypothèse de droits de propriété privés et formels. De nombreuses recherches ont cependant démontré que les deux pôles décrits par la théorie - échange marchand et non-marchand - sont rarement constatés tels quels sur le terrain; et que la réalité foncière semble plutôt se conformer à des régimes hybrides de propriété et d'allocation des terres, fonctionnant de manière plus ou moins flexible, et suivant des évolutions divergentes en fonction de l'environnement naturel et économique (Sjaastad, 2003; Benjaminsen and Lund, 2003; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Colin, 2008).

A partir de ce constat, **le premier chapitre** introduit deux hypothèses qui seront analyées empiriquement dans le reste de la thèse. Tout d'abord, l'accès au faisceau de droits sur la terre est déterminant pour garantir la subsistance des ménages en cas de choc économique: la terre permet d'accéder à de la nourriture et à des

revenus agricoles indépendants (Maxwell and Wiebe, 1998); elle facilite les crédits de consommation (Udry, 1990; Morduch, 1995); peut servir de réserve de valeur (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; De Janvry et al., 2001); et entre dans le fonctionnement complexe des réseaux de partage du risque. Ces différents aspects de la garantie foncière (ou d'un 'filet de protection sociale foncier') dépendent de différentes parties du faisceau de droits de propriété sur la terre. L'accès à la nourriture implique par exemple de détenir un droit d'usage sur la terre; alors que l'obtention d'un crédit par collatéralisation de l'actif foncier implique de disposer du droit d'aliénation[2]. En fonction de l'importance donnée à la terre dans les moyens de subsistance, les ménages peuvent alors se montrer réticents à transférer l'ensemble de leurs droits de manière permanente et irreversible. Ainsi, des ménages quittant l'agriculture pour des activités hors-ferme peuvent repousser la décision de vente des terres et favoriser d'autres modes de transferts tels que des contrats locatifs ou des arrangements non-marchands de types prêts, dons ou héritages anticipés. La location permet par exemple de conserver un accès au crédit, et dans une moindre mesure un retour à la terre - le droit d'usage n'étant transféré que temporairement. Les prêts possèdent ces mêmes avantages, mais ils peuvent en plus renforcer l'insertion des ménages dans leurs réseaux de partage de risque, surtout lorsque les prêts entrent dans des relations de quasi-crédit ou de réciprocité au sein des familles ou des clans.

Au niveau agrégé, l'existence d'une valeur 'protection contre les risques' encastrée dans la propriété foncière pourrait limiter le développement des marchés fonciers, en rendant les ventes de terre moins attractives que les dons ou prêts. A l'échelle des ménages, la vente de terre serait alors réservée aux ménages économiquement stables (ceux qui sont engagés dans des activités hors-ferme stables, ou qui ont des moyens alternatifs d'assurance à disposition).

Ensuite, la littérature économique a largement étudié les différents contrats locatifs choisis par les ménages, dans un arbitrage fermage vs. métayage. Cette littérature a cependant laissé de côté les échanges temporaires et non-marchands de terres -les prêts. Or, il est possible que la frontière entre échanges temporaires marchands (locatifs) et non-marchands (prêts) soit poreuse, notamment entre le métayage et certains prêts. Intégrer la possibilité de prêts gratuits des terres dans l'analyse des arrangements fonciers temporaires - surtout dans des contextes où ces prêts gra-

[2]on voit donc comment des analyses des droits de propriété de type Schlager and Ostrom (1992) peuvent affiner la perception des effets des risques de subsistance sur les pratiques foncières

tuits sont courants - pourrait permettre de mieux comprendre le rôle du partage des risques dans les contrats locatifs. Depuis l'intuition première de Newberry and Stiglitz (1979), les travaux empiriques ont en effet eu du mal à prouver l'existence de motivations de partage de risques dans le métayage, avec des conclusions souvent très contastées en fonction des pays et des outils empiriques utilisés (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Ackerberg and Botticini, 2000; Allen and Lueck, 1995; Aggarwal, 2007). Le chapitre justifie donc le recours à une analyse plus poussée des contrats d'échange des droits de propriété, qui n'établirait pas de séparation *ex ante* entre les transactions marchandes et non-marchandes. Pour des recherches futures, on pourrait alors concevoir un continuum de contrats fonciers temporaires ayant des liens plus ou moins importants avec la volonté de partager les risques entre tenants et propriétaires.

Deux cas d'étude: Thaïlande et Vietnam

Les chapitres 2, 3, 4 et 5 proposent donc d'étudier empiriquement ces deux hypothèses à partir d'études de cas localisées au Vietnam (chapitre 2) et en Thaïlande (chapitre 3). Ces pays ont été propices aux recherches sur les risques de subsistance et les mécanismes mis en place pour y faire face. Des travaux fondateurs comme ceux de Scott (1976) ou Lipton (1985), ou plus récents comme le travail de Townsend ou Paxon (1992), ont d'ailleurs été inspirés par la situation au Vietnam et en Thaïlande. Ces deux pays partagent par ailleurs des caractéristiques communes, notamment en termes climatiques et agronomiques avec des agricultures dominées par la riziculture et la mousson; mais ont évolué dans des contextes historiques, institutionnels et culturels suffisamment différents pour rendre leur confrontation pertinente.

Chapitre 2. Analyse empirique sur le Vietnam

Le chapitre 2 étudie, dans le cadre du Vietnam, l'hypothèse d'une réduction de l'offre de terre sur le marché du faire-valoir direct, en réponse à une volonté de

garantir les moyens de subsistance grâce à la propriété foncière. La réforme foncière de 1993 au Vietnam a en effet légalisé les transferts fonciers de type vente, location, héritage, prêts ou dons, après des décennies de collectivisation sous le régime communiste. La littérature économique s'est beaucoup intéressée à l'effet de cette réforme sur les marchés fonciers au Vietnam, et sur son potentiel en termes de développement économique (Van de Walle and Cratty, 2004; Deininger and Jin, 2008). Le consensus scientifique actuel indique que les marchés locatifs de type fermage et métayage ont généralement eu plus d'effets positifs que les marchés de vente. Les marchés de vente sont notamment accusés de ne redistribuer qu'une faible part de la surface agricole utile et de favoriser la concentration ou les inégalités foncières. Ce chapitre propose de regarder si, parce que détenir de la terre aide les ménages à se prémunir contre des risques de subsistance graves, ces derniers préfèrent louer, prêter ou même donner plutôt que vendre leur terre lorsqu'ils ne la cultivent plus. Plus précisément, le chapitre regarde si des ménages stables économiquement (ou moins dépendants de leur terre pour se protéger des risques) vendent leur terre plus fréquemment que d'autres. Afin de tester cette hypothèse, ce chapitre utilise la base de données Vietnamese Access to Ressource Household Survey (VARHS), collectée en 2006 par le Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM), le Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), l'Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development (IPSARD), and l'Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) avec la collaboration de Danida (Danish International Development Assistance) et de l'Université de Copenhague. Ces données sont singulières parce qu'elles réunissent des informations précieuses sur les risques subis par les ménages et sur les transferts fonciers marchands et non-marchands auxquels ils participent. La décision de vendre étant le résultat de deux décisions simultanées (ne pas cultiver la terre et choisir de transférer ces droits par vente plutôt que par location, prêt ou don), le chapitre estime la probabilité de choisir la vente comme mode de transfert, en fonction de la stabilité économique des ménages et d'une série de variables de contrôle. L'estimation corrige pour un biais de sélection dans la décision de ne pas cultiver la terre (et donc de la transférer par n'importe quel moyen). Les résultats confirment que les ménages avec une plus forte stabilité économique transfèrent plus fréquemment leurs terres, et retrouve l'existence de ventes de détresse dans l'échantillon de ménages observé.

Une étude de terrain auprès des migrants de l'exode rural en Thaïlande

Les trois chapitres suivants (3, 4 et 5) sont basés sur une étude de terrain menée en Thaïlande au deuxième semestre 2010. L'objectif d'une telle étude de terrain était double: dans un premier temps, pallier à l'absence de données thaïlandaises regroupant arrangements fonciers et garanties des moyens de subsistance; ensuite, obtenir une vision plus précise et approfondie de la nature de ces arrangements fonciers et de leur potentiel assurantiel; finalement, obtenir une alternative à la correction d'un biais de sélection par la méthode de Heckman (utilisée dans le chapitre 2) en étudiant une population sortie de l'agriculture et face à la seule décision du type d'arrangement à mettre en place, i.e les migrants permanents de l'exode rural. Étudier les arrangements fonciers au sein d'une population de migrants permanents comporte plusieurs avantages: comme il a déjà été mentionné, on n'observe que le choix du type d'arrangement foncier sans le 'bruit' du choix d'activité économique et de culture de la terre[3]; ensuite, on observe une plus grande quantité de transferts avec moins de moyens et de temps d'enquête; l'hétérogénéité dans la vulnérabilité face aux chocs économiques est plus importante chez les migrants que dans une population rurale classique; et finalement, il existe peu d'études empiriques sur la relation entre exode rural et marchés fonciers, notamment pour le marché des ventes. En plus de son objet principal, une telle étude de terrain peut donc apporter quelques pierres à une thématique encore peu étudiée.

L'étude de terrain a été réalisée en deux phases de février à août 2010, avec un budget de 8000 euros et la collaboration institutionnelle de la faculté d'économie agricole de l'Université de Khon Kaen. La premiére phase est une enquête semi-structurée dans des villages ruraux de la région du Nord-Est (*Isan*), avec pour objectif de caractériser qualitativement les arrangements fonciers choisis par les migrants en les observant à la source, c'est-à-dire à l'emplacement de la terre elle-même. Il était initialement prévu de partir des terres pour remonter ensuite à leurs propriétaires migrants. Cette stratégie s'est malheureusement révélée difficile à mettre en oeuvre dans le temps et les moyens impartis: en effet, les informateurs locaux ont refusé de

[3]En échange, la généralisation des résultats à la population entière est sujette à caution.

révéler l'identité et le contact des migrants propriétaires[4]. A la place, les enquêtes qualitatives ont donc été menées (en présence d'un traducteur[5]) avec les membres de la famille du migrant, et de préférence les personnes utilisant la terre du migrant. Dans les cas où les terres avaient été vendues, les personnes interrogées étaient des membres de la famille la plus proche possible du ménage migrant. Au total, des informations ont été recueillies sur 34 migrants dans 6 villages différents de la province de Khon Kaen, concernant leur situation économique telle que présentée par les répondants ainsi que les arrangements fonciers mis en place. Les répondants ont aussi été interrogés sur leur propre perception des pratiques foncières mises en place par les migrants.

La seconde phase de l'enquête est de nature quantitative, avec pour objectif de réunir une base de données suffisamment large et pertinente en vue de tests économétriques. Ces données ont été collectées à Bangkok en collaboration avec une équipe de 4 enquêteurs de l'Universié Kaseathsart (Bangkok). En l'absence de recensement national récent, l'échantillon final a été bâti sur plusieurs techniques d'échantillonage différentes. Tout d'abord, la population sélectionnée devait répondre aux trois critères suivants: avoir été propriétaire d'une terre au moment de la migration, avoir migré avec l'ensemble du ménage; et avoir migré de façon permanente. Ces critères visent à s'assurer que le ménage interrogé a ou a déjà eu une terre disponible au transfert, et qu'il ne cultive donc plus. Par ailleurs, pour garantir une certaine cohérence avec l'enquête semi-structurée de la première phase, les migrants sélectionnés étaient tous originaires de l'*Isan* (Nord-Est de la Thaïlande)[6].

Ensuite, diverses techniques de sélection des répondants ont été mises en oeuvre: une partie de l'échantillon a par exemple été obtenue par *snowballing*, c'est-à-dire qu'un certain nombre de répondants choisis au hasard donnent le contact d'un autre migrant qui est interrogé à son tour. Des rues et des lieux de travail ont aussi été choisis au hasard et systématiquement recensés. Finalement, les enquêteurs ont eu recours à ce que l'on appelle *'accidental sampling'*, c'est-à-dire un parcours aléatoire

[4]La raison principale de ce refus à donner le contact des migrants était la crainte d'une escroquerie, dans une environnement général de faible degré de confiance dans les intervenants extérieurs.

[5]l'enquêteur (moi-même) comprenant le thaï mais le parlant insuffisamment pour mener l'enquête, le traducteur restait nécessaire mais ne pouvait détourner l'information.

[6]Les différentes régions thaïlandaise affichent des dialectes et des pratiques foncières assez différentes. Ainsi, l'histoire que l'enquête semi-structurée a permis de saisir dans le Nord-est n'est peut-être pas valable, ou pas exactement dans ces termes, dans une autre région du pays.

au cours duquel les répondants visibles sont interviewés.

C'est, à notre connaissance, la première enquête de cette taille réalisée auprès des migrants installés à Bangkok. Ce qui n'est d'ailleurs pas surprenant, vu les difficultés rencontrées dans une telle entreprise: les répondants travaillant souvent 6 à 7 jours sur 7, il leur était difficile de nous accorder du temps[7]. Ensuite, la vie d'un migrant à Bangkok comporte des dangers significatifs, et la confiance est généralement assez basse envers toute personne qui n'appartient pas à un réseau de connaissances proches. Le questionnaire a donc dû jongler avec la volonté d'obtenir des données précises, et le risque de faire face à un refus de réponse de la part des personnes interviewées. Quant aux interviews effectuées dans les bidonvilles ou quartiers difficiles, elles comportaient des risques pour les enquêteurs eux-mêmes, gênant parfois le bon déroulement des entretiens. Enfin, le conflit entre chemises rouges et chemises jaunes et la répression militaire des mouvements d'avril et mai 2010 ont failli mettre un terme au déroulement de l'enquête. Beaucoup de militants des chemises rouges, dont le mouvement a été réprimé dans le sang, étaient des migrants originaires du Nord-Est: dans certains 'bastions' rouges, notre enquête était alors interprétée comme une stratégie du gouvernement visant à arrêter les militants. Malgré ces difficultés, la seconde phase du terrain est finalement parvenue à récolter 467 questionnaires avec des informations de bonne qualité.

Le questionnaire recense les informations suivantes sur le ménage: ses caractéristiques démographiques; l'historique de sa migration, sa situation avant migration, et la cause de la migration; le type d'activité économique du ménage, son revenu, sa consommation, son épargne, son accès au crédit, ou ses dettes; les chocs auxquels le ménage a dû faire face et sa protection sociale et privée; ses relations avec de potentiels réseaux de partage du risque à la fois dans son village d'origine et dans son milieu urbain; la nature de ses relations avec les membres de sa famille dans le village d'origine (remises et fréquence des visites); la nature des terres détenues en termes de qualité, de type de culture, et de droits de propriété; et la manière dont ces terres ont été transférées. Pour chaque type de transfert, des informations ont été récoltées sur la nature précise de l'arrangement. Par ailleurs, pour les ménages ayant vendu des terres, les données sur certaines caractéristiques essentielles telles que le revenu, la consommation, l'épargne etc. ont été collectées pour représenter

[7]Imposant alors un questionnaire de moins d'une demi-heure.

aussi la situation avant que la vente n'ait eu lieu. Certaines informations ont dû être sacrifiées pour éviter des refus de réponse ou des réactions de rejet, comme par exemple le prix de la terre, le nom et la localisation du village d'origine ou les montants précis des crédits obtenus. Le questionnaire en thaïlandais est proposé en annexe[8].
Les chapitre 3, 4 et 5 sont issus de cette étude de terrain.

Chapitre 3. Une étude qualitative des transferts fonciers des migrants en Thaïlande

Le chapitre 3 recense les principaux résultats de l'enquête semi-structurée dans les 6 villages thaïlandais. L'enquête confirme un marché de faire-valoir direct très peu développé dans le Nord-Est de la Thaïlande et de très rares décisions de vente face à une forte volonté d'achat. Cette caractéristique se retrouve également chez les migrants, qui choisissent beaucoup plus rarement les ventes comme mode de transferts, au profit principalement de prêts dits 'gratuits'. Cette première partie de l'enquête de terrain suggère que les ventes entraînent une coupure beaucoup plus profonde du 'filet de sécurité sociale' fourni par la terre, que ne le font les locations et les prêts. En particulier, le prêt gratuit ou quasi-gratuit permet au ménage migrant de maintenir des liens solides avec son réseau de partage du risque, généralement composé des membres du réseau matrilinéaire proche. L'enquête de terrain révèle également que la relation existant entre le migrant et la personne recevant la terre est essentielle pour évaluer correctement l'importance de la perte des mécanismes d'assurance liée aux transferts de terres. La vente des terres à de la famille peut par exemple favoriser le maintien des mécanismes de réciprocité, ou même rendre une vente réversible. Le chapitre indique finalement que les transferts utilisés par les migrants, qu'ils soient marchands ou non, qu'ils impliquent une contrepartie significative ou non, doivent être compris à travers le prisme de droits de propriété encastrés, individuels en apparence mais associés en réalité au réseau matrilinéaire proche, notamment du fait des héritages *inter-vivos* et *post-mortem*.

[8]Il n'existe pas de version en anglais.

Chapitre 4. Valeur 'filet de sécurité sociale' de la terre et décision de vente: une étude économétrique

Le chapitre 4 utilise la base de données quantitative obtenue auprès des migrants à Bangkok pour tester l'hypothèse d'un impact du 'filet de sécurité sociale' foncier sur la décision de vendre des migrants. Dans le même ordre d'idée qu'au chapitre 2, on regarde si les migrants économiquement plus stables sont aussi plus susceptibles de vendre leurs terres que les autres. Les résultats suggèrent l'importance des stratégies de garantie des moyens de subsistance dans les décisions de vendre des migrants permanents de l'exode rural: on confirme à la fois que la valeur 'filet de sécurité sociale' de la terre puisse réduire la propension à vendre de ménages plus vulnérables, et l'existence de ventes de détresses parmi ceux qui ont subi des chocs économiques importants. Ces résultats ne peuvent être étendus à une population autre que celles des migrants car ces derniers possèdent des caractéristiques particulières en terme d'aversion au risque et d'accès à la terre. Combinés aux résultats du chapitre 2 sur la population rurale au Vietnam, ils donnent cependant crédit à l'idée que les ménages puissent vouloir éviter à tout prix la vente, tant qu'ils n'ont pas accès à des moyens alternatifs pour se protéger des aléas économiques.

Chapitre 5. Une étude des transferts temporaires de terre, ou pourquoi dépasser une typologie type 'prêt' - 'location'

Le dernier chapitre 5 est une extension de la recherche présentée dans cette thèse. Il propose que la volonté de se prémunir contre des risques de subsistance peut avoir des effets sur le choix d'arrangements temporaires de type prêt ou location. Ce chapitre utilise une typologie des arrangements fonciers dépassant les catégories binaires 'prêt' ou 'location', à travers l'étude de trois aspects fondamentaux de l'échange de terre: la relation existant entre les parties de l'échange, la nature monétaire de la contrepartie, et sa valeur explicite (ou implicite). Cette typologie est ensuite appliquée à notre base de données thaïlandaise et permet de dégager cinq

catégories de transferts: les prêts gratuits, les prêts avec une contrepartie volontaire, les prêts avec une contrepartie obligatoire, le métayage, et le fermage. Une analyse économétrique simple est ensuite mise en oeuvre pour tenter d'identifier certaines motivations centrales dans le choix de ces pratiques foncières. Les résultats suggèrent que la recherche de garanties des moyens de subsistance peut conduire les migrants à préférer les échanges de type prêt aux échanges de type location. Mais cette volonté de protéger ses moyens de subsistance peut aussi générer des pratiques de 'location déguisée', c'est-à-dire des arrangements locatifs déguisés en prêts dans une logique de légitimisation sociale et de sauvegarde des relations avec les membres du réseau de partage des risques (la famille élargie). Malgré la simplicité des estimations économétriques, ces résultats ouvrent de nouvelles pistes de recherche sur l'aversion au risque dans les échanges temporaires des droits de propriété.

Chapter 1

Risk-coping and land tenure: A review of the literature

1.1 INTRODUCTION

> *"Capitalism relies heavily on markets and private property rights to resolve conflicts over the use of scarce resources. These fundamental characteristics of an idealized capitalistic system have been taken for granted by most mainstream economists even though the discipline of economics developed contemporaneously with Western style capitalism."*
> Alchian and Demsetz, 1973.

The main paradigm guiding land reform since the 1980's relies on the belief that individual and formalized rights on land are a guarantee of economic development, as they allow tenure security and an efficient allocation of land resources through markets. In the aftermath of the fall of the USSR and in the wave of market reforms under the Washington consensus, land policies therefore took the form of titling programs, with the explicit aim of enhancing land markets, and through these markets, of improving land use and productivity in order to stimulate growth. Land market development was essential to the process of reform, as it was believed to be the most efficient land allocation mechanism.

These land market reforms, however, have produced fairly mixed results, as acknowledged in the empirical literature. First, the efficiency effects expected by the stimulation of land markets were not always observed (Carter and Mesbah, 1993;

De Janvry et al., 2001; Deininger, 2003). Secondly, land policies often failed to turn traditional land allocation regimes into markets. In some cases, land markets took off even if land reform had not been implemented and rights were still customary (Andre and Platteau, 1998; Migot-Adholla, 1991) ; in other cases, land markets were lacking and remained quite unaffected by intensive efforts of land right formalization (Migot-Adholla, 1991; Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994; Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994b).

Many explanations have been put forth to this apparent lack of effect, or even failure, of such titling policies to create an efficient allocation of land through markets. It is actually one of the development issues that has been receiving the most attention from the research community. Among the papers which attempted to understand how market policy led to the observed outcomes, some have suggested that the informal risk-coping mechanisms made available through land access and governing customary rules in traditional village economies are an important explanation to the evolution of land right allocation systems (Platteau, 2005; Sjaastad, 2003).

The informal risk-coping mechanisms implemented in the absence of insurance markets or public social protection have received much attention in the literature; and the terms used to refer to the concept of informal risk-coping are diverse (Dercon, 2002). In this chapter, informal risk-coping is defined as all the devices individually or socially implemented which have the purpose of limiting households' vulnerability to livelihood shocks when private or public insurance are missing. The definition includes both individual practices such as saving, credit, or income diversification; and informal social institutions with the aim of spreading or sharing risk. The definition also combines safety nets - safeguarding minimum levels of subsistence - with consumption smoothing -reducing the variance of consumption over time. However, although the intuition of risk-coping motives in land tenure is frequently mentioned in basic terms, the theoretical and empirical research pertaining to its precise mechanisms and quantifiable outcomes on land allocation and economic efficiency is scattered and still in infancy.

The objective of this chapter is thus threefold. First, on a critical methodological basis, it looks at potential explanations to the lack of a coherent and detailed theory dealing with the impact of risk-coping motives on the nature of land arrangement. Secondly, this research aims at a review of this thin and spread out literature which has, through a wide array of perspectives and methodologies, made a connection

between two of the broadest segments in development economics: the land tenure literature, and the research on risk-coping behaviors in developing countries. Finally, once the general picture of current knowledge has been given, the chapter attempts to identify a few avenues and hypotheses to expand current research.

The dominant private property right paradigm, also called the standard theory of property rights (Demsetz, 1967; Libecap, 1989), creates a bipolarization of land allocation systems between market, and customary (or non-market), allocation of land. Market allocation systems work along private State-enforced ownership and the price mechanism, while customary allocation systems work along communal informal ownership and 'non-market' motivations in exchange. This classification into two well-defined systems nonetheless misrepresents the complexity of land arrangements, which are generally found to be composite forms combining both market and non-market features (Sjaastad, 2003).

First, the chapter argues that this standard bipolar view of land tenure has shaped the research on informal risk-coping motives and land allocation systems. In a first stream of literature, risk-coping motives have been circumscribed to the sphere of customary (non-market) systems of land tenure, in line with a large section of the economic thinking which sees social or equity motivations as an attribute of non-market institutions. In a second stream of literature, informal risk-coping has been looked at as a disrupting factor generating imperfections in the sphere of market allocation systems. However, in the end, the analysis of risk coping in land tenure has confined itself to treating risk-coping motives separately in each of the two polars of land tenure, i.e. customary vs. market, within the bipolar view of the standard theory of land rights. Because of this, the literature is barely sufficient to provide a coherent framework as to how and how much risk-coping matters. It has however provided piecemeal but precisely analyzed evidence that the risk-coping function provided by access to land can influence the nature of land transactions and the allocation design.

Thus, this chapter further proposes that, in line with Sjaastad (2003) or Colin (2008), if we consider the land tenure system as a vast continuum of practices combining both market and customary features rather than as a bipolar organism, informal risk-coping considerations might help explain some of the unexpected outcomes resulting from land market reform. It is also suggested that in the current state of knowledge, in-depth field researches, as well as careful empirical analysis are first

necessary to help provide a more general, although not structuralist, perspective on the significance of informal risk-coping endeavor in land allocation systems.
The next section (1.2) of the chapter presents the standard theory of property rights and explains how it has confined informal risk-coping motives to the sphere of customary allocation systems. The third section (1.3) presents some of the ideas that emerged from the introduction of multi-market failures in the analysis of land tenure system. This literature introduces risk-coping in the sphere of market exchange as 'market imperfection'; but fails to account for a more sophisticated approach of property rights. The last section (1.4) makes a few methodological propositions on how to approach informal risk-coping issues in land tenure, and offers a few examples as to how this methodology might help to deepen some of the main intuitions found in the literature.

1.2 A bipolar view of land allocation systems in the standard theory of property rights: how informal risk-coping becomes an attribute of the customary world.

(a) An overview of the standard theory of property rights

In the post-war decades, the scientific assessment of land tenure in the process of economic development, as well as the nature of land policies, was divided into two main schools, which favored either a centralized state owned organization of land rights, or a regime of freehold private property of land (Bassett and Jacobs, 1997). By the end of the 1980's and the decline of collective farming, a main paradigm of land tenure remained: the private property view of land tenure, or "standard theory of property rights" (Demsetz, 1967, 2002; Furubotn and Pejovivh, 1972; Johnson, 1972; Alchian and Demstez, 1973; Platteau, 1996). Most of the land reforms that were implemented in the years that followed were designed according to this paradigm.
It is generally cited for two of its most important recommendations: the development of legally-enforced private property rights on land (Demsetz, 1967, 2002; Feder and Noronha, 1987; Feder, 1988; Feder and Feeny, 1991a; Libecap, 1989; De Soto,

2000) and the celebration of markets as the most efficient regime of land allocation (Feder and Noronha, 1987; Feder and Nishio, 1998). In fact, the paradigm proposes a coherent and structured body of causally linked predictions, beginning with the belief that formal private property rights protected by the State facilitate the development of markets as it improves tenure security and creates a well-defined, secure, and complete bundle of rights held by individuals (Gould and Shrestha, 2006). In terms of policy making and recommendations from the World Bank, the theory translated into large titling programs and the production of land administrations, intended to encourage land market activity (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999).

Although many papers have approached land tenure issues from a property rights perspective, it is notable that, through this framework, the nature of land rights is somehow instrumental, in the sense that it is deemed desirable for one central reason: its market exchange compatibility (Rose-Ackerman, 1985). Private ownership of land is celebrated for its capacity to support the emergence of a market economy. In granting a right of alienation to land holders, it lifts customary prohibitions on sale or lease; in clarifying ownership rules and enforcing them effectively, it reduces transaction costs for the functioning of land markets; moreover, in helping to reduce imperfections in other markets, for instance in the credit market, it contributes to the general transition to an efficient market economy. Markets are then expected to drive an efficient allocation of land, moving land assets from less efficient to more efficient users (Feder and Nishio, 1998).

The literature has often emphasized, and criticized, the weight given by this paradigm to private rights and market allocation mechanisms (Bromley, 1989). We wish to draw attention to a more implicit, albeit noticeable feature. The private property right paradigm has also created a polarized view of land tenure, opposing the regime of market allocation to an old enemy: customary, non-market, common, traditional (or whatever other name it has been called) allocation of land (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006; Berry, 1994; Colin, 2008). This customary regime of land allocation, as we will call it in the rest of the chapter, is often said to generate a stagnant, investment-deterring and market adverse economy, in complete opposition to the market and development-enhancing private property regime.

The polarized view embedded in the private property rights regime systematically opposes each step of the linked predictions that compose its two polars (Colin, 2008). Figure 1.1 summarizes the situation: Case A describes the customary al-

Figure 1.1: The bipolar framework of the standard theory of property rights

Case	Land allocation regime	Property type	Rights enforcement	Security of rights	Allocation mode	Economic outcome
A	Customary	*Communal-access*	*Customary, Tradition, Informal*	*Low*	*Customary, Non-market*	*Inefficient, Underdevelopment*
B	Market	*Private rights*	*Formal*	*High*	*Market*	*Efficient, Development*

location regime of land and case B the market allocation regime of land. We will use these terms to describe the two polar cases throughout the chapter. Each polar regime, the customary allocation (A) and the market allocation regime (B), is a coherent and structured body of causal relations binding the nature of the property regime - the type of property rights and the enforcement process - to a specific type of allocation of land - market or customary - and finally to diverging outcomes in term of development.

We report the main idea illustrated in the table, and take the opportunity to define some of the most important terms to be used in this chapter.

The two polar cases A and B described in figure 1.1 display two symmetrical narratives. Both narratives begin with a type of property right (property type). In case A, the property type is under a communal-access rule. Communal-access rule can be defined as a situation where property rights on assets are controlled by more than one single actor, i.e. "property rights are exercised collectively by members of a group" (Seabright, 1993, p.113). We also refer to the seminal paper by Alchian and Demstez (1973) "*We shall use the phrase communal rights to describe a bundle of rights which includes the right to use a scarce resource but fails to include the right of an 'absentee owner' to exclude others from using the resource*"(p.19). In such systems, access to rights usually depends on group membership and follows a complex allocation pattern involving different parts of the bundle being allocated to different types of actors (Berkes, 1996). The definition of communal rights excludes open-access situations and has been narrowed down to represent cases where there

are actual exclusion rights (Stevenson, 1991; Bromley, 1992; Seabright, 1993)[1]. Even so, the concept of communal property refers to a very wide set of property settings, from pure community control to family-based ownership or overlapped rights among individuals, families, kin, and communities (Bruce, 1998). This broad definition of communal ownership is then set against a much more precise and narrow definition of the private property right regime in which land is owned under freehold and individuals possess a full bundle of rights on their asset. In the communal right regime, the identification of the decision makers for the land is a complex process, whereas in private property, the declared holder is also necessarily the decision maker.

Each of those two property regimes is attached to a specific type of enforcement. In the case of communal access (A) a group (a community, a kinship or a family) enforces the rule through traditions, norms or an interpretation of history as jurisprudence (Berry, 1997; Ensminger, 1997); and uses social stigma or group exclusion as the most common form of punishment. Because the rules are not written, the outcomes of conflict resolution are not clearly predictable *ex ante*, creating insecurity for the stakeholders. On the other hand private rights (B) are not sustainable under customary enforcement mechanisms, both because collective action fails to cope with growing intra-community conflicts, or because of external land claims by migrants or foreign companies. To reduce enforcement problems and transaction costs, private property therefore requires the intervention of a centralized entity with sufficient coercive power: the State and the Law.

The allocation regime and economic outcomes associated with those two types of property systems are diametrically opposed. Customary regimes (A), in placing the right of alienability before a collective decision, prohibit the emergence of land markets or seriously limit its existence[2]. Customary regimes allocate land along customary rules, generally according to a logic of equity rather than efficiency. On the other hand, private rights enforced by law (B) give the alienation right to individual decision makers, facilitate incentive compatibility and allow an efficient distribution

[1]Hardin (1968) used a definition of common property rights which combined communal property and open-access resources. This view has been much criticized, as open access are situations where there are no actual property rights, on account of no exclusion (Ostrom, 1990).

[2]The collective decision generates additional transaction costs; or selling may be in the interest of an individual user, but not in the interest of the community leader who imposes a ban on the sale. Communal ownership and customary tenure may therefore be responsible for incentive incompatibility, thus leading to disfunctional land markets.

of land through markets which contribute to economic development.
The transition from one regime of allocation to another (from A to B in figure 1.1) has been acknowledged by the standard theory of property rights, and will result in a change in property rights, i.e. from the individualization and a formalization of rights. A change in property regime from communal access to private rights engenders a transition from case A to case B (figure 1.1), and forges a path to development. The nature of the transition has been much discussed, opposing the advocate of a big push toward individualization through bottom-up titling programs (in the line of De Soto, 2000, 2003) and those in favour of an endogenous transition with demand driven formalization based on an evolutionary theory of land rights (Boserup, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; Platteau, 1996, for a critical assessment of the theory). According to this theory, population densification, technological change and the commercialization of agriculture are prime factors in the endogenous increase in land values and the consequent demand for more secure and individual land rights. In both cases, the transition from customary regimes to market allocation is a linear process beginning with a change - endogenous or exogenous - in the definition of property rights.
The idea of a linear evolution from a 'backward' tenure system to a 'modern' one is much older than Demsetz (1967)' s seminal work. The semantic opposition of private property and common-access regimes in terms of efficiency and economic outcome can be traced back at least to the 17th and 18th century and the English legal theory of property rights. The famous enclosure of commons in 18th century England was grounded on an antagonism between the gentry's idealistic vision of 'absolute', private and lawful property rights (SirBlackstones, 1765), and traditional common tenure systems. Demsetz himself seems to have found much of his inspiration in Adam Smith's work on property rights (Demsetz, 1967). Such a bipolar view of what is a superior property right regime and what is an inferior one is also symptomatic of land tenure debates during colonial times (in colonized India see Thomson, 1991), or of the motivation behind the creation of the French cadaster in the 19th century (Noizet, 1857)[3]. Thus, the view carried by the more contemporary standard theory of property rights is symptomatic of a very westernized represen-

[3]The cadaster in France was created with the self-assumed goal of reducing conflicts over land through defining rights properly in a private rights system in order to rule out the problems of the commons, and to foster land and credit markets.

Figure 1.2: Household insurance against subsistence risks: a presentation of existing coping mechanisms

INSURANCE MARKETS	PUBLIC SOCIAL PROTECTION	INFORMAL RISK COPING			
		Individual coping strategies		Social institutions for risk coping	
		Financial strategies : - Savings, - Asset accumulation, - credit,	Income sources : - diversification - low risk activities	Risk-sharing	Access to resources

tation of land rights, which has shaped our research on property rights and land tenure for more than a century. The bipolar view of a 'modern' market allocation of land opposed to a traditional, customary, allocation is likely to last a little while longer.

(b) Informal risk-coping as a feature of customary tenure

How do informal risk-coping strategies fit into this paradigm? Most often, they are consigned to case A of figure 1.1, in customary regimes of land allocation. In the general tradition of economics, non-market institutions are seen as 'bridging gaps" in competitive markets due to transaction costs or market failures. In the words of Arrow (1965)"*when market fails to achieve an optimal state, society will, to some extent at least, recognize the gap, and non-market social institutions will arise to bridge it*" (p.18). Those institutions follow mechanisms that supposedly differ from the allocation systems of markets, such as Polanyi's "reciprocity" allocation mechanisms (Polanyi, 1957) or social security, and are regarded as pervasive in many traditional societies (Dalton, 1967; Gerard-Varet et al., 2000).

The concept of 'informal risk-coping' as it is used in this chapter includes all of the different mechanisms that help households or communities avoid subsistence shocks when private insurance or public social security are missing (Jutting, 1999; Dekken, 2004). Figure 1.2 presents the various mechanisms that can be designed to protect households against livelihood risks. Private insurance and public social protection (the two first columns of figure 1.2) are generally deemed to be the most efficient,

and are favoured in developed countries. In developing countries, on the other hand, failing States and poor market development often lead to the emergence of alternative, informal ways of coping with risk (column 3 of figure 1.2) (Jutting, 1999; Dercon, 2004; Baez, 2007). Such informal risk-coping mechanisms can take the form of individual strategies such as credit, precautionary savings, and diversification of activities or crops. Informal risk-coping can also be pursued through informal social institutions such as risk-sharing networks or a social organization of the access to vital resources. Informal risk coping may also intervene *ex ante* - reducing the probability of a shock, occurence as is the case with income diversification - or *ex post* - to mitigate the impact of shocks on one's livelihood. Finally, informal risk-coping combines two different goals: first, the idea of a safety net or assistance, i.e. providing minimum levels of subsistence to avoid catastrophic events; secondly, the idea of consumption smoothing, i.e. reducing consumption variability over time. Empirical evidence tends to show that full consumption smoothing through informal risk-coping is rarely achieved in developing countries, and that safety nets are more frequently found (for a review on this topic see Dercon, 2002, 2004).

In the case of developing countries, many of the institutions observed in traditional societies have been understood in a functionalist manner to be providing informal risk-coping mechanisms (Besley, 1995). Such risk-coping institutions may take the form of free exchange of farm labour, risk-sharing, marriage rules, economic organization through enlarged families or communities, social norms of equity, and so on. More generally speaking, non-market institutions in the form of reciprocity have been interpreted as postponed purchase of insurance (Posner, 1980; Bromley and Chavas, 1989; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Coate and Ravallion, 1993)[4].

The literature on land tenure has also acknowledged the idea that non-market institutions are grounded in risk-coping motives. According to Deininger and Feder (2001): "*Communal resource ownership is often motivated by the ability to provide benefits in the form of easier provision of public goods, arrangements to enhance equity, or the ability to take advantage of synergies that would be difficult to realize under fully individualized ownership. Examples include risk-reduction through di-*

[4]The conceptualization of reciprocal and informal institutions as serving rational economic purposes of failing market environment is therefore diverging from theoretical streams which picture those institutions as embedded in social processes and cultures (Polanyi, 1957); and from some of the anthropological literature which assimilates social security motives to pure altruism or equity.

versification advantages in highly variable environments" (p.293).

The economic literature has spent much time looking at risk-coping behaviours in the form of risk-sharing and consumption smoothing[5]. However, institutions governing the access to resources may also be important providers of insurance, as has been argued for the case of land (Platteau, 2005). Customary rules governing the access to land may indeed have a safety net potential through the equal access rule that guarantees a basic level of subsistence (Platteau, 2005; Baland and Francois, 2005). The rule of equity and access to resources according to need said to prevail in developing countries (Platteau, 2000, 2005) is therefore understood as being motivated by risk-coping considerations, or, as proposed by Fafchamps (1992), as an ex-ante transfer of pooled resources that reduces ex-post need of resource pooling[6], in reducing the probability of chronic poverty. Those principles typically lead to practices such as equal share inheritance (Goetghebuer and Platteau, 2010); or rules providing land to immigrant populations (Colin and Ayouz, 2006). We may also quote some of the practices implemented in order to assist landless widows, whose deceased husband's land has returned to his kin (Gray and Kevane, 1999). Moreover, communal ownership over land, in allowing a frequent re-pooling of land within the community[7] (after fallow periods for instance), can help to cope with short terms lacks of land, as soon as the system is flexible enough (Noronha, 1985; Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996; Platteau, 2005). Informal risk-coping, according to this perspective, is confined to customary tenure and deemed incompatible with market allocation systems.

According to the evolutionary theory of land tenure described by Platteau (1996) the risk-coping feature embedded in communal land tenure system indeed disappears with the individualization of property rights and the emergence of land markets. First, the rise of land value and the increase in the exclusivity of rights preclude the pooling of land resources within the community. When the land allocation decision

[5]Practices of risk-coping such as use of child labour, cropping features, diversification of activities, use of assets for income smoothing, access to credit, have also been scrutinized in-depth.

[6]Communal ownership pools land and transfers it according to needs or equity rules. Everyone is then endowed with the means to attain at least a minimum level of consumption. This reduces the risk of deprivation and the need of ex-post risk-sharing.

[7]Communal or 'corporate ownership' frequently consists of the distribution of land use rights to the individual, with land allocation rights still held by the group, generally a community or an extended family. The group therefore theoretically has the power to redistribute land to help cope with shocks. This has been said to happen in some global regions (see Platteau, 1996).

passes to the hands of individual holders, the rule of access based on needs gives way to market mechanisms and allocation based on efficiency. The cost of collective action indeed becomes too high and risk-sharing or reciprocal practices surrounding land allocation gradually vanish. In this context, the provision of risk coping will be taken over by private insurance markets.

The fact that informal risk-coping motives are exclusive features of customary tenure and necessarily disappear in the linear transitions toward market allocation systems is clearly exposed in the literature dealing with local commons. Some of this recent literature (Baland and Francois, 2005; Delacote, 2009) proposes that Hardin (1968)'s tragedy of the commons has missed an essential argument. According to this literature, local commons such as forests or rivers provide safety nets in the form of equal and flexible access to basic resources, as these are equally and freely available to all strata of a village society. Access to resources is therefore seen as some kind of assistance allowing households to safeguard minimum levels of subsistence when shocks occur. According to Baland and Francois (2005), when property rights on the local commons are individualized, this safety net function is lost. Integrating the resulting cost in their model, Baland and Francois (2005) propose that the loss of the safety generated by the individualization of the commons will not be fully recovered if insurance markets fail due to imperfect information. They conclude that privatization of local commons might be desirable only under a specific set of conditions.

Similar arguments, although much less numerous, have been proposed in the land tenure literature. For Platteau (2005) or Leliveld (2008), specific institutional organizations of access to land - customary allocation - provide some basic kind of 'social security'[8], in the form of safety nets and equal access. However, as for the case of the local commons, this literature insists on the disappearance of this feature from land tenure all together once land rights are privatized: 'social security' will then be taken over by alternative types of institutions (insurance markets in particular). The first rationale behind this idea is related to private rights themselves, as they make the resource pooling much more difficult to implement. The second rationale lies in the belief that market exchange is based on efficiency considerations and leaves no place to equity or reciprocity motives. Overall, the literature just described sees informal

[8]Platteau (2005) uses the word "social security" to account for institutions with risk-coping aims.

risk-coping as a specific feature of customary allocation regimes. This literature is a direct legacy of the Demsetzian bipolar view of land allocation regimes and the evolutionary theory of land rights. Indeed, it relies on the belief of a fundamental inconsistency in the motives driving land allocation in two idealized property rights regimes, customary vs. market.

1.3 Allocation of land under multi-market failures: when risk-coping considerations enter the market sphere

(a) An internal criticism of the standard theory of property rights

The failure of private property rights policies has brought the literature on land tenure issues a wide array of internal critic. This criticism persisted in some of the central assumptions and descriptions of land tenure in the mainstream property rights model, mainly that private property rights provide superior outcomes, and that land markets allow a more efficient distribution of land assets for agriculture (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006). It also left untouched the bipolar view of allocation systems according to a customary versus market allocation regime, although the view of what market exchange entails somehow evolved.

The main outcome of this internal criticism for our present topic is found in the idea of market interlinkage (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982; Bardhan, 1985). Market interlinkage occurs when imperfections in a specific market generate imperfections in another market. In this context, informal risk-coping, which is a consequence of insurance market failure, may generate market failure in other markets, including the market for land. Risk-coping motivations that had been described as exclusively granted to customary allocation regime in the previous section thus become a feature of land markets.

Institutional failure and implementation problems in land policies have been much discussed as explanations for the insignificant effect of land titling policies on tenure

security and market development[9]. Looking at market interlinkages in rural economies is another way of analysing the relative failure of land market policies in the last decades. Indeed, the proposition that land markets lead to efficient distribution outcomes had been made on an assumption of competitive markets. If markets are perfect, land market prices correspond to the sum of discounted future streams of agricultural income that can be derived from it. As perfect markets also imply that the demand is not liquidity-constrained, the land market clears at a first best efficient equilibrium.

However, as first stated by Binswanger et al. (1995), when credit, insurance, or labour markets fail, land assumes a large number of functions whose value does not translate into market prices. If, moreover, credit market imperfections constrain potential purchasers, the price at which a supplier is ready to give up a plot may be higher than the liquidity of the demand. This could lead to two different scenarios, depending on the initial distribution of land. When land distribution is very uneven, a small class of large landholders will be able to derive liquidity through asset collateral and to acquire land on the market; this would lead to increasing concentration of land in the hands of the happy few (Carter and Zimmerman, 2000). According to a wide range of research, larger holders tend to be less efficient that smaller ones in developing countries and concentrations do not systematically mean increased agricultural productivity (Bardhan, 1973; Barett, 1996; Heltberg, 1998). On the other hand, when the initial land distribution is even, few landholders may have enough asset collateral to afford land purchase, and the level of activity on the market is most probably low. Imperfect markets can therefore have two different effects for land allocation: an 'inefficiency effect', or a 'missing markets effect'. The literature has nonetheless underlined that the 'inefficiency effect' is smaller in the rental market than in the sales market (Deininger and Jin, 2005, 2008; Deininger

[9]Incomplete land administrations, corrupt officials and failed States, demand-based titling programs (Platteau, 1996; Firmin-sellers and Sellers, 1999) and other failures in the design and workability of various reforms implemented (Deininger, 2003; Jacoby and Minten, 2007) were seen as a source of policy inefficiency. Moreover, in competing with local definitions of land rights and creating a world of competing tenure systems, formalization policies might have sometimes decreased clarity in land rights and increased insecurity of tenure (Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997; Ostrom, 2001). This led to a popular proposition that land laws should increasingly rely on customary systems and legalize their rules or afford more power to local authorities and communities in the enforcement of rights (Ostrom, 1990). Behind this argument lies the idea that security of tenure and market exchange can emerge out of customary tenure.

et al., 2008), while the 'missing market' effect is more frequently seen on the land sales market.

In this framework, the imperfection of land markets - 'inefficiency effects' and 'missing markets effects'- therefore results both from credit-constraints on the demand side, and a non-agricultural value of farm land which emerges due to imperfections on other markets. Among these non-agricultural functions of land in multimarket failure environments, the literature has mainly focused on the following: land is an 'asset' to hold when banks are not available or reliable; land can be used as collateral to obtain a loan; land provides access to food when food markets are incomplete or unsteady; land is ultimately a bridge against inflation (Binswanger et al., 1995; De Janvry et al., 2001). Binswanger et al. (1995) also mention that access to land can be valued for other 'non-economic' functions, such as political power, religious beliefs[10], or identity considerations.

An interesting feature of this multimarket failure literature is that it brings risk-coping considerations into the scope of land markets. In addition to the aforementioned functions, land may also provide an informal risk-coping function when insurance markets fail. This informal risk-coping function of land would result in additional distortions in the market allocation process through sale or rental. Land gives a means of risk-coping, both as a safety net and through consumption smoothing, in various ways. The literature has highlighted the following:

- Land improves access to staple food and reduces the risk of starvation when food markets are failing or unsteady (Maxwell and Wiebe, 1998, 1999; Burgess, 2001).

- Land allows income self-generation through agriculture production with a low entry cost if labour markets are failing or unsteady (Jayne et al., 2003).

- Land is an asset used for asset-based income smoothing when financial markets are failing. Asset-based income smoothing consists of the accumulation of assets in good times, and their release to the market in exchange of liquidity when times are bad (De Janvry et al., 2001; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003).

- Land as a collateral asset allows access to credit for ex post consumption smoothing if financial markets are incomplete and provides collateral for loans

[10] e.g. ancestor worship attached to land in some areas of Africa

to overcome information problems (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986; Diagne, 1999; Mohieldin and Wright, 2000)[11].

This literature presents another noticeable feature. When analyzing risk-coping mechanisms in land markets it distinguishes sales and rental as different contractual forms. The category of market exchange, which is considered as a black box in the standard theory of property rights, is heterogenous here according to the nature of the transfer of rights involved. Indeed, sale implies a complete and permanent transfer of the whole bundle of rights, while rental implies a partial and temporary (reversible) transfer (Sjaastad, 2003). The rental market itself includes different practices or contractual forms that have been classified by the literature as sharecropping and fix rents. Risk-coping motivations are thought to have a different impact on the sale and rental markets depending on the extent of rights transferred and on the reversability of the transfer. The research on the behaviour of land markets when insurance markets fail have looked at sale and rental markets in two distinct streams of literature. As the conclusions for the sale and rental markets differ quite notably, we will treat them in two diferent subsections (subsection (b) for the sale market, and subsection (c) for the rental market).

(b) Distress Sales

Distress sales are situations where, under the constraint of imperfect insurance and credit markets, households facing repeated shocks on their consumption are forced to sell land to derive immediate liquidity. Distress sales are, therefore, made for *ex post* risk-coping reasons. Distress sales have been theoretically analyzed in the asset-based insurance framework (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; Vatsa, 2004; Carter et al., 2007). Asset-based insurance is approached as a common strategy of asset saving - asset dissaving which allows consumption smoothing over time and replaces the operations of financial or insurance markets when these do not work. Yet, risk-coping through asset sales entails efficiency costs and might push households under the threshold of poverty. Indeed, land is a productive input within agriculture. Even though distress sales may help cope with current shocks, they seriously endanger

[11] The role of land access in the functioning of risk-sharing may also be a part of the social security value; however this is still purely hypothetical and not yet supported by empirical research. See section 1.2.b. for more information on the topic.

the subsistence situation of households in the future. Considered in the long-run, they actually increase households' vulnerability by cutting off their main source of food, income, and insurance.

Distress sales are responsible for two different features of the land market. The first is qualitative: distress sales encourage unequal distributions of land. The second one is quantitative: distress sales generate supply for the land market, and as such, may increase its redistributive activity. They can therefore mitigate the 'missing market effect' mentioned in section 1.2 (the fact that land markets do not always exist), but reinforce the 'inefficiency effect' of land markets (the fact that land markets do not generate the expected efficiency). We now discuss each of these effects in detail.

Distress sales have been deemed responsible for major inefficiencies and inequities in the land sale market (Deininger and Jin, 2008). They tend to be made specifically by the small but efficient farm holders who are least protected against livelihood risks; whereas the larger owners cope better with shocks and use this increased supply of land on the market to enlarge their holdings. This phenomenon has been shown to increase land accumulation and landlessness. Moreover, as Basu (1986) reported, transactions in such cases are often irreversible. Firstly, if markets are illiquid, repurchasing a plot after selling might be difficult. Secondly, in the case of covariate shocks, households pushed into sales are likely to be numerous and bring the market prices down. When better times come and sellers want to buy back their plot, supply is lower and the prices rise. Sellers are unable to afford a re-puruchase. Even in the event of idiosyncratic shocks, large land holders or businesses may take advantage of the seller's predicament and negotiate low sale prices (Bouquet, 2009).

The second effect of distress sales is to increase the activity of the land sale market. Andre and Platteau (1998), for instance, describe how a very dynamic market emerged in Rwanda prior to the conflict, mainly driven by distress sales. The asset based literature has proposed various models to illustrate how distress sales stimulate land markets. Zimmerman and Carter (2003) for instance, analyze how asset-based insurance works when households are able to hold a portfolio of different assets. They include in their paper livestock, grain, and land. Their results show that because it is a comparatively risky asset, land tends to be sold first and accumulated in a lower share than grain, a line which is mainly valid for the poorest households. This confirms the idea that income smoothing can reinforce initial inequalities in asset distribution (Dercon, 1997).

The assumptions made in the model of Zimmerman and Carter (2003) are somehow symptomatic of the whole approach of the insurance aspect of land through distress sales. They consider only one aspect of the informal risk-coping function of the access to land - its income smoothing potential. First, they stick to a classical conception of risk aversion where the size of income shocks has a linear impact on utility. This then ignores the wider perspective proposed in the concept of vulnerability, which accords particular significance to catastrophic shocks that push some households under minimum thresholds of consumption and into poverty traps. Indeed, selling productive assets such as land can increase a household's vulnerability to catastrophic events, and land might therefore be one of the last assets to be given up to the market. Secondly, their conclusions relate to a hypothesized world where risk-sharing or reciprocity institutions have disappeared. This is a direct legacy of the classical bipolar view of property rights: markets are supposed to depend on private rights, and collective institutions that could provide risk-coping through the organization of land access are not fully compatible with markets. There is actually no clear revendications in this stream of literature as to the nature of land rights, and property rights are only implicit to the framework.

The existence of asset-based risk-coping through distress sales is undeniable given the evidence that has been supplied in various areas of the world. Ruben and Masset (2003) confirm through panel data collected in Nicaragua that distress sales mainly affect small farms and increase the concentration of land; they also observe that before selling land, households use all possible coping strategies to avoid relinquishing ownership rights on land. Sahu et al. (2004), as Sarap (1998), also observe distress sales in the province of Orissa in India, and identify the source of such phenomena in the credit market which works imperfectly in a rural environment. Finally, Deininger and Jin (2008) also observe that the sales market is less efficient than the rental market in post land reform Vietnam, mainly as a consequence of distress sales.

The literature to date has only observed risk-coping motives as mitigating the 'missing market' effect we mentioned earlier (through distress sales). However, informal risk coping could also play a part in explaining this very same 'missing market' effect, when the intertemporal gain through retention of land access is taken into account. This might explain why households often prefer to use a large array of coping strategies before resorting to land sale, strategies that they apply in a sequential

way (Corbett, 1988; Olsen and Lloyd, 1994). Because the distress sales framework envisages market and distress sales as taking place in a world of purely individual property rights, it misses some of the more complex functions supplied through land ownership; and misses all the households who, not being hit by sufficiently strong shocks, will hold onto their asset to protect their social security power, even if this implies a loss of efficiency and missed opportunities; as well as those who will use a variety of tenure arrangements on the condition that they maintain access to social security.

(c) Sharecropping and risk-sharing

Distress sale is a first interesting step in singling out the sales market in terms of its relation to risk-coping mechanisms; and in abandoning the idea of a homogenous market allocation category. However, the introduction of risk-coping strategies in the market sphere has also been established by a very different stream of literature, whose aim was to understand the different contractual forms observed in the rental market; more specifically the choice of fixed rent or sharecropping contracts. This stream of literature is as much interested in explaining land market inefficiencies as in describing how insurance market failures can shape the observed rental contractual forms in a private rights regime. This subsection does not review all the land contract literature, which is very large and detailed, but illustrates only its main conclusions on the significance of informal risk-coping.

Sharecropping, which is the most pervasive form of land lease contract in the developing world, consists of sharing the final output between landlord and tenant. Fixed rent contracts, on the contrary, are more frequent in developed and industrial countries (Huffman and Just, 2004). The basic Marshallian framework actually provides no explanation as to why sharecropping contracts, deemed inefficient because of an incentive incompatibility, are so widely used to transfer land use rights.

The risk-sharing potential of sharecropping has been proposed to explain the prevalence of sharecropping all around the developing world. This theory relies on the assumption that landlords are less adverse to risks than their tenants in credit constrained environments (Stilglitz, 1974; Newberry and Stiglitz, 1979; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). The empirical evidence of risk-sharing motivations in sharecropping contracts is unclear. Risk-sharing in share-

cropping is sometimes empirically confirmed (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Ackerberg and Botticini, 2000), however a whole range of studies has found no proof of its significance (Allen and Lueck, 1995; Aggarwal, 2007). Other papers have also analysed risk-aversion in relation to the observed variety of designs and attributes in sharecropping contracts: for instance, risk-coping is found to explain the dominance of the 50:50 sharing rule, or why sharecropping is not so frequent with the bigger landholdings or in the cultivation of risky crops (Zahid, 1982; Otsuka et al., 1992; Bezabih, 2009).

Here again, as with the case of distress sales, informal risk coping enters the sphere of markets (here the rental market) in shaping the design of market exchange and formal contracts with potential effects on efficiency[12]. The negative impact of risk-coping motives on the efficiency of the rental markets (in terms of contract choice) is nonetheless deemed smaller than what is observed in the sales market, which has led many to favour rental markets over sales markets from a development perspective (Deininger and Jin, 2005, 2008; Deininger et al., 2008; De Janvry et al., 2001).

How can lease contracts such as sharecropping provide informal risk-coping mechanisms? Three main channels have been mentioned in the literature. First, the nature of the share contract itself may allow risk-sharing under the assumption that the landlord is risk neutral and the tenant risk adverse: the first will bear some of the risk with a lower utility loss thanks to his borrowing capabilities (Newberry and Stiglitz, 1979)[13]. Secondly, because of market interlinkage (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982; Bardhan, 1985) sharecropping might support credit arrangements between the tenants (who are liquidity-constrained) and their landlord (who may obtain loans through the collateralization of their land). The tenants may use the credit thus obtained for investment purposes, or for consumption smoothing. Finally, if we expand the idea of market interlinkage to institutions in general rather than to markets only, sharecropping arrangements made among kin, neighbours or relatives may be related to risk-sharing networks. Dubois (2000) finds that sharecroppers are often better insured than others, in part because they also benefit more widely from informal solidarity networks : "*either sharecropping indirectly improves the functioning*

[12]There is still an on-going debate on the efficient potential of sharecropping once risk is taken into account.

[13]Unobservable effort and moral hazard from the tenant must be introduced to make sharecropping also superior to wage contracts.

of these mechanisms [informal solidarity] for those participating in sharecropping or it directly generates state contingent security impossible to replicate with other available securities" (p.27). Sharecropping may indeed help solve the commitment and informational problems of informal risk-sharing networks (Dubois et al., 2008). This last idea has nonetheless hardly been analyzed in this literature, partly because it implies a deeper reflection on the nature of land rights and allocation systems in the rental markets. Besides, this literature has seldom considered the fact that, in the rental market and in sharecroping contracts in particular, contracts are often made among kins or relatives within a definition of tenure that fits neither in the private nor customary type of land allocation. Such situations could nonetheless reveal a complex definition of property rights

This idea of institution interlinkage in the provision of informal risk-coping is nonetheless particularly informative, as it specifically and explicitly breaks down the usual separation between market (formal) organization and non-market (informal) institutions for land allocation in terms of their relation to informal risk-coping. Dubois (2000)'s and Dubois et al. (2008)'s idea of interlinkage between different institutions, formal or informal, organizing access to land or to credit, is a first step in allowing the two previously mentioned poles of land allocation, customary and market regimes, to overlap or interlink in the face of social security issues. This is what we propose in the next section.

1.4 A continuum of tenure arrangements : how informal risk-coping may shape the face of land allocation systems

(a) A framework : Land allocation, a continuum of interlinked practices

As we proposed in the previous two sections, the bipolar view of land tenure systems has long associated informal risk-coping with customary organization of land tenure. Risk coping has been introduced in market regimes of land allocation in the form of market imperfections. The perspective of risk-coping motives in land

markets has opened the black box of the market regime category and taken into account the nature of the land transfer -either sale or rental - to understand the effect of risk-coping. This literature has nonetheless barely explored the fact that informal risk-coping considerations also shape land tenure arrangements in customary regimes of land allocation. Customary tenure is therefore still conceptualized as a black box, and the bipolar view of land allocation regimes remains.

This section presents some developments in land tenure research which, although not highly visible in the scientific debate, analyses land rights allocation as a continuum/set of complex and interlinked arrangements. We believe that such a framework may help to ascertain a more coherent perspective on the relationship between land allocation and informal risk-coping. It accounts for complex land arrangements and allows them to be hybrid forms eroding market components with the reciprocal features usually granted to customary tenure.

The empirical research has cited many cases which do not appear to fit easily into the theory of a linear transition from customary tenure to market exchange. Observers are often puzzled to see arrangements which do not correspond to any of the structuralist definitions that are attributed to sales, rental transactions, or customary reciprocal transactions - mainly free loans or gifts. To begin with, flourishing land markets have been observed in areas under customary and informal land rights (Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994a; Andre and Platteau, 1998). Secondly, many transfers observed in developing countries do not fit any of the traditional categories of land allocation. Disguised sales are a good example: these transactions officially designated as gifts are actually set up to permit future payment at a quasi-market price (Lin and Ho, 2005). These disguised sales are often implemented to by-pass community prohibitions on sales. The institution of "*tutorat*" observed in some parts of Africa is another example of unclassifiable transactions: customary institutions arrange sales to immigrant populations on the basis of equal and universal access to land, but with an implicit and community-enforced clause of sale reversibility (Kone et al., 2005; Colin and Ayouz, 2006; Chauveau and Colin, 2007), and create a patron-client relationship between the autochton seller and the migrant buyer. Although offically classified as sales, transactions made under the "*tutorat*" are actually closely related to reciprocal considerations. In summary, such transactions have a hybrid nature between their gift-like nature used to hide market and self-interest motives (disguised sales), or their sale-like nature which hide reciprocal motives (*tutorat*).

The history debate over intra-family land markets in 18th and 19th century France is also symptomatic of such discrepancies between the conceptual categories of land tenure and the observed reality (Derouet, 2001; Vigneron, 2003)[14]. Historical research looks at the following key question: was the intra-family market a real market responding to the price mechanism? Or were other considerations such as altruism, norms, cultures, and motives influential in the defining of market prices[15]. Land rights in 19th century France were supposedly individual and formal, thanks to the Napoleonian cadaster. Nevertheless, market transactions were undertaken preferably between relatives or extended families (Vigneron, 2003). The comparison of intra-family and extra-family sale prices draws contradictory results from one study to another. The main conclusion that can be ascertained from this literature is the poor understanding to date of motives in land transactions at that time.

The bipolar interpretation of land allocation systems - customary vs. market - does not wholly match the complexity and multiplicity of forms adopted by land arrangements. Moreover, if the transition from customary to market allocation systems is neither systematic nor linear, research needs new tools to apprehend all those transactions. The precise nature of land arrangements is of particular importance in understanding the impact of informal risk coping on land allocation processes.

The current understanding of land allocation regimes is described by Benjaminsen and Lund (2003) as a "*false dichotomy*". These authors propose instead that land tenure arrangements be described as "*institutional bricolage*" to reflect their ramification and flexibility. Sjaastad (2003) offers an interesting clarification on this matter: "*the distinction between reciprocity and market exchange, often regarded as clear-cut in the earlier literature, is no longer considered unproblematic. Commonly identified spaces in which the two forms of transaction were assumed to differ include the prior interdependence between the parties to the transaction, the alienability of the transacted good, the presence or absence of any immediate compensation, the degree to which such compensation is subject to precise calculation, and the 'moral evaluation' of the transaction. Increasingly, however, it is recognized that most of*

[14]Similar research can be found concerning land markets in medieval England ((Razi, 1981; Whittle, 1998).

[15]Even in developed countries where private rights are supposed to prevail, individuals do not necessarily possess the full alienability or transferability rights (Rose-Ackerman, 1985) and land transactions in agriculture are not exclusively following markets, as suggested by the extent of transmission of farms through bequest.

these spaces are continuous rather than binary, that a whole family of different transaction categories exists, and that each may possess any single property to a greater or lesser degree. These continuums provide opportunities for a gradual transition from pure reciprocity towards market exchange" (p.13). To a similar degree, Colin (2008) states that the general categories of "*private*" versus "*communal*" property, that he also terms '*modern*' versus '*customary*' systems produce misrepresentations of the reality of land tenure relations.

A baseline for this perspective may be found in the framework built by Berry (1994, 1997). Her empirical research in Africa leads her to criticize a theory of property rights based on 'reified' concepts of property rights in Africa. She states : "*Despite recent appeals for flexibility, in policies and institutional capacity, much of this discussion rests on reified, a-historical approaches to thinking about African institutions and their role in economic and political transformations.*" (Berry, 1997, p.1226). This conceptualization has in part emerged during colonial times in Africa (Berry, 1997; Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006). Interestingly, worldwide land tenure policies in the last 20 years have been widely shaped by the conceptualization of land tenure created in Africa[16]. The obtained framework has been applied to the other continents, often with no deeper anthropological statement of local tenure systems in their complexity[17]. Berry proposes that the standard paradigm of economic development, and particularly concerning land tenure, uses concepts that do not reflect local realities.

Land allocation is therefore made of a mixture of market and customary elements, although neither of these two ideal types is frequently seen. What should therefore interest researchers is the space of land arrangements between these two ideals. Unfortunately, the traditional theory of property rights does not have much to say on this matter. Colin (2008) makes two propositions to improve our understanding of land allocation systems that do not equate to the traditional view of land tenure. His propositions are twofold: first, more careful empirical analysis has to be carried out to identify the various right-holders and the complex interactions they

[16]As the prevalence of African studies in land tenure explicitely demonstrates.

[17]The land reform in Thailand is an exemplary case of such top-down land policies. South America nonetheless stands as an exception, as it has established over time its own, also reified, concepts of land tenure based on the exemples of the Latifundia and Minifundias. Asia, on the other hand, saw the same colonizers as Africa, around the same period. And as land tenure issues have not raised as much research as in Africa, it simply adopted the main framework.

have regarding their rights. In this regard, focus group interviews or rapid rural appraisal methodologies might seem particularly inappropriate when dealing with land issues ; unfortunately, they are also the most frequently used (Quisumbing et al., 2001). Land issues are usually sensitive, with high rates of misleading comments or non-responses by surveyed households. Even without the sensitivity aspect, the absence of coherent guidelines forces the researcher into a deeper involvement to avoid miconceptions. This implies thorough empirical studies (Besley, 1995) based very much on a local perspective (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009). Secondly, Colin (2008) proposes calling for various frameworks borrowed from different disciplines in order to offer a more general "*comprehensive perspective*" of land allocation systems. To avoid the limitations that emerged from the previous framework of land tenure, this comprehensive perspective avoids an overly structuralist approach that would fix an evolving and renegotiated reality, at the risk of reessentializing it.
Based on various fields and research (including Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Berry, 1997; Lund, 2000; Sjaastad, 2003; Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya, 2007; Colin, 2008), such a comprehensive perspective takes into account:

- a careful identification of right holders. This implies taking into consideration overlapped rights from the official owners to the residual claimants (quote overlapped rights). Various classifications of the different stakeholders have been provided in the literature, such as the famous work by Schlager and Ostrom (1992)[18]. The identification of rightholders will have consequences on the understanding of what rights (or which part of the bundle) are exchanged, and through which type of arrangement.

- furthermore, the understanding of land allocation processes has to be precise on the history and nature of all the variables potentially interacting in the transfer: the nature of the land, the way it is acquired, the institutional framework (the body of rules), how the allocation process of land interacts with other allocation processes of other resources, and other exchanges.

We believe that using such an explorative approach allows greater analysis of the role of informal risk-coping motives in land arrangements to observe how these mo-

[18]Schlager and Ostrom (1992) proposes a hierarchical categorization of land holders, from those who hold the smallest portion of a bundle of rights to those who hold almost all of the bundle: owner, proprietor, claimant, authorized user, authorized entrant.

tives evolve when systems diverge from the purely customary systems with corporate ownership, and how they shape the design of supposed market exchange, influence the activity of markets, and generate new types of arrangements. In the spirit of Sjaastad (2003), we believe that while land rights evolve through the process of development, land tenure arrangements reorganize themselves in a way that still provides informal risk coping. Firstly, private rights are not sufficient to generate efficient private insurance or to enforce a perception of equity in livelihood (Baland and Francois, 2005). Secondly, public social protection is generally lacking in developing countries, and tends to be significant only at a late stage of development. Hence, while the process of economic development increases private rights and markets, land may still maintain an essential role in the provision of safety nets. Thus, land allocation systems are expected to evolve to match both conditions: the rights and opportunities brought by economic development, and the provision of social protection when other ways are lacking. Land allocation systems are therefore unlikely to evolve linearly into pure market forms. Instead, they would adopt hybrid features that match the real conditions of the environment, such as informal risk-coping. The way such necessities (including risk-coping) shape the evolution of land allocation systems, in a complex combination of interlinked institutions, is what needs to be conceptualized in a more general framework.
The rest of the chapter proposes a few avenues of research that could emerge from such a framework.

(b) A few propositions

In the light of what has been said, three possible avenues of research are proposed, some of which are analyzed in the PhD research, and some are still pending.

First, the idea of interlinked institutions that emerge out of the work of Bardhan (1989) or Dubois (2000) is an interesting way of addressing informal risk coping. Imagine for instance a rural economy where land is under some kind of corporate ownership - let's say that kinship owns the land and that only partial bundles of rights are delivered to its members. Imagine also that risk-sharing exists but is observed mainly between members of this same kinship. In such a context, both land allocation and risk-sharing are organized within the same institution: the kinship.

It is therefore conceivable that both access to land and risk-sharing are somehow interrelated. Interestingly, the hypothetical situation just described - risk-sharing and land allocation within the same group or institution - is frequent in real life. As Fafchamps (1992) proposes, access to land might therefore be intertwined in a much more complex pooling system of resources, and be an important part of the other reciprocal transfers observed - risk-sharing or free exchange of labour for instance.
Research has shown that risk sharing is constrained by commitment problems, coming from potential opting out strategies from the wealthiest individual (Platteau, 1997; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). Commitment problems may increase when income opportunities outside of the community and wealth differentials broaden in the process of economic development. In societies where outside options are numerous and easily attainable, one solution to reduce commitment problems might be to tie individuals to the land. Group membership, or alternatively membership in risk-sharing networks, is the baseline of access to land. Those who opt out of risk-sharing networks thus risk losing their access to land. The reverse is also valid: those who cede their access to land, for instance through land sales, are liable to exclude themselves from the solidarity of risk sharing networks. This could be interpreted as a case of interlinkage, not only between different rural markets (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982), or between the informal and formal credit markets (Dubois, 2000; Dubois et al., 2008), but also among many other institutions that are observed in developed countries.
Such interlinkages between land allocation and reciprocity within risk-sharing networks is not circumscribed to the polar case of community control on land tenure. Neither is it meant to disappear with the individualization of rights, as could have been inferred from Platteau (2005) or related research (section 1.2). In situations where rights are privately and formally held, but where insurance markets or public social protections are not available, informal risk coping might still shape the allocation process of land. More accurately, precisely because of this interlinkage, informal risk coping might produce hybrid forms of land arrangements which can neither be classified as market or non-market.
The PhD research proposes to study a related case in Thailand. Here, rural households are found to insure themselves through risk-sharing networks. Such networks predominantly function within small and local groups, namely reduced forms of matrilineages comprising the wife's parents, siblings, nephews and distant relatives.

Land rights are private and formal ; market exists, but Thai rural households still access land to a great extent through inheritance and free land loans made with their relatives. Interestingly, inheritance and free land loans, as risk-sharing, mainly take place within this reduced form of matrilineage. Moreover, land ownership is an important pre-requisite to access reciprocal transfers from risk-sharing networks; and conversely membership in a risk-sharing network (the matrilineage) is *de facto* an important pre-requisite to land access.
The case just described might be understood as institutional interlinkage. The institutions governing the allocation of private land rights help risk-sharing networks to deal with their commitment problems. Therefore, even though nuclear households have the legal power to alienate their rights on land, the allocation system which is observed is not purely market; nor is it purely customary. This intuition is briefly summarised in chapter 3 and 5 of this thesis.

Secondly, a sounder reflection on the nature of land rights and allocation systems provides new insights on the link between sharecropping and risk-sharing. As proposed in section 1.3.(c), empirical proof of the provision of insurance by an institution such as sharecropping has been scarce and controversial. Methodological issues are often proposed as an explanation for the discrepancy between the theoretical propositions and the empirical evidence of risk-sharing in sharecropping. Such methodological issues may be, for instance, the difficulty in measuring risk-aversion, or taking into account heterogeneity in risk-preferences, land quality, or the various clauses in sharecropping contracts. Another avenue has yet to be explored. The literature has taken for granted that 'sharecropping' is a well-defined and relevant category of land exchange in developing countries. Nonetheless, if one forgets about a market vs. customary dichotomy of land transfers, it may appear that the frontier between sharecropping and the supposedly free loans is not always clear, especially if sharecropping is made between relatives or free loans include some form of compensation. Such compensation is usually of a voluntary nature and does not match market equivalent values. To refine the theoretical understanding of informal risk coping in the design and forms of temporary land transfers, it seems relevant to first better understand the frontier between the various types of temporary transfers of land rights (from rental to free loans); and secondly to investigate the pertinence of such a wide category as sharecropping, which levels contracts between perfect

strangers and contracts between relatives.
The last chapter (5) of the thesis proposes a preliminary exploration of the real frontier between land loans and sharecropping, with regard to the informal land contracts used by rural-urban migrants in Thailand.

Finally, and in continuity with the first and second propositions, a more exposed framework of land allocation and the consideration of interlinked institutions may reveal a complex relationship between the sale market and informal risk coping in land tenure. The literature has recognized risk-coping motives in distress sales, which are factors of increased activity on the sale market, as well as additional inefficiencies in land distribution.
Field accounts (mainly from Africa) nonetheless report that communities and customary authorities are often hostile to sales. In many places community caveats on sales are observed. Among the few explanations for such phenomena, risk-coping motives are often suggested (Soludo, 2000). First, because households who sell all their land and fall into poverty may later become the responsibility of these communities and impose a cost on them (Platteau, 2005; Soludo, 2000). Secondly, because sales, particularly when made to foreigners, reduce the amount of land in the community pool and the capacity of the community to sustain an access to all based on needs.
Interestingly, even where land rights are officially individualized and communities do not have a say in land decisions, land sale markets are often quoted to be sluggish. We propose that even in such contexts, informal risk coping may have a complex influence on the supply decision to the sale market (Sjaastad, 2003). First, holding on to land ownership, even if there are other more profitable opportunities for investment, might be a synonym of insurance and social protection in the presence of failing markets. Land, as already stated, is indeed a pledge of food, self-income generation and credit when food, labor, and financial markets are failing. Moreover, where risk-sharing is an important part of the social security available to households, and where land ownership increases households' access to such risk-sharing (as previously stated for the case of Thailand), selling land might seem even more costly to individuals seeking mechanisms to cope with potential income shocks. Under such assumptions, it is therefore possible that, even if communities or families do not impose a strict ban on sales, informal risk-coping motives coupled with intricate

overlapped rights limit the supply of land to the sale market. Two kinds of households would then be found to sell land more frequently: those who are not prone to income shocks and better insured and therefore credit land with a low safety net value; and those who are faced with repeated income shocks and, having exhausted every alternative means of protection, are forced to sell their land (distress sales). Risk-coping may therefore have a double-sided effect on the land sale market and impact the way it evolves with the development process and the emergence of 'modern' (market or public) insurance. This idea is observed in chapter 1, 3 and 4 of the thesis, first with rural households in Vietnam, and then among rural-urban migrants in Thailand.

1.5 CONCLUSION

The intuition that informal risk coping is a decisive factor in land tenure is therefore widespread. Nonetheless, the literature fails to provide a unified framework to analyse the precise relationship between land tenure and informal risk coping. Most of the contributions have been piecemeal, often focused on very particular aspects, or oversimplifying observed phenomena. The bipolar view of land allocation regimes between a market and a customary allocation system which still dominates the land tenure literature has rendered the task of analyzing the impact of social security motives on land arrangements even more arduous.

In this chapter, we have proposed to approach land allocation in its complexity, and as a continuum of hybrid types of arrangements, combining a wide variety of motives, from pure reciprocity to pure self-interest responding to market stimuli. Opening this door allows room for research on informal risk-coping in land tenure. A better understanding of how land arrangements evolve to provide social security with land individualization and when other mechanisms are missing is absolutely essential for the design of land policy and the evaluation of land market reforms implemented in the last 30 years. Moreover, it might help to level the status of land markets as an ideal to pursue and even call into the question the very idea that what are termed markets in developing countries follow the ideal and absolute market mechanism celebrated in economic theory. Finally, the very idea that has been developed in this chapter causes us to regress to the paradox of the chicken

and the egg: land policy has generally been understood as a step made to drive further modernization in the economy. However, if land allocation systems are to evolve depending on the other features of this very economy, the means and ends of land policy have to be reconsidered.

Chapter 2

Land Ownership as Insurance and the Market for Land: A Study in Rural Vietnam

2.1 INTRODUCTION

> *"The fear of food shortage has, in most precapitalist peasant societies, given rise to what might appropriately be termed a 'subsistence ethic'. This ethic, which Southeast Asian peasants shared with their counterparts in nineteenth century France, Russia, and Italy, was a consequence of living so close to the margin."*
> Scott (1976).

The standard theory of property rights assumes that the individualization of land rights in developing countries will steer the pattern of distribution toward market exchange -in other words, toward the form of land sales and rental markets (Boserup, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; Alston et al., 1996; Platteau, 1996). However, in a number of cases, the development of markets features mostly temporary transactions in the form of rentals, and much less frequently permanent transfers in the form of sales. Moreover, the individualization of land rights also features other kinds of land transfers which are referred to as 'informal', 'non-market', or 'customary' modes of exchange, and include pre-mortem inheritance, gifts, and free loans. Overall, the

least frequent transfers observed are land sales, which remain a little-used way to redistribute farm land.

Hence, this chapter asks whether land sale could be isolated from other kinds of transfers given its impact on future access to a vital function of farm land: its risk-coping power. The literature has already established farm land's multifunctional nature as a determinant of land market failure in developing countries (Binswanger et al., 1995; De Janvry et al., 2001). Here we focus on a risk-coping, or safety-net, function of land: in the absence of insurance markets and other risk-sharing mechanisms, land provides access to food, credit, and asset accumulation and also plays a role in risk-sharing networks. Because of the consequent loss of the land's value as a safety net, land sale differs from the other types of transfers. It is indeed the only type of land transfer that implies an irreversible loss of property rights and a disinvestment in local risk-sharing social networks, with an overall negative impact on the access to safety net embedded in land.

Overall, the safety net value of land could could decrease the willingness to sell of households that do not have access to alternative means to protect their subsistence. Households with means of economic stability that do not depend on land ownership credit land with a low safety net value, and in other word are inclined to opt for sale rather than rentals, free loans, or gifts, as a mode of land transfer. The literature has suggested that risk-coping strategies can increase the inequalities in land distribution through the phenomenon of distress sales (Carter and Mesbah, 1993; Deininger et al., 2009). Here we propose that, when private insurance and public protection are lacking, individual risk-coping strategies reduce the turn-over rate in the sale market through a supply effect.

To address these issues, we use 2006 data from the Vietnamese Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS). With its 1993 land reform, Vietnam shifted to the individualization of land rights and to the legalization of land transfers through markets or customary transactions. Since then, what was previously under collective or state ownership is now in the hands of households, who retain use rights on their plot and have been granted the right to transfer land through sales, rentals, loans, bequests, or mortgages. We use the VARHS data set to examine whether the decision to sell land (rather than transferring it by renting or through other 'informal' channels) is contingent on household economic stability, after applying a Heckman correction for a selection bias in the decision to transfer land at all, conditioned by an occupa-

tional choice between agriculture and the off-farm economy. We expect households that credit land with the lowest safety-net value -in other words, the most stable households- to exhibit a greater willingness to sell land.
We find a positive relationship between households' economic stability levels and the probability to sell rather than exchange land through any other way. These results support the notion that sales differ from other land transfer types because of their negative effect on land-related safety nets.
The balance of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides a short literature review and the general framework for a relationship between the safety net value of land and the determination of sales market supply. Section 2.3 summarizes the land rights situation in Vietnam and section 2.4 presents the VARHS data, and Section 2.5 explains our empirical strategy. Section 2.6 discusses the main results, and we conclude in Section 2.7.

2.2 Land Ownership as Insurance and the Supply of Land to the Sale market

(a) From a Standard Theory of land Rights to a Dysfunctional Land Sale Market with Multimarket Failures

The economic literature has until now followed two paths to explain the specific pattern of land sales markets in developing countries : a property rights or transaction costs perspective; and an investigation into the complex mechanisms driving the demand for and the supply of land on the sale market.
The standard property rights theory proposes that the formalization of land rights through standardized registration of title deeds, workable land administration and land mapping systems, improves the security of land tenure and reduce transaction costs in market transactions (Boserup, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; Alston et al., 1996; Platteau, 1996). According to this framework, the non-emergence of land sales in developing countries would be related to the absence of third-party enforcement of land rights. Informal land tenure enforced by communities or kinships tends to specifically oppose land sales : it reveals an overlapping of rights and claims on land

that can create a serious impediment for the development of sales markets alone. Nonetheless, worldwide empirical studies assess the fragile association of land sales market development and the quality of land tenure. Land sale has for instance developed in countries with no formal systems of land rights (see Andre and Platteau, 1998; Platteau, 1996; De Janvry et al., 2001). Improved land rights security, in any way, does not systematically guarantee the development of dynamic sale markets.
The second stream of literature associates multimarket failures (specifically, in the capital and labour markets) with a land sales market that is less efficient than rental markets (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986; Kimura et al., 2011). In countries with failing financial markets, land has many attributes that greatly exceed that of merely sustaining agricultural production (Binswanger et al., 1995; De Janvry et al., 2001). Namely, land ownership establishes collateral for loans and facilitates access to political power. Land can also be used as a store of value when macroeconomic indicators are volatile, and (like most assets) it is subject to speculative motives. According to this approach, we are confronted with a land market failure triggered by constraints on credit and by demand-side illiquidity (Binswanger et al., 1995; Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Shearer et al., 1991; Carter and Mesbah, 1993). In economies with uniqual initial allocations of land, market exchanges might lead to a concentration process that is not always efficient. In economies consisting of a majority of smallholders and rather equal initial distributions, the whole demand side is illiquid or insolvent and thus the amount of land exchanged is low or nil.
This approach has been tested empirically and confirms the role of the credit market in the inefficiency of land markets that is driven by the demand side. Our purpose here is to extend the idea of complex claims on land and of land's multiple functions in an environment of multimarket failure, by introducing a connection between the reluctance of economic agents to sell land and the safety-net function of land in the absence of insurance markets or other modern, income-smoothing mechanisms.

(b) Sales and the Loss of the Safety-Net Value of Land : A framework

Land allows for risk coping in a variety of ways. Land is the most important asset in agriculture production: as such, it has the ability to produce food (Maxwell

and Wiebe, 1998, 1999), and to allow self-sustainability in times of market-based or unemployment crisis. Land enables access to credit for consumption smoothing, and plays an essential role in the functioning and enforcement of risk-sharing local networks (Platteau, 2005; Promsopha, 2010), although there has not been much economic research on this issue. Finally, it is the core component of rural households' wealth (for a review of arguments on land values, see Binswanger et al. (1995)). In an asset-based insurance framework, land is accumulated in a portfolio of assets to buffer households' consumption against major shocks. Its insurance function materializes when it is sold by vulnerable households after repeated shocks to income that deplete their asset stocks and endanger their survival (on this see, among others, Dercon, 2002, 2004; Zimmerman and Carter, 1999; Jalan and Ravallion, 2001; McPeak and Barett, 2001). Empirical studies do confirm that land sales are occasionally used to protect current consumption at the expense of future productive capacities, a phenomenon known in the literature as distress sales (Sarap, 1998; Rawal, 2001; Sahu et al., 2004; Ruben and Masset, 2003; Deininger et al., 2009). In that sense, the risk-coping ability of land can, when shocks occur, feed the market. But the social safety net embedded in land is broader than the sole asset-based insurance perspective; and would therefore be best kept in retaining ownership rights or claims on land's abilities (for intuitions on the impact of the safety net value of land in the reluctance to sell see Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994b; Platteau, 1996, 2000, 2005; Soludo, 2000).

This argument seems to suggest that households who assign a high value to land's safety net function would by all mean not transfer their land, even if it implies leaving the land unused in an unprofitable way, and except if they are forced into sales due to desperate conditions. But the reality is actually different. Unused land is not an option in many developing countries where property is still maintained through actual occupation; and the facts reveal that in alternative to sale, there is a wide variety of ways in which land can be exchanged, in which part of the claims on land's function can be maintained or irreversibility of the loss of land rights can be reduced. Our proposition is simple: Of all the patterns of land exchange, land sale is the only one that necessarily leads to an irreversible loss of the land's safety-net functions (Promsopha, 2010). Land rental, defined as a temporary transfer of land use in exchange of a payment, allows the owner to retain his credit access through collateral and to return to farming, although not in a very flexible way given the

terms of the rental contract. Free loan of land is also a temporary transfer of land use except that no formal payment is made; land borrowers are, in a sense, informally 'indebted' to the owner. The extent of this indebtedness is unclear, as is the form in which it is supposed to be repaid. Such lending generally takes place among relatives and eventually nourishes the operations provided by this type of risk-sharing network. Return to farming is allowed and quite flexible. Finally, free loan of land permits, as rentals do, collateral use of the land.

The role of gifts in retaining access to land's insurance function is not as straightforward. Gifts imply a transfer of both use and ownership rights, including a transfer of title deeds when those are available; the collateral function of land is therefore handed over to someone else. Furthermore, gifts are not temporary but rather permanent transfers of rights. At first sight, then, returning to the land is not possible. But because, as with loans, no actual payment is made in the transfer, we can well suppose that land recipients are similarly indebted in some way to the previous owner. The debt could, in some cases, take the form of assistance in the event that the previous owner faces shocks or welfare loss. Finally, gifts can be reversible under some conditions (Promsopha, 2010).

These facts render land sales a breed apart, since in this case the transfer of rights is both permanent and irreversible. Because sales entail a monetary payment, purchasers are not indebted to sellers after the transaction takes place [1]; therefore, given the transaction's implicit terms, buyers owe sellers no social support in case of later trouble. This irreversibility of land sales is even more pronounced when the buyer is from outside the seller's community (Platteau, 2005). Moreover, as argued by Basu (1986), when land markets are imperfect and demand is far from satisfied, recovering some land through purchase after selling would be arduous -especially for the most vulnerable.

In sum, a land sale constitutes the most drastic cutoff from safety-net access. Land sales preclude future insurance in terms of collateral, food production, and capacity to generate income; they also preclude any appeal for support from a risk-sharing network. With respect to the motive of preserving insurance, we shall favour a clas-

[1] Exceptions to this rule include the institution of tutorat (a form of agrarian clientelism) in the Ivory Coast (Colin and Ayouz, 2006) and pre-emption rights in sub-Saharan Africa (Platteau, 2005). Irreversibility, too, may be weakened, as when the buyer is related to the seller and the price was fixed at below market value.

sification of 'sales versus all other transfer types' in analysing the supply of land to the sale market. This safety net value will enter the land sale decision and counterbalance households' potential benefits in selling. Those benefits include the need of large amounts of cash for investment purposes and are increasing with households' discount rates and local land prices.
Once the upside of land sale is considered, we expect that, except for the case of distress sales, households choosing to sell their land rather than rentals, free loans or gifts, will assign a low value to land's insurance function, because they insure themselves with means which do not depend on lawful claims on land's safety net function.

2.3 The Land Issue in Vietnam and Descriptive Statistics

(a) Land Reform: The Land Market Controversy

As China did previously, the communist country of Vietnam has been engaged since the 1980s in the process of individualizing property rights through their *doi-moi* reforms. This process began for agriculture with the recognition of households as the main units of farm production, and it culminated with the 1988 '*resolution 10*' that established individual use rights to land. Plots were distributed to households in accordance with equity principles applied (with varying levels of rigor) across Vietnam's regions. A complementary land law was also enacted in 1993; its purpose was to constitute the still missing elements necessary for establishing a workable private property rights system: legal titles (the Land Use Certificates, LUCs) were introduced and land transfers were legalized.
The 1988 and 1993 land laws have established in Vietnam a system under which legal ownership rights symbolically belong to the state even though the land use rights are in households' hands for a period of 50 years. Land transfers in the form of sales, rentals, bequests, loans, gifts, and mortgages are authorized but must be submitted to the authorities for official validation. Since 1993, diverse revisions have further eased the transfer procedure and optimized the registration process.

All together, the evolution of ownership in Vietnam is such that land transfers are increasingly facilitated. The liberalization of land rights has been followed, as could be expected, by a boom in land exchange rates through the development of land markets and other, non-market transfer forms including loans and gifts of all sorts. The case of Vietnam actually provides a life-size evaluation of the economic literature on land reforms, since the individualization of land rights and the capacity to transfer it are not neutral for economic welfare. As usual when land issues are concerned, analyses of the 1993 land law's impact have split between those who credit the resulting land market for the country's economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s (for example Do and Iyer, 2003; Van de Walle and Cratty, 2004; Van den Broeck et al., 2007; Deininger and Jin, 2008; Ravallion and Van de Walle, 2008) and those (for instance Akramlodhi, 2005) who claim the land laws exacerbated inequality and created a growing class of landless citizens.

All of the cited studies focus on the effects of land market legalization, but none have examined the impact of legalizing the non-market types of transfer. The 1993 land law did give households the freedom to exchange, lend freely, or bequeath their newly acquired land rights. According to the VARHS database, land market transactions account for only a small portion of the total land area changing hands each year (among such other forms as state reallocation, mortgages, gifts, and loans). Strangely, this fact has not attracted the interest of Vietnamese specialists. Virtually the lone study attempting to distinguish between distinct forms of transfers is the work of Deininger and Jin (2008), but they look only at the determinants of land sales versus land rentals. These authors conclude that, even though rental markets are measurably redistributive in favour of 'poor but efficient' households, the land sale market can lead to property accumulation through distress sales and speculative purchases.

(b) General Features of the Vietnamese Rural Economy

In Vietnam, land ownership is typically very small scale, with wide differences among provinces. The land distribution in Vietnam is relatively equal, as it is in many other Southeast Asian countries and also as a direct result of the 1988 allocation policy adopted by the government for the first land distribution (Ravallion and Van de

Walle, 2008). The Gini coefficient of land has nonetheless risen over the last 10 years (Deininger and Jin, 2008). Landlessness is also on the increase, but rural landless households constitute just a small portion (about 1 per cent) of our sample households.

Vietnamese property rights regarding land are less straightforward than they look on the paper, as reported in other studies (see for instance Do and Iyer, 2003). (Deininger and Jin, 2008) report in their data that 88 per cent of households had obtained a legal document by 1998. Titles are issued according to the surveying and registration supplied by the state. Issuance of LUCs differs greatly among provinces, which suggests bias in the authority with respect to the quality of administrative procedures. Such differences, however, do not reflect any North-South pattern, as some might posit.

We have described a rural world of small owners, still relatively homogenous in holding size but with varying levels of access to agricultural assets and inputs. For most Vietnamese households, diversification of activities is in fact a necessary step to make ends meet -a phenomenon commonly observed in other rural economies of the developing world. This indicates not only that agricultural income is insufficient to cover households' needs but also that households are diversifying their income sources, most likely to smooth cash flows over time and seasons. Social security in Vietnam is still in its infancy, formal credit markets are still seriously constraint (Bao Duong and Izumida, 2002), and Vietnamese households, as in so many other places, rely on informal and often inefficient strategies to buffer their consumption (Jowett, 2003; Xuan Thanh et al., 2006).

2.4 Data Description

(a) The VARHS survey

One problem that may explain the relative lack of interest in Vietnamese non-market transfers is the lack of data on this issue. Indeed, the most frequently used database with reference to rural and agricultural issues in Vietnam is the Vietnamese Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS); in that survey, information on land transfers is limited to those of the market type. In this study we use a different database, the

2006 Vietnamese Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS). That survey was carried out among 2,300 households in 12 provinces of Vietnam from the North to the South. It is designed to be representative of the Vietnamese Rural Population. The VARHS database was set up through the collaborative efforts of the Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM), the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development (IPSARD), and the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) with the assistance of Danida (Danish International Development Assistance) and the University of Copenhagen (VARHS, a,b).

This database provides various sorts of information that are hard to find in equivalent data sets. In particular, we have information on land transfers of all types made by the household during the preceding five years, including the transactors' identities and the transaction price; and we know about households' savings, expenditures, and access to credit as well as other measures of income and asset levels. We know precisely which kind of activity is undertaken by each of a household's members. We are also informed of each household's access to insurance and social transfers from the state and non-governmental organizations. Finally, information is provided at the household and village level, allowing for precise analysis.

(b) Land Ownership and Transfers: VARHS Descriptive Statistics

In our data, about 15 per cent of available plots have been exchanged in some way during the five years preceding 2006. In this figure we include expropriation by the state, loss, rentals, loans, gifts, and sales. Four types of individual transfers merit their own categories in the VARHS: sales, rentals, free loans (temporary exchange for no payment), and gifts (permanent transfer with no payment). No specific reference is made in the survey to pre-mortem inheritance, which is therefore classified in the category of gifts. In the five years prior to the survey, 7 per cent of the plots have been exchanged through any of those four categories.

The supply and demand side of land transfers cannot be reconciled using data extracted from the questionnaire responses. The reason is that, whereas the means of land acquisition is available for all plots (whatever their date of acquisition), data on

land divestment have been collected only for the last five years (that is, since passage of the 1993 land law). In addition, the data on land transfers and land acquisitions are not perfectly symmetric, since land loans and gifts (other than bequests) have not been recorded as distinct types of land acquisition. This imbalance precludes a parallel study addressing both sides (demand and supply) of the transactions.
Data reveal the overwhelming dominance of the state as a source of access to land, but those are mainly plots acquired before the land reform (see Table 2.1). Since the land reform, however, individual acquisitions have replaced the state as the most frequent form of transfer. The data indicate that the emergence of individual transfers has yet redistributed less than half of total land area in Vietnam.

[INSERT TABLE 2.1 HERE]

The insignificance of land transfers through individuals or households is quite astonishing: land sales are only 7 per cent of all individual transfers undertaken in the five years preceding the survey (that is, 0.45 per cent of all land plots); and when we add rentals to sales (thereby creating a 'market transfers' category), together they still constitute just 36 per cent of all transfers. Thus other types of exchanges, such as loans and gifts, account for nearly two thirds of all individual transfers undertaken by households from 2001 to 2006. The preponderance of these other exchange types underscores once again the relevance of analysing their determinants and potential effects for land distribution.
A North-South comparison of transfers also reveals some interesting features. The overall mobility of land does not differ between the North and South of Vietnam, despite what their political histories might have suggested. That being said, outright sales are mostly concentrated in the South, and likewise (though to a lesser extent) for gifts. Sales account for but 2 per cent of total land exchange in the North, where land loans are typically used instead and occur with nearly twice the frequency as in the South. Rentals, however, are nearly equally prevalent in both regions. Overall, we observe transfers involving a documented change of legal ownership more frequently in the South than in the North of Vietnam; conversely, there is more land exchange without document shifting in the North. These differences could be explained by historical differences in the degree of involvement of local authorities in land property rights and by the varying importance of collective own-

ership due to the concentration of ethnic minorities. Note also that the percentage of households that sold land is highest both for the poorest and the richest quintile of our distribution and is lowest for the 'middle poor' and average households.

[INSERT TABLE 2.2 HERE]

Another expected but interesting result can be derived by analysing the setup of land transfers. Namely, market transfers tend to rely less than do non-market transfers on interpersonal relations. Even so, the percentage of market transactions consummated between relatives remains quite high (see Table 2.2).
Finally, we look at the possession of Land Use Certificates on plots according to the kind of transfer undertaken (Table 2.3). The classic theory of property rights predicts that plots going through the market should be better titled. In fact, our observations confirm the opposite: plots that are transferred by selling are the least likely to be titled.

[INSERT TABLE 2.3 HERE]

We are now in a position to estimate our model of land sale decisions as a function of household vulnerability.

2.5 Econometric Specification

(a) Estimation Strategy

Our study models a household that faces a binary decision: to sell land or to transfer it through another type of exchange - rental, loan or gift. The household chooses the outcome that maximizes its welfare, a decision that depends on a set of characteristics affecting the relative attractiveness of each outcome for the household. Among these characteristics we are looking specifically at what selling land entails, as compared with using other transfer types, with respect to accessing the safety-net value of land. We expect stable households to sell land more frequently as they credit land with a low safety net value.
Hence we first estimate the probability that a household will choose to sell land

-instead of transferring it in some other way- by using a simple and binary probit estimation strategy:

$$Pr(S_i = 1) = \phi(\beta_0 + \beta_1 V_i + \beta_2 V_i^2 + \beta_3 C_i) \tag{2.1}$$

Here $Pr(S_i = 1)$ is the probability that household i chooses to sell a plot of land conditional on having already decided to transfer it. The variable $S_i = 1$ if the household has sold land at least once in the last five years; $S_i = 0$ if the household has transferred land in the last five years through rental, loans, or gifts -that is, not in the form of sales. As we study the choice between sales and other categories of transfer, the population of interest concerns households who are transferring land only.

The term V_i is an indicator of household stability (see the next subsection for further details); we expect its coefficient , β_1 to be positive. The variable V_i^2 is the square value of the indicator of economic stability V_i. It is designed to identify a non-linearity in the relationship between stability and the probability of selling land arising from the combination of two phenomena: the 'static' insurance function of land, whereby greater income stability leads to a higher probability of selling land; and the asset-based insurance function of land, through which households with the least income stability may resort to distress sales in order to avoid the effects of catastrophic shocks. If our hypothesized nonlinearity is confirmed, then we should obtain a U-shaped relationship. Finally, C_i is a set of controls regarding households situation that we employ to ensure coherence with respect to previous results in the literature. We observe 373 transferring households within the VARHS survey for 2006.

(b) Heckman correction for selection bias

In our model as described so far, the type of transfer chosen by households is observed within a restricted sample, the transferring households, and so all non-transferring households have been ignored. Such restriction of the dependent variable could be associated with a selection bias. The decision to sell is indeed the result of two intertwinned deicions: whether a plot is to be kept or given away

(transferred), and how a plot should be given away: sale, rental, gift, or other types of arrangements.

Transferring land through any of the observed means -sales, rental, free loans or gifts- could be interpreted as the consequence of a single factor: the withdrawal from farm work and land cultivation. This phenomenon may be first associated with the lack of farm labour to cultivate, or with ageing and retirement. It may also be associated with occupational choice toward non-farm activities. In this case, then, empirical results on the determinants of land sales would have little to do with insurance motives and might rather be driven mainly by the occupational and land-use changes required in any industrialising country. Yet suppose that, after compensating for occupational choice bias in our model of interest, we still find a significant impact of household stability on land sales. In that case, our results on the determinants of land sales will be more robust.

In light of these considerations, we use a probit estimation with Heckman selection. The model regression equation is still (2.1), but now we correct for Heckman selection. The selection equation estimates the probability that a household i participates in a transfer of land (sales, rentals, loans and gifts), rather than in no transfer at all. The decision to transfer land is expected to depend negatively on households' involvment in land cultivation:

$$Pr(T_i = 1) = \phi(\theta_0 + \theta_1 V_i + \theta_2 V_i^2 + \theta_3 C_i) + \theta_4 A_i \tag{2.2}$$

where $Pr(T_i = 1)$ is the probability that a household i has transferred land -through sale, rental, gifts or free loans. $T_i = 0$ if household i has transferred no land by any of the existing arrangements. A_i is a selection variable to control the involvment of households in agriculture. Households giving up agriculture are expected to transfer some land, independently of the precise type of transfer they choose (sale, rental, loan, gift). We proxy for A_i through three variables: first, the share of households' total income which is driven from agriculture occupations, and which proxies for economic involvment in farming. Because agricultural income is here being measured as a share of households' total income, there is a lower risk of capturing indirectly the value of land: land values may indeed be a factor in the decision to choose sale as a mode of transfer rather than in the decision of a transfer in itself. Secondly we measure households' farm labour capacities through the average number of households'

working members per square meters of held farm land. A smaller capacity to farm land holdings may lead households to transfer some plots, although not particularily through sales. Finally, we add a dummy capturing whether the household's head is more than 60 years old: in a traditional society such as Vietnam, older households are expected to transfer their land more frequently, both if they no more have the capacity to cultivate it themselves, and if they are providing their children with an access to land.
We observe 2324 households in the full sample and 373 transferring households.

(c) Measuring Vulnerability and Stability

Of course, the workability of the model presented here depends strongly on our measurement of vulnerability levels. This matter is so crucial that we now devote a separate section to exploring it.
We view stability as the inverse of vulnerability, but it remains a challenge to measure accurately the level of either. Generally, vulnerability is seen as depending on both consumption levels and variance over time, and is increasing in probability that future consumption levels will fall below a defined lower bound, which is understood as the threshold under which households' basic needs are not sustained and investment strategies are compromised (for discussion on the notion of vulnerability see Coudouel and Hentschel, 2000; Pritchitt et al., 2000; Alwang et al., 2001; Hoddinott and Quisumbing, 2010).
Stability has also been portrayed as a multidimensional notion: stability levels depend simultaneously on income risk, *ex ante* insurance mechanisms, and available *ex post* risk responses. We remark that there are many sources of risks and that risk-coping strategies are numerous. By definition a measure of stability is 'composite'. For instance households with very different levels of income might face equal levels of stability allowing for variability in diversification of activities or in availability of ex-post risk-coping mechanisms. Or households with the same type of economic activities might differ in their economic stability because of an inequality of access to credit from financial institutions or neighbours. Therefore, it would be unsatisfactory to approach vulnerability through each of its dimensions alone. Those dimensions have to be considered simultaneously and as being compensable.
Our data are cross-section and relate to a single year. As we do not have access

to panel data, we propose instead to create a composite indicator for measuring stability. This indicator will be based on a set of dimensions that should have a positive effect on households' economic stability - in other words, on the probability that they will never fall below the subsistence threshold.
Given the long list of potential dimensions, we use principal component analysis (PCA) and cross-correlation checks to select the variables that will constitute the indicator. The number of variables retained through a strict PCA may prove to be too restrictive, so we add a few dimensions for their theoretical relevance (and considering their rank in the PCA). We also checked for possible correlation bias among the different variables, to avoid accounting twice for similar aspects of economic stability. We tried different forms of the indicator by adding or removing some of the selected dimensions. The form of the indicator did not change the shape of our results down to four dimensions, and we kept the form which displays the best coherence with the literature on the sources of economic stability. We end up with the following composites for our indicator.

- Wealth as proxied by the value of the household's house.
- Savings in cash.
- Number of insurance schemes to which households subscribe -counting only those insurance programs that are meaningful for the household's economic stability (for example, health insurance, life insurance, social insurance, and vehicle insurance).
- Household's income per head.
- Stability of economic activities undertaken in the household as proxied by the percentage of household members who actively participate in 'stable' economic activity[2].

[2]To classify an activity as stable we compute the number of days per month averagely worked in each job reported by respondents and then separate this sample into two halves about the mean; jobs whose hours are above (or below) the mean are labelled stable (or not stable). We then count how many household members have a so-defined stable job and divide by the total number of active household members to obtain a ratio. The measure of 'job stability' thus obtained is highly correlated with the probability of having a labour contract, which suggests that our proxy is a reasonable one.

- Schooling level as measured by household members' average number of school years. That is, we measure average schooling years as the ratio of total household members' schooling years to the number of household members.

Now, in order to compute the composite indicator of economic stability, we use standard normalisation and a linear aggregation methodology without weights and under the assumptions that income-buffering strategies are compensable and that their relative importance is household specific. Thus we obtain our stability indicator V_i (for the methodology of composite indicator, see Nardo, 2005). For descriptive statistics on the indicator and its dimensions, see Table 2.4. The indicator is also significantly negatively correlated with the number of consumption shocks suffered by households in the last five years[3], which suggests that our measure of stability is a pretty good fit. Shocks may nonetheless not be used as a proxy for economic stability. Indeed, vulnerable households not yet submitted to shocks may be tempted to keep rights on their land for insurance purposes. The asset framework theory Zimmerman and Carter (2003) proposes that a high probability of future shocks leads to asset accumulation (land here), while the realization of a shock lead to the sale of previously accumulated assets. Vulnerability and realized shocks are therefore related but can't be used interchangeably for our purpose here.

[INSERT TABLE 2.4 HERE]

(d) Description of Variables

We add a set of control variables to our theoretical model. To explore further the phenomenon of distress sales, we also measure the number of shocks the household has encountered over the previous five years. To take into account the quality of land rights security, we measure the percentage of agricultural land in households' holdings that are covered by an LUC title. We also measure the distance (in km) to the closest commune people's committee, which is in charge of delivering land titles and has an important part in land conflict resolution[4]. Another way to measure the

[3] In the VARHS questionnaire, households were asked to state if they had had to reduce their consumption in the last five years, and if yes, how many times.

[4] The commune level people's committee delivers titles in collaboration with the land registration committee from the Bureau of land administration, although both are located in the same town.

security of land rights consists of looking at titling status at the communal level, since the security of land rights depends to a great extent on the quality of the local administration. We therefore introduce a village-level dummy capturing whether villages have implemented the 2003 Land Law.

The quality of a plot is also presumed to increase the probability of selling land, since it will fetch a higher price and so increase the household members' acceptance of the sale. Unfortunately, the VARHS data on land prices features too many missing values to be of interest. Instead, we control for land quality by calculating the agricultural income generated per square meter cultivated by the household, and we also control for the total size of land holdings. The state of the demand for land purchases also needs to be considered. We therefore control whether households's villages are located in remote areas. Remote areas are likely to be poorly integrated in the market economy, and to drive a low demand for land, specifically from outside the village.

Credit constraints are captured by a dummy equal to one if the households has either been refused a loan, or self-restrained from asking a loan in fear of being refused. We measure the strength of potential family claims on land by the number of sons of age to make claims on land inheritance (14 to 60 years old). Bequests traditionnaly tend to be made to sons, although not necessarily in equal share. This variable identifies potential bequest presssure.

Finally, we check whether the household lives in the North or in the South of Vietnam. Summary statistics for the full sample are proposed in table 2.5.

[INSERT TABLE 2.5 HERE]

2.6 Empirical Results

We now report estimation results for the three models of regression described in Section 2.5. The estimates seem to confirm our main theoretical prediction. In Vietnam, selling households are less vulnerable than their transferring counterparts; they have more stable sources of income and are better educated and wealthier.

Land holders deal directly with the people's committee and much less frequently with the Bureau of land administration (Do and Iyer, 2003).

(a) Land Sales: Prerogative of the Less Vulnerable

We first estimate the simple binary probit model of sale decision versus all other types of transfers described in equation (1) with village clusters : results are presented in table 2.6. We then add a correction for Heckman selection: we use the command *heckprob* in stata. The dependent variable in the selection equation (2.2) takes the value of 1 if the household has sold land in the last five years and 0 if it has transferred land through any other way (rentals, gifts, or loans). The results are presented in Table 2.7. The upper part of the table gives the result for the estimation of the equation of interest (2.1). The bottom part of the table gives the result of the selection equation, and the test of joint significance of the coefficient with and without a Heckman correction of a selection bias.

In table 2.6 and 2.7, specification (1) fits a model with the indicator of stability and control variables, but ignores the potential nonlinearity. Specification (2) investigates the nonlinearity effect by integrating the square value of the indicator of stability. Specification (3) fits a model with the various independent dimensions of economic stability (section 2.5.c), in order to see what are the driving forces in the relationship between stability and land sale decisions.

The likelihood ratio test of joint significance at the bottom of table 2.7 confirms a selection bias, and the relevance of a Heckman correction in our estimation. The selection variables are all strongly significant. The rate of agricultural income in total income and the availability of family farm labour are inversly related to the probability to transfer land -through sale, rental, gifts or free loans. On the other hand, households over 60 years old seems to tranfer land more frequently, as the life-cycle theory would have predicted.

We find a significant positive relationship between the degree of economic stability of households (as measured by our indicator) and the likelihood that land is sold rather than transferred through other channels. This result is robust in the simple probit estimation, as well as in the Heckman selection estimation (table 2.6 and 2.7). It is also robust in specifications (1) and (2) of the estimation with Heckman selection (table 2.7)[5] and confirms the idea that more stable households use sale as a mode of transfer more frequently than others, probably because they give a

[5]In the simple probit estimation presented in table 6, the coefficient of economic stability is not significant in specification (2) because of collinearity with the square value of the stability indicator

lower value to the safety net function of land. Specification (3) shows that nor the amount of savings, the access to private insurance, or the stability of wage activities are significantly related to the probability to sell. The main drivers of economic stability in the decision to sell land are rather income, wealth, and schooling.
The coefficient of the square value of economic stability is not significant, hence we can not confirm a non-linearity in economic stability. On the other hand, shocks are significantly and positively related to the probability to sell[6]: this is distress sale. Vulnerable households therefore keep their land as a precaution and sell only when shocks occur. We tried to cross the variables of shock and economic stability to look whether stability matters in the occurence of distress sales after a shock. As the results were insignificant, we do not report it here. To conclude, our data reflects both distress sales and the idea that vulnerable households would not easily sell their land because of its safety net function.

[INSERT TABLE 2.6 and 2.7 HERE]

Our results pertaining to the control variables are also interesting. As expected, the probability of selling (as compared with other transfer types) is much lower in the North than in the South. Credit constraints and land productivity are either insignificant factors or have a small impact. The number of living sons is found to reduce the probability to reduce the participation to any transfer (in the selection equation) and particularily to sales. Inheritance pressure might therefore be important in Vietnam, either because sons claim their rights or because parents themselves fear for their children's access to land in a context of increasing land pressure. Finally, remote areas are less likely to see households sell land, which confirm that a low demand may depress sale decisions. With a low demand, market prices are probably lower, reducing the relative benefits of land sale.
Surprisingly, the percentage of household land under a LUC title has a significantly negative effect on the probability to sell. If our variable correctly proxies the security of land tenure, then this result goes against the basic theory of titling programs and market activity. In order to explain this phenomenon, we must look at the demand side of the market. In Vietnam, most land is expected to be titled in the

[6]although the variable shock is not significant in the two first specifications of the simple probit estimation, in table7

relatively near future; therefore, well-informed purchasers use their power to take advantage of the potential appreciation in value of presently untitled land. These speculators buy land now at a cheap price, expecting that the value of their investment will increase once the titling program covers the newly purchased plot. Moreover, households with weaker property rights and no titles might be more easily forced to sell by speculators or officials. The negative relationship between the percentage of LUC titles in communes and the probability of selling might therefore suggest that insecurity of tenure can increase the development of sale markets in an unethical way. Also, the transmission effect of titles on land tenure security might depend on how titling influences intrahousehold repartitioning of property rights, which our estimation strategy does not capture (see Van den Broeck et al., 2007, 2008). Moreover, the economic literature has increasingly emphasized that formalisation of land rights may often run counter to local, customary definitions of land ownership, thereby reducing initial tenure security (Migot-Adholla et al., 1991; De Janvry et al., 2001). The implementation of the 2003 Land Law is insignificant in the model of interest, but increase the probability to participate to a land transfer in the selection equation. This is probably due to the significance of the 2003 land law to handle rental contracts.

(b) Testing for exogeneity

The interpretation of our results is nonetheless circumscribed by a main limitation: our estimates of the economic stability of household might suffer from an endogeneity bias, coming from unobserved factors affecting both the choice of sale as a transfer and the stability levels of households. With cross-sectional data, the common methodology used to deal with potential endogeneity consists in calling upon instrumental variables. Our data do not provide for a clear-cut instrument that would unquestionably fulfill the restrictions necessary to instrumental variable models. We nonetheless instrument economic stability with the distance from primary schools, but those results have to be understood as attempts for more robustness rather than for definitively rulling out the risk of endogeneity.

To extend our results, we instrument the indicator of households' stability with the access to primary education (the distance between the household's main dwelling and the nearest primary school). Education is a crucial element of economic stabil-

ity, in providing for higher paid jobs and higher resilience in case of job lay-off. The distance to primary school partly captures the cost of accessing the most basic level of education, and literacy. Its relation with economic stability is therefore easily justifiable. But a good instrument should also be excluded from the main equation, and unrelated to the disturbance terms. Education levels plays an important part in the decision to sell land. But the distance from primary school, or the costs or chance to obtain such education have no reason to influence directly the decision to sell, except through its impact on the final level of education that will be obtained, and as such, through economic stability.
Results of the probit model with instrumental variable and robust standard errors are given in table 2.8. Our instrument performs well enough, although we would have preferred a higher F statistic. We can nonetheless not reject the hypothesis of exogeneity in our estimates.

[INSERT TABLE 2.8 HERE]
Those last findings strengthen the main results of table 2.6 and 2.7, i.e more economic stablility increases the probability to sell land rather than transferring it through another type of transfer.

2.7 CONCLUSION

The land rights situation in Vietnam has incited much debate, especially about the impact of the 1993 decision to authorise land markets. The debate opposes advocates and detractors of market exchange, who see the reforms as respectively poverty reducing or poverty enhancing. However, this debate has not yet considered the 1993 land law's effect on such individual, customary transfers as gifts and rentals. The research reported here suggests that it may be wrong to systematically categorize land transactions, as either 'market' or 'non-market' transactions. In fact, according to our analysis of the VARHS, only land sales seem to differ from the other individual transactions in respect of the access to the safety net value: households that are more stable are more likely to sell land than exchange it through any other channel. Among all types of existing transfers, land sales might

indeed be the one that most drastically reduces access to land's safety-net functions. As a result, households with significant alternative non-land coping mechanisms are more inclined than others to give up their land rights so irreversibly. For less stable households, the position of land in their risk-coping strategies makes it extremely valuable, and selling prices are too low to compensate for land loss through sales. We therefore propose that, when addressing specific aspects of land -such as the access to the safety net it provides- a strict classification of market versus non-market land transfers may not always be the most relevant; as a result, it might engender poorly fitting (or even counterproductive) policy recommendations. Our results are preliminary, of course. Further research should look for other valid instruments of economic stability, apply the hypothesis analysed in this research to other contexts and countries, and understand more fully how all the different individual transfer types address the insurance aspects of land access.

Table 2.1: Acquisition modes (in per cent of plots)

From:	**Number of plots**	**per cent of plots**
State or Commune	8045	61
Inherited	1849	14
Bought	984	7
Cleared and occupied	1464	11
Rented in or borrowed	775	6
Total	13181	100

Table 2.2: Receiver of plots (per cent)

	Receiver			
	Relative	**Friend**	**other household**	**Total**
Sale	13.5	45.76	39.07	100
Rental	47.62	3.97	47.62	100
Gift	99.09	0.45	0	100
Free Loan	77.88	2.42	19.7	100
All transferred plots	59.54	13.15	26.8	100

Table 2.3: Plots with land Use Certificate (per cent)

Ownership if LUC)			
	Yes	**No**	**Total**
Sale	67.8	32.2	100
Rental	79.76	20.24	100
Gift	84.55	15.45	100
Free Loan	87.88	12.12	

Table 2.4: Stability Indicator, Summary Statistics

Variable	**Mean**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**
Housing Value (000 VD)	113678.10	0[7]	3500000	2323
Income per head in (000VD)	6046.47	0[8]	227168.30	2319
Insurance scheme subscription	1.05	0	4	2323
Active mbers in stable activities	0.15	0	1	2320
Saving amount (000VD)	10171.6	0	503000	2323
Average schooling years	5.34	0	11.37	2320
Stability indicator	5.36	0	35.06	2319

Table 2.5: Variables: Summary Statistics

Variable	**Mean**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**	**Level**
Old dummy	0.309	0	1	2320	household
Farm labour per sqm	0.002	0	0.18	2300	household
Agr. income (per cent)	0.367	0	1	2320	household
Credit constraint	0.050	0	1	2322	household
shock	0.663	0	5	2321	household
North Vietnam	0.572	0	1	2323	
Property title (per cent)	0.7732	0	1	2105	
Total land area (sqm)	8950.960	0	7666219	2323	household
Agr. productivity (VND)	10857.981	0	283425	2323	household
Number of sons	0.731	0	7	2323	household
People Com. Office (km)	2.174	0	60.1	2321	household
Primary school (km)	1.349	0	51	2316	household
Remote area	0.303	0	1	2213	village
Land Law 2003	0.95	0	1	2213	village

Table 2.6: Simple Probit on the Sale decision

Variable	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**
Ind. of stability	0.06***	0.04	
Ind. of stability squared		0.000	
Shock	0.13	0.13	0.16*
Housing value			0.00***
Savings			-0.00
Insurance provision			-0.13
Income per head			0.00**
Stable activity			0.32
Schooling years			0.07*
credit constraints	0.09	0.07	0.07
North Vietnam	-1.08***	-1.08***	-1.11***
Property title	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Land law 2003	-0.58	-0.59	-0.76
People com. office km	0.09*	0.09*	0.11**
Total land area	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00*
Agr. productivity	0.000	0.000	0.000
Nb of sons	-0.17	-0.16	-0.22*
Remote area	0.43*	0.43*	0.50*
Cons	-0.19	-0.06	-0.38
N	348	348	348

*Notes: significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01*

Table 2.7: Probit on the Sale decition with Heckman selection

Variable	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**
	Equation of Interest: Dependent variable S_i, sale vs other transactions		
Ind. of stability	0.082***	0.085*	
Ind. of stability squared		0.000	
Shock	0.151*	0.151*	0.181*
Housing value			0.001***
Savings			-0.000
Insurance provision			-0.087
Income per head			0.001***
Stable activity			0.317
Schooling years			0.085**
credit constraints	-0.037	-0.038	-0.031
North Vietnam	-1.109***	-1.109***	-1.208***
Property title	-0.008*	-0.008	-0.007
Land law 2003	-0.283	-0.282	-0.490
People com. office km	0.082*	0.083*	0.103
Total land area	-0.001	-0.001*	-0.000*
Agr. productivity	0.000	0.000	0.000
Nb of sons	-0.189*	-0.190*	-0.245**
Remote area	0.403*	0.403*	0.500***
Cons	-1.155	-1.169	-1.263
Uncensored N	348	348	348
	Equation of selection: Dependent variable transfer land [0;1]		
Ind. of stability	0.064***	0.064***	
Ind. of stability squared		0.000	
Shock	0.004	0.004	0.123
Housing value			0.000
Savings			-0.000
Insurance provision			0.061*
Income per head			0.000***
Stable activity			-0.132
Schooling years			0.035*
credit constraints	-0.210	-0.210	-0.208
North Vietnam	0.038	0.037	-0.009
Property title	0.001	0.001	0.001
Land law 2003	0.541**	0.539**	0.501***
People com. office km	-0.022	-0.022	-0.020
Total land area	0.000**	0.000*	0.000*
Agr. productivity	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000*
Nb of sons	-0.101**	-0.100**	-0.096*
Remote area	-0.006	-0.008	-0.004
Family labour per sqm	-127.458**	-126.886**	-130.535**
Old dumy	0.541***	0.540***	0.536***
Agr. income rate	-0.864***	-0.867***	-0.872***
Cons	-1.602***	-1.579***	-1.531***
Censored N	2105	2105	2105
VillagesN	427	427	427
Arthrho	0.549**	0.558**	0.493**
pseudologlikelihood	-910.058	-910.021	-893.938
LR test: chi2(pvalue)	5.25(0.022)	5.07(0.024)	4.20(0.040)

*Notes: significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01*

Table 2.8: Results from IV regression

Endogenous var: ind. of stability. Instrument: primary school (km)	
Main Output. Dependent var. S_i, sale vs other transactions	
Ind. of stability	0.176**
Shock	0.189**
credit constraints	-0.250
North Vietnam	-0.791****
Property title	-0.004
Land law 2003	-0.468
People com. office km	0.132***
Total land area	-0.000**
Agr. productivity	0.000*
Nb of sons	-0.291***
Remote area	0.5999***
Cons	-1.282
Output: first stage regression. Dep.var : ind. of stability	
Primary school (km)	-0.636***
Shock	0.597***
credit constraints	-1.666**
North Vietnam	0.570
Property title	-0.015
Land law 2003	0.387
People com. office km	-0.267**
Total land area	0.002***
Agr. productivity	-0.000
Nb of sons	-1.157***
Remote area	-1.650**
Cons	8.680***
N	348
Villages N	147
Arthrho	-0.706
lnsigma	1.520***
pseudologlikelihood	-1123.939
Wald test of exogeneity, chi2(pvalue)	1.17 (0.280)
Underidentification test, Kleibergen Paap Wald stat (pvalue)	6.88 (0.008)
Weak instrument test, Kleibergen Paap F stat (pvalue)	6.64
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values	
10 per cent maximal IV size	*16.38*
15 percent maximal IV size	*8.96*
20 per cent maximal IV size	*6.66*
25 per cent maximal IV size	*5.53*

*Notes: significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01*

Chapter 3

A Descriptive Analysis of Migrants' Strategies Regarding Land Holdings in Their Villages of Origin: Preliminary Results from a Case Study in the Northeast of Thailand

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This study is a preliminary introduction to a wider research which looks at one possible explanation as to why land is so rarely exchanged through the sale market, especially when compared with rental markets, inheritance and other non-market modes of exchange. In various papers, land has been said to be a social safety net for rural households, as a tool for food production, a secure store of value, and a crucial element in the intertwined social network solidarity. Social safety nets are understood as informal risk-coping mechanisms aiming at the protection of minimum levels of subsistence, when insurance markets and public social protection are lacking. This hypothesis has scarcely been studied empirically (Soludo, 2000; Pinckney and Kimuyu, 1994b; De Janvry et al., 2001; Platteau, 2000), if we except a few

theoretical papers related to common and communal property (Baland and Francois, 2005; Platteau, 2005; Dercon, 2004). Moreover, the papers that have described the social safety net function of land have generally been focusing on distress sales and the Sub-Saharan case.

We believe that this safety net function of land is crucial in a country like Thailand and decided to look empirically at the truthfulness of such a hypothesis to explain, at least in part, the low liquidity of land sale markets with respect to the benefit of other 'temporary', 'informal' or 'interpersonal' ways of exchange. The complexity of analyzing land sales mainly arises because two intertwined decisions are taken simultaneously by an economic agent before selling land. In the first place, he must decide whether it is worth or not parting with a plot. This decision is somehow understood in the 'occupational choice' framework and has to do with life cycle theory, land quality, and optimal farm size, among others. This is not the issue that we want to focus on here. In the second place, once the agent has decided to part with a plot, he needs to choose through which channel he intends to do so: should he sell? Rent the land out? Lend it for free to some relatives? Leave it as a pre-mortem inheritance? It is precisely this second step of the decision that we are investigating through this case study in Thailand. We propose that the safety net function imbedded in land has a role to play in this 'second step' choice between different types of transfers; at least, a role to play in making the fundamental decision to sell distinct from any other transfers.

The twofold choice simultaneously undertaken in the land sale decision makes empirical work on the determinant of land sales versus other ways of transfers quite complicated. Disentangling the two choices is even harder when we know that land sales are quite rare, and are found in much too small numbers to be meaningfully compared to the figures of other transfers. A very wide sample of rural households would have to be gathered before we could come up with any significant number of sales. To overcome these difficulties, we decided to look for a population displaying the highest possible rate of land transfers: rural-urban migrants. Indeed, migrants from rural areas who now live far away from their villages are for the most part unable to farm their land themselves, and are, therefore, faced with the necessity of transferring their plots one way or the other.

The overall purpose is thus to determine whether the land safety net function of land has a role to play in the way rural-urban migrants part with their plots. But we feel

that, before coming so far, we need to understand the whole panel of ways available to exchange plots in Thailand, how they work, and what they exactly imply for both parties of the exchange. Indeed, our hypothesis implies that transferring land by ways other than sales is actually meant to maintain an access to the land safety net function. We cannot advance such an argument without providing at least some rough evidence that this is true, and we need foremost to understand how the various temporary and/or informal transfers of land rights can preserve the insurance function of land better than land sales do. This is the purpose of this chapter.

A number of rural villagers have been interviewed about their acquaintances or relatives within rural-urban migrant households, who own or used to own farm land in the village. The survey tries to understand what is done with the land after migration and how it interacts with the access to rural safety net mechanisms. The study site chosen is the Northeast, thus our results might not be extendable to other provinces. Northeast Thailand was chosen because it displays the lowest rate of activity in the land market with the highest prevalence of out-migration.

The field research confirms that land sale implies a quasi irreversible cut-off from the land safety net. Free land loans, on the other hand, are often chosen to transfer migrants' land rights, as it allows to retain a sizeable access to the safety net function of land. For permanent rural urban migrants, increased opportunities for return and the preservation of relationships with relatives are the most crucial elements of the land safety net. Finally, the safety net function of land appears to be associated with strong social norms and to be embedded in a complex system of overlapped rights. Those conclusions cast doubts on the potential evolution of the safety net function of land with the emergence of alternative risk-coping mechanisms.

The results of this study are nonetheless explorative as well as case-specific, and cannot be used for generalization or causality making. Moreover, we think that only an in-depth anthropological study could provide all the necessary information on the implicit social complexity in the informal transactions of land. This study hopefully provides sufficient insights on how these exchanges work to help us carry out a quantitative study in further research.

In the next section (3.2), this chapter exposes the situation of land access and transfer in Thailand through an historical perspective. The section 3.3 explains the theoretical framework behind the 'safety net value' of land and justifies its use in the case of Thailand. Section 3.4 presents the main results of the field research

and examines the results with the theoretical propositions. The last section (3.5) provides a conclusion.

3.2 Farm Land and Land Exchanges in Thailand: A General Assessment

(a) Farm Land in Thai History

The best account of farm land ownership in Thai history was made by Charles Mehl in 1986 (Mehl, 1986). According to his research, land tenure in Thailand has been greatly influenced by a long history of an endless land frontier that ended sometime in the 1980s and shaped a pattern of small landholders with individualized property rights (Moerman, 1968). Until the middle of the 19th century, land control "*was as much a matter of state policy as of the free choice of the populace concerned*" (Siamwalla 1972 quoted in Mehl, 1986). The Northeastern part of the country specifically followed a pattern of settlement through the initiative of the people themselves; they chose the most convenient and richest land over the course of their migration routes. The frequent migration of the population probably contributed to what Mehl calls the "*lack of attachment of rural Thais to any particular plots of land for religious, cultural, or social reasons*" (Mehl, 1986), which still describes quite well the relationship that Thai farmers maintain with their land nowadays. Although sentimental attachment to one's plot is observed, it is not backed up by specific religious or mystic beliefs, or strong community attachment and norms.

After the 1850's, state control over land ownership was gradually replaced by individual property rights held by those farming the land. At the beginning of the 20th century, different areas of the country were progressively opened to individual claims based on land use and revocable as soon as this use ended, and almost always for very small portions of land. At about the same period, the first legal titles of ownership started to be printed and distributed in the most accessible areas of the country, mainly throughout the Central Plain.

In the mid 20th century, land ownership patterns in Thailand were already strikingly diverging from many other areas of the world: firstly, Thailand had no pattern of huge farms with a single owner and a multitude of landless laborers, except for

some big concessions in Rangsit and Bangkok compounds (Molle, 2002). Secondly, land was not governed by strong communal or tribal claim over ownership, except maybe for open-access resources such as forest and pastures. No accounts are found of a preemptive community permission over land sale decisions.

For a pretty long time then, the units of ownership detaining farm land were small farming households (Molle, 2002), and even smaller in the North and Northeast of the country (Mehl, 1986). This history of recurrent migrations and of the early individualization of property rights are not the only factors in understanding the current modes of access to land. Equally important are the bequest and marriage customary laws, and the land frontier culture that dominated until the 1980's. In Thailand, land inheritance is oriented toward equal division among daughters (Whittaker, 1999; Ng, 1970). Daughters inherit land at marriage, and it is the future husband who is expected to pay a dowry. As land was free to clear everywhere, newly-wedded couples would farm their portion of parental land made available pre-mortem, and complement it with land-clearing. Overall, young couples separated quite early from the core of the households.

Until the 1980's, therefore, the most important ways to access land was land clearing, land inheritance, and, in some areas opened to commercialization, land sales, which have been allowed for a long time, but were active almost only in urban and sub-urban areas (Molle, 2002). Rental contracts were rare except around Bangkok, since free land was everywhere available for no charge, and land loans among relatives seem not to have been frequent, or at least accounts are rare and do not provide accurate figures of their prevalence (Visser, 1980).

(b) Land Access from the Closure of the Land Frontier until Today

In the 1980's, the land frontier was finally reached. With the demographic growth still at a peak, land that had always been an abundant good grew scarcer. Although rice cropping technologies had improved sufficiently to allow cultivation on a larger scale, land holdings rather tended to decrease in size, partly due to fragmentation through equal inheritance.

This sort of revolution in land availability had huge consequences on both property rights and land access patterns. Although land ownership had long been private or

household-grounded, retaining legal guarantees over the land appeared increasingly valuable, in line with the theoretical predictions of the standard property right literature (Demsetz, 1967; Boserup, 1965; Platteau, 1996). At the same time, one of the most central way of accessing farm land, virgin forest clearing, had almost disappeared. Pre-mortem inheritance took over, and for some rural households today, it is the only way they will ever acquire land.

In this general scenario, what happened to land sales? Theory would predict a spur in the activity of the land sale markets all over the country. First of all, land scarcity is supposed to increase land value as a commodity and, therefore, market turn-over rates (for an empirical study in Rwanda see Andre and Platteau, 1998). Secondly, because large scale titling programs were implemented in 2000, according to a survey by Phelinas (2001), around 80 per cent of the land was covered by a legal document, called a '*chanot*', reducing transactions and information costs, and fostering mortgages (Chalamwong and Feder, 1986; Leonard and Narintarakul Na Ayutthaya, 2003; Rattanabirabongse et al., 1998). Thirdly, agriculture has become more commercialized than ever, making land a readable input in the market economy. Last but not least, emigration rates in rural areas became pretty high[1], specifically from the poorest areas of the country. Those migrants can reasonably be expected to relish their plots when leaving their farm, or after a few years in urban areas. Nonetheless, a spur in the farm land sale market is not what is observed today, or at least not as a general pattern in the whole country[2]. Land sales, moreover, seem to be concentrated in sub-urban areas. Grandstaff, et al. also mentioned that the huge migration movement out of the Northeast has not led to the consolidation of land holdings through sales, stopped the fragmentation pattern or spurred tenancy (Grandstaff et al., 2009). What is described here is not case-specific and is reported in various other countries of Africa (Migot-Adholla, 1991; De Janvry et al., 2001).

The low rate of turn-over in the farm land markets does not mean that the land ownership pattern has suddenly become inert with the closure of the frontier. Indeed, access to land increasingly goes through temporary transfers of use rights.

[1] If only for the Northeast, well over two million people were estimated as living in another province or country (Grandstaff et al., 2009).

[2] Phelinas (2001) observes in her survey that in Roi-Et Province in the Northeast, only 11 per cent of the land area had been acquired through purchase.

Land rental has increased a lot, although this phenomenon is mentioned only in the Central Region, and clearly does not describe the situation of the Northeast[3]. In 2003, 79 per cent of the holders owned the totality of the land they farmed, and 8 per cent did not own any of their farm land. Interestingly, half of those 8 per cent of households farming in tenancy recorded that they used the land free of charge.
Land rentals are not the only way through which temporary land use rights can be transferred. Informal accounts during previous field work revealed that informal free land loans between relatives are frequently practiced. Grandstaff et al. (2009) also mention free transfer of ownership. Molle (2002) also states that tenancy between relatives are part of a biggest set of non-market exchanges such as free exchange of farm labour or assets. We did not find any recent research on the nature of these informal land loans in Thailand, or on their prevalence.

3.3 Land as Social Safety Nets: Theoretical Framework

What we describe above is quite a good example of the kind of puzzle we are interested in; although all the pre-conditions for the development of farm land sales are present, sales still remain a minor way of exchanging land.

(a) Among Other Theoretical Propositions: The Safety Net Value of Land

The economic literature provides many explanations as to why land sales might not be an optimum way of exchanging land. The most popular theory on this issue points to the informality of land rights as a source of market failure (Deininger et al., 2008). This theory has been put into doubt through worldwide case-specific empirical research, refuting a systematic statistical relationship between land legal ownership systems and land market activity; and this theory may not apply well to Thailand which has implemented legal private ownership for a long time (Rattanabirabongse et al., 1998).
Another way to look at our question is to focus not on what impedes land sales, but

[3]In Isan, according to Grandstaff et al. (2009), tenancy has not undergone any major increase.

on why keeping land ownership rights might sound more attractive to farmers. The economic literature's answer to such a question is to call upon the various functions of land, which are not reproduced in land sales prices (se for instance Carter and Mesbah, 1993; Binswanger et al., 1995; Shearer et al., 1991; De Janvry et al., 2001). If these various functions of land can be kept by transferring only temporary use rights, through rental for instance, then not selling is a perfectly rational strategy. Among these various functions of land, the following have been more cautiously studied: the credit access aspect as land ownership allows collateral and credit; the maintenance of political power; the precautionary accumulation of assets; the speculative potential; and the symbolic, religious or emotional function. Finally, a last function has been frequently mentioned but scarcely looked at empirically, and might be accurately applied to the case of Thailand: farm land provides a safety net for a vulnerable populations. Indeed, land can produce staple food for a very low entry cost, or even no production cost at all, apart from the shadow cost of labor (Maxwell and Wiebe, 1998). In a similar spirit, it allows income self-generation when labour markets are unsteady. It is an indestructible asset with a quite secure value; and although not much has yet been said on this matter, farm land has some undefined role to play in the functioning and enforcement mechanisms of rural social networks.

The hypothesis of a safety net value embedded in farm land sounds especially attractive when analyzing the situation of Southeast Asia, and Thailand in particular. The precursor of all the more recent works on the role of risk aversion and second best insurance strategies is, of course, Scott (1976) and his book on the overwhelming importance of rice security for Southeast Asian farmers. Later studies have been set up in the Asian region to look at how risk aversion might influence behaviors (Paxon, 1992; Binswanger, 1983; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). That land transfers in Thailand are among those many decisions that are affected by risk aversion, therefore, does seem plausible. This is all the more plausible if we look at the debate that followed the 1997 crisis; as rural-urban migrants lost their jobs in the cities, they massively returned to their villages until the situation settled down, and were absorbed in the agricultural labor force. The exact number of those returnee migrants at that time is not easy to figure, as data on internal migration are scarce, and the returns were temporary and not all occurring at the same time. Nonetheless, it has been believed to have been around two millions (Subhadhira et al., 2004). Agricul-

ture and communities were then designated as a crucial safety net in a modernized fluctuating economy, where no public social security has yet been implemented. If agriculture has served as a safety net, then farm land has also. Finally, authors such as Vanwey (2003, 2004) have already underlined the status of farm land in Thai culture. According to Vanwey (2003, 2004) land is seen as an important security and help to maintain tight relationships with relatives, particularily for migrant populations.

(b) Different Transfers of Land Ownership for Different Outcomes on the Land Safety Net

There is, however, a major difference between our 'safety net value' argument and the analysis of most of the other functions of land; collateral use of land, the power guarantee, the speculative function and, to a certain extent, the symbolic function of land, can all be efficiently maintained through temporary transfers of use rights through rental. We believe that this is not as straightforward as for the case of the land safety net function. Farm land works as some kind of insurance if its owners expect that they will be able to grow food, make agricultural income or sell land for cash income at any time necessary; or if they can expect to use it as an implicit claim for help from the social network. We, therefore, provide some predictions as to how each type of land transfer used by migrants - rentals, free loans or sales - might impact the availability of the land safety net function.

As not much has been written on this matter, we can only suggest a few elements of how and how much of the land safety net functions are safeguarded through the large panel of transfers available. First, we predict that free loans of land might be the most effective way to keep a quick hand on the land safety net function (as proposed by Vanwey, 2003, 2004); it allows for a flexible return to farming and safeguards the social safety net and relationships with village relatives. Land rental is also a temporary exchange of land rights allowing return to farming, but it might not be as flexible as free land loans and does not have the same power in enhancing social network assistance[4]. Finally, as an irreversible loss of land rights, land sales probably imply a greater loss of the social safety net.

[4]We do not talk about gifts as pre-mortem inheritance here, as it is probably a rarely used way of transferring land by the migrants, since few of them have reached the age to bequest land.

The description that we just made on each transfer's implication for the access to the safety net function of land is only hypothetical. The validity of this account might depend on the exact way in which those transfers are implemented in Thailand. Although we might find some literature on tenancy rules in Thailand, it is uncertain whether those tenancy rules are the one chosen by migrants. Moreover, as we have already mentioned, not much has been said about free land loans, and land sales have rarely been examined beyond their official definition. We believe that the impact of those transfers for social protection might, in fact, depend both on the nature of the contract and on the relationship existing between the two parties of the transaction.

3.4 Field Results

(a) Data Description

Our purpose is to get a general overview of migrants' farm land as they are away in other provinces or countries, and to investigate to what degree each type of transfer implemented could guarantee the use of the land as a social protection tool, in relation to the decision to sell. Such a study requires a qualitative, rather than quantitative study, being more descriptive in nature.

The difficulty in the design of our study comes from the double location of our two objects of enquiry: migrants are away in urban areas, but their land is in a rural location. We can, therefore, not be in proximity to both, the migrant and the land. We chose for this part of the study to go where the land is located. We set interviews in some rural villages, with the relatives of migrants knowing the migrant's situation well, or are currently using the migrants' land. By doing so, we probably lost some information on the migrants' economic situation, but gained information on land use, land transfers, and had an interesting insight into the nature of transfers from the other side of the transaction - the receiver.

We chose to keep our survey in Khon Kaen Province for logistic reasons. The agriculture in Khon Kaen is a mix of rice fields and highlands devoted mainly to cassava and sugarcane cultivation. The land is generally quite dry and of poor quality, although recent investment in irrigation facilities and water infrastructures has improved access to water. We chose six villages thanks to the CDD survey of 2009.

Our sampling of the villages mainly attempted to find areas with a great concentration of long-term migrants. Interestingly, the villages displayed various prevalence rates of out-migration with migrants heading toward different provinces; a great heterogeneity in land quality and land scarcity; as well as uniformity in the degree of commercialization of agriculture. In each village, we interviewed the village headman - or headmen when the villages where separated in different sub-administrative areas. After the interview, the headman was asked to provide a contact for the migrants' relatives whom we could interview within the village.

For the survey to be meaningful, we implemented a number of criteria. Firstly, we required that targeted migrants should have left the village for more than a year and be permanent migrants. Secondly, we wanted migrants who had left with their whole household; we did not interview migrants when they had left children with relatives in the village. Finally, we interviewed only migrants who had owned some land before leaving the village, or had land of their own in the village now. All those criteria are necessary to insure that surveyed migrants really have land available to transfer, rather than cultivate land themselves as is often observed when migration is temporary. We included a few migrants whom bequest transfer had not officially been made, as we were interested in seeing how those migrants would act with this very land[5]. Of course, as aforementioned, we could not interview the migrants themselves as they were away, so we went to their closest relatives in the village. Almost 40 per cent of the respondents were the migrant's parents, and the rest were siblings, or more distant relatives, such as uncles, aunts or cousins, who were currently using the migrant's land. Except for one case, respondents had a good knowledge of the migrants' situation and land use, although they knew less of their life in the city. Altogether, we gathered information on 34 migrant households, plus the village headman interviews and informal discussions with other migrants' relatives or friends. Five of our respondents could answer for more than one migrant household. Interviews were semi-structured, which all together makes this survey explorative in nature. The analysis mainly relies on respondents' narrative rather than on statistics. Finally, triangulation of answers was not always possible, depending on the migrant household's relatives that could actually be reached.

97 per cent of our respondents were nuclear families, with an average age of re-

[5]Indeed respondents referred to this land as the migrant's despite the absence of actual ownership title.

spondents of 48 years old, and 59 per cent were women. Their main profession was farming. The migrants for who they answered about owned in average 8 *rai*[6], and 45 per cent of the migrants owned some highlands used for cash crops; 1/4th of the land owned by migrants was reported with a particularly low productivity, even compared with the standards of the province; 2/3 of the migrants were qualified by their respondent relatives as poor or very poor; and 1/3 as rich or very rich. Around 40 per cent of the migrant households had independent occupations, such as street-selling, a small restaurant, or their own business, repair shop or small textile industry. About 30 per cent were working as low skilled workers in factories, and 10 per cent had high jobs, such as government workers or skilled labor in factories. The average number of member of a migrant household was 3.5.

Respondents were asked about the migrant household's occupation before departure, and their current situation and wealth in the city. Information were gathered on the migrants' land, and on every possible transaction that the household had made since leaving - sales, mortgage, rental, loans, and gifts. Respondents were also questionned about their general opinion as to why a migrant household might keep or sell land and on the specific value of land for a migrant. We sometimes found it hard to get information, as land remains a sensitive issue, but compared to what we expected, we felt that land transfer issues were actually less problematic for respondents than it might have been elsewhere.

In the following, we give our main impression of the interviews. We will sometimes provide percentages of answers, but those percentages do not mean much, as the sample is very small.

(b) Land Sale Activity

Before digging into the precise nature of each type of land transfer, we first wanted to make sure that our question is actually relevant to the case of the Northeast of Thailand. First of all, the interviews in the different villages confirmed that land sales are a rare phenomenon; most villages had not seen more than one transaction in the last five years, residential land included. Some village headmen could not recall any transactions in this period of time and had to go back to a longer period of time (10 years). Only one village displayed a higher rate of land sale market

[6] 8 *rai* equals 1.30 hectares.

activity, with four plots that had been sold in the last five years, of which one was by a migrant, and all the other plots by villagers. In all the villages, land loans, free of charges, were frequently used to transfer plots, followed by rental. Bequests, of course, made up the highest share of land transactions.

We have already said that land sale market activity in the visited villages was quite low. But a low activity on the market can come from three different sources: institutional difficulties which make transactions difficult for both parties of the exchange; a rationing from the demand side; or a rationing from the supply side. Obviously, there were no significant institutional constraints on sales, as market activity is fully allowed, and land property right definition is quite clear. In three of the villages we visited, all the land was recorded under a full ownership title - a *chanot*. In the three other villages, most of the land was also under those full ownership titles, and as for the land which did not have proper documents, owners always had a proof of ownership of some kind, or a title with lower ownership coverage than the usual *chanot*. We did not get any account of conflict on plot boundaries or such, and villagers seemed to have confidence in community enforcement of local rights if any conflict was to befall someone's untitled land. The loss of land to big companies through mortgages was the only mentionned source of insecurity, although the practice is legal. Finally, respondents did not see in the institutions any constraints on selling or buying land if they had decided to.

The suvey therefore tried to look from which side of the sale market the rationing on transactions came from, since most of the economic literature has focused on demand constraints in access to credit and liquidity to buy the land. Nonetheless, in all of the six villages, the rationing seems to rest on the supply side. We asked village headmen and the respondents whether it would be hard to find a buyer once you decided to sell land, and whether it would be hard to find a piece of land on sale if you decided to buy one. All the village headmen's and 88 per cent of the respondents' answers were that a lot of people would be ready to buy land if only there were plots to be freed within the village, but that supply of land was lower than needed[7]. They assessed that finding a buyer when selling land was an easy and rapid task. From those interviews, it seemed that the low amount of land sales transactions observed in the villages is mainly supply driven, confirming that it is

[7]The 22 per cent of respondents who did not agree with this statement made contradictory answers to both of the questions, on buying and selling.

wise to investigate the reasons that might hold back an agent from selling land.
The supply-driven constraint on land sale market activity was even more obvious when we focused on migrants. Migrants, indeed, own land that could be made available on the market; as expected, they use the sale market more frequently than the village population. A bit over 25 per cent of the migrants had sold some land since leaving their village. 10 per cent of them rented their highland as they loaned their rice fields free of charge, to which could be added another 10 per cent of households for which the arrangement stood at the limit between a loan and a sharecropping agreement. The rest of the migrants had loaned free of charge all their land. So, altogether, 65 per cent had loaned at least part of their land, which makes loans free of charge the first type of transfer used by migrants. Once more, finding a buyer was no constraint for migrants, according to their relatives respondents. Overall, land sales are a minor way of transfer of plot rights in our sample.
The chapter now comes to the description of the different types of transactions and what they might imply for the social protection function of land.

(c) Description of Transfer Types

Land Sales

Land sales in Thailand are quite close to what land sales would be in any developed country. In the villages we observed, land sales are a permanent transfer of the whole bundle of ownership rights, accompanied by a transfer of legal documents. Return to land after the transaction is not possible, and all the land functions definitely change hands at the time of the sale. Nonetheless, sales are not all equivalent in the degree of safety-net loss, and, from respondents' answers, it seems that the degree of this loss greatly depends on the identity of the buyer and his pre-existing relationship with the migrant seller.
It is first interesting to look at how land sales are conducted by migrants. From a general agreement, migrants who decide to sell land will first ask their relatives, and specifically the ones who are currently using the plot, whether they want or can buy the plot. Sale prices could be negotiated to help relatives to purchase the plot, but it is doubtful whether the price can really go far under the market price - respondents' answers are uncertain on this point. If the relatives are not interested, or cannot afford the land, the owner then puts his land on the general market, available to the

highest bid. Overall, it seems that not proposing the land first to the relatives is a scandalous outrage.

The nature of land sales also seems to diverge according to the identity of the purchaser. First, when sale transactions are among relatives, the transaction aims at a 'fair' price; whereas in transactions made among non-relatives, the aim is for the highest bid. Secondly, the identity of the purchaser changes the chance to re-purchase a plot after selling it. All respondents agreed that a plot sold to a relative can, under certain conditions, legitimately be re-bought by the first owner, although he would have to buy it at market price (that is almost always higher than what he had received when selling). On the other hand, respondents saw no reasons why the previous owner should be entitled to re-buy a plot if he has sold it to a non-relative, the less if the purchaser is from outside the village. We might then advance that land sales to relatives are, to a certain extent, more reversible than land sales to non-relatives. Yet, although respondents mentioned those facts in general terms, we did not observe it directly.

Finally return to farming the land is impossible after selling, but if migrants have sold land to relatives and have to come back with serious financial problems with no income alternative, they may possibly farm the land previously owned under shared farming - sharing production costs and income - with the relative, or be more kindly taken as labor on the relative's farm for at least a short period of time in exchange for a roof and food. This seems to explain most of the migrants' interests in keeping land within their relative networks, even upon selling. Respondents made another very interesting point concerning land sales. They stated that migrants who have sold all their land holdings in the village will not come to visit their offspring and relatives as often as others, and will not give much news.

We are inclined to suggest the following:

- Land sales obviously lead to the loss of collateral use for consumption loans, except if it allows buying new land somewhere else.

- Land sales make return to farming - food production and independent income generation - almost impossible, except if land has been sold to relatives. In this case, land may be re-bought, or the returnee migrant in need might be allowed to share farming on his former plot. Return to farming is, in any case, seriously compromised.

- Land sales when the migrant has no land left in the village seem to generate a cut between the migrant and his village social network or relatives' social network. This does not mean that the migrant will be refused any help further on. Nevertheless, we can imagine that it will limit the firmness of the relationships and decrease the degree, amount and probability of being helped when needed.

To conclude, land sale clearly cuts-off the land function as a social safety net. Nevertheless, selling to a relative might lessen the impact of land sales on village social network's assistance in case of income shock befalling a migran's household.

Land Rental

Land rental is another type of market exchange, although as compared to land sales, it is temporary and concerns only use rights. A temporary transfer of use rights is considered as rental if a payment is made in exchange of the transaction. We include in the 'rental' category both fixed rent and sharecropping.
Fixed rent or sharecropping was not frequently quoted by our village respondents as a way migrants used to transfer plots' right while being away. As we already said, only 10 per cent of them used fixed rent contracts in association with free land loans, and 10 per cent more had settled some kind of sharecropping agreements, although the respondent did not call it so. Village headmen and many respondents, nevertheless, said that they knew or had heard of some migrants renting their land to someone else when leaving the village.
The story that we come up with on land rental is, therefore, based less on observed situations than on accounts and general knowledge by our informants, and might have to be improved through a largest sample of migrants. Nonetheless, the story makes sense and we relate it here.
First of all, the land which is eligible for renting is almost entirely made of highlands. Highlands in the Northeast are the upper-level land, less reachable by water, not prone for rice cultivation and planted with cash crops, such as cassava, sugarcane, corn, or tree plantations. Rice fields were mostly transferred through land loans, but in some case were seen in sharecropping agreements. So, to sum-up, fixed land rent contracts are made when the crop is traded, on the highlands; while sharecropping is rarely used by migrants, even on rice fields.

The second characteristic of land rental is that they were rarely made between relatives, but between people who had no pre-existing relationships, except for living in the same village. To sum-up, land rental by migrant is seen mainly between non-relatives, while relatives prefer free land loans.

Finally, we attempted to get a look at how exactly the rental agreement is defined and enforced with the migrant being away. Firstly, all of the rental contracts we could directly observe, and most of the contract that respondents had heard about, are renewed every year. If the migrant has decided that he wants to get his land back, he has every legitimate and legal right to do so at the end of the rental year, since the contract actually states so. Most of the rentals follow fixed rent contracts, sometimes under written contract and sometimes informally[8]. In such contracts a fixed amount of money is paid before the farming year, sometimes accompanied by a cash deposit, which helps migrants to monitor land use and degradation on their plot. According to the villager respondents, fixed rent contract are chosen firstly to save migrants the time of commercializing the crop and the necessity of coming back every year. Secondly, fixed rents paid before harvest avoid failures to pay by the tenant and allow a smooth enforcement of the contract.

To sum-up, it seems that rental, although not very frequent, allows safeguarding a significant amount of the social safety net function of land. It allows a return to farming the land as the contract is set for a short period of time, but the date is not very flexible, and migrants will have to wait until the end of the contract duration to evict the tenant. As rental is only a partial transfer of land rights, the migrant can still make use of his holding to ask for a loan from a bank or a saving group. Moreover, the rent that he regularly derives from the transaction is a source of income which can help make ends meet. Finally, it is not clear from respondents' answers whether land rental has any impact on social network assistance in case of loss. If the rental has been made to a non-relative while a relative actually had views on using the plot, relationships might be deterred. Otherwise, land rental should not impede nor improve the assistance received from the social network.

[8]In his study of the Chao Phraya delta,Molle (2002) specifies that most contracts are oral, but this does not make the tenancy insecure, as other well-functioning mechanisms are settled to enforce the terms of the arrangement.

Land Loans

As aforementioned, most migrants leave their land under the free use of some relatives. Those relatives could be the elderly parents, offspring, uncles and aunts, or cousins. Understanding the precise nature of the use contract was not easy. Indeed, respondents stuck to the 'use for free' answer. A general pattern, nevertheless, seems to emerge.

First, land loans are rarely completely free. Although the migrant does not ask for any price or portion of the crop for using the land, he is somehow entitled to some part of it, specifically when the land is rice field. The deal seems to rest on the migrant receiving some of the harvest for his consumption, never for sale or making a profit. He is not to ask anything, but the user is to give to him voluntarily. If the migrant asks for a repayment in nature, the arrangement is then perceived as sharecropping. The quantity given varies significantly. Some migrants are reported to refuse the rice offered. Some said that the migrant took only a bag or two, and not regularly, depending on whether they would be present at harvest time or had the transport facilities to carry it back. This is the most frequent situation observed. Other stated, nevertheless, that migrants got their due every year, which amounted from about 10 to 25 per cent of the harvest made on the land. In any case, it is still very far from what we observed in sharecropping agreements mentioned above.

It is difficult to assess whether the volume of rice transferred in exchange for the free use of land is related to an owner/user wealth differential, or to migrants' wealth only, or to migrants' lifestyle, or to how close is the tie between owner and user (parent-child versus distant relatives), because our sample is in fact too small. Nevertheless, those who receive the highest share of rice are also generally those who come at harvest or re-planting time to help their relatives to work. From villagers' answers, we also have the feeling that the closer the relationship between the migrant and his 'free' tenant, as in the case of children to parents, the closer the transfer of rice stands to an 'altruistic' gesture. On the other hand, the more distant the relatives, between cousins for instance, the closer the transfer of rice stands to an informal and undeclared repayment in exchange of a kindly made favor.

Respondents also said that being able or not to use the migrant's land for free does not change the fact that help is due between relatives. Nevertheless, all of them added that ties between the migrant and his relative using the land might be tight-

ened by this win-win transaction, and that relatives might be entitled to provide even greater assistance knowing that they are using the migrant's land for free. This kind of free loan was also really helpful for the migrant, who, according to the respondent, could have a trusty person to monitor his land in absence. Finally, all respondents agreed that under these kinds of temporary transactions, the migrant would be able to come back to his land any time. If the migrant needs to come back in the middle of a harvest season, he may share farming with the relatives currently using the land (getting some part of the profit, sharing food and meals and so on), and will then get his full ownership bundle of rights back after harvest. But land-using relatives have 'never' been seen refusing to give back use rights on land at the end of a farm season, or refusing to share farming with the migrant in the middle of the season if asked.

To sum-up, land loans do indeed preserve a great deal of the social safety net function of land; return to food production and land farming income is made possible and flexible; the use of land for bank loans is of course still allowed; and finally, land loans strengthens the relationship between migrants and their relatives using the land. Social network functionality is somehow protected or even tightened by the 'free' or 'gift-like' nature of the transaction.

In conclusion, this description seems to confirm a hierarchy of the different types of land transfer according to the degree of land social protection loss. Sales to a stranger, as it directly and irrevocably cuts access to land and lessen social ties, implies a definitive loss of farm land social safety net value. Sales to a relative is next, as they almost irreversibly cut access to land but reduce the damages done to social ties, and safeguard a small niche for return with relatives. Rental is third, which allows keeping collateral functions and a return to land possibility, but reduces the flexibility of return to the land's income generation activities until the end of the rent contract. The type of transfer of rights which safeguards best the social safety net value of land is free land loans to relatives, as collateral use and return to farming are both allowed, and social ties are kept or even increased.

(d) Selling versus Keeping Land

The survey then tried to assess the validity of the safety net hypothesis as one of the potential causes of migrant households limiting their supply on the land sale market in favor of other temporary or informal ways. When asked, the safety net value of land owned by migrants definitively made sense for almost all the respondents. Both respondents' general opinion and observed real cases were analyzed to account for the reasons that stopped migrants from selling their land, and that led them to keep their land instead, even after a long period of time away. After respondents' spontaneous answers, various potential reasons were proposed to respondents, who gave their personal opinion.

Reasons for Keeping Land Rights

First, keeping land was deemed necessary for the migrants who wanted or needed to come back to the village. Migrants could need to come back for two reasons; the first reason has to do with private preferences which led them to prefer a life in the village. But respondents stated that although this reasoning was frequent when a single member of the household left to work, it was rarer when the whole household left. As for the second reason, even when migrants had no specific preferences for a life in the village, they would keep some land there just in case of serious problems in their new urban life, such as financial difficulties, debts, job loss, and so on.
One condition for the argument of land as a security to hold upon potential return migration is that selling the whole holding makes things much more complicated for those who need to come back because of economic difficulties. When asked whether having no more land is a barrier for migrants who wish to return, respondents explain two different scenarios. For a migrant who has gotten rich, being landless is not a problem upon returning, as they would be able to buy some new land, or to rent some for a start. But for migrants who have to come back because of financial difficulties, the situation is the complete opposite. In such case, migrants are likely not able to buy new land or to rent a plot, so that their only solution is to farm on some relatives' holdings through share work, or to look for off-farm work which is not always available. The poorest migrant households with no land would, therefore, be restrained in their ability to return, or in their abilities to sustain a livelihood upon return. Moreover, some respondents added that whatever the migrant's wealth

level, landlessness always made returns more costly and difficult, because of the cost and time wasted looking for new land. Nonetheless, according to a few respondents, the situation of landless migrants upon return is not perfectly homogeneous, even among those who return because of being hit by some income shocks. Indeed the capacity to sustain a livelihood in the village also depends on the ability and willingness of the migrant's social network to provide assistance. Here again, the identity of the buyer of the migrant's plot might matter, and a plot sold to relatives might be of some kind of assistance when migrants look upon their offspring's generosity.
The second spontaneously stated reason for keeping land in the village when migrating is related to old age and children's bequest; migrants keep land so that their children will themselves have some land at their disposal in the village. Although most agreed that the migrant's children are often used to the urban life and have few abilities for farming, they still observe that even if migrants themselves have made a good situation of their own, they have no guarantees about what their children will have to cope with; leaving them some land, even land that they will hardly be able to farm, helps to secure their life. The other concern is that having farm land at disposal, even in a small size, is a strong guarantee for old age.
Respondents also agree upon other reasons which explain why some prefer to keep some land. Land can be used to get a loan with the bank. Respondents do not agree that migrants often use land for investment loans, as to do so, they have to return to the village and borrow from a local bank, which is tiresome. But, in case migrants encounter severe problems, such as illness, they will then go through the time-costing procedure to be able to make consumption loans to sustain their life.
90 per cent of the migrants agrees that keeping some land in the village is a strategy that migrants should all follow, for the reason we mentioned above. The only exception to this alleged best strategy is said to concern well-off migrants who have good jobs and, therefore, do not fear the need to ever come back to farming. Those migrants are seen as having reasons to sell, especially if selling the land in the village can help them buy new fixed assets - land or houses - closest to their new place of life.
We are, therefore, tempted to conclude that land does have a safety net value in the eyes of the respondents, and that they evaluate this value as important in migrants' decision to keep land. If our respondents were true, then the role of land as a social safety net for migrants is related to land allowing for the production of food; to it

being an occupation that you can do whatever the state of the labor market; to a thing that links you to your broad relatives; and to its use for getting loans.

Reasons for Selling Land

Those were the reasons stated to keep land. We cannot, by deduction, conclude as to the reasons of selling land, which might lie on a completely different line of reasoning. So, taking the problem the other way around, we asked respondents why their migrant relatives had sold land if this had indeed happened, and asked their general opinion on the matter when land sales had not occurred. The straightforward answer was that migrants who have sold have had financial problems and urgently needed money. Land is sold as a last result, after the car or the motorcycle, stocks of crops, if available, gold, or livestock.

The idea of selling land to invest in something else was not widely agreed upon. Nonetheless, if we changed slightly the question into selling land to invest when migrants were already well-off and had secured a good livelihood in their new place, respondents enthusiastically agreed. Moreover, they all explained that, except for those who were forced into sales because of unfortunate events, selling migrant households anticipated never coming back in the village to live. In some cases as well, respondents stated that migrants had sold their land in the village to buy new land somewhere else, generally residential land or even a house.

Overall, two different profiles of selling migrants emerged. They were stated to be either very wealthy with a good situation; therefore selling all land at once, save for the house sometimes which could be used at times for visits. Or they were very poor and having financial problems, and selling either the whole holding or only part of it depended on the size of their holding relative to the amount of money needed.

What can be concluded from this section, although with caution, confirms our first hypothesis. Land has a value as a safety net for migrant households. This can lead them to prefer keeping it while being away. When they are wealthy and therefore neither return migration or consumption loans are expected, the land loses part of its social safety net value. But this might not lead to automatic sales if other criteria are taken into account in sale decisions. From our interviews, one of those other criteria could be a huge wealth differential between the rich migrants and their relatives using the land, leading to sale-restraint for something like ‘altruistic’

reasons. Another reason could be a long planned craving for returning to the village and improving the farm with the earned money. Finally, land safety value as a restraint to selling land might also crack down for those who stand at the bottom of the economic 'stability' chain. For those migrant households, when crossed with urgent money needs, the immediate liquid value of land might overpass any claim for any later need of the social safety net function of land, leading to what the literature has referred to as 'distress sales'.

(e) Discussion: Digging Deeper Into the Safety Net Theory

Our main hypothesis on the role of a safety net value of land in the decision to keep rather than sell land seems to be strengthened by our preliminary results from the field. But our interviews did not only allow confirming what we had already theoretically understood, it also permitted us to dig deeper into the role of land for the social protection of migrants and how this might impact the theory on the decision to sell.

Land in the access to safety nets: Is Individual Ownership Really Individual?

Inheritance from parents is the main mode of access to ownership of land in the region, following an equal split between daughters[9]. When children get married, they receive some land from their parents as pre-mortem inheritance, and the parents keep some of their own land for themselves, which is split after their death. This system simultaneously allows young couples to access land, and parents to give incentives for their children to care for them when they retire. The transfer of legal ownership on the land is not always made immediately: young couples are often seen with *de facto* ownership on a plot but with no legal document in their name, for a period that varies from a few months to many years[10]. This situation confirms a blurred limit between relative networks' and individual households' claims on land. What implications does this have on the decision to sell land? All migrants who wish to sell have first to ask if any of their relatives are interested in buying the

[9] Although, in present days, because of increasing scarcity of empty land, parents holdings are very often distributed between all children - including sons.

[10] The legal transfer is not done either because parents do not have the opportunity or want to keep some reserve right at hand.

land. If that is the case, then the outcome is easy and the sale is made more or less informally. If it is not the case, or if the relatives cannot buy the plot, then the migrant is not advised to take the final decision alone; their relatives, and of course their parents, have a say as to the desirability for them and the relatives network of selling - or 'letting go' of - the land to someone else. This is where the actual name on the ownership title might matter, although absence of ownership was not seen as mere barrier to selling land; even in cases where the relatives were against selling, the migrant actually could sell against the will of their parents[11].

What does this suggest about our topic? Firstly, the safety net value of land cannot be looked at alone without having a systematic inquiry into what is at stake in the relatives' network. Secondly, if village relative networks are important in safeguarding a safety net for migrants, then we have to consider the implication of land sales for the relationships between migrants and their relatives. Although property rights are private, and individuals are the real decision units involved in any transfer of land, relatives do have an implicit claim on land that they can use through bargaining, negotiations and enforcement through threats of land alienation or exclusion from one of the main source of assistance, the relatives network, in a world where public social protection is inexistent.

Some previous studies have already mentioned the role of relatives' claim in limiting the amounts of land sales and the real extent of individualization in agriculture (Haugerud, 1989). What we add here is that relatives' claims on land have an impact on what sales mean for safety net considerations. Selling land might in some cases not only mean an impossibility to return to the land, but also generate a distance or even serious conflicts between the seller and his relatives, which are a part of the migrant's safety net strategy.

Land Safety Net Value as a Social Norm

Before concluding, we wish to develop an additional element which came out of the semi-structured interviews with the villagers. The idea of farm land ownership as a way to safeguard one's economic survival was admitted without any doubt by all our respondents. We felt, through their responses, that the land safety net value

[11] We observed one such case; threatening their parents at the worse, the migrant obtained their agreement and sold the land to a non-relative.

of land was a kind of common knowledge shared by all and stated by all. Keeping some land for security appeared to be the 'good' or 'wise' thing to do. But some respondents also told us that even if they thought keeping land was essential, they saw a lot of people selling land to buy a car or other immediate goods. This could be interpreted as a case where the consideration of land being an access to social protection is actually acting as a social norm. If what we propose if true, it might have important implications on the way this land safety net value influences selling decisions, and how it is meant to change over time. The economic literature is for the time far from reaching a consensus on what social norms actually mean for economic decision making, and how they might evolve through time. Some of this economic literature has underlined that social norms might appear for a rationally grounded reason (see for instance Fafchamps, 2004; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996; Sindzingre, 2007), but given the system of transmission of those social norms, their disappearance might be slow and progressive. If the social safety net value of land is indeed derived from a social norm, then it will impact the consequences that a better public social protection or improved income security for individuals can have on the selling decision. In fact, the reduction of the social safety net value of land might not be as huge as expected directly following each of those two factors, depending on how the social norm of the 'good and safe value' of land will evolve through time.

3.5 CONCLUSION

What should first be reminded from this preliminary research is that selling land rather than keeping some ownership rights on it, through various kinds of land arrangements, is a decision that answers to a wide variety of precepts, which importance depends both on households' inherent preferences and their economic situation and priorities. Any claim to have found the prime factor in land sales would be misled. The second lesson to be drawn from our research is that the boundaries between each category of land transfer are quite blurred. The nature of the transfer will not only depend on the category under which it is referred to by the migrants - rent, use for free, sale - but also on the pre-existing relationships between the two parties of the transaction or the economic differential between both. Altogether, this makes the study of the determinant of land transfer types even more troublesome.

In a general way, the field study seemed to confirm that the safety net value imbedded in land is one of the factors affecting migrants' decision to prefer renting land and loaning it for free to relatives rather than selling. We, nevertheless, have to call caution as to not simplistically reduce this land safety net function to a few realized and observable behaviors. The way for land to provide social security, and the way the perception of land as a social security influences behavior, might call upon complex notions, such as social norms and social networks, both of which are not yet completely understood in their relationship with economic outcomes. If this preliminary research is to lead to a more systematic empirical analysis on how the social safety net value of land can influence the land sale decision, we will have to take special care with those two last suggestions.

Finally, our research suggests that caution has to be made concerning land markets. This article underlined that land market activity is quite low in the Northeast of Thailand, specifically land sales, even if the situation of land rights seems quite secure. We might, nonetheless, not conclude that this low turn-over rate of farm land sales in a subsistence region is a bad sign for poverty reduction. On the contrary, it might be the sign that, until effective public social security systems and secure alternative sources of income are available, vulnerable households, specifically rural-urban migrants, still have access to some kind of informal social security. If households choose not to use sales to transfer land, it is not necessarily because heavy constraints prevent them to do so when they want to, but rather because not selling is the second best efficient option in their situation.

Chapter 4

Land ownership as a safety net and land sales: a study among rural-urban migrants in Thailand

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen the development of two major streams of literature in development economics. The first deals with the development of land markets and the effect on poverty reduction and economic efficiency (see Deininger and Feder, 2001; De Janvry et al., 2001, for review of the literature). The second has revived the concept of vulnerability and risk aversion of poor households and identified this as being salient in the mechanisms driving poverty (see Morduch, 1994; Dercon, 2004; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003, for a literature review). These two streams of literature have been combined to analyze a particular feature of rural land sale markets: the phenomenon of distress sales. Distress sales arise as desperate risk-coping mechanisms which increase the liquidity of land and create an inefficient supply on the land sale market (Carter and Mesbah, 1993; Ruben and Masset, 2003; Sahu et al., 2004; Deininger et al., 2009).

We believe that the relationship between the risk-coping strategies set by households in developing countries and the development of the land sale market is much more complex than the sole phenomenon of distress sales. Distress sales - i.e. selling land in case of shock- is an ex-post and last resort coping strategy (see Ruben and

Masset, 2003). But for those who are not submitted to shocks, keeping land - i.e. not selling land - can also be seen as an insurance strategy implemented *ex ante*. Land has an intrinsic safety net or self-insurance function which is made more valuable through retention of ownership rights than through sale (De Janvry et al., 2001). When food, labour, financial or insurance markets are incomplete, land may indeed help to safeguard minimum levels of subsistence. Ownership rights on land not only guarantee staple food or agricultural income; they also provide credit collateral and a range of risk-coping strategies that we classify in this chapter as the 'safety net value' of land.

Apart from the phenomenon of distress sales, the impact of this safety net value on the activity of the land sale market has hardly been studied empirically. This relationship could nevertheless have significant consequences on the development of land sale markets in the transitional phase of economic development. In particular, households leaving agriculture to undertake non-farm activities could be found to supply land to sale markets with an significant time-lag; hence delaying the rationalization of remaining landholdings in rural areas.

Accordingly, this chapter proposes to look empirically at the willingness of a particular category of households to sell land: permanent rural urban migrants, who are permanently opting out of agriculture and are potentially heterogeneous in their valuation of the land safety net. For this purpose, data was collected in Thailand among 467 permanent rural-urban migrants. These migrants have moved permanently to cities, i.e. with no conscious intent to return. Through occupational choice, they cease to be involved in rural land cultivation. Moreover, since unused land in Thailand can legally be seized by the State, they are inclined to transfer land permanently - as sales or gifts - or temporarily - as rentals or free loans. Interestingly, sales are not often used to transfer land rights by the Thai migrants studied. The safety net function of land could be one way to explain this reluctance to sell land in lieu of other types of transfers. Retaining a safety net through land rights is particularily important for this migrant population, generally determined as vulnerable. First, land ownership may improve the sustainability of temporary return as a way to deal with catastrophic shocks. Secondly, retaining land may help maintain a relationship with rural risk-sharing networks (Promsopha, 2010).

Finally and in accordance with the present empirical strategy, rural-urban migrants display a significant heterogeneity in the degree of income risk they face and the

non-land risk-coping strategies they implement. Hence, the safety net value that permament rural-urban migrants associate to rural land, and therefore their willingness to sell land, might differ according to their current level of economic stability. We test whether Thai permanent rural-urban migrants selling their land are significantly different from non-selling migrants in terms of non-land economic stability. We use the methodology from Chaudhuri et al. (2002) to measure economic stability and lower the potential endogeneity in our estimation as far as possible.

Results show that migrant households who sell land are significantly more economically stable than those who do not sell land. Interestingly, households who have been submitted to consumption shocks also sell land more frequently than others. We conclude that vulnerable households are reluctant to sell land, except when the shocks they fear are realized. We therefore confirm both the idea of keeping ownership rights as a risk-coping strategy for migrant households with low levels of non-land economic stability, and the phenomenon of distress sale.

The next section of the chapter (4.2) presents the main insights from the literature and outlines the theoretical framework. Section 4.3 gives an overview of land markets and migration in Thailand. Section 4.4 presents the data. Section 4.5 explains the empirical strategy, section 4.6 discusses the main results of the research, and section 4.7 concludes.

4.2 A review of the literature

(a) Land as an insurance

When a number of markets fail, farm land acquires a multiplicity of functions which exceed the sole agricultural production function and generates imperfections on land markets (Binswanger et al., 1995; De Janvry et al., 2001). Among these, one function has been clearly identified by the economic literature as a risk-coping instrument: according to the asset-based insurance framework (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003), land is a liquid asset that cannot physically be destroyed and is resistant to inflation. Upon imperfections on insurance markets it is accumulated *ex ante* as a risk-coping mechanism and its insurance function materializes through sale when a shock occurs.

But if we look carefully, many more of the functions supplied by land carry a risk-

coping component. First, land allows the production of staple food and as such improves the food security of poor households when food markets are incomplete (Maxwell and Wiebe, 1998, 1999; De Janvry et al., 2001). Secondly, land provides a source of self-employment when labour markets are imperfect, thin and fluctuating, and as such helps safeguard minimum levels of consumption (Binswanger et al., 1995; De Janvry et al., 2001; Jayne et al., 2003). This perception has been revived with the Asian financial crisis which was partially absorbed by a temporary increase in agricultural employment through access to land. A 'safety net' interpretation of this self-employment function is particularly appealing in economies where the market off-farm economy is rising, combining increased income opportunities with new sources of risk such as job layoff and macro-economic crisis. In this case, land ownership can be assimilated to risk diversification and a safety cushion.

Land also provides an access to credit which is decisive for *ex post* consumption smoothing (Udry, 1990; Deaton, 1992; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Besley, 1995; Morduch, 1995). Land ownership as collateral is indeed more or less compulsory for access to formal credit (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986; Binswanger et al., 1995; De Janvry et al., 2001), and might also generate access to informal money-borrowing (Diagne, 1999; Mohieldin and Wright, 2000). .

Finally, land ownership probably plays a role in the functioning of risk-sharing networks, even more so when such risk-sharing networks operate along the natural line of land inheritance, i.e. matrilineality or patrilineality. Land temporary contracts such as sharecropping have already been observed to carry an insurance component, and have frequently been seen to be intertwined with credit provision for consumption smoothing (Otsuka et al., 1992). However, land ownership may also, on the one hand, guarantee the owner access to the risk-sharing network; and on the other hand, ease enforcement processes within this same risk-sharing network, specifically in limiting absentee or migrant owners from opting out of decision-making.

Land ownership therefore allows or eases the access to a range of risk-coping strategies that we call here the 'land safety net', as opposed to the 'non-land safety net' including all the risk-coping layouts accessible outside of land ownership.

(b) The insurance value of land and the market for land

The nature of the relationship between this land safety net function and land sale markets depends on which element of the safety net one looks at. On the one hand, the asset-based insurance materialized through land accumulation and distress sales generates additional supply of land to the sale market and may well encourage its activity and liquidity (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; Vatsa, 2004; Carter et al., 2007). Distress sales nonetheless mainly affect the most vulnerable and asset-poor households submitted to severe shocks. Thus, it intensifies land concentration and inefficiencies in land distribution (Shearer et al., 1991). Distress sales have been confirmed empirically in various studies (Carter and Mesbah, 1993; Sarap, 1998; Ruben and Masset, 2003; Sahu et al., 2004; Deininger et al., 2009).

On the other hand, most aspects of the land safety net function - access to food, self-employment, credit or risk sharing - can only be realised if at least some components of the bundle of rights on land are retained by the household. The safety net value of land may therefore make households reluctant to give their holdings to the sales market; and therefore also potentially reduce the liquidity of markets. In a risky environment with multi-market failures, the safety net value of land ownership might be very high, increasing a potential gap between the land thirst coming from a credit-constrained demand-side and a low willingness to sell from a risk-adverse supply-side.

As a matter of fact, land sale is distinctive among all types of land transfers available to households since it implies an irreversible loss of the full bundle of land ownership rights together with the access to land risk-coping abilities. According to Platteau (2000), social security considerations may explain the observed reluctance of landholders to sell land (Migot-Adholla, 1991) even when they have moved to urban areas. Rentals, sharecropping contracts or even free loans might look much more attractive for households attaching a strong safety net value to land (Promsopha, 2010).

On a macro perspective, the safety net value of land is likely to be higher when non-land risk coping mechanisms are not available and when 'non-land' income sources are volatile. At the household level, the safety net value of land is likely to be higher for the households who are particularly vulnerable and have the weakest access to modern and cost effective risk-coping mechanisms. Households with a better access

to stable non-land sources of income or to non-land insurance mechanisms might display *ceteris paribus* a lower valuation of the safety net function of land, and be more inclined to sell their land than others. This relation will not hold, however, for the most vulnerable households of the society when they are forced into selling to cope with shocks.

As an empirically testable proposition, we propose that households that are more economically stable - independently of their access to land - may also be found to sell their land more frequently. The safety net value of land will typically factor in the selling decision when social protection or private insurance do not exist, when access to credit depends on land collateral; or when labour markets are incomplete, and the off-farm economy is unsteady and offers only precarious low-skill employment prospects.

The effect of the safety function of land could particularly help to explain the willingness to sell of households leaving agriculture for off-farm activities in the industrialization phase of development. The decision to sell is indeed the product of two different ingredients: the decision to use or not use the land; and the decision to transfer ownership rights through sale in particular. Factors affecting the first type of decision might blur the readability of the factors affecting the second type. Think for instance of a household fully insured through a private financial scheme, but still optimally cultivating his entire farm holding. This household credits land with an almost zero safety net value, but will nevertheless not sell. But for households who are definitively exiting agriculture, through permanent migration for instance, the safety net function of land may be a prime factor in explaining why they would not necessarily release their plots to the sale market.

(c) Land ownership as a safety net, sale markets, and permanent rural-urban migrants

There is actually very little research analyzing or quantifying the impact of permanent rural urban migration on the evolution of land sale markets at the source location. Most studies have focused on the activation of a rental market through migration (Deininger and Jin, 2005); or have looked at sales markets as a causal push or pull factor in the decision to migrate (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006).

However, in a phase of industrial transition and structural change, permanent migration from rural to urban areas could reasonably be expected to influence the functioning of sale markets. More specifically, economic theory would expect it to increase the supply on sales markets and help the consolidation of farms.

Indeed, permanent migrants do not return to their village other than for occasional visits, have no intention of settling back in their village, and do not farm their own plots. As such, they either leave their holdings idle or transfer it, generally through sales, rental, free loans, and much less frequently, gifts (Promsopha, 2010). Permanent rural urban migrants would be expected to sell their land if markets were to be perfect, land would be valued only for agricultural production and land rights would be secure. The income generated through land sale would then be re-invested by the migrants more profitably. However, this situation is not necessarily observed, and permanent migrants are often found to hold on to their plots and to favour arrangements such as free loans or rentals in order to retain land rights (Sjaastad, 2003).

The literature on land markets development provides a few potential explanations to the reluctance of permanent migrants to sell land. First, in line with the standard theory of property rights, the nature of land rights and enforcement can impact the functioning of sales markets (see Demsetz, 1967; Libecap, 1989; Feder and Feeny, 1991b)[1]. If land is under communal tenure, the migrant may be constrained by community prohibitions on sales and thus release his plots to the community pool or loan it freely to his kin (Sjaastad, 2003; Platteau, 2000). Moreover, if land rights are not formally defined, transaction costs may be high enough to discourage migrants from sales transactions. Insecurity of land rights under freehold tenure systems may nonetheless have ambiguous effects on migrants' decisions to sell: under the threat of seeing land plots seized and lost, migrants may be tempted to sell immediately (for some evidence on insecure rights and sales see Ruben and Masset, 2003). Lastly, in the spirit of the evolutionary view of land rights (see Platteau, 1996), the lower the market value of land - given low population densities or commercialization of agriculture- the lower the activity in land markets. In this respect, the characteristics of the land itself may factor in the selling decision: plots of a greater quality allowing the cultivation of cash crops may have a greater market value and be sold

[1]For a review see Platteau (2000); Deininger and Feder (2001).

more frequently.

From a different perspective, retaining land may also make sense if identity considerations affect migrants' selling decisions: migrants may want to keep their land in order to maintain some form of cultural identity (Cleveland and Chang, 2009). In this respect, migration duration and the frequency of visits back home may matter in shaping migrants' sentimental ties with their source locations. Long-planned retirement strategies have also been stated as motivation to return home (Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002) and therefore to retain the land throughout migration. Finally, the relatively small number of land sales observed in permanent migrant populations may also be a reflection of demand side constraints. Indeed, drastic credit rationing in rural areas could obstruct purchases by local farmers at the source location. Thus, permanent migrants would be willing to sell but be unable to find a purchaser.

This last proposition only holds if market imperfections generate additional non-agricultural functions to the land, which prevent the market from clearing. The safety net value of land is one of those functions, and might seem particularly appealing to explain the reluctance to sell of permanent rural urban migrants. First, a growing body of research underlines that migration carries its own risks: it might displace migrants from their political, social and economic rights (Li, 2005) and exposes them to 'urban risk', such as unemployment (Jayaweera and Anderson, 2008). Secondly, land ownership in migrants' source location may ease the process of return in case of failed migration or chronic unemployment. The literature on return migration gives quite contradictory results on the motives and sustainability of return (Ilahi, 1999). Nonetheless, in the event of severe shocks, leaving the door open to return may appear to migrants as an important safety cushion - even if used only as a last resort. Furthermore, access to land has been stated earlier in the chapter to be closely interrelated with access to risk-sharing networks. Permanent migrants at subsistential risk could therefore favour arrangements that allow to keep a hand on land and hence through land maintain relationships with rural risk-sharing networks. For instance, favouring free loans to relatives - with no direct compensation - may grant migrants access to solidarity from those same relatives. On the same lines, giving relatives priority over a rental agreement when land is scarce may be repaid to the migrant later through reciprocity.

In summary, retaining land ownership in the village of origin, even with no *a priori* plan to return, might therefore appear as a potential safety net for those migrants

who have not secured their livelihood. Migrants who have secured a stable position in their new location and do not feel the threat of forced return migrations may place a lower emphasis on the land safety net function. Consequently, they may also be more willing to sell land to benefit from the income flows generated by sale and enjoy the immediate profit.

Applying the idea of land ownership as a safety net to migrants and their land sale decision nonetheless requires two observations. First, migration has traditionally been viewed in the literature as a risk-coping strategy implemented to diversify risk (Katz and Stark, 1986; Hussein and Nelson, 1998; Chen et al., 2003; Wouterse and Taylor, 2008). Migrants may therefore appear as a specific population in their relation to risk. Secondly, lack of land is a common push factor in the decision to migrate, so that permanent migrants may have land holdings which are much smaller than national averages. Thus, there might be a minimum threshold to the size of landholdings in order for land to provide a safety net. These observations prove that caution is necessary when identifying a potential selection bias in the permanent migrant population, and indicate the need to acknowledge the process of migration itself in the empirical identification strategy. Conclusions made for this particular population are otherwise difficult to extend to the population as a whole without further inquiries.

4.3 Land and risk-coping mechanisms in Thailand

(a) Land markets in Thailand

Thailand is of particular interest for our story. Since its large scale titling programs in the 1980's it has been described as a pilot and successful case for developing land and credit markets through the formalization of land rights (Rattanabirabongse et al., 1998). That such titling programs have had an impact on access to formal credit in Thailand is of little doubt (Feder and Onchan, 1987; Chalamwong and Feder, 1988). However, the real impact of the formalization of land rights on the development of land markets is not as transparent. The existence of land markets in Thailand can be traced back to the late 19th century, at least for the most fertile areas of the central plain (Mehl, 1986). The land pattern in Thailand displays a low concentration of land, a dominance of small-holders in agriculture with a very

low number of landless farmers, and a moderate activity both on the rental[2] and the sale market (Phelinas, 1995; Srijantr and Molle, 2000; Phelinas, 2001; Molle and Srijantr, 2003)[3]. Property rights are formally and informally detained by individuals or more often household units (Mehl, 1986).

The usual hindrance of sales market activity does not fully explain this stylized fact. The definition of property rights is not overly conflictual or imprecise and according to Phelinas (2001) around 80 per cent of land plots were titled in the 1990's. Agriculture is increasingly commodified, with farmers devoting a growing part of their fields to cash crops. Average size of land holdings is typically small and decreasing since the closure of the land frontier in the 1980's (Phelinas, 2001). The thirst for land purchase is very explicit. But this does not seem to have created a spur in the market, as the evolutionary theory of land rights had predicted[4]. Financial markets are, as elsewhere, imperfect (Paulson and Townsend, 2004). However, access to financial intermediation has been improved throughout the country during the 1990's and 2000's (Jeong and Townsend, 2007; Kaboski and Townsend, 2009). Finally, sentimental attachment to the land is not prevailing, probably because the closure of the land frontier is recent and Thai peasants have experienced a long history of mobility. For most Thai farmers, one particular plot is as good as another,provided its production abilities are equivalent (Mehl, 1986). There is also no evidence of a community ban or caveat on land sales.

Typically, in such a situation, we would naively expect that markets, rental if not sale, play an important part in the redistribution of land. Nonetheless, although the data are scarce, it seems that ownership and use rights mainly change hands through non-market transfers: inheritance of course, but also, more surprisingly through free loans and intra-generational gifts (Phelinas, 2001; Molle, 2002; Molle and Srijantr, 2003). Sales are actually not very frequent relative to the other types of individual transfer, especially in some areas of the Northeast.

[2]The fact that the rental market has not greatly developed since the closing of the land frontier is surprising in itself (Srijantr and Molle, 2000).

[3]According to Phelinas (1995), the egalitarian structure of land ownership in Thailand is mainly the consequence of legal limits on the quantity of land Thai elites were able to appropriate. The rate of landlessness is around 2 per cent of the farmer population.

[4]According to Richter (2005), only 5 per cent of the land is rented in the region we will study here, the Northeast of Thailand, against 17 per cent for the North.

(b) Rural-urban migration and the land markets in Thailand

Rural-urban migration has also been a sizeable phenomenon since the mid twentieth century. The policy emphasis has long been on permanent migration, in the hope that it would help urbanization and alleviate poverty pressure in rural areas (Singhanetra-Renard, 1999). Circular or temporary migration has been acknowledged more recently. Migration in Thailand is the result of the usual push and pull factors[5], and permanent migration is only a fragment of a very complex migration pattern including seasonal or intra-household migration as a diversification strategy[6]. Small plots of land, rather than landlessness, is likely to generate migration movements (Vanwey, 2003).

Many studies have focused on the effect of migration, temporal or permanent, on the source locations (Vanwey, 2004). However, none has yet looked in depth at the effects of such migration on the distribution of land rights and the development of land markets.

Rural-urban migration is mainly a 'Northeast to Bangkok story' (Chamratrithirong et al., 1995). The Northeast is the poorest area of the country, although it has been developing rapidly in the last 20 years. But even though migration from the Northeastern region is high, Grandstaff et al. (2009) offer mixed conclusions on the ability of out-migration to stimulate land markets, to slow the fragmentation of plots, and to drive land redistribution. Interestingly, although the Northeast is the main source of rural-urban migration, it has not yet created a radical change in land rights distribution, nor has it greatly activitated land markets, either sale or rental. Migrants, even when permanently settled in their destination locations, often keep their landholdings and leave land freely to kin for minimal compensation. Free or quasi-free loans are actually favored by migrants when it comes to transferring land; and if rental or sharecropping are frequently seen for migrants' highlands suitable for cash cropping, it is extremely rare for migrants' rice fields (Promsopha, 2010).

[5]Permanent rural-urban migration is the result both of push factors such as lack of opportunities in rural areas due to lack of land or scarcity of off-farm jobs; and of pulling factors such as aspirations to benefit from the urban life, at least for the better educated households (Chamratrithirong et al., 1995; Richter, 2005).

[6]Many males and females under 25 years old move to urban areas to search for employment. This is both the consequence of life-cycle and of the structure of urban low-skill labor which is more likely to attract young people.

(c) Land as a safety net and Thai rural-urban migrants

The safety net value of land seems a plausible explanation to the pattern of land transfers observed among permanent migrant households. First, land has a strong 'security' value for the Thais in general, even though it does not create the sentimental attachment found elsewhere. Land ownership has long been at the center of households' asset strategy, and a good predictor of household's wealth (Moerman, 1968). The value of land is clearly attached to its safety net and food production component. In a very stimulating study, Vanwey (2003) states that the *"second economic motivation [in keeping land ownership] is the security provided by land. Owning at least a small piece of land guarantees that a household will always be able to produce at least a little food. Owning a more substantial piece of land (even if not large enough to support a family) provides old age security as well as security against unemployment. Socially, land ownership provides less quantifiable but no less important benefits. Individuals can maintain symbolic membership in a community through continuing to own land in the community, regardless of where they work"* (Vanwey, 2003, p. 125).

Land ownership is in fact a determinant of security in the generic Thai culture. Land is rice, and rice is, as so well stated by Moerman (1968) or Scott (1976), survival. Today still, even with the development of highland cash crops culture which yield profitable income, rice fields are still valued, and local farmers who completely abandon rice production for cash crops are not numerous (Barnaud et al., 2006). However, land is also much more: it is a key to independent income generation, to credit provision (Ahlin and Townsend, 2007), and to insurance of contractual agreement with relatives. This last point has never been subjected to indepth analysis in Thai studies. Vanwey (2004) or Rigg (2003), in the context of the anthropology of Thai rural life underline the centrality of land ownership to maintaining membership in the community. This is of specific importance for the migrants, who can make intertemporal contracts with their relatives - generally matrilineal networks[7]- who

[7]The preferential risk-sharing network of a household in Thailand comes from the wife's network and constitutes her parents and siblings. Land is traditionally bequeathed in equal share to daughters, with sons accessing land through marriage (Phelinas, 1995; Whittaker, 1999). With an increasing land scarcity, this pattern is nonetheless shifting to equal share among daughters and

use the migrants' land free or quasi-free of charges (Promsopha, 2010).

Land's security is particularily relevant for migrants in Thailand, as they are generally found to insure themselves through safeguarding a possibility to return to their village in case of failure. Land ownership and remittances are two ways to do so (Vanwey, 2003, 2004), as they allow to maintain relationships with relatives back home, and to stay in some form of reciprocal relations with potential future claims for assistance. The 1997 and 2007-08 crisis highlighted this: with the surge of unemployment, millions of migrants returned home to farm their land[8]. Those returns were nonetheless often temporary and generally followed by re-migration (Grandstaff et al., 2009). This would seem to suggest that temporary return is sometimes used in Thailand as a risk-coping strategy.

Apart from land ownership, risk-coping mechanisms available to migrant households are, as elsewhere, mainly informal. Formal private insurance is lacking. Social protection has only a marginal ability to smooth consumption despite the growing involvement of the State in this matter[9]. Migrants therefore use credit from informal money lenders or kin; social transfers or reciprocity within urban risk-sharing networks; a portfolio of assets which in an urban setting are generally cars, housing, gold, hoading or bank saving accounts. Migrants' ability to insure against shocks is also probably improved by social capital availability and access to a risk-sharing network in their hometown[10]. There is, consequently, a significant heterogeneity in migrant's economic stability.

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sons.

[8]According to the survey, around 1.5 or 2 millions returnees have been recorded in the period 1997-98 (Grandstaff et al., 2009).

[9]Social protection has been expending fast since the administration of prime minister Thaksin Chinawatra, which consolidated and universalized health insurance, paved the way for unemployment compensation and the pension system (Looney, 2004).

[10]Social capital is central in the decision to migrate, in the localization of migration, and in the access to employment upon arrival (Garip, 2008).

4.4 Data

(a) Survey methodology

Data were collected in the Spring 2010 among 467 permanent rural-urban migrant households from the Northeast of Thailand, now settled in Bangkok. We decided to restrict our sample to migrants from the Northeast to ease the analysis of inheritance and other cultural features likely to influence the bond to the land; but also because migrants from the Northeast are the most numerous and visible. This is of course at the expense of the potential generalization of our results. The Northeast is generally the poorest region of Thailand, although its poverty rates have rapidly decreased since the beginning of the 1990's (Richter, 2005), and average income differs greatly among its 20 provinces.

The surveyed population consists of permanent rural-urban households and respondents had to fulfill a set of conditions to be eligible for the survey. They had to have owned land at the time of migration[11], they had to be full migrant households with no household members, children or spouse, left in their village; they had to be staying in Bangkok the whole year with visits home of no longer than a month; and were not to farm their land themselves. These last conditions are necessary to ensure that respondents' plots are available to transfer and therefore to sale. Finally, our respondent had to have no intention of returning to the village voluntarily.

A main concern of the survey is its representativity. Population Census are available in Thailand, but in the Spring 2010, the last census available was made in 2000. Obtaining a random sample from this census would have in fact been very difficult, as the urban population and migrants in particular are very mobile, and there is no such referent as a village head to provide new contact addresses. Drawing a sample of migrants from the 2000 sample would therefore have introduced a selection bias in interviewing only the migrants who have not moved since 2000, rather than providing a representative population of migrant. We therefore had to resort to a much more primitive methodology to select our respondents. In order to reduce potential selectivity bias, we multiplied the sampling methodologies to approach respondents: migrants were approached in areas of varying affluence; through systematic sam-

[11] If our respondent did not own land, our study made little sense.

pling of randomly chosen street and workplaces; through accidental sampling[12]; and snowballing. This does not insure that our sample is representative, specifically knowing sample size, but we hope to have reduced the potential bias as much as technically possible.

We computed basic statistics from our sample to compare with some nationally representative reports (UNDP, 2009), and found no major discrepancies.

Surveying migrants in their urban environment is arduous: they have little free time and it is hard to gain their trust in a place like Bangkok where there is no trustworthy spokesman. The design of the questionnaire was therefore a compromise between aiming to gather precise and quantifiable information, and avoiding the risk of initiating a high rate of non-response. Data were collected on households' basic characteristics: land holdings, history of migration and land transfers including sales, rentals, gifts and free loans, the economic situation of households focused on economic stability or vulnerability, and the access to both rural and urban risk-sharing networks.

(b) Basic descriptive statistics: Land transfers

Household heads in our sample have on average 43 years and in 90 per cent of the cases are males. Many studies on rural-urban migration in Thailand find that migrants are typically young individuals and females (Chamratrithirong et al., 1995): this finding does in fact not hold when we consider only permanent and full household migration and exclude temporary and individual migration.

The migrant households interviewed have left their village in average 16 years ago. 86 per cent declare farming to be their main occupation before moving. Almost half of our sample cite appeal for urban life as the main reason to migrate. 19 per cent declare their goal to be future in-farm investment: this might have important implications on their decision to sell. Other reasons to migrate are, in order of importance, career concerns, lack of land, and education motives.

Sampled households own on average 14 rai of land[13], which is very small and much less than the Northeast regional average. This is not that surprising since lack of

[12] Using a randomized track where the enumerator approaches potential respondents close at hand.

[13] 14 rai correspond to around 2.24 hectares.

land is a common push factor in the decision to migrate. Almost 90 per cent of land holdings are rice fields, with the remainder being highland used for the cultivation of cash crops such as sugarcane, cassava, rubber, fruit and vegetable, or other tree plantations. 85 per cent of the households had a full ownership title on all their plots, with 10 per cent detaining no legal title at all[14]. This is equivalent to the numbers proposed by Phelinas (2001) in various provinces of the Northeast. Finally, only 11 per cent of the sampled migrants households had ever bought land, with the remaining households having accessed land only through inter-vivo or post-mortem inheritance. The ratio of purchases might seem low by international standards, but is consistent with the recorded facts in Northeast Thailand (Phelinas, 2001).

12 per cent of the migrant households we interviewed had sold part or all of their land holdings since moving. 18 per cent of the sold plots were highland - highland being therefore over-represented in sales - and 81 per cent of these plots carried a full legal title, which is lower than the numbers for the full sample. Property titles do not therefore seem compulsory to engage in a sale transaction. Almost half of the sale transactions were made with siblings, a quarter with outsiders (someone that the household did not know prior to the transaction), and the remainder with parents, children, or neighbors. Interestingly then, land sales primarily occur with people that the household had/have/will have relationships with.

Plots that are not sold are exchanged through two main channels: free loans and some form of sharecropping or rental arrangement. Free loans are in the majority: 73 per cent of the migrant households loan their plots for free, 11 per cent loan their plot for free but declare a small compensation in kind, eight per cent leave their plot in sharecropping arrangements and six per cent rent it at a fix price[15]. The land market, whether rental or sale, was therefore not widely used by migrants to transfer their plots, in benefit to free loans.

Basic descriptive statistics: Economic situation

The main occupation of our sampled migrants is, unsurprisingly, low-skill factory employment, street selling, or taxi driving. These occupations are generally unsta-

[14]The 5 remaining per cent own incomplete titles with no legal power to sell.

[15]We find almost no land left unused, as unused land can be seized by the State according to Thai Law.

ble, sensitive to macro economic shocks and with a high rate of turnover, although the actual situation depends on the size of factory[16] on the amount of capital invested in the street selling business, and on the status of the taxi-driver[17]. Self-employed activities including street selling and more steady businesses are overly represented as they involve 42 per cent of respondent households. Only four per cent of the sample had a member employed as a government worker, and other stable occupations such as office work or high-skilled positions are not frequently accessed.

14 per cent of the migrant households in our sample have achieved a university degree of education. This means half of the households have at least one member with a full secondary education. This education performance does not, nonetheless, translate into equivalent output in high skilled jobs, as seen above. Education, therefore, may not be the grail of consumption security described by Rigg and Salamanca (2009), at least for the population we observe.

18 per cent of households declare to have suffered from unemployment shocks, and 64 per cent that they have experienced consumption strain. 66 per cent of the sample migrant households have known credit constraint, i.e. have been refused a loan, or have not applied for one for fear of being refused. This constraint might be lowered by access to a rural and urban risk-sharing network: 82 per cent of the sample have close ties with relatives in Bangkok, of which half have ties with relatives enjoying a better economic situation than the migrant's. 60 per cent of our respondents admit to having already borrowed money from their relatives in Bangkok, compared to 52 per cent of village relatives.

Overall, it seems that most of the permanent rural-urban migrants belong to the vulnerable classes of Bangkok, and that their access to efficient risk-coping mechanisms are limited.

[16]Bigger factories resist economic shocks better and are legally obliged to provide lay-off compensations or health insurance.

[17]Independent taxi-drivers own their car and are generally better off.

4.5 Estimation strategy

(a) Main estimation strategy

The purpose of the study is to evaluate the impact of the safety net value of land on migrants' decision to sell, under the hypothesis that migrants' valuation of the safety-net function of land is heterogeneous and depends on their access to non-land economic stability. We propose to estimate the probability that a permanent migrant household will sell its plot according to his non-land economic stability level and a set of control variable, using a probit specification.

$$Pr(S_i = 1) = \phi(\beta_0 + \beta_1 Z_i + \beta_2 X_i) \tag{4.1}$$

Where $S_i = 1$ if the permanent migrant household $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$ has sold land since migrating and $S_i = 0$ if the permanent migrant household i has not sold any land. Z_i is a measure of the migrant household non-land economic stability, X_i is a vector of control variables, β is a set of unknown parameters, and ϕ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Our specification of S_i covers an underlying relationship of the type $S_i = \begin{cases} 1 & if \ \ S_i^{share} > 0 \\ 0 & otherwise \end{cases}$ with S_i^{share} is the share of the total land holding which is sold by migrant household i.
Entirely selling farm holdings rather than piecemeal might generate very distinct effects on migrants' access to risk coping through land. Therefore, the quantity of land sold might matter in the relationship between the non-land economic stability and the decision to sell. Economically vulnerable households exposed to extreme consumption shocks might for instance sell only parts of their holdings, and keep the rest of it for future risk-coping eventualities, whereas very stable households would sell all their holdings at once as there is no necessity for a land safety-net value. The binary specification of S_i ignore this potential outcome, therefore we also want to explain the share of the total land holding which is sold. An OLS estimation would lead to biased estimates here as almost 90 per cent of the sample has sold no land at all. In addition to the probit, we therefore estimate a tobit methodology, and censor the left hand observation when $S_i^{share} = 0$.

(b) Measuring vulnerability

The core of our estimation strategy depends on the assessment of the non-land economic stability of households. The non-land economic stability is not directly observable and depends on various dimensions of a migrant's life, from his source of income to his relationship with a risk-sharing network or access to credit. A clear measurement implies a clear theoretical definition: economic stability is understood here as being a function of the probability to fall under a socially defined standard of poverty. It is in fact decreasing in the probability to fall under the poverty line. A household is regarded as perfectly stable if it has a null probability of falling under the poverty line. In more general terms, it implies that stable households have no risk of suffering from poverty incidents.

In this sense, the economic stability is the reversal of the concept of economic vulnerability, which has been widely discussed in the literature (see Alwang et al., 2001; Dercon, 2006; Bhattamishra and Barrett, 2010). The notion of vulnerability has become increasingly prominent in the economic literature to account for poverty trajectories in the presence of uninsured risks. Due to its novelty, the notion of vulnerability is associated with many different definitions, each definition leading to a specific measurement methodology (Hoddinott and Quisumbing, 2010). We use here the idea of vulnerability as expected poverty, in the spirit of Chaudhuri et al. (2002). According to this view, vulnerability increases when the probability of falling under the poverty line, or of being in 'danger' in the future, increases (Calvo and Dercon, 2005). In a more general perspective, it is understood as a function that increases with the probability of future poverty. This probability depends both on the variability of income or consumption and on its average levels.

In this sense, economic stability is indeed the exact inverse of economic vulnerability. We state that $Z_i = -(V_i)$, where V_i is a measure of the economic vulnerability of an individual household i. Referring to the concept of vulnerability is actually convenient because measurement methodologies already exist in the literature.

In general, vulnerability as expected poverty is best measured with panel data which allow an evaluation of income means and variance over time (Calvo and Dercon, 2005; Ligon and Schechter, 2003). We, unfortunately, do not have such panel data. Instead we use the methodology from Chaudhuri et al. (2002) to measure vulnerability with cross-section data. This methodology proposes to estimate a consumption

function and to derive the estimated mean and variance of consumption using 3 step feasible least squares. The basic logic behind this methodology assumes first that expected consumption can be functionally derived from basic households' characteristics, and secondly that the disturbance term in the estimation of the consumption function can be understood as proxying idyosyncratic shocks and income variance. It is close to the more classical measure of poverty, but differs in making the assumption that the disturbance term of the consumption function depends on individual characteristics.

Rather than calling upon a consumption function as in Chaudhuri et al. (2002), we base our measurement on an income function. The first rational behind this choice brings us back to our data: income reports are of a much better quality than the consumption reports. Consumption was hard to compute for respondents, implying a high rate of non-response and a discrepancy or inaccuracy in their accounts. Income accounts, on the other hand, were more detailed and informed. Secondly, income is sometimes found as a substitute to consumption in poverty measures when consumption information are missing or inaccurate (Ravallion, 1996; Meyer and Sullivan, 2003). Finally, using income is not as bothersome for urban households who derive most of their consumption from cash income[18], as for rural households whose consumption is largely auto-produced.

Based on Chaudhuri et al. (2002), the income function is as follow:

$$\ln Y_i = \eta C_i + e_i \tag{4.2}$$

Where $\ln Y_i$ is the logarithm of household i annual income Y_i, C_i is a bundle of characteristics of household i, η is a vector of parameters and e_i is a mean zero disturbance term. This disturbance term captures idiosyncratic shocks explaining the different income levels of households otherwise equivalent. The variance of the error disturbance term depends on the same households characteristics C_i. To obtain a measure of economic stability, we estimate both income mean and income variance using 3 steps feasible least squares in order to deal with heterosedasticity:

$$\hat{E}\left[\ln Y_i \mid C_i\right] = C_i\hat{\eta} \tag{4.3}$$

[18]Migrants might also receive bags of rice when visiting their rural relatives or consume some of the food produced in a street selling business, but this is, from our field accounts, marginal relative to total consumption, especially as our respondents do not farm their own fields.

$$\hat{V}\left[\ln Y_i \mid C_i\right] = \hat{\sigma}_{e,i} = C_i\hat{\theta} \tag{4.4}$$

Since we posed economic stability as the inverse of vulnerability, we therefore obtain:

$$\hat{Z}_i = -(\hat{V}_i) = -\left\{\phi\left(\frac{\ln z - \hat{E}\left[\ln Y_i \mid C_i\right]}{\sqrt{\hat{V}\left[\ln Y_i \mid C_i\right]}}\right)\right\} \tag{4.5}$$

where ϕ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and z is the poverty line. We do not use the official poverty line set for Bangkok compound (UNDP, 2009), which is much too low and identifies an underrated 2 per cent of Bangkok population as being 'poor' (UNDP, 2009). Instead, we use the minimum wage as a base for the poverty line. The minimum wage indeed seems to be a good approximation of a minimum acceptable livelihood in Bangkok, in that it is close to a natural wage. The minimum wage in Thailand is indeed defined in a narrow sense - to offer sufficiency to a single person. Moreover, the minimum wage is determined at the provincial level, which allows to account for significant provincial variations in the cost of living. The cost of living is indeed significantly higher in Bangkok than in the rest of the country, a difference which is not captured by the national official poverty line. We use the 2010 minimum wage level for Bangkok compound. We expected the parameter β_1 of this variable of economic stability $\hat{Z}_i$ to be positive[19].

Summary statistics on the measure of stability are presented in table 4.1 and the result from the first stage OLS estimation of the income function (equation (4.2)) are proposed in table 4.2 . As the negative size of the stability variable complicates the interpretation of its value, we transform it by adding 1. Households with a stability of zero face a certain outcome of being under the poverty line and are said to be fully vulnerable. Those with a stability of 1 have a null probability to fall under the poverty line and are therefore classified as perfectly stable. Between these two extremes, stability increases when the stability indicator increases. We also look at the correlations between the variable of stability and potentially important parts

[19] A kdensity test insures that our model satisfies the conditions for normality assume in equation (4.5).

of the non-land economic stability of migrant households (table 4.3). Our estimate of economic stability is tightly related to both estimated level and variability of income. It is negatively related to income shocks, but positively to education, asset ownership (car and house), savings, or the stability of employment.

[TABLES 4.1 AND 4.2 AND 4.3 HERE]

Most papers using the expected poverty approach to measure vulnerability impose a threshold in the estimated probability to define households that are vulnerable. Since our interest relates to the continuous value of the estimated probability, we do not need to impose such a threshold here. As stated in section 4.2, the relationship between the economic non-land stability of migrant households and their decision to sell land might not be linear, as a consequence of distress sales. To capture a potential non-linearity, we propose to introduce the square of our economic stability variable.

(c) Control variables

The measurement of stability that we propose measures overall economic stability of migrant households and not the non-land economic stability specifically. To improve our estimates, we also control for leading dimensions of the non-land economic stability of migrant households. These dimensions include: secondary education attainment; yearly income; asset wealth captured by house and car ownership; constraints on credit access with a dummy for households who have been refused a loan or have desisted from applying for fear of being refused; the stability of employment[20]; public sector employment; and the amount of savings. As these dimensions are redundant with the summary indicator of economic stability presented in the previous subsection, we do not include them in the regressions.
We also check whether households experienced on consumption strain[21], and whether households have suffered unemployment periods. Controlling for shocks might seem

[20]We measure the stability of employment as the share of occupation type in the household which can be classified as stable, depending both on the nature of the job and of the employer.

[21]We measure shockcs with a dummy equal to one if the household declares financial difficulties which made it hard to consume as usual in the last five years and zero otherwise.

redundant in regard to the variable of economic stability. Nonetheless, we believe that the probability of falling under the poverty line or receiving a shock, and the number of shocks which already occurred, are distinct realities, particularly for our purposes. Indeed, a household vulnerable to shocks might be keeping land to insure in case of shock but might also be selling land when a severe shock actually occurs. To account for other factors that might influence the decision to sell land, we construct several additional control variables capturing characteristics relative to household structure, migration history, risk-sharing networks, and land holdings. These variables capture the various determinants of land sales described in the literature and in sections 4.2 and 4.3. Household specific characteristics include whether the household head is female, the age of household head and the size of the household. Migration specific variables include whether the household has migrated with the aim of future in-farm investment, because of lack of land access, or due to education aspirations; and the number of years elapsed since the household moved to Bangkok. Variables concerned with the risk-sharing network accessible to the household combine the frequency of visits made to the village in a year; whether the household remits money to his village relatives; whether the migrant household has richer relatives in the village; and whether he has richer relatives in Bangkok. This last variable can also be understood as an element of the non-land economic stability of migrant households. Finally, land holding characteristics include whether households detain full ownership titles on their plots, whether they own highlands suitable for cash cropping; total size of land holdings; and whether migrant households have ever bought plots, as this creates an experience of the sale market and because purchased plots are said to be more easily sold. Summary statistics of these control variables are proposed in table 1.

(d) For further robustness

First, to insure that there is no risk of reverse causality between the economic stability of households and their probability to sell, we introduce an artificial lag in the measure of stability. For the selling households, the components building the non-land economic stability have been calibrated to represent the situation before

the time of the transaction[22]. Moreover, respondents who had not sold their holdings were asked if they had plans to sell land in the future. They could respond either "definitely not", "yes, maybe", or "yes, definitely". We therefore extend the model to account for those households who demonstrate a firm intent to sell (answered "yes definitely"). We revise the dependent variable in (4.1) to be S_i^{will} now equal to one if the household has sold or will definitely sell land. This is maybe not very orthodox, but it potentially expands our analysis. We now have:

$$Pr(S_i^{will} = 1) = \phi(\beta_0 + \beta_1 Z_i + \beta_2 X_i) \tag{4.6}$$

The main shortcoming of our estimation is the potential endogeneity bias. The most frequent methodologies proposed in the economic literature to deal with this problem are lagged and/or instrumental variables. Unfortunately, we only have cross-section data which, in addition, do not provide a strong and valid instrument of the non-land economic stability.

4.6 Results

Results are proposed in tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. Table 4.4 gives the probit results for the estimation of equation (1) , i.e. of the probability that the household has sold land according to its economic stability and a set of control variables. The two first specifications give the results for a linear estimation of the variable of economic stability with no control variables at all (1) or excluding controls on the dimensions of economic vulnerability (2). Specification (3) looks at the individual effects of some dimensions of stability in the relationship between economic stability and the probability to sell, and specification (4) incorporates the square value of the economic stability to capture potential non-linearity.
Table 4.5 is identical except that it looks at the model with the extended dependent variable S_i^{will} from equation (4.6), an estimation of the probability that a household has sold or will definitely sell land. Finally, table 6 gives the results from the tobit

[22]Information has been adjusted to represent the situation before the sales transaction for income, consumption, asset ownership, savings, credit constraint, consumption shocks, occupation, and business ownership.

estimation on the share of land holdings sold, which mostly back up results from the probits.

[INSERT TABLE 4.4 and TABLE 4.5 and TABLE 4.6 HERE]

The coefficient of the economic stability is significant, and indicates a positive and stable relationship with the probability to sell in all specifications, and in both models from tables 4.2 and 4.3, as well as in the tobit estimation. Interestingly, the coefficient of the indicator of economic stability is also significant when we explain the probability that a household has sold or will sell (table 4.5). Stable households are likely to know in advance if they are going to sell, whereas vulnerable household do not make this type of decision ahead of time but rather when faced with an unexpected shock. Our variable S_i^{will} therefore self-selects stable households with definite intentions of selling land.

Specifications (3) in table 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show the effects of particular dimensions of stability on the probability to sell. Education levels, wealth in the form of car or house ownership and the stability of migrant's jobs - all measured before the sale took place - are all found to significantly and positively correlate with the probability to sell land. Credit constrained households, on the other hand, are found to sell land less frequently. The level of cash savings does not seem to influence the selling decision. Overall, it seems that the most important alternatives to land in securing livelihood are education, asset ownership, and occupational options.

The non-linearity in the relationship between the economic stability of migrant households and their decision to sell land is not confirmed by our data, as the coefficient of the square value of stability is insignificant, while not affecting the estimates for the variable of economic stability. Results therefore confirm a linear relationship. To strengthen our conclusions, we also created two additional dummies corresponding respectively to the highest and lowest percentiles of the economic stability variables: we did not find any significant results. We do not report these results here due to space limitations.

The linearity found in the relationship between economic stability and the probability to sell land does not however invalidate the existence of a distress sale phenomenon in our data. The coefficient of the dummy capturing consumption shocks is indeed positive and strongly significant in tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 and in all their

specifications, implying that suffering consumption shocks makes sale more likely. Employment shocks have a significant positive impact only on the probability that households have sold or will definitely sell (table 4.5), or when we do not add any control variable in the sale model (first specification (1) of table 4.4). The coexistence of positive estimates both for the economic stability of households and the previous occurrence of shocks confirm that insurance considerations can both generate sales or hold them back. Sales are made when unexpected shocks occur, but in the absence of shocks, migrant households prefer to retain their land unless their stable situation renders this unnecessary. We also introduced two interaction variables, one for economic stability and consumption shock dummy (stab x shock), and one for economic stability and unemployment shock (stab x unempl). The idea was to ascertain whether the degree of stability affects the response to shocks through sales decisions. As none of those interactions were found to be significant, we do not report the results.

Some of the results from the control variables are also worth noting. Households who migrated due to lack of access to land are more likely to sell land: this is not surprising as a very small size of holding does not permit self-sufficiency in income or in food in the event an income shock forces the household to return. The safety-net value of land would, in such cases, be compromised. The length of migration is also significantly and positively related to the probability to sell land in the S_i^{will} model (table 4.5) and specification (3) of the tobit model (table 4.6). The lack of significance in other specifications probably comes from the fact that the duration of migration is strongly correlated to the economic stability, and to the frequency of visits back home which is significant in most specifications. A basic interpretation of these results suggests that the longer a migrant has settled, the more stable his economic situation, the less he visits his relatives back home, and the lower are his aspirations to retain land against the eventuality of a hypothetical forced return.

Access to richer relatives in the village is also positively related to the probability to sell. We may find an explanation in Promsopha (2010): in Thailand there is an implicit procedure that a migrant would have to follow to sell his land. He would first ask if any of his relatives wish to buy the plot. If this is the case, they may purchase it. If they don't want to or lack the liquidity to buy, the migrant is then given the green light to sell to an outsider. Moreover, sales to relatives are, contrary to sales to outsiders, potentially reversible, and help to maintain a healthy relationship

with the relatives as well as their assistance power. If the migrant has rich relatives able to purchase, selling would probably look more appealing. Rich village relatives with a land thirst are also likely to urge migrants to sell.
The characteristics of land holdings are also significantly correlated with the probability to sell land. In contradiction to the propositions made in the literature, the coefficient of the dummy for the ownership of a legal propery title is negative, although not significant in all specifications and models. The negative sign suggests two possible hypotheses: first, plots that are not titled are insecured and at risk of being grabbed by others. Households would therefore sell their untitled holdings as quickly as possible. We may guess that for permanent migrants, the insecurity of rights becomes even more of an issue if they have no relatives to monitor their land, or if they are in conflict with their relatives. Secondly, untitled land precludes collateral. If there is a strong difference in the way households have access to finance in urban and rural areas, these households may place different values on the collateral function of land. If urban credit relies more on land collateral than rural credit, the non-agricltural value that migrants give to their land could be lower when there is no title, thus helping to clear the market.

4.7 CONCLUSION

Our results provide evidence of a positive relationship between the economic stability of households retiring from agriculture and their decision to sell their farm land. This positive relationship confirms both the idea that the safety net function of land can, in some cases, restrain the supply of land to the sale market; and when shocks occur feed the land market through distress sales.
The empirical insights proposed in this chapter are only a first empirical enquiry into some of the fugitive and qualitative statements found in the anthropological and development literature on the safety net function of land and the supply of land to the sale market. Important progress could be made using panel data to improve the measurement of non-land economic stability and valid instruments to strenghten the endogeneity check. Further research should also confirm the existence of such a relationship in different settings and countries.
The relationship identified in the chapter could also have important significance for

the evolution of land markets over time and along the rural-urban migration movement driving the development progress. Historical accounts from todays' developed countries suggest that the redistribution of farm land operating along the industrialization process has not always been most efficient, nor driven by the market, at least not by the sales market. The idea that the safety net function of land might generate resistance to the development of the land sales market could be an interesting avenue to observe both comtemporary and historical cases.

If the results of this chapter were to be confirmed by further research, it would enable further discussion on the desirability of land sale markets in settings where land ownership represents an essential tool for social protection. Moreover, it would help confirm that, frequently, forcing land markets to households when the public social protection is lacking and insurance markets are imperfect is liable to produce counterintuitive and poverty enhancing effects.

Table 4.1: Variables: Summary Statistics

Variable name	**Unit**	**Mean**	**Min**	**Max**
economic stability	Probability [0;1]	0.534	0	1
shock dummy	0/1	0.640	0	1
unemployment dummie	0/1	0.171	0	1
Stability dimensions:				
highest degree	lowest to highest degree	2.749	0	5
income per head	baht per year	96104.62	7200	740000
own housing dummy	0/1	0.178	0	1
own car dummy	0/1	0.405	0	1
crediconstr	0/1	0.644	0	1
stable employment	persons	0.574	0	2
government employ. dummy	0/1	0.060	0	1
saving	months	5.832	0	60
household charac.				
head as female dummy	0/1	0.103	0	1
age of head	years	43.163	21	71
size of household	persons	3.737	1	16
migration charac.				
migr: in-farm inv.	0/1	0.191	0	1
migr: education	0/1	0.053	0	1
migr: lack of land	0/1	0.079	0	1
years since migration	years	16.318	1	50
Relatives charac				
village visit	times per year	1.40257	0	2
remittances dummy	0/1	0.595	0	1
village rich relatives	0/1	0.465	0	1
Bangkok rich relatives	person	1.034261	0	20
land charac.				
legal title dummie	0/1	0.899	0	1
highland owner dummy	0/1	0.206	0	1
bought land dummy	0/1	0.109	0	1
size of land holdings	rai (1 rai = 0.16 hec)	13.952	1	100
Debt Dummy	0/1	0.597	0	1
Business dummy	0/1	0.424	0	1
Health insurance dummy	0/1	0.233	0	1
Observations	**464**			

Table 4.2: OLS results: income function

	Dependent var.: ln(income)
	(1)
shock dummy	-0.080
credit constraint	0.011
health insurance dummy	-0.014
households with secondary educ.	0.104
size of land holdings	0.003
stable job	0.085**
Bangkok rich relatives	0.034**
saving	0.006**
own car dummy	0.299***
business dummy	0.168***
average years in an occup	0.006*
highest degree	0.010
size of household	-0.164***
head as female dummy	-0.046
age of head	-0.004
government employ dummy	0.162
Debt dummy	0.043
own housing dummy	0.203***
cons	9.388***
R^2	0.295
N	464

*Notes: significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01*

Table 4.3: Stability and its dimensions: Coefficients of correlation

Variable name	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**	**8**	**(9)**	**(10)**	**(11)**	**(12)**
economic stability (1)												
shock dummy (2)	-0.14***											
unemployment dummie (3)	-0.06	0.14*										
schooling (4)	0.26***	-0.05	0.00									
income per head (5)	0.31***	-0.07	-0.02	0.18***								
own housing dumm (6)	0.29***	-0.01	-0.10**	0.07*	0.24***							
own car dummy (7)	0.41***	0.03	-0.02	0.17***	0.28***	0.22***						
crediconstr (8)	-0.05	0.18***	0.06	0.06	-0.03	0.02	-0.01					
stable employment (9)	0.32***	-0.02	0.08	0.22***	0.19***	0.12***	0.29***	-0.9*				
government employ. dummy (10)	0.9**	0.06	0.05	0.08*	0.06	0.11**	0.01	0.01	0.09			
saving (11)	0.29***	-0.12***	-0.03	0.12**	0.17***	0.15***	0.12***	-0.10**	0.13***	-0.00		
Estimated income means (12)	0.34***	-0.04	0.04	0.33***	0.33***	0.25***	0.54***	-0.01	0.35***	0.16***	0.31***	
Estimated income st.dev (13)	0.18***	0.19***	-0.00	0.14***	0.14***	0.15***	0.49***	-0.01	0.36***	-0.03	-0.03	0.37**

Notes: Significance levels:* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

Table 4.4: Probit on the sale model

	Dependent variable sale S_i			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic stability	**0.709*** **	**0.746*** **		**0.618***
Economic stability square				**0.170**
Shock dummy	**0.594*** **	**0.647*** **	**0.890*** **	**0.643*** **
Unemployment dummie	**0.372****	**0.277**	**0.361**	**0.279**
Stability dimensions:				
schooling			0.850***	
income per head			0.000***	
own housing dummy			0.402*	
own car dummy			0.615***	
credit constraint dum.			-0.475**	
stable employment			0.306***	
government empl. dum.			0.101	
saving			0.010	
household charac.				
head as female dum.		-0.003	-0.032	-0.017
age of head		0.009	0.007	0.009
size of household		0.067	0.006	-0.071
migration charac.				
migr: in-farm inv.		0.065	0.258	0.075
migr: education		0.181	-0.257	0.176
migr: lack of land		0.604**	0.667**	0.605***
years since migration		0.011	0.017	0.011
Relatives charac				
village visit		-0.248**	-0.361***	-0.244***
remittances dummy		0.253	0.196	0.252
village rich relatives		0.518**	0.601***	0.587***
Bangkok rich relatives		0.041	0.059	0.043
land charac.				
ownership title dum.		-0.496**	-0.751***	-0.506***
highland dummy		0.175	0.113	0.176
bought land dummy		0.325	0.101	0.327
size of land holdings		0.003	0.002	0.003
cons	-2.103***	-3.004**	-3.123***	-3.046***
chi2	27.94	65.22	110.57	65.38
N	464	464	464	464

Notes: Significance levels:* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01

Table 4.5: Probit on the sale will model

	Dependent variable sale will S_i^{will}			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4))
economic stability	**0.710*** **	**0.440** **		**0.636** **
Economic stability square				**-0.263**
shock dummy	**0.594*** **	**0.566*** **	**0.648** **	**0.578*** **
unemployment dummie	**0.372***	**0.321***	**0.373***	**0.318***
Stability dimensions :				
schooling			0.156	
income per head			0.000***	
own housing dummy			0.170	
own car dummy			0.344**	
crediconstr			-0.120	
stable employment			0.270**	
government employ. dummy			0.103	
saving			-0.000	
household charac.				
head as female dummy		-0.219	-0.262	-0.196
age of head		0.010	0.006	0.010
size of household		0.054	0.023	0.048
migration charac.				
migr: in-farm inv.		0.099	0.239	0.082
migr: education		0.086	-0.334	0.101
migr: lack of land		0.321	0.389	0.323
years since migration		0.015*	0.317*	0.015*
Relatives charac				
village visit		-0.150	-0.203*	-0.156
remittances dummy		0.085	0.035	0.089
village rich relatives		0.478***	0.440***	0.480***
Bangkok rich relatives		0.007	-0.016	0.009
land charac.				
chanot dummie		-0.244	-0.341	-0.232
highland owner dummy		0.061	0.047	0.059
bought land dummy		0.146	-0.066	0.146
size of land holdings		0.003	0.002	0.003
cons	-2.103***	-2.575***	-2.605***	-2.561***
chi2	24.94	49.78	80.61	50.32
N	464	464	464	464

Notes: Significance levels: 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01*

Table 4.6: Tobit model: share of land holdings sold

	Dependent variable: share of total land holdings sold			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic stability	**13.788*** **	**12.762*** **		**16.731**
Economic stability square				**-3.979**
shock dummy	**12.213*** **	**10.964*** **	**15.175*** **	**10.556** **
unemployment dummie	**5.765**	**3.950**	**3.607**	
Stability dimensions:				
schooling			14.366***	
income per head			0.000	
own housing dummy			4.374	
own car dummy			10.717***	
crediconstr			-9.487**	
stable employment			4.126	
government empl. dummy			0.477	
saving			0.080	
household charac.				
head as female dummy		0.809	0.283	0.972
age of head		0.131	0.079	0.130
size of household		0.946	-0.053	0.921
migration charac.				
migr: in-farm inv.		1.603	3.057	1.662
migr: education		-1.351	-7.326	-4.438
migr: lack of land		11.381**	11.864**	11.331**
years since migration		0.256	0.345*	0.255
Relatives charac				
village visit		-4.935**	-6.342***	-4.951**
remittances dummy		4.820	4.256	4.748
village rich relatives		10.380***	7.936**	10.380***
Bangkok rich relatives		0.672	0583	0.671
land charac.				
chanot dummie		-7.892*	-10.356**	-7.702
highland dummy		2.804	2.178	2.789
bought land dummy		4.761	0.875	4.620
size of land holdings		0.254**	0.270**	0.255**
cons	-45.073***	-56.863***	-54.211***	-57.021***
sigma	22.571***	20.382***	18.674***	20.373***
chi2	19.65	55.67	94.76	55.71
N	464	464	464	464

*Notes: significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01*

Chapter 5

Temporary transfers of land and risk-coping mechanisms in Thailand

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Despite its large-scale titling programs, Thailand has a relatively thin land rental market in rural areas, especially in the vastly populated and poorly developed region of the Northeast. Yet favourable conditions for the development of a dynamic land rental market are not lacking: land is scarce and increasingly fragmented, the Public Land Registry has been established long ago, property rights are traditionally held by nuclear households, agriculture is increasingly commercialized, and emigration rates (including permanent migration) are high. Moreover, Thailand has been considered a successful case of land formalization through its large scale titling programs established in the 1980's.

But if access to land through rental does not seem to involve more than 5 per cent of agricultural land in the Northeast of Thailand (Richter, 2005), it does not imply that land rights are not exchanged at all. Various reports mention the importance of customary channels for the distribution of land, including free loans of land within family networks (Phelinas, 2001; Srijantr and Molle, 2000; Grandstaff et al., 2009). Land titling policies have therefore not fully changed the pattern of land distribution in the Northeast of Thailand, which displays a predominance of loans over rentals.

To help understand why, this chapter identifies the motivations and incentives involved in households' choices of a specific type of land transfer. We use a unique set of data collected through field work and the gathering of information on rental and free loan arrangements settled by Thai rural-urban permanent migrants. The methodology we use is exploratory and allows us to draw profiles of the households and plots that are involved in each type of arrangement.

Two potential avenues are examined in this chapter to explain Thai households' preference for loans rather than rentals. First, as proposed in the literature (see Platteau, 2000, for a review), the establishment of a formal system of property rights does not necessarily imply the disappearance of local and intra-family tenure systems[1]. The consequent co-existence of two levels of land rights may create tenure insecurity and limit the participation to land rental markets. Secondly, a strong dependence on risk-sharing mechanisms as a way to cope with shocks could lead households to favour land loans instead of rentals, particularly if the free nature of loans awards landholders with future claims on assistance from their 'tenants'[2], and if land loans take place within the regular risk-sharing network of landholders (typically the family or the kinship). In the end, risk-sharing and land tenure systems may depend on the same institution, the family or kinship, and as a consequence have intertwined effects on the participation to land rental markets.

The literature on land issues has generally analyzed land transactions in two broad categories of exchange: market and non-market transactions (here respectively rentals and loans). The works of authors such as Sjaastad (2003) or Colin (2008) nonetheless suggest that a binary framework opposing market and non-market transactions may not always be adequate when analyzing land transfers. Indeed, this framework does not account for the diversity of land arrangements used by households (Sjaastad, 2003; Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009; Benjaminsen and Lund, 2003), nor apprehend correctly their redistributive power. In developing countries, the majority of land transfers actually belongs to an intermediary 'grey zone', which does not fully respond to market mechanisms while not being fully unfamiliar with it (Sjaas-

[1]According to Platteau (2000) land rights evolve endogenously to match the economic environment. Consequently, exogenous land policies such as tiling or registries do not have the power to alter local land rights. *De facto* formalization will only arise if it is demand-driven(Platteau, 2000).

[2]We use the term land 'tenant' here to refer to the user of land in a loan transaction, although the term 'tenant' is usually used within the frame of rental transactions

tad, 2003; Benjaminsen and Lund, 2003).

In order to correctly identify the motivations involved in the loan and rental arrangements observed in our data, this chapter implements a thorough methodology to categorize the temporary transfers of land located in this 'grey zone'. Four characteristics are analyzed in parallel: the category under which land transfers are referred to by questionnaire respondents, the nature of the relationship between the two parties of the transaction, and whether the compensation is monetary (or non-monetary), and explicit (or implicit). We apply those characteristics to our data, in order to draw a typology of land temporary transfers. Beyond the notions of 'loan' or 'rental', five different categories are thus identified: free loans, loans with voluntary compensations, loans with compulsory compensations, sharecropping, and fixed rent. Those categories are then called forth in the analysis of the motivations involved in land transfers.

The results of this analysis first validate the idea that empirical research on land arrangement needs to go beyond the simple categories named by questionnaire respondents ('loan' or 'rental') in order to understand the motivations in land transfers and to carry out effective land policies. In Thailand, arrangements named free loans are for instance found to include various distinctive arrangements, from free exchange to transactions that take the name of loans, but have the form of sharecropping contracts. Secondly, the delays between *de facto* changes in ownership and their official registration illustrate the supremacy of intra-family rules in the definition of land rights. A sound formal property right system therefore proves nonsufficient to establish *de facto* formal property rights[3]. Thirdly, risk-coping motivations are found to generate a preference for loans and to encourage participation to 'disguised' rentals (rental transactions disguised as loans). Finally, it seems that the case of 'disguised rental' may be a direct consequence of the interplay between risk-coping motivations and the overlapping of property systems. In the legitimization process of actual rental as being free loans (that is, socially accpetable), households manage to secure their relationship with the extended family network, which happens to be their main source of both risk-sharing and access to land.

Section 5.2 introduces the chapter's methodology to characterize land exchange. Section 5.3 reviews the literature on the participation to rentals and loans. Section

[3]Which confirms previous results from the literature (De Janvry et al., 2001).

5.4 presents the context of land rights in Thailand. Section 5.5 introduces survey methodology. Section 5.6 presents descriptive statistics on the various arrangements observed in our survey data. Section 5.7 gives the results regarding the main motivations driving the choice of land transfers. Finally, the chapter discusses the main results of this investigation and concludes.

5.2 A methodology for the classification of land transfers

(a) Market and non market transfers of land: adequate categories?

Most of the literature on land rental and loan arrangements has - implicitly or explicitly - used a binary conception of land arrangements: land rentals and loans belong respectively to market and non-market allocation systems, and are therefore understood as fundamentally different. In line with (Demsetz, 1967), Feder and Nishio (1998) or De Soto (2000), the boundaries drawn between those two broad categories have implicitly been justified by differences in terms of economic and efficiency outcomes (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006). Land markets are indeed assumed to generate productive incentives and efficient outcomes (Feder and Noronha, 1987; Feder and Nishio, 1998), while non-market exchange is commonly seen as responsive to equity or reciprocity motives, sometimes at the expense of efficiency (De Janvry et al., 2001; Platteau, 2005). Moreover, within this binary framework, the literature has established a causal relationship matching the nature of property rights with the prevailing type of land allocation: private property rights[4] are to be encouraged in order to develop land markets and improve the efficiency in land distribution[5].
Most of the scientific research and related policy recommendations on land rentals and loans have relied on this binary framework of land arrangements, opposing market and non-market. Yet, this binary typology of land transfers generates a few ambiguities for the research on land issues. First, the definition of what market and

[4]Private property is defined as a full bundle of rights on land in the hands of an individual entity (Deininger and Feder, 2001).

[5]On the other hand, communal rights produce non-market transfers of land. Communal access refers to "*property rights* [that] *are exercised collectively by members of a group*" (Seabright, 1993).

non-market transfers of land respectively entail is not always clear in the literature (Benjaminsen and Lund, 2003; Sjaastad, 2003). And the lack of a clear and coherent definition then blurs the boundaries between what belongs to the market and what belongs to non-market transfers (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009).

The problem could be insignificant if most cases of land transfers were extreme or ideal cases easily classified as either market or non-market. Unfortunately, and as already stated in a growing body of the land tenure literature, most transfers of land are located in a 'grey zone' between pure market and pure non-market types of exchange (Colin, 2008; Sjaastad, 2003; Benjaminsen and Lund, 2003). Land arrangements can be found in a multiplicity of forms, and combine together features of market and non-market exchange. Hybrid forms of exchange can for instance be found in the African institution of *Tutorat* (gift-like exchange officially recorded as land sale)[6], or in 'disguised sales' (land sales officially registered as gifts)[7].

The discrete classification of land transfers actually poses a series of problems for empirical research. First, it does not provide empiricists with comprehensible criteria to separate the different transactions of the 'grey zone' in homogenous and coherent categories. As a result, empirical research and questionnaires have often relied on the terms 'loan'-'gift','rental'-'sale' (used by the actors themselves) to overcome this lack of comprehensive criteria in the definition of market and non-market land allocation (Quisumbing et al., 2001; Sjaastad, 2003; Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009). However, the category under which actors name their land transactions does not necessarily match the definition used for it by the researcher. Research therefore takes the risk of taking transactions for what they are not: the most obvious example here is 'disguised sales', classified as gifts whereas they have very few similarities with classic gifts, and do not involve the same motivations. Overall, a hasty classification in unsuitable categories could generate inaccurate results on the comparative benefits of different systems of land allocation, and eventually bring about unfit land policies.

This chapter therefore proposes a framework designed to apprehend land arrange-

[6]The *Tutorat* organizes land sales to immigrant populations but with the explicit goal of an access based on need and a clause of reversibility, if the previous owner was to require his former plot (Colin and Ayouz, 2006; Chauveau and Colin, 2007).

[7]Disguised sales occur when transactors give the aspect of a gift to a transaction based on the fulfilment of self-interest and leading to a compensation in cash, i.e. similar in many ways to a sale (Teklu and Lemi, 2004; Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006).

ments adequately in empirical research. This framework considers land transfers in a continuum going from pure market to non-market or gift transactions, and analyzes transactions located in the 'grey zone' as hybrid forms combining features from both market and non-market allocation systems.

(b) A framework to characterize land transfers

Attemps to provide a continuous (rather than binary) typology of land allocation systems have been found in property rights approaches including Berry (1997), Schlager and Ostrom (1992), Ostrom (2001) or Colin (2008). While keeping their emphasis on a richer classification of land allocation systems, our own framework focuses on the analysis of the transactions themselves (rather than on property rights *per se*[8]). Its main purpose is to provide a general methodology allowing observers to draw typologies of land arrangements that match local specific conditions and the diversity of forms in land arrangements.

The literature has identified three main features seen as 'pivot' in the identification of market as opposed to non-market exchange ('rental' compared to 'loan'). Land markets are supposed to be impersonal (1), monetized (2), and set at explicit market prices (3). On the other hand, non-market transfers or gifts are supposed to be personal (1), unmonetized (2), and based on implicit compensation systems (3). However, empirical and field studies suggest that these three features (how impersonal, monetized and explicitly compensated is the exchange) are rarely found in those two specific (and perfectly symmetrical) combinations that would indicate unquestionably market or non-market transfers (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006; Sjaastad, 2003). Instead, land arrangements are found to be hybrid forms in a wide panel of combinations of the three features (how impersonal (1), monetized (2) and explicitly compensated (3) is the exchange).

Our methodology therefore proposes to begin with a thorough analysis of the three features aforementioned, so as to draw a clear picture of their potential combinations in land arrangements. A transfer may for instance be personal, unmonetized,

[8]We do not assume in this chapter that there is a deterministic relationship between the nature of property rights and land allocation.

but be set at an explicit market price[9]. Moreover, each of those features is here seen as evolving in a continuum, and is therefore characterized in a scale rather than in a discrete evaluation of its two polar states[10]. Then, the so-defined combinations of our three continuous features are compared with the official categories under which economic actors refer to their transactions ('rental' or 'loan'). Discrepancies between the 'official' categories and the real nature of the arrangements may indeed reveal social norms, legitimacy issues, or particular institutional features such as the prohibition (or obligation) of specific transactions. In the end, observers should be able to infer regularities in the various forms of arrangements recorded in their data and to draw a typology that is both representative of local specificities and coherent with the diversity of land arrangements.
For the purpose of data analysis, we now go through a more definite description of the three features used in our methodology.

- The pre-existing relationship between the parties involved (1): A relationship is considered perfectly impersonal if the two parties have never met each other in the past nor will ever interact in the future; and perfectly personal if the two parties have known each other for a long time and can hardly avoid repeated interaction in the future. A perfect example of personal exchange takes place between parent and child. The nature of the relationship is then evolving between those two polar cases. An in-depth analysis of the nature of local rights, following for instance the methodology by Colin (2008) is here compulsory to assess the real nature of the relationship between the parties. In the literature, personal or repeated relationships between parties have been stated to generate the establishment of non-market institutions (such as contracts), and they question the nature of motivations in exchange, specifically if social norms or altruism may be involved (in parent-child relationships for instance). On the other hand, the price mechanism involved in markets allows the establishment of impersonal relationships.

- The involvement of money (2): A monetary transaction of land involves a repayment in cash, while a non-monetary transaction of land involves no re-

[9]Or be impersonal but monetized with implicit compensation systems; or any other combination.

[10]There are indeed degrees in the evaluation from purely impersonal to purely personal, or from purely monetized (liquid) to purely unmonetized (illiquid) arrangements, and so on.

payment or in-kind repayment. In the case of in-kind payment, the liquidity of the good involved is used to assess the monetary nature of the transfer. Although economic theory has not systematically associated markets with the use of money[11], empirical evidence suggests that marketization and monetization in land transfers go hand in hand in the process of development (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006; Colin and Woodhouse, 2010).

- The explicit nature of the compensation (3): A compensation is said to be explicit if it involves a compulsory payment at a price that has been explicitly (orally or by writing) negociated and agreed on by the two parties. An implicit compensation has never been explicitly negotiated or agreed on by the two parties, and is repaid on a 'voluntary' base (it is therefore not binding). The explicit nature of the compensation helps to differentiate between gift/countergift and market compensation systems. Markets indeed need visible prices to clear, while on the other hand, gift giving is "*reciprocated without certainty*" (Offer, 1997)[12].

Market and non-market exchange have traditionally been related to specific types of motivations: self-interest or welfare maximization in sale or rental; reciprocity in gift or loan. On the other hand, the motivations involved in 'grey zone' transfers are not as easily classified *ex ante*. This chapter applies the present methodology to draw a typology of the land arrangements recorded in our Thai data. This typology will then allow simple econometric estimations aimed at the analysis of the motivations involved in those land arrangements.

Before this, we propose a short review of the existing literature on the participation to temporary transactions such as loans and rental contracts.

[11] barter is indeed considered as market.

[12] In the tradition of Mauss (2001), gift giving works through compensations with no explicit price. Various studies such as Akerlof (1982) have described in economic terms the compensations of gifts as responding to social norms rather than to explicit negotiations

5.3 The choice between loan and rental: A short review of the literature

The choice between various types of land temporary transfers (such as loans or rentals) has been matched with various interpretations in the literature, mainly with a property right perspective and a market failure theory under the assumption of interlinked markets. Those interpretations have nonetheless essentially relied on the binary view of land transfers opposing market and non-market allocation regimes. After reviewing their main arguments, this section comments on the potential contributions of a typology of land transfer based on our methodology (reviewed in section 5.2.(b)).

(a) Property rights perspective

According to mainstream economics, the nature of property rights influences the type of transfer chosen (Demsetz, 1967, 2002; Libecap, 1989). On the one hand, formal private property rights may promote the development of land markets in reducing transaction costs and allowing the compatibility of incentives (Feder and Noronha, 1987; De Soto, 2000). On the other hand, communal or informal rights have been accused of deterring land markets given high transaction costs, tenure insecurity or even the prohibition of market transactions because of their non-conformity with customary rules and ethics (De Janvry et al., 2001). Accordingly, the lack of a formal system of property rights may depress land rental markets and push households into setting non-market transactions such as free loans.

However, empirical evidence shows that the establishment of formal property rights is not always sufficient to bring about rental markets and to put an end to land loans. Indeed, according to Platteau (2000) or De Janvry et al. (2001), formal property systems may compete with local informal land allocation systems, which generate a new form of tenure insecurity and deter market exchange. In particular, conflicts between formal and local property rights may occur if the formalization of land rights goes through a top down process that is not backed up by an endogenous *de facto* evolution of property rights (Boserup, 1965; Platteau, 2000; Bouquet, 2009). Overall, the quality of the formal system, its interactions with informal rules, and *de*

facto tenure security should influence the type of transfer favoured by households. Moreover, if land transfers are explicitly regarded as hybrid and combining market and non-market features (as in subsection 5.2.(b)), the potentially conflicting coexistence of different levels of ownership (typically formal, communal, kin or family) might lead to the design of new, intermediary, or hybrid forms of transfers that are neither fully market nor fully non-market. In particular, those hybrid forms of exchange could have been thought of to reconcile households' economic needs of the moment with the requirements of the various levels of land rights. Arrangements could also be devised so as to help overcome contradictions and conflicts between different sets of rules. 'Disguised sales' typically enter this type of strategy: households wish to sell land for economic reasons, but disguise it as gifts so as to comply with customary rules. Temporary transfers could also display this kind of 'disguised' arrangements.

To clarify, a situation with many loans and few rentals such as observed in Thailand does not necessarily mean that market motivations - welfare maximization, efficiency - are not involved at all in the process of land allocation. Instead, loans might be designed in such a manner that market incentives comply with the set of rules governing land rights, or so that the contradictions between different levels of property right definition are overcome.

(b) Risk-coping motivations

The literature has also explored the idea of market failure and market interlinkage as potentially disturbing factors for land markets. The basic idea behind this theoretical stream is that imperfections in markets such as credit or labour can hit the functioning of land markets themselves (Binswanger et al., 1995; Carter and Mesbah, 1993). Malfunctioning land markets might then display low volumes of activity, in lieu of other types of transfers[13].

In the same vein, failures in the insurance market have been accused of generating imperfections in the land market (Zimmerman and Carter, 1999). Although

[13]The literature has for instance studied the impact of labour market imperfections on the design of rental contracts such as sharecropping contracts. Sharecropping, which is widely used in the developing world, was indeed not found to match the ideal of market perfectly, and was therefore questioned on its capacity to reach Marshall efficiency because of moral hazard issues (Huffman and Just, 2004; Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982).

much of the literature has focused on permanent transactions and distress sales, the general idea is that failures in the insurance market lead to the implementation of informal risk-coping mechanisms, settled individually by households or through collective customary institutions. Such customary institutions are for instance found in the form of communal rights on land, which allocate land according to needs or in search of equity (Platteau, 2005; Deininger et al., 2009; Baland and Francois, 2005). Land loan as a tool in this type of allocation system may then involve risk-coping motivations and be preferred to rental when insurance markets fail and alternative risk-coping mechanisms are too costly.

In particular, chapter 3 proposes that land loans help migrant households to safeguard an access to the safety net value of land: it allows a more flexible return to land farming than rental. Moreover, free loans may be involved in a more complex organization of reciprocal transfers in-kind, set with the purpose of risk-sharing (Fafchamps, 1999). A free loan of land could for instance provide landlords with a claim for free labour or credit in times of need. As Fafchamps (1992) puts it, informal land arrangements may also allow to pool land resources as an *ex ante* preventive measure to reduce livelihood risks, and therefore reduce the necessity of costly *ex post* insurance against shocks. Land loans could be specifically designed to guarantee poor 'tenants' with a minimum access to subsistence through land resources, under a traditional equity rule (Platteau, 2005). Therefore, households who attach a strong value to the risk-coping mechanisms they can access through land may want to rely on land loans and intra-family or intra-kinship free transfers, rather than rental contracts settled at market price.

Here again, this analysis assumes that a typology of 'loans' vs. 'rentals' is relevant to apprehend the motivation involved in land arrangements. However, if we consider land transfers as hybrid forms combining market and non-market features, risk-coping motivations could become involved in a larger spectrum of transfers that allow risk-coping, but leave room for other types of motivations. Sharecropping, which is a particular form of rental arrangement, has for instance been assumed to allow the setting of risk-sharing between tenants and landlords, but with quite ambiguous empirical evidence. However, those studies have not established a distinction between sharecropping arrangements between relatives and arrangements between strangers. The influence of risk-sharing motivations could become much more visible if we analyze land arrangements with a complex typology such as pre-

sented in 5.2.(b), rather than with the rigid categories of 'loan' or 'rental'.
In the end, since risk sharing and informal tenure are probably organized by the same institution (communities, kinships, families), their impacts on the type of transfer favoured by households could be interrelated.

(c) Additional interpretations

Beyond the property rights or market failure analyses, a set of other factors have been identified as slowing down the activity of rental markets and encouraging land loans. First, poor land values make market exchange unattractive (Platteau, 1996; De Janvry et al., 2001). Land value usually depends on the quality of land, the value of the crop it allows to cultivate or the location and remoteness of the plots. The commercialization of agriculture, demographic pressure on land resources or urbanization usually increase land values and boost land rental markets through a demand effect (Deininger and Feder, 2001). The development of other markets such as financial, food or labour markets could also be reflected positively in land markets (Binswanger et al., 1995).
Household demographics may also matter in the choice of loan vs. rental. In a society evolving fast toward market economy, young households are for instance said to adopt their land practices to new market conditions faster than their elders (Soludo, 2000)[14]. Gender may also be an important factor in land decisions, but the nature of its effect will vary according to inheritance rules and the traditional allocation of property within the household.
Finally, for the migrant population we study in this chapter, the geographic distance from land, the frequency of contacts with the rural community, remittances, or migrants' economic situation (a sudden need for cash, for instance) all influence the decision behind the participation to loan vs. rental arrangements.
The rest of this chapter applies our methodology of land transfer categorization to analyze temporary land arrangements settled by migrants from the Northeast of Thailand.

[14]Soludo (2000) or (Platteau, 2005) underline for instance that younger landholders in Africa are quicker than their elders to throw themselves into land sales.

5.4 Land arrangements in Thailand

(a) Property rights in Thailand

Thailand's land history is singular. First, land had never been a symbol of power until the middle of the nineteenth century[15] (Mehl, 1986), and by then the Thai monarchy had already imposed upper limits on the surface of land that could be held. Secondly, a long history of migration and the technology used in rice cultivation have led landholding toward small nuclear households units (Mehl, 1986; Foster, 1984). In legacy to those factors, the distribution of land in Thailand is quite even, with a rural economy of small landholders and a low rate of landlessness. Around 3 farmers on 5 hold all the land they cultivate, and in the Northeast the numbers are even higher (4 on 5).

It is interesting to investigate land issues in Thailand since it has been considered by many as a successful case of land formalization, and an illustration of the benefits of private rights and sound titling systems for economic development. In the 1980's, Thailand has indeed implemented an important land reform, mainly aimed at a large scale distribution of titles to speed up a process that was otherwise estimated to take over 200 years before full title coverage (Burns, 2004). Various papers, mainly published just after the first phase of the reform, find that titling has helped the development of a financial market and the increase of agricultural productivity (Chalamwong and Feder, 1988; Feder and Onchan, 1987).

Property rights appear to be well-defined in Thailand, and the security of tenure is quite high compared to other countries with equivalent levels of development. However, the success of Thailand's titling policy, which has hardly been matched elsewhere, is not coming from scratch. Thailand has indeed a long history of private property rights and a well-established land administration. First, the customary organization of land has traditionally favoured household ownership on land, so that the intervention of the State to establish a private property regime has not met any community defiance, opposition or incompatibility. This traditional individual (rather than communal) ownership pattern has also formally been recognized by the monarchy in 1872, when King Chulalongkorn put an end to the realm's symbolic

[15]Because of the labour intensity necessary in rice cultivation, war intended at the control of labour rather than of the land itself.

ownership of land and established freehold. A land titling system (Department of Land, DL) has been created as soon as 1901, and a Land Code in 1954. Finally, the closure of the land frontier[16] and a growing land scarcity made the titling of land desirable in the eyes of local farmers, who were increasingly confronted to land grabbing by private companies, and wished for an access to formal credit. The 1980's land titling programs was therefore implemented in a favourable institutional framework.

But if the effect of this large scale land reform has been significant for the development of credit in rural areas (Chalamwong and Feder, 1988; Feder and Onchan, 1987), its impact on land markets has not yet been demonstrated. Land markets are indeed much older than the formalization of plots, and their activity seems more easily influenced by the expansion of urban areas than by the issuance of land titles (Grandstaff et al., 2009).

(b) The Northeast: Economy, land, and rural anthropology

Land markets generally display low turnover rates, although the situation varies widely from one region to the other: Thailand is indeed divided in four regions: the Central Plains, the South, the North and the Northeast. Although those regions are not administratively recognized, they correspond to areas with very different cultural, ecological and economic characteristics. The Northeast, in which our empirical studies were led, is the poorest area of the country, with an agriculture much closer to subsistance farming than in the rest of the country. Its agriculture is nonetheless turning to cash crops such as sugarcane, cassava, or rubber. As mentioned above, the turnover rate on the Northeastern land market is remarkably low: in some representative provinces, less than 10 per cent of plots have been acquired through purchase (Phelinas, 2001), and the rental market seems to involve just a bit over 5 per cent of all agricultural land.

Demand-side constraints on market participation are also particularly high: land is generally quite poor and poverty reduces the liquidity of potential purchasers. In the meantime, there is an increasing number of households retiring from agriculture

[16] In the 1980's, forest land had drastically decreased, and remaining forests were protected by the Thai government in national parks.

to undertake non-farming activities, specifically through permanent rural-urban migration. This could suggest an excess of land supply. However, this is not what we observe in the region. On the contrary, local farmers have an important land thirst, and land is scarcely available on the sale or rental market (Grandstaff et al., 2009). According to Molle (2002), it is also in the Northeast that communal solidarity and organizational capacities are the highest, and that non-market land arrangements are the most visible. Rare are the papers that have actually looked in detail at the mechanisms involved in those non-market arrangements (Grandstaff et al., 2009).

The anthropology of Thailand may nonetheless give some insight on the nature of land arrangements in the Northeast of Thailand. According to Moerman (1968) or Vanwey (2003), glutinous rice (and through it, rice fields) is a cornerstone in the society of the Northeast. Access to rice fields is synonymous of being well-fed, which explains the reluctance of Northeastern farmers to abandon rice fields in favour of more profitable cash-crops (cultivated on the highlands). The economic and social status of rice fields and highlands therefore differs radically, since highlands are sustainable only for cash-crop cultivation.

Anthropologists have also approached land ownership patterns through the structures of family and inheritance. Their research has for instance underlined the importance of small networks of relatives based on *coresidence* (including relatives who have shared the same roof) (Embree, 1950), or on the concept of *Yaadt phinong* (Foster, 1984; Whittaker, 1999). *Yaadt phinong* is a widely used term in Thailand which designates the extended family, and generally includes parents, siblings, uncles and aunts[17]. The relationship to aunt and uncles is tighter on the wife's side, thanks to a matrilineal structure. This *Yaadt Phinong* structure is key to the access to solidarity mechanisms as well as land. Land arrangements are also mainly settled between *Yaadt Phinong*. Traditionally, land was bequeathed in equal shares to the daughters at their marriage, while sons accessed land through their wife's holdings and were thereafter free to clear new plots in the forest empty lands. The youngest child (or daughter) cultivated their parents' holdings under share-farming, until their death. But with marriage nowadays happening later in the life cycle, and the closing of the land frontier, inheritance practices are currently evolving toward

[17]This network is therefore larger than the nuclear household but smaller than a kinship or matrilineal line.

equal share inheritance between all the children, in order to avoid landlessness[18]. Loans of land are frequent (Grandstaff et al., 2009), for instance between siblings after inter-vivo bequests. We nonetheless did not find any evidence in the literature on the exact conditions or prevalence of such land arrangements.

5.5 Survey methodology

The data used in this chapter were originally collected to study land sale decisions made by rural-urban migrants coming from the Northeast of Thailand. Information was also collected on the land arrangements implemented by migrants when not selling their land. The survey was operated in the second semester 2010, and followed two phases.

(a) Survey: first phase

During the first phase, semi-structured interviews were conducted with farmers in rural areas. The purpose of this first phase of field research was to gather qualitative information on the land arrangements chosen by migrants while away. It was conducted in rural areas, where migrants' plots are. Six villages were sampled in the province of Khon Kaen, with the assistance of the Community Development Department database 2009 (CDD). The Villages were selected for their display of high permanent migration rates, but for being otherwise representative of other villages in the Northeast.

Village headmen were then interviewed and asked to provide the contact information of permanent migrant households and their close relatives living in the village. The migrants that we selected to be part of the survey had left the village permanently, with their entire nuclear household, and had owned some farm land before departing.

[18]The closure of the land frontier forbids land clearing as a mean of access to land. Therefore, the tradition to exclude sons from land bequest may lead them to landlessness. Moreover, with marriage happening later in life, sons (who traditionally accessed land through their wife) may have no land to cultivate until their 30's: parents therefore prefer to give some plots of land to their sons as well as their daughters.

As most migrants were away, interviews were made with migrants' relatives, preferably those farming the migrants' land (when it had not been rented or sold out to outsiders). Respondents were asked to give basic information on the migrant households, to describe in detail the arrangements that were made about the migrants' land, and to offer their personal opinions on the choice made by migrants (the migrant they answered for but also all migrants in general). In the end, we gathered semi-structured interviews on 34 migrant households. The purpose of such qualitative surveys is not to test hypotheses, but to grasp intuitions, to understand the details behind observed phenomena, and to have a first feedback on the validity of our intuitions.

(b) Survey: second phase

The second phase of the survey was originally thought to be made in continuity with the semi-structured interviews of the first phase: rural respondents were expected to provide the contact information of the migrant relatives they were asked about. As most of our respondents in phase 1 refused to provide such information, the second phase of the survey was finally implemented independently, with a new sampling procedure. The second phase took place in Bangkok compounds, with the purpose of gathering a large database on permanent migrants from the Northeast, their economic situation, their migration history, and the land arrangements they chose while being away. This second phase is therefore designed for econometric analysis.

The migrants sampled to participate to this second phase of the survey answered a few criteria: they had permanently left their home with the whole of their household, and had owned land before moving out. 467 migrant households were finally selected under a non-randomized process. Because of the lack of a recent census, various complementary sampling methodologies were used, from snowballing to accidental sampling. From the 467 households, we obtain 475 temporary land arrangements (loans and rental). 15 observations have been removed from the final sampling because they involve forest land unsuitable for land cultivation. The 460 remaining arrangements are all temporary and involve partial transfers of land rights, which exclude the comparison to land sales. Land sales are indeed excluded

from the database, since information on sale and temporary transfers have not been gathered symmetrically, precluding a parallel analysis.
The sampled land arrangements are then cross-analyzed with detailed information on the nature of the land and property rigths, the relationship with both rural and urban *Yaadt Phinong* (network of relatives), the history and reasons behind migration, the economic stability and occupation of the migrant households.

(c) Phase 1 and Phase 2 : the complementarity of qualitative and quantitative data

The rest of the chapter uses both phase 1 and phase 2 of the survey to look at the different forms of temporary land arrangements. The database collected in phase 2 is used to provide quantifiable and statistically significant evidence. Basically, it means that all the statistics provided in the next sections derive from phase 2 of the survey.
On the other hand, the semi-structured interviews of phase 1 help us draw intuitions and design an identification strategy for hypothesis testing. It is also a precious tool to make meaningful interpretations of some of the unexpected statistical results. In the next sections, qualitative information, quotes from local actors, and interpretations of statistical results all come from phase 1 of the survey. Overall, phase 1 and 2 are complementary and allow us to provide a meaningful picture of land arrangements in the field, backed up by statistical evidence.
The fact that data are collected among migrants has important consequences for most of our results. Migrants are specific in many aspects: their involvement in agriculture, their relationship with land and rural networks, their risk aversion, and so on. Our results therefore only apply to this particular population.

5.6 Land arrangements: Descriptive statistics

We now apply to our data the methodology for a typology of land transfers that we described in section 5.2. First, we examine the nature of the compensations involved in land arrangements (whether it implies a monetary transfer and whether it is explicit). We then characterize the relationship between the parties involved

through a precise reviewing of local land rights and anthropology. Finally, we compare those features with the official category under which land arrangements have been referred to by questionnaire respondents.
Statistics (phase 2 of the survey) are used to find regularities in the characteristics of land transfers, while qualitative data (phase 1 of the survey) are used for intuitions and interpretations.

(a) Land arrangements and the structure of the questionnaire

If we look at the basic structure of the temporal arrangements settled by Thai migrants on their land, the collected data first proposes that 86 per cent of those arrangements are classified as free loans, 8 per cent as sharecropping, and 6 per cent as fixed rent contracts [19]). Rental contracts are therefore scarcely used by migrants, who favour free loans.
The semi-structured interviews (phase 1 of the survey) reveal that free loans, transcribed through the term *"hay chay fee"* in Thai language, apply to a wide variety of practices. The structure of the questionnaire was therefore designed to obtain a clear picture of the various arrangements named *"hay chay fee"* (free loans). This was not an easy process, as respondents were reluctant to give up their *"hay chay fee"* answer and admit to receiving compensation fees in exchange of lending their land.

The process followed by the questionnaire is summarized in figure 5.1. It is consistent with the guidelines for a categorization of land transfers proposed in section 5.2. First, respondents were asked which type of land arrangements they had settled on while being away. Their answer could either be free loans (*"hay chay fee"*), sharecropping, or fixed rent contracts (the general idea of 'rental' was not well understood by respondents[20]). Semi-structured interviews (survey phase 1) suggest that sharecropping and fixed rent contracts have well-established, structured and stable rules

[19]Fallow land is rare with only 5 households leaving some plots fallow. Unused farm land can indeed be legally seized by the State.

[20]There was actually no generic and understandable term for the idea of 'rental' in Thai language.

Figure 5.1: Structure of land arrangement in the questionnaire



that do not vary much from a contract to another. In a fixed rent contract, the tenant offers a cash deposit before the cropping season, and pays a cash rent fixed in advance by the landlord. The rent is frequently paid at the sealing of the rental deal, but may also be expected after the harvest, although it is rather uncommon. In a sharecropping contract, tenant and landlord agree on the share of the harvest to be paid at the end of the harvesting season. The payment is either in-kind or in-cash, at the convenience of tenants and landlords and depending on the nature of the crop and its transportation cost. Payment in-kind is more frequent on rice fields, especially if the landlord intends to keep a part of the harvest for his own consumption. On land planted with cash crops, the share is almost always paid in cash due to high crop transportation costs. Sharecropping or fixed rent contracts were easily identified in this first step of the questionnaire's process[21].

In the case of land loans, further questions have been necessary to define the nature of the arrangements. Basically, if respondents had made a *"hay chay fee"* type of arrangement (free loans), they were asked whether the loan was made in exchange

[21]The categories 'fixed rent' and 'sharecropping' were coherent with the information that was later provided by respondents on the details of the arrangements.

of some kind of compensation, or with no compensation at all. The term "compensation" was voluntarily kept vague in the questionnaire, or otherwise respondents would have refused to answer[22]. Respondents who admitted taking a compensation in exchange of lending their land were asked about the nature and amount of this compensation. Once they admitted to the compensation, respondents gave the required information much more easily. On the other hand, households who did not admit to taking a compensation were asked if they had been given something in exchange, as a thanks. The transfers given in return were almost always bags of rice.

It is only after this time-consuming process that more information could be gathered on the other features of the arrangements. This includes: the nature of the repayment as well as its amount, the length of the contract, details on the plot involved in the transaction, the relationship between the two parties as well as a rough evaluation of their wealth differential.

The questionnaire finally informs on three types of land loan. First, land loans may be completely free of charge, when migrants do not concede to taking or being given anything in exchange for their loan. Of course, no matter how careful the questionnaire, we cannot exclude that those free loans of land actually allow landlords to make some claims on 'tenants' in the long run. 21 per cent of all the "*hay chay fee*" arrangements (or 18 per cent of all arrangements) are classified as perfectly free. Secondly, land loans may occasion a compensation, but the quantity and nature of the compensation is decided freely by land 'tenants', and is not compulsory although implicitly expected by the migrant household (the landholder). Such loans with voluntary repayment represent 66 per cent of all loans (or 54 per cent of all arrangements). Finally, an arrangement may be called "*hay chay fee*" by respondents, but be made with an explicit compensation which is fixed by the landlord himself and compulsory for the tenant[23]. This last type of arrangements amounts to 13 per cent of all loans (or 11 per cent of all arrangements).

[22]The refusal to answer when the nature of the compensation was made explicit (monetary, rice bags, service) was significant.

[23]Renegociation of the compensation in such loans is nonetheless stated as frequent.

(b) The compensations: how and how much

Table 5.1 gives the type of repayment used in the various arrangements. As expected, the sharecropping contracts are paid as a share of the final production[24], and fixed rent contracts as a fixed amount. The situation is not as clear in the case of loans. Overall, the majority of compensations for land loans are offered in rice bags, but they can also be found as a fixed share of the agricultural production. The nature of the compensation differ significantly depending on the different categories of loan that were mentioned earlier. When the compensation is compulsory and explicit, it is a fixed share of the harvest in 80 per cent of the cases. When the compensation is voluntary and implicit, it is made in rice bags in almost 90 per cent of the cases.

[INSERT TABLE 5.1]

The statistics reported in table 5.1 do somewhat matter. Rice bags are a much imprecise measure. The qualitative interviews (survey phase 1) suggest that Thai farmers all have an approximate idea of the kilograms of rice contained in those rice bags, but they also agree on the potential variations from a bag to another. The fact that rice bags are favoured in loans with voluntary compensations but not in loans with compulsory compensations is somehow symbolic, as if the gesture mattered more than the quantity itself. Besides, when sharecropping is repaid in-kind (on rice fields), rice is carefully weighted by the landlord. Rice bags are indeed not trusted as an accurate instrument of measure.

The various forms taken by compensations make comparison hard. We therefore try to compute the market equivalent value of all types of compensation, for each category of transfers. When the transfer is made in rice bags, we measure the average capacity of a rice bag and multiply it by the 2010 farm-door price for rice. When the transfer is made as a share, we use our data on the size of plots and their yields, as well as the 2010 farm-door prices, to obtain the market value of the fee. Table 5.2 shows the monetary value of the various compensation made in each type of arrangement.

[24] This share is repaid in rice on rice fields, and always in cash on the few highlands that are cultivated under sharecropping contracts.

[INSERT TABLE 5.2]

At first sight, loans seem to be made with a much lower compensation than rental contracts in general. But as proposed before, loans cover a quite wide reality. When analysed in detail, it appears that the market-equivalent value of compensations is very similar in sharecropping and in loans with compulsory payments fixed by migrant landlords. This raises the following question: why do respondents refer to those transactions as "*hay chay fee*" (free loans) rather than as sharecropping contracts? A possible interpretation is that free loans with compulsory repayment are sharecropping contracts that need to be legitimized as being 'free', rather than guided only by landlords' self-interest. This strategy, which we call a 'legitimization process', might be implemented to match traditional institutions and social norms. In particular, this 'legitimization process' seems to be frequently required when land arrangements are made among relatives (table 5.3).

(c) The Relationship between the parties of the transaction

[INSERT TABLE 5.3]

Table 5.3 indeed examines the pre-existing relationship between tenants and landlords in each type of transaction. Most of transactions are made according to a principle of 'co-residence', that is when people have shared a same roof. Namely, 'coresidence' includes parents, children, and siblings. More distant relatives such as uncles and aunts (covered by the concept of "*Yaadt Phinong*") are found less involved in land transactions than the Thai anthropological literature may have suggested. Finally, outsiders[25] have a very small part in land arrangements, which are made mainly between relatives. Outsiders are nonetheless observed more frequently in rental contracts, and even more so in fixed rent contracts. Fixed rent contracts clearly differ from the other transfers in terms of the people involved in

[25]Neighbours and people that the household has never had contact with have unfortunately been equally classified as outsiders.

the transaction, being much more open to outsiders. Moreover, the prevalence of parent-child transactions is decreasing progressively in a continuum ranging from purely free transactions to fixed rent contracts.
Table 5.4 displays the market-equivalent value of the compensations for each type of 'tenant' - landlord pre-existing relationship. There seems to be a progressive increase of the payment as the ties between the two parties loosen. The compensation is lowest when the transaction takes place between parent and child, and highest when it is set with an outsider.

[INSERT TABLE 5.4]

A few conclusions can be derived from those preliminary statistics. First, land arrangements indeed seem to follow a sort of continuum, going from non-market transactions influenced by apparent altruism or reciprocity (such as really free loans) to arrangements such as fixed rent that are set at market price independently of a pre-existing relationship. Secondly, separating this continuum in two groups (loans and rentals) seems coherent, but empirical analysis has to be careful in setting the boundaries between loans and rental: some arrangements officially classified as loans have for instance very similar characteristics to sharecropping (loans with compulsory compensations). Thirdly, the nature of the relationship between the two parties of the transaction seems to be an even better predictor of the amount of the compensation (the rental price equivalent), than the type of arrangement itself.

5.7 Choosing a type of arrangement

(a) Empirical approach

We propose to analyse here the profiles of households and plots involved in the different categories of land arrangements that we have just identified. In particular, we look for correlations between the nature of property rights attached to land, the safety net value of land, and the types of arrangements chosen. We estimate a series of regressions with land arrangement categories as a dependent variable. Regressions, compared to correlation indices or comparison of means, allow to track conditional relationships and provide a more precise identification of the important

covariations between dependent and independent variables. Regression estimates can nonetheless not be interpreted as causal relationships here, because of some obvious endogeneity biases. We estimate the following equation :

$$A_{i,p} = \alpha + \beta_1 PR_{i,p} + \beta_2 S_i + \beta_3 C_{i,p} \tag{5.1}$$

Where $A_{i,p}$ is the type of land arrangement settled by household i on plot p, $PR_{i,p}$ is the nature of the property right held by household i on plot p, S_i is the safety net value that household i credits land with, and $C_{i,p}$ is a set of control variable on household i and plot p.

According to the literature (reviewed in section 5.3), we first expect that plots involved in traditional systems of property rights involving the extended family or the "*Yaadt Phinong*" structure, are more likely to be exchanged through arrangements on the 'non-market side' of the continuum (i.e. loans). Secondly, we expect that households relying on traditional safety net mechanisms are also likely to choose arrangements on the 'non-market side' of the continuum of land arrangements (i.e. loans).

The previous section (5.6) warns that the definition of land arrangement categories (the definition of $A_{i,p}$) is far from neutral and needs to be set carefully when coming to empirical analysis. We therefore test different definitions of $A_{i,p}$.

- First, we estimate a simple binary variable of rental vs. free loan arrangements based on the official categories given by questionnaire respondents ($Rental_{i,p}$)[26].

- Secondly, to account for the intermediary status of loans with a compulsory compensation, we estimate the dependent binary variable $Rental_{i,p}^{BIS}$, which is quite similar to $Rental_{i,p}$ except for the fact that we now consider loan arrangements with compulsory payment as rental, because of its proximity to sharecropping arrangements[27].

[26] $Rental_{i,p}$ is equal to one if the arrangement is a sharecropping or fixed rent contract, and equal to zero if the arrangement has been classified as "*hay chay fee*" by the respondent, independently of the nature of the compensation.

[27] $Rental_{i,p}^{BIS}$ is therefore equal to 1 if the land is under fixed rent, sharecropping, or loan with compulsory compensation.

Section 5.6 also underlines that both loans with no compensation at all (really free loans) and fixed rent contracts seem to differ significantly from other transfers, since they are two extreme cases in the continuum of arrangements. We therefore estimate:

- The dependent variable $Free_{i,p}$ is equal to one if the arrangement set by household i on plot p is perfectly free of compensation[28].

- The dependent variable $Fix_{i,p}$ is equal to one if the arrangement set by household i on plot p is under a fixed rent contract[29].

Finally, we propose a multinomial logit which enable the estimation of all the categories of arrangement proposed in section 5.6:

- The dependent variable $Transfer_{i,p}$, covering the following categories of land arrangements: free loan with no compensation (free), free loans with voluntary compensations, free loans with compulsory compensation, sharecropping, and fixed rent. Table 5.5 summarizes the variable $Transfer_{i,p}$. We set the base outcome at 0 (free loans with no compensation).

[INSERT TABLE 5.5]

(b) Explanatory variables

The independent variables of interest in our estimates are the nature of property rights $PR_{i,p}$ and the safety net value of land for households S_i. The safety net value of land for an individual household is difficult to measure. We use a qualitative proxy here. Households were asked to assess the following sentence: "*Households from the Northeast who now live or work in Bangkok should always keep land because land is a safety if some problems were to happen to them*". They could answer: 1. fully agree; 2. partly agree; 3. partly disagree; 4 strongly disagree. Households who answered 1 are classified here as giving a strong value to the safety provided by land. To complement this variable, we also proxy for the risk aversion of households. In

[28] And zero otherwise.
[29] And zero otherwise.

the questionnaire, households were presented with the following hypothetical situation : "*Imagine that you have 60 000 baht*[30]*. This money has to be kept in a bank and will be made available to you only in ten years. During those ten years, you have only two choices to make about this money.*
1st choice : you leave the 60 000 baht in an secured account. You will receive no interest rates, and in ten years, you will receive the exact sum of 60 000 baht, no more and no less.
2nd choice : you can play in the bank a win/loose game, with one chance on two (50/50) to win or lose. If you win, in ten years you will have tripled your original 60 000 baht and will therefore receive the sum of 180 000 baht. But if you lose, you will lose 50 000 baht and in ten years you will receive only 10 000."
Households who choose the 1st choice are classified as risk-adverse, and those who choose the 2nd choice as risk-neutral. Of course this is a very rough proxy, but it at least offers a basic approximation of households' risk preferences.
The nature of property rights ($PR_{i,p}$) depends on various criteria and therefore has a composite nature. We propose a series of variables to proxy the nature of the property rights held by household i on plot p. First, we check whether the land is titled with a "*chanot*". The titling system in Thailand is quite complex, and various types of titles have been distributed over the years. Yet only the "*chanot*" (NS3, NS3k, and NS4 titles) legally grants full ownership and sale[31]. The semi-structured interviews (survey phase 1) suggest that the overlapping of rights is significant within relative networks (the "*Yaadt Phinong*" structure). A visible consequence of such overlapping is that arrangements made between relatives, especially inter-vivo bequests, are neither automatically followed by a modification of the name registered on the ownership title (*chanot* or any type of inferior title), nor by an official registration at the Land Administration Office. The legal transfer of ownership, in the case of bequest, actually takes from a few too many years, and will sometimes not be officially registered until the death of the parents or first holder. We therefore measure whether the legal transfer of ownership was made after households first acquired their plot p. We also check whether households have ever encountered land conflicts with their relatives and whether households are certain to sell their land in

[30] 60 000 baht is equivalent to around 1500 euros.
[31] Plots that do not have a *chanot* either have a SPK or *soopookoo*, which does not allow the transfer of ownership but gives a right to a *chanot* in the process of land reform; or no title at all.

the future[32].

Keeping in mind the importance of overlapping rights over land in a network of relatives, we provide a few proxies on the nature of the relationship that migrant households keep with their "*Yaadt Phinong*". First, we check whether migrant households have settled land arrangements with parent (or child), with siblings, more distant relatives, or outsiders. We check whether migrant households ever got assistance from village relatives[33], whether they send remittances[34], and the frequency of their visits to the village. We also proxy for the 'lending' power of the migrants' relatives (village as well as Bangkok relatives), linked with migrant's income: respondents were asked for the maximum amount of money they thought themselves able to borrow from their "*Yaadt Phinong*", and we then weighted it with households' yearly income.

We add a set of control variables. We first look at the economic and demographic characteristics of households : whether households own a house in Bangkok, the highest diploma held in the household, the age and gender of the household heads. Households' migration characteristics are also important: the number of years elapsed since the first migration decision, whether households have migrated for lack of land, and whether migrants come from the Northeastern provinces classified as poor by the Thai Office of Statistics. Finally we also look at fundamental characteristics of the plots involved in the arrangement: whether the earth is classified as "*of a good yielding quality*" by the household, whether it is highland or rice fields, whether it has been accessed through purchase (rather than inheritance), and the overall size of landholdings. Table 5.6 provides summary statistics on the variables used in regressions.

[INSERT TABLE 5.6]

[32]Households were asked if they had the intention to sell their land in the future, and could answer 1.No for sure, 2.Yes maybe, or 3. Yes for sure. The variable is therefore equal to one if the household has answered 3. Yes for sure.

[33]This variable captures only non-monetary forms of assistance, and is partly subjective as to what type of assistance we were referring to. It is therefore rather based on respondents' feeling of having received assistance, than on an objective measure of the nature and amount of such assistance.

[34]The dummy for remittances is equal to one if the household sends remittances at least once a year, and zero otherwise.

(c) Results

Table 5.7 presents the results for the probit estimation of the dependent variables $Rental_{i,p}$ (first column) and $Rental_{i,p}^{bis}$ (second column). Table 5.8 gives the results for the probit estimation of the dependent variable $Fix_{i,p}$ (first column) and $Free_{i,p}$ (second column). Table 5.9 gives the results for the multinomial logit estimation of the dependent variable $Transfer_{i,p}$. We make an IIA test, which states that the Ho hypothesis of independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA test) cannot be rejected, allowing us to run the multinomial logit estimation. We propose here a summary of the main findings from table 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9.

[INSERT TABLE 5.7, 5.8 AND 5.9]

Risk-coping motivations

First, risk-coping motivations are found to matter in the type of land arrangements to which households participate. Households who strongly value the safety net value of land are also more likely to have chosen loans (non-market arrangements), rather than rentals (market arrangements). Yet, this result only holds when loans with compulsory compensations are classified as loans rather than rentals (in the first column of table 5.7). The significance of the dummy proxying risk-lover households also confirms that households who participate to rental arrangements are not as risk-adverse as those who participate to loans. We may therefore conclude that risk-coping motivations do indeed contribute to make arrangements with non-market characteristics more attractive than rental contracts.

But if risk-coping motivations appear as coherent in a binary choice between loan and rental, table 5.8 and 5.9 give interesting insights on the real implications of those motivations in the design of land arrangements. Fixed rent contracts clearly involve households that give a low value to the safety net function of land (table 5.8). On the other side of the continuum however, free arrangements do not seem to involve the households that are the most dependent on land risk-coping mechanisms (none of the variables measuring risk behaviours are significant in the $Free_{i,p}$ model in table 5.8). Table 5.9 actually reveals that it is the intermediary transfers, those that are located in the grey zone of land arrangements (loans with compensation,

voluntary or compulsory) that are the most related to risk-coping motivations, and explains the significance of risk-coping motivations in loans (table 5.7).

Property rights

Property rights also seem to matter in the participation to rental rather than loan arrangements (table 5.7), although not in the expected way. The holding of a *chanot* (full ownership title) is negatively correlated with the participation to rental arrangements: such a result is at odds with the propositions made in the literature. Moreover, households who have been legally made owners of their plots, and have their own name on the land title, are less likely to participate to rental than those who are not yet legal owners on their plots! Overall, this would suggest that legal ownership does not matter in the choosing of land arrangements or even decrease the participation to land rental markets.

To analyze this matter further, we created an interaction variable between the dummy *Chanot* and the dummy *Legal ownership status*. This interaction variable is significantly and positively correlated to the participation to rental (in the first column of table 5.7 only). We are tempted to interpret those results as follow: first, a *chanot* with no legal transfer of ownership (not the right name on the title) does not provide enough security to enter the rental market. Indeed, plots with no legal transfer of ownership (not the right name on the title) are usually implicitly held under communal or overlapped rights: current land owners often share ownership rights with the relative from whom they acquired the plot (most likely parents or sibling). In such situations, a current landholder who has a title not registered in his own name, is entitled to transfer preferably to his unofficial 'co-owner' or 'natural claimant', with no expected charges. Such overlapping of rights among current and previous land owners was made very clear in the semi-structured interviews (survey phase 1). It generally happens preferably after a non-market, intra-family exchange of land - non-market, intra-family exchange of land being scarcely recorded officially. Secondly, a plot where the transfer of ownership has been made (the right name on the title) but which is not covered by a full title of ownership (*chanot*) is also not secure enough to be rented out, and even more so to outsiders. To put it more simply, neither a *chanot* alone nor a legal transfer of ownership (the right name on the title) alone are sufficient to allow tenure security with outsiders or even rela-

tives. On the other hand, if households have at once a full ownership title (*chanot*) with their own name on it, they may be secure enough to call on outsiders and market rental contracts. Titling programs therefore seem insufficient to develop land markets. Informal tenure can dominate land allocations systems even in a country with a well-established formal system of land rights. In the end, informal allocation systems take over the formal system, and titling programs that had been carefully designed become incomplete and ill-matched with *de facto* ownership patterns. Those results confirm other findings from the economic literature (Platteau, 1996, 2000; De Janvry et al., 2001).

Property rights and risk coping mechanisms: the interplay

Nonetheless, as in the case of the safety net value of land, the results on property rights only hold for the first column of table 5.7 ($Rental_{i,p}$), when loans with compulsory compensations are classified as loans rather than rental. An explanation may be found in the multinomial logit results. In table 5.9, we have chosen free loans (with no compensation at all) as our base outcome. But if instead we shift the base outcome to sharecropping (= 3), we find that households who participate to loans with compulsory compensations give a comparatively high value to the land safety net function, and are less likely to hold a *chanot* over their land[35]. Households choosing loans with compulsory compensations are therefore dependent on the safety net value of land, and consequently not secure on their plots.

Loans with compulsory compensations actually involve some kind of 'market' motivations quite similar to sharecropping, which explains why its classification as rental may be relevant ($Rental^{bis}_{i,p}$) when looking at exchange with outsiders or at the quality of land. But loans with compulsory compensations also involve households dependent on traditional risk-coping mechanisms such as risk-sharing, which explains that its classification as loan ($Rental_{i,p}$) is relevant when looking at risk in land tenure. If those households are also insecure on their plots due to overlapping rights, officially asking for a fee in exchange of land transfer could look socially unacceptable and generate conflicts with relatives[36]. Indeed, as stated before, if land

[35]We do not give the results on the multinomial logit with a base outcome= 3 due to a lack of space.

[36]Classifying loans with compulsory compensation as loans ($Rental_{i,p}$) is here also relevant to identify the impact of the insecurity of tenure.

is owned with no title or with a title registered to the wrong name, it is probably held through overlapping rights. Those overlapping rights could then enter in conflict with the idea of 'making money' individually over a land transaction. Conflicts with relatives and traditional institutions could in turn reduce the effectiveness of risk-sharing mechanisms in the future. As a consequence, those households disguise their rental transactions as loans, so as to legitimize them in the eyes of the "*Yaadt Phinong*". This legitimization is necessary to help secure a plot and retain an access to solidarity mechanisms, whilst allowing the making of market benefits over a transaction of land. Those transactions may be called 'disguised rentals', in reference to the phenomenon of 'disguised sales'.

Fixed rent and free loan: at both ends of the continuum

The model estimating the choice of fixed rent ($Fix_{i,p}$) seems to perform much better than the model estimating free loans ($Free_{i,p}$)[37]. The decision to undertake free loans is therefore poorly understood.

A few features are nonetheless visible: free loans ($Free_{i,p}$) take place between very close relatives, generally parent and child. This is visible in both table 5.8 (compared to all transfers) and table 5.9 (compared to other types of loans). On the other hand, fixed rent arrangements ($Fix_{i,p}$) are much more impersonal, open to outsiders or people that households have had no relation with before the land deal. Moreover, fixed rent contracts seem to be used when relatives are rich enough to afford such contracts for cash crop cultivation: table 5.9 indeed reveals that fixed rent contract, when compared to free loans, are likely to be settled with relatives who have a high lending power. Relatives' lending power may be interpreted here as a proxy for relatives' average wealth, or as a positive wealth differential between the relatives and the migrants. Fixed rent is also often designed for highland and cash crops.

Finally, the involvement of households in their village of origin takes an important part in the choice of fixed rent contracts: households who do not visit their village frequently, or have left for a long period of time, will find the enforcement of fixed rent contract costly and time-consuming.

[37] see the R square in table 5.8.

Results on control variables

Results on some other control variables are also worth noting. Rental contracts involve more impersonal transactions, since arrangements are more frequently made with outsiders than they are in the case of loans. Households who participate to rental arrangements are generally wealthier (they own a house more frequently, see table 5.7) and better educated (in the case of fixed rent only, see table 5.8). This may either imply that they are well-integrated in the market economy, or that they are less vulnerable to consumption shocks and therefore able to take on risky yet profitable choices. In other words, they are able to rent land for profit and to forgo free loans and their safety net benefits.

Older households or households with a female head participate more frequently to rental arrangements than to loans, maybe because they feel secure in their land rights and as a result are protected from claims coming from their relatives. Land property is indeed traditionally held by women in the Northeast of Thailand. Older households are more likely than younger households to have made the legal transfer of ownership on land titles, and to feel that land is rightfully theirs. Those results nonetheless go against the idea that elders are not inclined to favour land markets.

The results presented here are of course subject to caution. The empirical identification strategy that we used here is very basic and only intended at enabling preliminary insights on the land arrangements settled by migrants in Thailand, and what they involve. Results can be understood only as correlations, and may suffer from endogeneity biases. Finally, the nature of our sample does not allow the generalization of our results to the Thai population as a whole: it is specific to land arrangements in the Northeast of Thailand, and to the decisions made by migrants.

5.8 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

This chapter first suggests that a binary framework of land arrangements which separates rental and loan as two distinct categories with clear boundaries is not always the most relevant tool. Indeed, many of the transfers made by Thai permanent migrants appear to be hybrid arrangements sharing similarities with both 'rentals' and 'loans'. The typology of land transfers that we apply in this chapter allows for instance to identify 'disguised rentals', that is *de facto* rental arrangements disguised

as loans, and officially referred to as 'free loans' by local actors.

Then, our typology of land transfers allows us to see the survival of intra-family ownership in an otherwise formal system of property rights. Finally, our typology underlines the importance of risk-coping motivations in land transfers. In particular, risk-coping motivations are found to lead households to prefer free loans, but also to legitimize *de facto* rental arrangements in disguising them as loans ('disguised rental') so as to safeguard their relationship with risk-sharing networks.

To conclude, risk-coping motivations appear here as one of those forces that, because they are economically rational, go in the way of land formalization policies and market development. Thailand has tried, in the last two decades, to use land titling policies as a tool to tackle poverty in the Northeast. With the final completion on the 1980's titling project in the offing, Thailand needs to find a new approach to address land issues. The consideration of risk-coping motivations in land tenure, and the setting of adequate social protection policies might be one way, among others, to address this matter.

Table 5.1: Type of repayment for the use of land (per cent)

	Free loans	Free	Voluntary compens.	compulsory comps.	Sharecropping	fix-rent
Rice Bags	64.6	0	89.9	19.6	2.6	0
Share (per cent)	17.1	0	10.1	80.4	97.4	0
Fixed amount (baht)	0.26	0	0	0	0	100
No payment	21.2	100	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Obs	391	85	257	51	39	28

Table 5.2: Amount of compensation per type of transfer

	Mean	**Standard dev.**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**
Free	0	0	0	0	89
Free loan, voluntary	304.4	491.3	0.4	3520	258
Free loan, compulsory	1250.3	597.3	75.4	2640	49
Sharecropping	1465.7	859.5	158.4	5000	36
Fixed rent	920.3	862.9	150	4000	28
All loans	357.5	576.7	0	3520	391
All rental	1138.4	920.4	0	5000	69
All	474.6	697.1	0	5000	460

Table 5.3: Pre-existing relationship between the parties, per type of land arrangement

	Parent-child	**Sibling**	**Distant relat.**	**Outsider**	**N**	**Total**
Free	42.70	52.81	3.37	0	89	100
Free loan, voluntary	32.95	52.33	13.18	1.55	258	100
Free loan, compulsory	18.37	38.78	32.65	10.20	49	100
Sharecropping	5.56	61.11	16.67	16.67	36	100
Fixed rent	21.43	25	14.29	39.29	28	100
All loans	33.25	50.90	13.55	203	391	100
All rental	13.10	39.29	11.90	20.4	84	100
All	30.43	50	13.70	5.65	360	100

Table 5.4: Amount of compensation, and relationship between parties

	Mean	**Standard dev.**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**
Parent child	333.5	615.3	0	3520	140
Siblings	447.7	723.8	0	5000	230
Relatives	668.8	661.4	0	1760	63
Outsiders	1020.3	633.2	17.6	2500	26
All	474.6	697.1	0	5000	460

Table 5.5: Variable *Transfer*

Code	Type of arrangement
0=	Free
1=	Loan with voluntary compensation
2=	Loan with compulsory compensation
3=	Sharecropping
4=	Fixed rent

Table 5.6: Explanatory variable: summary statistics

	Type	**Mean**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**
Safety net value of land	(0;1)	0.89	0	1	475
Risk lover	(0;1)	0.17	0	1	475
Chanot	(0;1)	0.91	0	1	474
Legal ownership status	(0;1)	0.45	0	1	473
Land conflict	(0;1)	0.07	0	1	475
Will sell land	(0;1)	0.11	0	1	475
Child-parent	(0;1)	0.30	0	1	460
Siblings	(0;1)	0.50	0	1	460
Relatives	(0;1)	0.14	0	1	460
Outsiders	(0;1)	0.05	0	1	460
Assistance from relat.	(0;1)	0.55	0	1	475
Visit home	visit per year	1.44	0	2	475
Remittances	(0;1)	0.60	0	1	475
Village relat. lending power	of year income	9.69	0	246.55	473
Bkk relat. lending power	of year income	24.06	0	1190.48	474
House	(0;1)	0.16	0	1	475
Schooling	lowest to highest degree	2.76	0	5	473
Age of head	years old	43.06	21	71	475
Head as female	(0;1)	0.09	0	1	475
Good land	(0;1)	0.74	0	1	475
Highland	(0;1)	0.11	0	1	462
Land size	rai[38]	14.93	1	100	474
Bought land	(0;1)	0.11	0	1	474
Years since migr	years	16.61	1	50	475
Migr. for lack of land	(0;1)	0.07	0	1	475
Poor province	(0;1)	0.34	0	1	472

Table 5.7: Rental vs loan: Probit estimation

	$Rental_{i,p}$	$Rental_{i,p}^{BIS}$
Safety net value of land	-0.1*	-0.8
Risk lover	0.32*	0.39**
Chanot	-1.48***	-0.74*
Legal ownership status	-1.09**	-0.28
Chanot*legal status	1.43***	0.51
Land conflict	0.18	0.21
Will sell land	0.31	0.27
Child-parent	-0.30	-0.85***
Siblings	0.03	-0.61***
Relatives	omitted	omitted
Outsiders	1.46***	1.28***
Assistance from relat.	0.35*	0.37**
Visit home	0.21	0.32**
Remittances	0.0.13	-0.05
Village relat. lending power	0.49	-0.29
Bkk relat. lending power	0.07	0.05
House	0.63***	0.44**
Schooling	0.05	-0.06
Age of head	0.04***	0.04***
Head as female	0.47*	0.07
Good land	0.37	0.21*
Highland	0.71***	0.40
Land size	-0.02	-0.01
Bought land	0.26	-0.01
Years since migr	-0.03***	-0.03***
Migr. for lack of land	-0.48	-0.40
Poor province	-0.17	-0.21
cons	-2.72***	-2.02***
Pseudo R2	0.32	0.25
Pseudo log likelihood	-123.35	-188.88
N	447	447

Notes: Significance levels: 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01*

Table 5.8: Free loans and fixed rent: Probit estimation

	$Fix_{i,p}$	$Free_{i,p}$
Safety net value of land	-0.44	-0.57**
Risk lover	0.24	0.14
Chanot	-0.01	0.08
Legal ownership status	0.09	-0.25
Chanot*legal status		
Land conflict	-1.85	-0.54
Will sell land	0.53	-0.06
Child-parent	0.25	0.35**
Siblings	-0.20	omitted
Relatives	omitted	-0.64**
Outsiders	1.32***	no obs.
Assistance from relat.	-0.02	-0.29*
Visit home	0.12	-0.24**
Remittances	-0.22	0.16
Village relat. lending power	1.45***	-0.16
Bkk relat. lending power	0.17	0.01
House	0.03	0.38*
Schooling	0.21**	-0.01
Age of head	0.03**	0.06
Head as female	0.86**	0.46*
Good land	0.17	0.11
Highland	0.87**	-1.09***
Land size	-0.01	-0.00
Bought land	0.27	0.02
Years since migr	-0.05***	-0.02
Migr. for lack of land	0.29	0.51*
Poor province	0.35	-0.03
cons	-4.47***	-0.71
Pseudo R2	0.40	0.18
Pseudo log likelihood	-61.09	-177.28
N	447	447

Notes: Significance levels: 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01*

Table 5.9: Category of arrangement: Multinomial logit estimation

	Base outcome : Free loan (no compensation)			
	loan voluntary compens	**loan compulsory compens.**	**sharecropping**	**fixed rent**
Safety net value of land	1.19***	1.89**	-0.28	-0.08
Risk lover	-0.46	0.03	0.48	0.45
Chanot	-0.43	15.13	-4.13***	-1.87
Legal ownership status	-0.69	16.17	-2.72*	-1.57
Chanot*legal status	1.15	-15.43	4.23***	1.92
Land conflict	1.02	1.30	1.52	-4.42
Will sell land	0.05	0.43	0.51	1.03
Child-parent	-1.70**	-3.30***	-3.23***	-1.02
Siblings	-1.19*	-2.83***	-0.85	-1.59
Relatives	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
Outsiders	16.92	18.00	19.72	20.71
Assistance from relat.	0.48*	0.70	1.54***	0.47
Visit home	0.43**	0.91***	1.14**	0.86*
Remittances	-0.34	-0.45	0.32	-0.62
Village relat. lending power	0.22	-5.41*	-2.10	2.96*
Bkk relat. lending power	-0.33	-0.29	-0.55	-0.03
House	-1.16***	-0.79	0.92	-0.60
Schooling	0.21	-0.24*	-0.08	0.44**
Age of head	-0.01	0.07**	0.07***	0.09**
Head as female	-1.29**	-1.57**	-0.80	0.77
Good land	-0.24	0.11	0.56	0.35
Highland	-2.50***	-2.6***	-0.95	0.47
Land size	0.000	-0.000	-0.01	-0.06
Bought land	-0.03	-0.72	0.51	-0.17
Years since migr	0.07***	0.03	0.00	-0.57
Migr. for lack of land	-0.91*	-0.68	-16.81	5.65**
Poor province	0.26	-0.15	0.17	-0.54
cons	3.42***	-16.07	-1.72	-5.07
	Pseudo R2= 0.30			
	Pseudo log likelihood=-394.06			
	N=447			

Notes: Significance levels: 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01*

Conclusion générale

L'influence des stratégies de protection contre les risques dans les choix des ménages et les institutions informelles des pays en développement n'est plus à démontrer. Les différents chapitres de cette thèse confirment qu'ils doivent être pris au sérieux dans l'analyse des pratiques foncières des pays en développement, et ce même lorsque des réformes de grande ampleur garantissent des droits de propriété privée et les conditions nécessaires au développement de marchés.

Le chapitre 1 défend l'idée que l'ampleur des comportements de protection contre les risques de subsistance dans les pratiques foncières ne peut être appréhendée sans faire l'économie d'une approche précise des droits de propriétés et des arrangements entourant l'accès à la terre. Il est notamment crucial de sortir de l'approche bipolaire des régimes de droits de propriété qui oppose régimes de droits communautaires et régimes de droits privés. A la place, il est conseillé de considérer les régimes de droits comme des formes hybrides et flexibles qui permettent par exemple d'assurer un accès au 'filet de sécurité sociale' fourni par la terre.

Les chapitres 2 et 4 ont énoncé l'importance quantitative du 'filet de sécurité social' foncier dans les décisions de ventes de terres, appliquée au Vietnam et à la Thaïlande. Au Vietnam (chapitre 2), les ménages sans situation stable choisissent moins fréquemment la vente comme mode de transfert de leurs terres agricoles, au profit de contrats locatifs ou d'arrangements non-marchands de type prêts et dons. En Thaïlande, les migrants permanents issus de l'exode rural vendent plus fréquemment leurs actifs fonciers lorsqu'ils ont acquis une situation stable et sont moins vulnérables aux chocs de subsistance.

Le chapitre 3 indique que les migrants thaïlandais préservent mieux la fonction 'filet de sécurité sociale' de la terre lorsqu'ils mettent en place des échanges temporaires et partiels de leurs droits de propriété. Certains aspects des arrangements fonciers sont

d'ailleurs choisis dans ce but, comme lorsqu'une transaction s'effectue entre deux membres d'une même famille élargie. Au final, la protection par l'accès à la terre semble étroitement liée à d'autres institutions, comme les réseaux matrilinéaires qui en Thaïlande sont très impliqués dans les échanges réciproques de type partage du risque.
Le dernier chapitre confirme l'importance d'une typologie adéquate pour comprendre les motivations impliquées dans les échanges temporaires de terre. Une typologie plus riche permet alors de percevoir des pratiques complexes comme les 'locations déguisées', qui s'apparentent à du métayage mais sont qualifiées comme prêt par les acteurs eux-mêmes. La volonté de garantir ses moyens de subsistance, notamment à travers le partage du risque, apparaît ici encore déterminante dans la mise en place des arrangements fonciers, non seulement en favorisant les prêts - qui participent à des systèmes complexes de réciprocité au sein des familles élargies - mais aussi en engendrant des formes hybrides de transferts, telles que les 'locations déguisées'. Ces dernières sont alors pensées pour combiner les incitations de marché avec la nécessité de respecter les institutions traditionnelles pour bénéficier efficacement du partage du risque.

Au final, la thèse suggère l'importance du risque pour expliquer la nature des arrangements fonciers mis en place dans les cas étudiés. La conclusion générale du travail mène à deux recommandations principales pour les politiques foncières dans les pays étudiés: tout d'abord, favoriser des marchés de faire-valoir direct dans des environnements où les risques de subsistance ne sont pas pris en charge par des programmes publics peut réellement mener à des équilibres de marché inefficaces. Lorsque peu de ménages sont capables de s'assurer une situation économique stable, il est probable que les seuls à mettre en vente leurs actifs sur le marché le feront contraints et forcés par une précarité insoutenable, dans une logique de ventes de détresse. Au final, la transition vers des activités hors-ferme ne se traduira pas forcément par une redistribution massive des droits de propriété par le marché: principalement pour les marchés de vente, et dans une moindre mesure pour le marché locatif si les prêts de terre ont pour avantage de favoriser le fonctionnement des réseaux de partage de risque.
Les résultats des différents chapitres peuvent néanmoins conduire à se poser une question plus profonde encore. Si les acteurs eux-mêmes se refusent à participer au

marché foncier tant que certaines des nécessités de base de la vie ne leur sont pas garanties, quel est le pouvoir réel de politiques foncières facilitant les transactions marchandes? La recherche économique a généralement considéré qu'un meilleur mode d'allocation des terres a le pouvoir d'entraîner le reste de l'économie dans une spirale vertueuse. Au delà des courant idéologiques sur les droits de propriété, ce postulat devenu presque inconscient a justifié des décennies de réformes foncières multiples et variées. Mais si, comme l'illustre le cas des risques de subsistance étudié ici, la terre est très fortement connectée à d'autres segments de l'économie, il est probable que les régimes d'allocation de la terre ne se modifient qu'en réaction à des évolutions dans ces autres segments. Ainsi, il serait illusoire de voir l'évolution des modes d'allocation de la terre comme une source exogène de développement. Car c'est aussi le développement des autres segments de l'économie qui peut, par effet d'entraînement, générer une redistribution plus favorable des terres.

Cette thèse n'est bien entendu pas la seule à en être arrivée à de telles conclusions. Ce qui est, à notre connaissance, plus inhabituel dans les arguments proposés ici, c'est que le développement de mécanismes de protection sociale effectifs, plus probablement à travers des programmes publics, pourrait jouer un rôle essentiel dans l'évolution des pratiques de distribution des terres. Ce rôle est peut-être encore plus important dans les économies en transition avec une importante sortie de main d'oeuvre de l'agriculture. Si, pour s'assurer une subsistance minimale, les ménages n'ont d'autres choix que de garder leur terre dans un cadre de gestion traditionnelle du risque (en sacrifiant potentiellement des investissements plus productifs), les modes d'allocation foncière risquent fort de réagir à des motivations autres que productives. Concrètement, cela signifie que les échanges seront aménagés pour conserver une partie du 'filet de sécurité sociale' foncier. Sachant que ces mécanismes d'assurance informelle ne sont pas parfaits, une partie de la redistribution foncières pourrait par exemple suivre le modèle des ventes de détresse au bénéfice d'une concentration croissante des ressources. Libérer les individus ou les ménages du poids des risques pesant sur leur survie élargit leur champs de choix économiques, dont celui d'abandonner définitivement leur terre au profit d'autres activités, lorsque celles-ci permettent d'augmenter leur niveau de vie.

La piste des mécanismes de protection contre les risques existant dans les pratiques foncières peut néanmoins être poursuivie plus avant. Au delà de potentielles tentatives pour retrouver nos résultats avec d'autres données et dans d'autre contextes,

plusieurs projets de recherches sont possibles. Dans un premier temps, on pourrait analyser plus en détail puis tester empiriquement la relation potentielle entre une gestion collective ou empiétée des droits de propriété, et la capacité à réduire les problèmes de *commitment* constatés dans les réseaux de partage des risques. Ensuite, une analyse plus précise de la relation entre différents dispositifs d'assurance - privée, micro-crédit, protection sociale publique - et l'évolution des pratiques foncières pourrait être envisagée. Enfin, l'investigation empirique des intuitions de la thèse pourrait se tourner vers une étude de cas inédite: l'histoire de la seconde moitié du 19ème siècle en France. Cette période a en effet connu un fort exode rural en pleine période d'industrialisation, dans un contexte de droits de propriété officiellement privés et défendus légalement dans le code civil. Différents travaux d'historiens révèlent que durant cette période, les marchés fonciers ont côtoyés des arrangements intra-familiaux souvent non-marchands de type prêts ou dons. Par ailleurs, les gouvernements qui se sont succédés jusqu'à l'après seconde guerre mondiale ont tenté à plusieurs reprises de favoriser une allocation marchande des terres, avec des effets très mitigés. Les analogies avec la situation décrite dans cette thèse sont donc nombreuses, et une telle étude pourrait offrir des intuitions plus précises sur l'évolution des relations foncières de l'époque en relation avec la protection contre les risques. Cette thèse se termine donc en ayant ouvert des portes qui peuvent présager d'une recherche future fructueuse.

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Appendix

แบบสอบถาม แรงงานอพยพ

Introduction

ฉันทำงานเป็นนักวิจัยในมหาวิทยาลัยขอนแก่น เดินทางมาพบคุณด้วยเหตุผลที่ว่าเราต้องการอยากรู้และเข้าใจถึงเหตุผลของผู้คนในการมาทำงานที่นี่ ชีวิตความเป็นอยู่ของผู้อพยพออกจากบ้าน และมีวิธีการอย่างไรในการประสานความสัมพันธ์กับบ้านเกิดและที่ดินทำกิน. นี่เป็นการสำรวจซึ่งมีลักษณะลับเฉพาะ และจะไม่สามารถติดตามชื่อและที่อยู่ของผู้ให้ข้อมูล

รหัส	

สถานที่สัมภาษณ์ :

ผู้สัมภาษณ์ :

สถานะของแบบสอบถาม 1.สมบูรณ์แบบ 2.สมบูรณ์แบบบางส่วน 3.ไม่สมบูรณ์แบบ

ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ แบบที่1 1.ให้ความร่วมมือเต็มที่ 2.ให้ความร่วมมือบางส่วน 3.ไม่เต็มใจให้ความร่วมมือ

ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ แบบที่2 1.ใช้เวลาคิดใคร่ครวญกับคำถามและยอมรับว่าไม่แน่ใจในคำตอบ
ดูเหมือนไม่แน่ใจแต่ตอบทุกคำถาม
3ไม่ฟังคำถามอย่างถูกต้องและหลีกเลี่ยงการให้คำตอบ
4.อื่นๆ โปรดระบุ

การสังเกตการณ์ ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ :

รายละเอียดข้อมูลผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์:
ชื่อ :
เพศ :
อายุ :

การตรวจสอบคำถาม
(คำถามข้างล่างนี้มีจุดประสงค์เพื่อตรวจสอบความเป็นจริงของผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ว่าสอดคล้องกับตัวอย่างในรูปแบบใด ถ้ามีคำตอบว่า ไม่ใช่ โปรดขออภัยผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์และหยุดการใช้แบบสอบถาม และหยุดการใช้บันทึกของแบบสอบถามดังกล่าวภายหลัง)

บ้านเกิดคุณอยู่ภาคอีสานใช่ไหมครับ? 1. ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่
พวกคุณมาอยู่ที่นี่พร้อมครอบครัวทั้งหมด-ยกเว้นผู้สูงอายุเช่นพ่อแม่ใช่ไหม? 1. ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่
ไม่ทราบว่าตั้งแต่คุณละทิ้งบ้านเป็นเวลาเกินหนึ่งปีหรือยัง? 1. ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่
ก่อนที่คุณจะละทิ้งบ้านมาที่นี่ คุณมีที่ดินทำกินเป็นของคุณเองบ้างไหม? 1. ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่

(รหัส การใช้ :

ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ตอบว่า “ไม่ทราบ” : ใช้รหัส **“D.K”**

ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ปฏิเสธการให้คำตอบ : ใช้รหัส **“R”**

(โปรดพยามซักถามเมื่อผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ตอบว่าไม่ทราบหรือไม่แน่ใจจนกว่าจะได้คำตอบที่ดีที่สุด)

(ในที่นี้ความหมายของคำว่า **ครอบครัว** หมายถึงทุกคนที่อาศัยอยู่บ้านหลังเดียวกันและแบ่งปันภาระค่าใช้จ่ายภายในครัวเรือน)

ตอนที่ 1. รายละเอียดข้อมูลทั่วไปด้านครอบครัว

เราขออนุญาตถามคุณเกี่ยวกับข้อมูลทั่วไปในครอบครัวคุณ

1.1 ผู้นำของครอบครัวคุณอายุเท่าไร? .....ปี

1.2 ผู้นำครอบครัวเป็นเพศหญิงหรือชาย? 1. ชาย 2.หญิง

1.3 สมาชิกในครอบครัวมีกี่คน? .....

1.4 สมาชิกในครอบครัวที่มีอายุต่ำกว่า15ปีมีกี่คน? .....

1.5 สมาชิกในครอบครัวที่อยู่ในวัยทำงานมีกี่คน? .....

1.6 สมาชิกในครอบครัวที่กำลังอยู่ในระหว่างการศึกษาเล่าเรียนมีกี่คน? .....

1.7สมาชิกในครอบครัวที่อยู่ในวัยเกษียนหรือแก่เกินไปที่จะทำงานและไม่ได้มีกิจกรรมใดๆที่ก่อให้เกิดผลผลิตมีกี่คน? .....

1.8 ในครอบครัวคนที่ได้รับวุฒิการศึกษาสูงสุดคือวุฒิการศึกษาอะไร? .....

1.ป.4 4.ม.6

2.ป.6 5.ป.ว.ส

3.ม.3 6.ปริญญา

1.9 สมาชิกในครอบครัวที่จบมัธยม3.มีกี่คน? .....

ตอน **2** . ประวัติความเป็นมาของการอพยพ / Section 2. History of Migration

คำถามที่เราจะถามต่อไปนี้จะเกี่ยวข้องกับการละทิ้งถิ่นที่อยู่ในหมู่บ้านอย่างไรชีวิตความเป็นอยู่ที่นั่นก่อนเดินทางมาอยู่ที่นี่

2.1 ครอบครัวคุณอพยพมาจากจังหวัดไหน? .....

2.2 สมาชิกในครอบครัวคุณมาจากตำบลเดียวกันใช่ไหม? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่

2.3 กี่ปีมาแล้วที่ครอบครัวนี้ได้ละทิ้งหมู่บ้านในชนบทครั้งแรกเพื่อมาทำงานหรืออยู่อาศัยที่ไหนก่อน .....

2.4.1อาชีพหลักของครอบครัวก่อนที่จะละทิ้งหมู่บ้านชนบทแล้วมาอยู่ที่นี่คืออะไร?(ดูรหัสข้างล่าง) รหัส :

2.4.2ครอบครัวนี้มีงานอื่นๆนอกเหนือจากที่กล่าวข้างต้นก่อนละทิ้งหมู่บ้านมาหรือไม่?ถ้ามีอาชีพอะไร? ดูรหัสข้างล่าง รหัส :

รหัส การจ้างงาน 1 :

1. การเพาะปลูก หรือปศุสัตว์
2.แรงงานไร้ฝีมือ
3.งานชำนาญการเฉพาะ (ครู ตำรวจ...)
4.ธุรกิจส่วนตัว
5. อื่นๆ / other

2.5 ทำไมครอบครัวคุณต้องละทิ้งถิ่นฐานในชนบท? (*ให้อ่านสาเหตุตัวอย่างให้ผู้ตอบคำถามฟัง*)

สาเหตุตัวอย่าง *(ผู้ตอบคำถามไม่สามารถเลือกคำตอบเกินหนึ่งข้อ)*

1.สะสมออมเงินในกรุงเทพฯเพื่อนำมาใช้เป็นทุนในการเพาะปลูกหรือทำธุรกิจขนาดเล็กในท้องถิ่น
2.ไม่มีที่ดินเพียงพอในการทำกิน
3.เพื่อเสาะแสวงหาชีวิตที่ดีกว่า
4.เพื่อเหตุผลทางการศึกษา
5.มีปัญหาข้อขัดแย้ง/หนี้สินในท้องถิ่น
6.ถูกส่งให้มาทำงานครั้งแรกโดยบุพการี / ญาติ
7. หางานเฉพาะทางซึ่งไม่มีในบ้านเกิด
8.อื่นๆ .....ระบุ / other (specify)

2.6 ก่อนที่ครอบครัวคุณจะละทิ้งชนบทมา มีที่ดินทำกินในครอบครองหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่

2.6.1 ครอบครัวนี้มีที่ดินถือครองประมาณกี่ไร่ที่ตัวเองเป็นเจ้าของ? .....

2.6.2 ที่ดินทำกินที่ครอบครัวถือครองในหมู่บ้านชนบทเป็นที่ดินที่ดีหรือไม่?
1.ใช่ ทั้งหมด
2. ใช่มีบางส่วน
3.ไม่ใช่ที่ดินที่ดี

2.6.3 ครอบครัวถือครองที่ดินที่ใช้ทำนากี่ไร่? .....

2.6.4 ครอบครัวถือครองที่ดินที่เป็นไร่หรือสวนกี่ไร่? .....

[ถ้าผู้ตอบคำถามไม่มีไร่หรือสวนให้ข้ามไปข้อต่อไป **2.6.6** *]*

2.6.5อะไรคือพืชหลักที่ปลูกในไร่หรือสวน

1. อ้อย .....
2. *มันสัปหลัง*
3.ข้าวโพด
4. ยางพารา
5. *สวนผลไม้/สวนผัก*
6. ต้นยูคาลิตัสหรือไม้เศษฐกิจ
7. อืน ๆ

2.6.6กอ่นที่คุณจะละทิ้งหมู่บ้านไม่ทราบว่าที่ดินของครอบครัวคุณมีโฉนดอยู่แล้วหรือไม่? มีทั้งหมดหรือบางส่วน?
1.เต็มพื้นที่
2.บางส่วนของพื้นที่
3.ไม่มีโฉนดทั้งหมด

2.6.7 ครอบครัวได้ที่ดินถือครองมาก่อนละทิ้งถิ่นฐานอย่างไร่?(แต่ละหัวข้อให้ตัวเลขเป็นไร่)

1.ของขวัญ หรือมรดกตกทอดจากบุพการี ถ้าใช้มีกี่ไร่/ .....ไร่.
2.ของขวัญจากญาติ ถ้าใช้มีกี่ไร่ ..... ไร่.
3.ซื้อหามาเอง ถ้าใช้มีกี่ไร่ ..... ไร่
4.ได้รับจากทางราชการ ถ้าใช้มีกี่ไร่ .....ไร่
5.ได้รับจากการใช้หนี้แทนเป็นที่ดินถ้าใช้มีกี่ไร่ .....ไร่
6.อื่นๆ.....โปรดระบุ ถ้าใช้มีกี่ไร่ .....ไร่

2.6.8 ครอบครัวนี้มีเอกสารสิทธิ์การถือครองที่ดินของตัวเองหรือเป็นเอกสารสิทธิ์ที่การถือครองที่ดินร่วมกับบุพการี?

1.เป็นผู้ถือครองเอกสารสิทธิ์ทั้งหมด
2.เป็นผู้ถือครองเอกสารสิทธิ์บางส่วนของพื้นที่
3.บุพการีเป็นผู้ถือครอง

2.6.9 ก่อนที่ครอบครัวคุณจะละทิ้งชนบท มีบ้านพักอาศัยของตัวเองหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่

2.6.10.a ก่อนคุณมาจากหมู่บ้าน คุณมีกิจกรรมหรือ งานส่วนตัวทำหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่

2.6.10.b ถ้าใช่ เป็นกิจกรรมประเภทอะไร?

1.งานฝีมือในบ้าน
2.ร้านผลิตภัณฑ์วัตถุดิบหรือร้านขายของชำ
3.ร้านอาหารเร่ริมทาง
4.ร้าน ค้าอื่นๆ (อู่ซ่อมรถ ซ่อมอุปกรณ์ไฟฟ้า)
5.ธุรกิจเกี่ยวกับขบวนการเพาะปลูก
6.ธุรกิจเกี่ยวกับผลผลิตอื่นๆ
7.ขับรถ / แท็กซี่
8.อื่นๆระบุ.....

รหัส.....

2.6.11 ตั้งแต่คุณละทิ้งบ้านมาครั้งแรก คุณได้เคยกลับไปอยู่ที่หมู่บ้านอีกหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่เคย

*(ถ้าคำตอบคือ ไม่ ไปยังข้อที่ **3**.)*

2.6.11.1 ทำไมคุณถึงกลับไป? (*มีสาเหตุตัวอย่างให้ผู้ตอบคำถามเลือก*) (กาทุกอย่างตามหัวข้อที่ให้ข้างล่างจากคำตอบของผู้ตอบ)

1.มีหนี้สิน หรือ ปัญหาทางการกู้ยืม
2. ตกงาน
3.เจ็บป่วยหรือปัญหาด้านสุขภาพ
4.ต้องดูแลญาติสนิท
5.ต้องการลงทุนในหมู่บ้านที่อยู่ (ไร่นา บ้านอาศัย ธุรกิจอื่นๆ)
6.คิดถึงบ้าน
7.อื่นๆ

2.6.11.2 เมื่อคุณกลับไปอยู่ที่หมู่บ้านในชนบท คุณเลือกทำในกิจกรรมหลักหรือประกอบอาชีพอะไร?

1.ทำไร่ทำนา
2.แรงงานรับจ้างนอกฟาร์ม
3.งานส่วนตัวนอกจากทำไร่นา

รหัส.....

ตอน **3** ระบบเครือข่ายการเชื่อมโยงในสังคมของหมู่บ้าน

เรากำลังจะถามคุณเกี่ยวกับญาติสนิทที่ยังอาศัยอยู่ในหมู่บ้านชนบทที่คุณได้ละทิ้งมา

3.1 จำนวนญาติในครอบครัวคุณที่ยังอาศัยอยู่ในหมู่บ้านที่คุณจากมามีกี่ครัวเรือน? .....

3.2 ญาติที่ยังอยู่ที่นั่นที่คิดว่าฐานะค่อนข้างยากจนกว่าคุณมีจำนวนกี่ครัวเรือน? .....

3.3 ญาติที่ยังอยู่ที่นั่นที่คิดว่ามีฐานะดีกว่าคุณมีจำนวนกี่ครัวเรือน? .....

3.4 ญาติที่ยังอยู่ที่นั่นที่คิดว่ามีฐานะเท่าคุณมีจำนวนกี่ครัวเรือน? .....

3.5.ญาติที่ยังอยู่ที่นั่นที่คิดว่าฐานะจนหรือยากจนมาก (เราหมายถึงยากจนจนไม่สามารถพอเพียงกับการใช้จ่ายปกติให้ยืนอยู่ได้)มีจำนวนกี่ครัวเรือน? .....

3.6.1 ญาติที่อยู่ที่มีที่ดินทำกินเป็นของตัวเองแต่น้อยกว่า5ไร่ มีจำนวนกี่ครัวเรือน? .....

3.6.2 ญาติที่อยู่ที่มีที่ดินทำกินเป็นของตัวเองอยู่ระหว่าง 6 ถึง15 ไร่ มีจำนวนกี่ครัวเรือน? .....

3.6.3 ญาติที่อยู่ที่มีที่ดินทำกินเป็นของตัวเองแต่มากกว่า **15** ไร่ มีจำนวนกี่ครัวเรือน? .....

3.7 ญาติที่อาศัยในหมู่บ้านได้เคยขอยืมเงินจากคุณบ้างหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่

3.8 คุณได้เคยขอยืมเงินจากญาติของคุณหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่

3.9.สมมุติถ้าหากว่าในอนาคตคุณประสบปัญหาและต้องการขอยืมเงินจากญาติของคุณในหมู่บ้าน : ในจำนวนญาติทั้งหมดของคุณที่นั่นใครพอที่จะยอมให้เงินคุณยืม-ในจำนวนเท่าไรที่คุณคิดว่าสามารถจะยืมได้สูงสุด? .....

3.10 นอกเหนือจากการยืมเงินคุณได้เคยขอความช่วยเหลือในด้านอื่นจากญาติของคุณในหมู่บ้านหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่

3.11 คุณได้เคยมาเยี่ยมญาติของคุณในหมู่บ้านบ่อยแค่ไหน?

1.สองครั้งในหนึ่งปีหรือมากกว่า
2.ปีละครั้ง
3.นานๆครั้ง
4.ไม่เคยไปเยี่ยมมานานไม่ต่ำกว่าสิบปี

3.12 คุณมักจะส่งเงินกลับไปยังที่หมู่บ้านอย่างสม่ำเสมอไหม? ถ้าใช่ บ่อยแค่ไหน?

1.ใช่ อย่างน้อยทุกๆเดือน
2.ใช่ อย่างน้อยทุกๆปี
3.ใช่ แต่น้อยกว่าหนึ่งครั้งในหนึ่งปี
4.ไม่เคยเลย

ตอน **4** ประวัติเกี่ยวกับที่ดิน

เรากำลังจะถามคุณเพิ่มเติมเกี่ยวกับที่ดินที่ถือครองในหมู่บ้านของคุณ และจะเน้นในเรื่องของการใช้ประโยชน์ในปัจจุบันในขณะที่คุณอยู่ที่นี่ในกรุงเทพฯ

4.1 ตั้งแต่ครอบครัวคุณจากหมู่บ้านมา คุณได้ขายที่ดินบางส่วนหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่

*(ถ้าคำตอบคือ ไม่ ใช้ไปต่อที่คำถาม **4.2**)*

4.1.1 คุณขายที่ดินไปเพียงครั้งเดียว หรือขายมากกว่าหนึ่งครั้ง ? 1.ครั้งเดียว 2.มากกว่าหนึ่งครั้ง

	ครั้งที่1	ครั้งที่2	ครั้งที่3	ครั้งที่4	ครั้งที่5
4.1.2 ประมาณกี่ปีมาแล้วที่คุณได้ขายที่ดินไป?					
4.1.3 คุณขายไปจำนวนกี่ไร่?					

4.1.4 ส่วนใหญ่เป็นที่นา หรือเป็นที่ไร่สวน? 1.ที่นา 2.ที่ไร่สวน 3.ทั้งสองอย่างปนกัน	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส
4.1.5 ส่วนใหญ่เป็นที่ดินที่มีคุณภาพหรือไม่มีคุณภาพ? 1.ที่ดินที่มีคุณภาพ 2.ที่ดินที่ไร้คุณภาพ	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส
4.1.6 ที่ดินนั้นมีโฉนดใช่ไหม? 1.มีโฉนดทั้งหมด 2.บางส่วนมีโฉนด 3.ไม่มีโฉนด	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส
4.1.7 คุณขายที่ดินให้ใครไป? ให้กับญาติหรือคนในหมู่บ้านหรือคนต่างถิ่น 1.พ่อแม่ 2.ลูกๆหลานๆ 3.ญาติคนอื่นๆ 4.ไม่ได้เป็นญาติในหมู่บ้าน 5.บุคคล / บริษัทฯ ซึ่งไม่ได้อยู่ในหมู่บ้าน	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส
4.1.8 คุณได้ที่ดินที่ขายไปนี้มาอย่างไร*?(อ่านตัวอย่าง)* *ตัวอย่าง* 1.จากพ่อแม่ 2.ของขวัญจากญาติ 3.ซื้อหามาเอง 4.การจำนอง 5.จากทางราชการ 6.อื่นๆ.....ระบุ	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส
4.1.9 ถ้าคุณได้รับที่ดินมาจากพ่อแม่ คุณมีชื่อเป็นกรรมสิทธิ์ในขณะที่คุณขายแล้วใช่ไหม? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส
4.1.10 ทำไมคุณถึงได้ขายที่ดิน? *(อ่านตัวอย่าง)* *ตัวอย่าง* 1.เผชิญปัญหาและต้องการเงินด่วน 2.ต้องการใช้เงินที่ขายที่ดินได้เพื่อนำไปลงทุนในเรื่องอื่นๆ 3.มั่นใจว่าจะไม่กลับมาเยือนที่หมู่บ้านอีกเลย 4.กลัวว่าจะเสียที่ดินไปหรือหรือคนมาอ้างสิทธิ์ เมื่อเจ้าตัวไม่อยู่ 5.เพื่อช่วยในการซื้อที่ดินแปลงใหม่ในอีกที่หนึ่ง 6.อื่นๆ....ระบุ	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส	รหัส

4.2 ตั้งแต่ครอบครัวคุณจากหมู่บ้านมาคุณได้ขายบ้าน หรือบ้านพร้อมที่ดินที่อาศัยอยู่หรือไม่?	1.ใช่	2.ไม่
4.2.1 ประมาณกี่ปีมาแล้วที่ครอบครัวคุณได้ขายบ้าน หรือบ้านที่อยู่อาศัยไปพร้อมที่ดิน?	.....	
4.2.2 ใครเป็นผู้ซื้อบ้านของคุณ? 1พ่อแม่ 2.ลูกๆหลานๆ 3.ญาติคนอื่นๆ 4.ไม่ได้เป็นญาติแต่อยู่ในหมู่บ้าน 5.คนอื่นที่อยู่นอกหมู่บ้าน		

4.3 ปัจจุบันครอบครัวคุณยังมีที่ดินทำกินเหลืออยู่ในหมู่บ้านบ้างไหม?

1.ใช่ 2.ไม่

4.4 ครอบครัวคุณได้เคยให้ที่ดิน / โอน บางส่วน แก่ลูกหลานหรือไม่?	1.ใช่	2.ไมใช่
*(ถ้าคำตอบคือไม่ ไปต่อที่คำถาม **4.5.1**)*		
4.4.1 ถ้าครอบครัวคุณเคย จำนวนกี่ไร่ที่ได้โอนให้ไป?	.....	
4.4.2 ประมาณกี่ปีมาแล้ว?		

ถ้ากรณีที่ผู้อพยพได้ขายที่ดิน ถามเขาว่าก่อนขาย ที่ดินมีการใช้ประโยชน์อะไร? ถ้าไม่เคยขายที่ดิน อยากทราบว่าที่ดินปัจจุบันใช้ประโยชน์อะไร?

	ฉากที่ 1	ฉากที่ 2	ฉากที่ 3
4.5.1 ปัจจุบันใครเป็นผู้ใช้ที่ดินทำกินที่ครอบครัวนี้เป็นเจ้าของในหมู่บ้าน ที่คุณละทิ้งมา? 1.พ่อแม่ 2.พี่น้อง 3.ลูกๆหลานๆ 4.ญาติ 5.อื่นๆ			
4.5.2 ผู้ใช้ที่ดินนั้นมีฐานะความเป็นอยู่ในระดับไหนเมื่อเทียบกับเจ้าของที่ดิน ?: 1.รวยกว่า 2.จนกว่า 3. ฐานะพอกัน			

4.5.3 ชนิดของสัญญาเช่าเป็นแบบอะไร?*(อ่านตัวอย่าง)* ตัวอย่าง 1.ให้ใช้เปล่า หรือ โดยแบ่งผลประโยชน์จากผลผลิตของพืชผลตามส่วน 2.ให้ใช้เปล่าแต่แบ่งผลผลิต แลกเปลี่ยนตามกำหนดคงที่ 3.ภายใต้สัญญาเช่าที่ตายตัว (โดยจ่ายล่วงหน้า) 4.ภายใต้ข้อตกลงในการแบ่งผลผลิต			
4.5.4ใช้รูปแบบอะไรในการเช่า / การแบ่งผลผลิตของพืชผล?			
4.5.4.a ถ้าสัญญาเช่าเป็นแบบตายตัว	บาท/ไร่	บาท/ไร่	บาท/ไร่
4.5.4.b ถ้าเป็นแบบแบ่งผลผลิตจากพืชผล(เลือกหน่วย ของการวัดตามที่ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ตอบ)	%	%	%
4.5.4.c ถ้าให้ใช้ที่ดินโดยไม่ได้เก็บค่าเช่ามีจำนวนเท่าไร(หมายถึงให้ใช้ฟรีแต่ในบางคราวแบ่งผลลิตไปกินต่อปี	ถุง/ปี	ถุง/ปี	ถุง/ปี
4.5.5 สัญญาเช่าตายตัวเป็นเวลากี่ปี?(ถ้าสัญญาให้เปล่า ให้ใช้1ปี ยกเว้นกรณีที่ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ตอบเป็นอื่น)			
4.5.6 ระบุชนิดของที่ดิน 1.ที่นา 2.ที่ไร่หรือสวน			

4.6 คุณเคยมีข้อขัดแย้ง หรือไม่เห็นด้วยกับญาติเกี่ยวกับที่ดินหรือไม่?

1. บ่อยครั้ง 2.น้อยครั้ง 3.ครั้งเดียว 4. ไม่เคยเลย

4.7 คุณคิดว่าสักวันหนึ่งจะขายที่ดินของคุณหรือไม่?

1.ใช่ แน่นอน

2.บางที

3.ไม่ขาย แน่นอน

4.8 ในมุมมองความคิดเห็นของคุณ ในประโยคต่อไปนี้คุณเห็นดว้ยมากนอ้ยแค่ไหน

	1เห็นด้วยมาก	/2เห็นดว้ยปานกลา	3เห็นดว้ยนอย	4ไม่เห็นด้วย
4.8.1 คนอีสานที่ทำงานอยู่ในกรุงเทพควรเก็บที่ดินในต่างจังหวัดไว้เพราะเป็นหลักประกันยามมีปัญหา				
4.8.2 คนอีสานที่มาทำงานในกรุงเทพแล้วขายที่ดินของเขาในต่างจังหวัดเป็นคนที่ไม่วางแผนอนาคต				
4.8.3 การมีข้าวเก็บมีไว้ในยุ้งสางเป็นหลักประกันว่าเราจะมีกินตลอดปี				

ตอน 5 รายละเอียดเกี่ยวกับงานและรายได้

เรากำลังจะถามคุณเกี่ยวกับรายละเอียดของงานในครอบครัวคุณที่ทำและรายได้จากการทำงาน

เราจะถามคุณเกี่ยวกับสมาชิกในครอบครัวที่มีรายได้สูงสุดและเป็นงานที่มั่นคงและอันดับสองของครอบครัว *(ถ้าบางครอบครัวมีแค่คนเดียวที่สามารถทำงานได้ให้ทำเครื่องหมาย **X** ในช่องที่สองหรือถ้าคนสองไม่มีงานทำหรือตกงานให้เขียนว่าว่างงานในช่องที่สอง)*

	สมาชิก 1	สมาชิก 2
5.1.1 บุคคลสองคนที่อ้างถึงประกอบอาชีพอะไร?		
5.1.2 ใครเป็นนายจ้าง?(ดูรหัสงานข้างล่าง)		
5.1.3 รายได้/เงินเดือนจากการทำงานนี้ประมาณเท่าไร?		
5.1.4 มีสัญญาการจ้างแรงงานหรือไม่? ๑.มี ๒.ไม่มี		
5.1.5 ได้ทำงานนี้ต่อเนื่องมานานกี่ปีแล้ว?		
5.1.6 ได้ทำงานกี่วันในหนึ่งเดือน?		

<u>รหัสสำหรับชนิดของงาน</u>	<u>ชนิดของนายจ้าง</u>
1.แรงงานก่อสร้าง 2.แรงงานไร้ฝีมือในโรงงาน 3.งานสำนักงาน(ผู้ช่วย บัญชี) 4.วิศวกรหรือ เทียบเท่า(ในโรงงานหรือบริษัทฯ) 5.ผู้ชำนาญด้านค้าขาย หรืองานธุรกิจส่วนตัว(งานช่างกล ช่างไฟฟ้า) 6. รักษาความปลอดภัย 7.งานบ้าน 8.ภัตตาคารหรืองานโรงแรม 9.งานทำความสะอาด 10.ธุรกิจค้าปลีก / พนักงานขาย 11.เจ้าของธุรกิจส่วนตัว /ครอบครัว ค้าขายแผงลอยริมถนน 12.เจ้าของธุรกิจส่วนตัว / ครอบครัวจ้างในงานร้านอาหารหรือธุรกิจค้าปลีก 13.ขับรถแท็กซี่ (รถ มอเตอร์ไซค์รับจ้าง) 14.ครู 15.ทหาร / ตำรวจ 16.ไม่มีงานหรืออยู่บ้านเฉยๆ 17.อื่นๆ	1.เจ้าของธุรกิจส่วนตัว หรือ ธุรกิจในครัวเรือน 2.เป็นนายจ้างส่วนตัวนอกเหนือจากครอบครัว **3.**โรงงานหรือพนักงานบริษัทเอกชน **4.**.จ้างโดยหน่วยงานราชการ หรือ หน่วยงานภายใต้การกำกับดูแลของทางราชการ

5.2 สมาชิกในครอบครัวนี้มีการเปลี่ยนงานอาชีพหลักกี่ครั้งตั้งแต่ละทิ้งหมู่บ้านมา? .....

*(ถ้าคำตอบคือ0 ไปต่อที่คำถาม **5.3**)*

5.2.1ทุกครั้งที่เปลี่ยนงาน เขามักจะได้งานที่

1 ดีกว่างานเดิมที่ทำอยู่

2.แย่กว่างานเดิมที่เคยทำ

3.พอๆกับงานเดิมที่เคยทำ

5.3 มีบ่อยครั้งแค่ไหนที่สมาชิกในครอบครัวนี้ตกงานเกินกว่าหนึ่งเดือนในระยะเวลา5ปีที่ผ่านมา?

1.มีสม่ำเสมอ

2.บางครั้ง

3.มีเพียงครั้งเดียว

4.ไม่เคยเลย

5.4 สมาชิกในครอบครัวนี้มีจำนวนเท่าไรที่มีส่วนทำให้ได้รับการคุ้มครองแรงงานตามแผนจาก บริษัทนายจ้าง งานที่ทำ สถานะ ของงาน หรือ จากระบบเอกชนอื่นๆ ?(หมายถึงการคุ้มครองเมื่อมีการเลิกจ้าง) .....

5.5 สมาชิกในครอบครัวนี้มีจำนวนเท่าไรที่มีส่วนได้รับ บำนาญ ตามแผนจาก บริษัทนายจ้าง งานที่ทำ สถานะ ของงาน หรือ จากระบบเอกชนอื่นๆ หรือ ความเกี่ยวพัน ?(หมายถึงหลังการเกษียณ .....

5.6 ไม่ทราบว่าคุณมีประกันสังคมให้หรือไม่? ๑.มีทุกคน ๒.มีเฉพาะบางคน ๓.ไม่มีเลย

5.7 ปัจจุบันครอบครัวนี้เป็นเจ้าของธุรกิจ / ร้านค้า หรือไม่? 1. ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่

(ถ้า ไม่ ไปต่อที่คำถาม **5.8**)

5.7.1 เป็นธุรกิจแบบไหน?

1.ธุรกิจแผงลอยริมถนน

2.ร้านค้า / ร้านอาหาร

3. เจ้าของกิจการขนาดเล็ก ธุรกิจชำนาญการ เฉพาะ (ช่างประปาหรือช่าง ไฟฟ้าช่างซ่อม)

4. เจ้าของกิจการขนาดกลาง หรือ ใหญ่

5.อื่นๆ

5.7.2 ธุรกิจนี้ดำเนินการมาเป็นเวลากี่ปีแล้ว? .....

5.7.3 ความคาดหวังในอนาคตเกี่ยวกับการดำเนินการในธุรกิจนี้ว่า-:

1.ขยายตัว

2.หดตัว

3.คงที่ไม่เปลี่ยนแปลง

5.8 คุณมีแหล่งรายได้นอกเหนือจากเงินเดือนและหรือเงินสดหมุนเวียนในธุรกิจหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่

5.8.1 อะไรคือชนิดของรายได้?

1.ค่าเช่าที่ดินในหมู่บ้าน

2.ค่าเช่าบ้านในเมือง

3.ได้รับเงินจากการใช้หนี้ของของลูกหนี้

4.รายได้จากผลผลิตของพืชผลในที่ดิน

5.อื่นๆ

5.9 รายได้จากเงินเดือนทั้งหมด รายได้จากธุรกิจ และรายได้นอกเหนือจากนี้อื่นๆ คุณคิดว่ารายได้ของครอบครัวในปีนี้เป็นอย่างไร?

(ถ้าผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ไม่สามารถตอบได้เป็นรายปี ถามว่ารายได้ทั้งหมดในรายเดือน)

5.9.1 รายได้ต่อปี	฿
5.9.2 รายได้รายเดือน	฿

(คำถามข้างล่างนี้ใช้สำหรับครอบครัวที่มีการขายที่ดินบางส่วนตั้งแต่ได้ละทิ้งหมู่บ้านมา สำหรับครอบครัวที่ไม่เคยขายที่ดินให้ไปตอนที่ 6)

5.10.1 ในขณะที่คุณขายที่ดิน สมาชิกในครอบครัวคุณมีบางคนตกงานหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ ไม่

5.10.2 เปรียบเทียบกับปัจจุบัน บอกได้ไหมว่าในขณะที่คุณขายที่ดินสถานภาพของคุณเป็น อย่างไร*(อ่านตัวอย่าง)*

ตัวอย่าง

1.แย่กว่าสภาพปัจจุบัน

2.แย่กว่าปัจจุบันเพียงเล็กน้อย

3.เหมือนกับปัจจุบันทุกประการ

4.ดีกว่าปัจจุบันเพียงเล็กน้อย

5. ดีกว่าปัจจุบันมาก

5.10.3 ในตอนที่คุณขายที่ดิน คุณมีธุรกิจอยู่ใช่หรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่

ตอน 6. ฐานะ การออม และกำลังในการกู้ยืม

ต่อไปเรากำลังจะถามคุณเกี่ยวกับครอบครัวคุณ ในเรื่อง ทรัพย์สินและการออมที่คุณมีตอนนี้และในอดีต จำนวนเท่าไร่

รายการ	6.1 ครอบครัวคุณเป็นเจ้าของทรัพย์สินในรายการข้างล่างนี้หรือไม่? ในแต่ละรายการมีจำนวนเท่าไร?	***6.2 (สำหรับครอบครัวที่มีการขายที่ดินก่อนหน้าที่ขายที่ดินเขามีทัพย์สินอยู่แล้วหรือไม่-)โปรดยืนยันจำนวนทรัพย์สินที่เป็นเจ้าของในขณะที่คุณขายที่ดินเป็นครั้งแรก***
1.บ้าน ที่อยู่อาศัยในประจุบันที่นี้		
2.รถยนต์		
3.รถมอเตอร์ไซด์		

6.3 ในห้าปีที่ผ่านมาคุณได้เคยกู้ยืมเงิน หรือ มีปัญหาอื่นๆ ที่ทำให้ครอบครัวคุณต้องลำบากใน การใช้จ่ายอย่างที่เคยทำปกติหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่

6.3.1 ถ้าใช่ มีจำนวนกี่ครั้ง? .....

(คำถามนี้ใช้เฉพาะกับครอบครัวที่มีการขายที่บางส่วน สำหรับครอบครัวที่ไม่เคยขายที่ดินขอให้ไปต่อที่คำถาม6.5)

6.4 ในตอนที่คุณขายที่ดิน คุณเคยมีประสบการณ์ในปัญหาเรื่องเงินทุนในจำนวนเงินเท่ากับปัจจุบันหรือไม่?

1.มากกว่าในปัจจุบัน
2.เท่ากับในปัจจุบัน
3.น้อยกว่าในปัจจุบัน
4.ไม่เคยมีปัญหาเลย

6.5 ครอบครัวนี้สามารถมีเงินออมได้ไหม? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่ 3.มีแต่หนี้สินเท่านั้น**3.**

[ถ้า ไม่ ไปต่อที่คำถาม 6.6] / [If no, go directly to question 6.6]

6.5.1 บ่อยครั้งแค่ไหนที่ครอบครัวนี้สามารถออมเงินได้ **1.** ทุกๆเดือนหรือเกือบทุกเดือน 2.ทุกๆปี 3.น้อยกว่าหนึ่งครั้งในหนึ่งปี

6.5.2 ครอบครัวนี้ออมเงินไว้เพื่อเป้าหมายอะไร? (ให้เหตุผลสำคัญเพียงสองข้อตามตัวอย่าง 1.คำตอบ ..... 2...คำตอบ .....

ตัวอย่าง
1.ในกรณีที่ประสบปัญหา
2.เพื่อการศึกษาของบุตรธิดา
3.เพื่อซื้อที่ดิน / ซื้อบ้าน / รถยนต์
4.เพื่อลงทุนในการทำธุรกิจที่นี่
5.เพื่อใช้จ่ายยามชราภาพ
6.เก็บไว้ให้บุตรยามจากไป
7.ไม่มีเหตุผลที่แน่ชัดจริง
8.อื่นๆ.....

6.5.3 ลองนึกภาพดูว่าถ้าเกิดมีความเสียหายอย่างใหญ่หลวงอันเนื่องมาจากสาเหตุใดก็ตามคุณมีเหลือเพียงเงินที่ออมไว้เพื่อการใช้จ่ายเท่านั้น คุณคิดว่าประมาณกี่เดือน ที่คุณคิดว่าคุณสามารถจะอยู่ได้ก่อนที่เงินที่ออมไว้จะใช้หมด? ..... เดือน

คำถามข้างล่างนี้เกี่ยวข้องกับกำลังในการกู้ยืม

6.6 คุณเคยได้ยืมเงินหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่

6.6.1 คุณเคยคิดที่จะพิจารณาขอยืมจากแหล่งเงินทุนดังกล่าวแต่ตัดสินใจไม่ขอยื่นเรื่องขอกู้หรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่

6.6.2 คุณเคยขอยื่นเรื่องขอกู้เงินจากแหล่งเงินทุนดังกล่าวแต่ถูกปฏิเสธหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่

6.7 ปัจจุบัน คุณมีหนี้สินที่ต้องจ่ายคืน หรือไม่? (ธนาคาร กลุ่มสินเชื่อเอกชน ญาติ ....) 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่

(คำถามต่อไปนี้สำหรับครอบครัวที่ได้ขายที่ดินไปบางส่วน สำหรับครอบครัวที่ไม่เคยขายที่ดิน ไปยังข้อที่ 7)

6.8.1 คุณคิดว่าครอบครัวนี้จะได้รับเงินกู้จากแหล่งเงินทุนต่างๆในจำนวนปริมาณ 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่
เท่ากับในตอนที่ขายที่ดินหรือไม่?

6.8.2 เปรียบเทียบกับปัจจุบัน ตอนคุณขายที่ดินครั้งแรก คุณมีเงินออม

1.มากกว่าปัจจุบันมาก

2.มากกว่าปัจจุบันเล็กน้อย

3.เท่ากับปัจจุบัน

4.น้อยกว่าปัจจุบันเล็กน้อย

5.น้อยกว่าปัจจุบันมาก

6.8.3 คุณมีหนี้สินในตอนที่คุณขายที่ดินหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่

ตอน 7. การบริโภค

เรากำลังจะถามคุณเกี่ยวกับรายจ่ายในการบริโภคของครอบครัวคุณ

7.1 ในหนึ่งเดือน ประมาณได้ไหมว่าครอบครัวนี้มีรายจ่ายจากการบริโภคเท่าไร? (อย่าลืมรวมค่าเช่าบ้าน ค่าอาหาร ค่าเดินทางค่าเล่าเรียน ค่าผ่อนหนี้ ค่าเสื้อผ้า ค่าการ บันเทิงและอื่นๆ) *(ถ้าผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์รู้สึกยุ่งยากในการตอบ คุณสามารถใช้ตารางข้างล่าง ซึ่งได้อธิบายชนิดต่างๆของค่าใช้จ่ายในการบริโภคที่เป็นไปได้)*	**บาท**

(คำถามข้างล่างนี้ใช้กับครอบครัวที่มีการขายที่ดิน สำหรับครอบครัวที่ไม่เคยขายที่ดิน ให้ข้ามไปต่อที่ตอนต่อไป)

7.2 ตั้งแต่คุณได้ขายที่ดินไปแล้วคุณคิดว่ากำลังในการใช้จ่ายของครอบครัวเป็นไปในรูปแบบไหน? 1.ดีขึ้นกว่าเดิม

2.เหมือนเดิม

3.แย่ลงกว่าเดิม

	รายเดือน	(ในกรณีที่รายจ่ายบางอย่างต้องจ่ายให้เป็นปี)
7.1.1 อาหาร / Food		
7.1.2 บุหรี่ / Cigarettes		
7.1.3 การศึกษา ค่าเล่าเรียน หนังสือ / Education, school fees, books…		
7.1.4 ค่าพาหนะและน้ำมัน / Transport and gasoline		
7.1.5 ค่าความบันเทิง (ออกไปเที่ยว ซื้อหนังสือ)Leisure (going out, buying books …)		
7.1.6ค่าเช่าบ้านและค่าไฟ / House rent and electricity		
7.1.7 ผ่อนชำระหนี้ / Debt repayment		
7.1.8 สาธารณสุข (ค่ายา) / Health		
7.1.9 ค่าเสื้อผ้า / Clothing		
7.1.10 บ้าน / รถยนต์ / จักรยานยนต์ซ่อมบำรุง / House/Car/Motorbike Repair		
7.1.11 อื่นๆ..... / Other		

ตอน 8 ญาติในท้องถิ่นที่อยู่ และเพื่อนบ้าน

ต่อไปเรากำลังจะถามคุณเกี่ยวกับญาติ และเพื่อน ที่คุณมีอยู่ที่นี่ในกรุงเทพฯ

8.1 คุณมีญาติหรือเพื่อนบ้างหรือไม่ที่อาศัยอยู่ในกรุงเทพฯ? ที่พออาศัยพึ่งพาได้ 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่

8.2 ถ้าใช่ มีอยู่กี่ครอบครัว? .....

8.3 มีญาติหรือเพื่อนจำนวนเท่าไรที่อยู่ในกรุงเทพที่คิดว่ามีฐานะจนกว่าคุณ? .....

8.4 มีญาติหรือเพื่อนจำนวนเท่าไรที่อยู่ในกรุงเทพที่คิดว่ามีฐานะรวยกว่าคุณ? .....

8.5 มีญาติหรือเพื่อนจำนวนเท่าไรที่อยู่ในกรุงเทพที่คิดว่ามีฐานะพอๆกับคุณ? .....

8.6 ญาติหรือเพื่อนที่อยู่ในกรุงเทพฯได้เคยขอยืมเงินจากคุณบ้างหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่

8.7 คุณได้เคยขอยืมเงินจากญาติหรือเพื่อนที่อยู่ในกรุงเทพฯบ้างหรือไม่? 1.ใช่ 2.ไม่ใช่

8.8 ลองนึกภาพดูว่าในอนาคตคุณประสบปัญหาบางประการและคุณจำเป็นต้องขอยืมเงินจากญาติหรือเพื่อนทุกคนที่อยู่ในกรุงเทพฯ คุณคิดว่าสามารถจะระดมเงินยืมได้ทั้งหมดเท่าไร? .....

ตอน 9 สถานะภาพของสมมุติฐานทางทฤษฎี

เราใคร่ขอถามคุณ เกี่ยวกับสถานะภาพของสมมุติฐานทางทฤษฎีสองข้อ โปรดตอบโดยคิดว่าเป็นสถานการณ์ที่เกิดขึ้นกับคุณจริง

ลองจำลองภาพว่าขณะนี้คุณมีเงินออมอยู่ในธนาคาร 60,000 บาท เงินจำนวนนี้มีให้คุณใช้ได้เพียงภายในสิบปี ในระหว่างสิบปีนี้ คุณมีทางเลือกเพียงสองหนทางที่จะเลือกใช้เงินจำนวนนี้อย่างไร

ทางเลือกที่ 1 : คุณเก็บเงิน จำนวน 60,000 บาทนี้ไว้ในบัญชีเงินฝากที่ปลอดภัย โดยคุณจะไม่ได้รับอัตราดอกเบี้ยใดๆ และในสิบปีให้หลังคุณจะได้รับคืน ในจำนวนเท่าเดิม คือ 60,000บาท ไม่มากหรือน้อยกว่าเดิม

ทางเลือกที่ 2 : คุณเลือกที่จะใช้วิธีเสี่ยงเล่นพนันเกมกับธนาคารแบบ ได้ / เสีย โดยมีโอกาสในการที่จะได้หรือเสียแบบ 50 / 50 ถ้าคุณชนะภายในสิบปี คุณจะได้รับสามเท่าของจำนวนเงินต้น คือได้รับ 180,000 บาท แต่ถ้าหากคุณเสีย ก็จะเสียแค่ 50,000 บาท ภายหลังจากนั้นสิบปีคุณจะได้รับคืนแค่ 10 000 บาท

9.1 ในจำนวนสองทางเลือกคุณจะเลือกแบบไหน?

1. ทางเลือกแบบที่ 1
2. ทางเลือกแบบที่ 2