Auteur / Autrice : | Aurélien Létocart |
Direction : | Jacqueline Flauss-Diem |
Type : | Thèse de doctorat |
Discipline(s) : | Droit privé |
Date : | Soutenance en 2011 |
Etablissement(s) : | Amiens |
Mots clés
Résumé
A risk management contract may be either offensive and défensive. In the first case, it is to prevent the realization of the risk. This can be achieved by forcing the fails contractor to perform his obligation; the penalty clause in that respect is an intrumentof the highest order. It can also be reached by the paralysis of the adverse effects of the breach, then we can talk about suspension of the contract. Above all, the defensive risk management is illustrated for those outsider the shere of contract, the modification of the contract, usually at the initiative of the parties. The phenomenon of inaccuraciesis in offering the best illustration. Managing risks is essentially offensive to charge the expense thereof on the party. Regarding external risks, force major is in an eloquent example of risk transfer. For internai risks, freedom of contract plays a vital role and can lead to management profitable for either party