Les fichiers mentaux en tant que base pour l'individuation et l'établissement de référence des groupes non-arbitraires

par Shimon Mercer-Wood

Projet de thèse en Philosophie

Sous la direction de François Récanati.

Thèses en préparation à Paris Sciences et Lettres , dans le cadre de Ecole transdisciplinaire Lettres - Sciences , en partenariat avec INSTITUT JEAN NICOD (laboratoire) et de Ecole normale supérieure (établissement de préparation de la thèse) depuis le 01-09-2017 .


  • Résumé

    Les fichiers mentaux en tant que principe pour l'individuation et l'établissement de référence des groupes non-arbitraires. Le cadre conceptuel des « fichiers mentaux » figure dans une des questions clés de la philosophie analytique, à savoir, le débat entre le descriptivisme et le singularisme. Abordé dans les années 60 (GRICE 1969), et suivi corollairement par la linguistique (Kartunnen 1976) et les sciences cognitives (Kahneman, Ttreisman et Gibbs 1992), ce cadre propose une interprétation alternative de la référence singulière, tout en évitant les hypothèses discutables du descriptivisme. Cette démarche porte sur des préoccupations classiques de la philosophie du langage, tel que les erreurs d'identité dans lesquelles des termes coréférentiels sont impliqués (par exemple, le fameux cas de Hespserous et Phosphorous soulevé par Frege). Les fichiers mentaux sont postulés comme un mode de représentation repose sur des «relations de connaissance» plutôt que sur la satisfaction de descriptions définies, ce qui nous permet d'avoir une sémantique à deux niveaux (semblable à la distinction sens/référence de Frege), sans adopter les principes du descriptivisme, qui sont largement remis en cause par la « nouvelle théorie de la référence » prônée par Saul Kripke, Hillary Putnam etc. depuis les années 70. Plus récemment, ce cadre conceptuel a gagné de l'importance sous la forme développée par Recanati, qui propose un modèle indexical pour l'établissement relationnel de la référence. Le « principe actif » de ce modèle est celui des « relations épistémiquement fructueuses », par lesquelles un objet peut être « donné » à la connaissance d'un sujet, au lieu d'être « décrit » au sujet en termes de ses traits. Selon cette interprétation, les traits présupposés s'appliquant à cet objet, ne participent pas forcément au fichier mental qui y fait référence. Ainsi, dans le cas de coréférence, on peut concevoir deux fichiers mentaux distincts, qui servent de deux modes de représentation du même objet, ce qui expliquent le conflit potentiel entre deux attitudes propositionnelles par rapport à un seul objet, les deux tenues par un sujet rationnel. Crucialement, cela ne nous oblige pas à croire que les deux modes de représentation consistent en deux descriptions différentes de l'objet (Recanati 2012). La classe d'objet dont il s'agit le plus souvent au fil du débat « descriptivisme/singularisme » est bien celle d'objets uniques dotés d'une contiguïté spatio-temporelle (Mont Blanc, Venus, Cicero, etc.). La recherche projetée examinerait la mesure dans laquelle on peut appliquer le concept de « relations épistémiquement fructueuse » comme principe d'individuation et d'établissement de référence par rapport aux groupes non-arbitraires, en tant qu'objets qui ne sont pas spatio-temporellement contigus. « Groupes non-arbitraires » dans ce sens peut comprendre, par exemple, des espèces naturelles (comme l'or, l'eau, les chats etc.) mais aussi des espèces technologiques (les fours, les stylos, les voitures), comme d'autres groupes artificiels. Cependant, l'étude ne soulèvera pas, à priori, la question de l'applicabilité de ce principe par rapport aux objets sans aucune extension spatio-temporelle, qui semble entraîner un ensemble distinct de problèmes philosophiques. Le statut de tels groupes non-arbitraire comme des objets fait le sujet de plusieurs débats métaphysiques. Toutefois, dans la littérature de la philosophie du langage et de la philosophie de la science, on voit une tendance à prendre des groupes de la sorte pour des objets uniques et singuliers, donc, pour des objets sur lesquelles des pensées particulières peuvent se former. C'est ainsi que Saul Kripke soutenait que la référence par rapport aux espèce naturelles fonctionne de la même manière que celle des noms propres. Ce propos suggérerait qu'il existe dans le monde un objet unique et distinct nommé « l'eau » de la même manière qu'il en existe un nommé « Thomas Jefferson » (Kripke 1980). Semblablement, W.V Quine a insisté que « toute somme dont les parties sont de l'eau, est elle-même de l'eau » (Quine 1980). Tout cela est l'expression, peut-être, d'une intuition selon laquelle chaque groupe non-arbitraire constitue un objet distinct, unique et précis, qui peut faire le sujet de pensées singulières, d'une façon que les sommes méreologiques (par exemple, la somme dont les parties sont un chat à Madrid, une chandelle à Paris et une clé au Caire) ne le peuvent pas. La recherche projetée ne contestera pas le statut des groupes arbitraires comme des objets sur lesquelles des pensées particulières peuvent se former. Pourtant il sera argumenté que ce propos était entretenu jusqu'à ce jour en faisant appel aux traits essentiels (tel comme la structure moléculaire H20 dans le cas de l'eau ou le numéro atomique 79 dans le cas de l'or) comme principe d'individuation et d'établissement de référence (Kripke 1980). S'il en est ainsi, il se trouvera que même les grands défenseurs du non-descriptivisme soutenaient en effet des postulats crypto-descriptivistes, au moins par rapport aux espèces naturelles. La recherche projetée examinerait donc si les « relations épistémiquement fructueuses» peuvent nous offrir une alternative véritablement non-descriptiviste aux traits essentielles comme principe d'individuation et d'établissement de référence par rapport aux groupes non-arbitraires, en tant qu'objets uniques et distincts. Au cours de cet étude, certaines problématiques seront adressées. Notamment, une distinction soutenable sera établie entre individuation en tant qu'« objet immédiat et spécifique » (désignation plus rigoureuse à développer), par exemple « ceci est Rosinante», et individuation en tant que membre de groupe (peut-être individuation sortale), à savoir « ceci est un cheval ». Alors, dans le cas classique de « c'est un oiseau, c'est un avion, c'est Superman », il semblerait qu'il existe un niveau de référence sur lequel l'individuation, pour ainsi dire – le sujet du « c'est » – reste constant à travers les trois identifications successives, tandis que sur un autre niveau de référence, l'objet est individué de nouveau à chaque nouvelle identification (car si « c'est » un avion, c'est n'est pas un oiseau, et si « c'est » Superman, ce n'est pas un avion). À priori, notre recherche apportera une contribution conséquente si elle prouve que c'est à ce deuxième niveau de référence que l'individuation peut se-faire d'une manière relationnelle. Tel démonstration renforcerait la valeur théorique du cadre conceptuel des « fichiers mentaux » en étendant son applicabilité et sa puissance explicative. Qui plus est, l'étude aurait mis au grand jour des distinctions significatives issues des différences entre l'individuation des objets individus et l'individuation des groupes – différences largement négligées jusqu'ici. Ces distinctions pourraient éventuellement porter sur d'autres problématiques philosophiques importantes liées à la question du « groupe en tant qu'objet », tels que la relation entre identité numérique (comme dans la phrase « Ce sont deux noms pour le même objet ») et identité sortale (comme dans la phrase « les deux béchers contiennent le même liquide »). Bibliographie provisoire Azzouni, J. (2011) Singular Thoughts (Objects-Directed Thoughts). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 85 : 45-61. Baxter, D., (1988), “Many-One Identity,” Philosophical Papers, 17(3): 193–216. Barcan, Ruth C. (1947). ‘The identity of individuals in a strict functional calculus of second order'. Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):. Beebee, Helen & Sabbarton-Leary, Nigel (eds.) (2010). The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge. Bealer, G., 1975, “Predication and Matter,” Synthese, 31(3–4): 493–508.. Burge, T., 1975, “Mass Terms, Count Nouns, and Change,” Synthese, 31(3–4): 459–478. –––, 1977, “A Theory of Aggregates,” Nous, 11(2): 97–117. Burke, M., 1992, “Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account,” Analysis, 52(1): 12–17. Campbell, J. (2006) Sortals and the Binding Problem. In F. McBride (ed) Identity and Modality, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 203-18 Chisholm, R., 1973, “Parts as Essential to Their Wholes,” Review of Metaphysics, 26(4): 581–603. –––, 1975, “Mereological Essentialism: Some Further Considerations,” Review of Metaphysics, 28(3): 477–484. Dasgupta, S., 2009, “Individuals: an essay in revisionary metaphysics,” Philosophical Studies, 145(1): 35–67. Devitt, M. (1989) Against Direct Reference. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 : 206-40. Denkel, A., 1989, “Matter and Objecthood,” Dialogue, 28(1): 3–16. Donnellan, K. (1966) Reference and Definite Descriptions. Reprinted in S. Schwartz (ed.) Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, pp. 42-65. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1977. Donnellan, K. (1970) Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions. Synthese 21 : 335-58. Evans, G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference (edited by J. McDowell). Oxford : Clarendon Press. Dummett, M., 1981, Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ellis, B., 2001. Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. Fine, K., 1994, “Compounds and Aggregates,” Nous 28(2): 137–158. –––, 1999, “Things and Their Parts,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23(1): 61–74. –––, 2003, “The Non-Identity of A Material Thing and Its Matter,” Mind, 112(446): 195–234. Geach, P. (1962) Reference and Generality. Ithaca : Cornell University Presss. Goodsell, T. (2011) Mental File Explanations. Ms. Hacking, Ian (2007c), 'Putnam's theory of natural kinds and their names is not the same as Kripke's', Principia 11(1), 1–24 Hirsch, E., 1971, “Essence and Identity,” in Identity and Individuation, M.K. Munitz (ed.), New York: New York University Press. Kripke, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity. Oxford : Blackwell. Loar, B. (1976) The Semantics of Singular Terms. Philosophical Studies 30: 353-77. Lowe, J. (2007) Sortals and the Individuation of Objects. Mind and Language 22 : 514-33. McDowell, J. (1977) On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name. Mind 86: 159-85. Murez, M. (2011) Mental Files and the Dynamics of Identity. Peacocke, C. (1975) Proper Names, Reference, and Rigid Designation. In S. Blackburn (ed.) Perini-Santos, E. (2006) Perceptual Modes of Presentation and the Communication of De Re Thoughts. Facta Philosophica 8 : 23-40. Prior, A. (1959) Identifiable Individuals. Review of Metaphysics 12 : 521-39. Reprinted in his Putnam, H. (1975) The Meaning of Meaning. In his Philosophical Papers 2 : Mind, Language and Reality, pp. 215-71. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Pylyshyn, Z. (2003) Seeing and Visualising. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press/Bradford Books. Recanati, François, 2012. _Mental Files_. Oxford University Press. Recanati, F. (1993) Direct Reference : From Language to Thought. Oxford : Blackwell. Recanati, F. (1996) Domains of Discourse. Linguistics and Philosophy 19 : 445-75. Recanati, F. (2004) Literal Meaning. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Recanati, F. (2010a) Singular Thought : In Defence of Acquaintance. In R. Jeshion (ed.) New Essays on Singular Thought, pp. 141-89. Oxford : Clarendon Press. Recanati, F. (2011) Mental Files and Identity. In A. Reboul (ed.) Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Electronic publication, University of Geneva, Philosophy Department (http://www.philosophie.ch/kevin/festschrift/). Recanati, F. (2012a) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification : What It Is and Where It Comes From. In S. Prosser & F. Recanati (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification : New Essays, pp. 180-201. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Recanati, F. (2012b) Empty Singular Terms in the Mental-File Framework. In M. GarciaCarpintero & G. Martì (eds.) Thinking and Speaking about Nothing, pp. 00-00. Oxford : Roca-Royes, Sonia (2011). ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.' Philosophy Compass 6 (1): Russell B. (1910-11) Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 : 108-28. Sainsbury, M. (2002) Departing from Frege. London : Routledge. Sainsbury, M. (2005) Reference Without Referents. Oxford : Clarendon Press. Salmon, N. (1986) Frege's Puzzle. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press/Bradford Books. Salmon, Nathan U. (2005). Reference and Essence. Prometheus Books Schiffer, S. (1981) Indexicals and the Theory of Reference. Synthese 49: 43-100. Schiffer, S. (1995) Review of Direct Reference. Linguistics and Philosophy 19 : 91-102. Schroeter, L. (2008) Why Be an Anti-Individualist ? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 : 105-141. Strawson, P. (1997) Entity and Identity. Oxford : Clarendon Press. Sharby, Richard (1968) Why a Class can't Change its Members Noûs Vol. 2, No. 4 Sidelle, Alan (1989). Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. Cornell University Press Strawson, P.F., 1959, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York: J.W. Arrowsmith. –––, 1970, “Particular and General,” reprinted in Universals and Particulars: readings in ontology, Loux, M.J., (ed.), New York: Doubleday. Tahko, Tuomas E. (2015). Natural Kind Essentialism Revisited. Mind 124 (495): Treisman A. (1992) L'Attention, les traits, et la perception des objets. In D. Andler (ed.), Introduction aux Sciences Cognitives, pp. 153-91. Paris: Gallimard. Treisman, A. & Schmidt, H. (1982) Illusory Conjunctions in the Perception of Objects. Cognitive Psychology 14 : 107-42.

  • Titre traduit

    Can Epistemically Rewarding Relations serve as a basis for individuation of and reference to non-arbitrary groups?


  • Résumé

    Can Epistemically Rewarding Relations serve as a basis for individuation of and reference to non-arbitrary groups? The conceptual framework of mental files figures in on one of the key debates of analytic philosophy – the question of descriptivism versus singularism. First introduced in Philosophy in the 1960s (Grice 1969), followed by corollaries in linguistics (Kartunnen 1976) and cognitive studies (Kahneman, Ttreisman and Gibbs 1992), the framework seeks provide an alternative to the descripitivist account of singular reference . This bears on some of the classic concerns of the philosophy of language such as identity mistakes involving co-referential terms (e.g. the renowned Hesperus and Phosphorus problem first introduced by Frege). Mental files are postulated as a mode of representation based on relations of acquaintance rather than on the satisfaction of descriptions, allowing for a two-level semantics (akin to Frege's sense/reference distinction) which avoids the pitfalls of descriptivism, an approach widely discredited by the ‘New Theory of Reference' elaborated by Kripke, Putnam and Marcus since the 1970s. More recently, the framework gained prominence in the form developed by Recanati, who posits an indexical model for relational determination of reference. The ‘active ingredient' of this model is “Epistemically Rewarding Relations” whereby an object is ‘given' to the acquaintance of a subject, rather than being ‘presented' to the subject through in terms of its properties. Crucially, on this account, the properties presumed to be true of the object, are not necessarily part of the mental file. Thus, in the case of coreference, one can conceive of two distinct mental files, serving as distinct modes of representation of the same object, without being committed to those modes of representation consisting of different description of the same object (Recanati 2012). The class of objects most commonly discussed in the literature of the descriptivism/singularism debate is that of individual spatio-temporally contiguous unique objects (Mont Blanc, Venus, Clark Kent, Cicero, Bernard J Ortcutt etc.). The proposed research will examine the applicability of ER to groups, qua non spatio-temporally contiguous objects, such as natural kinds, e.g. water, gold, swans, birch trees etc., possibly extending the discussion to artificial groups such as economic kinds, e.g. currencies, and technological kinds, e.g. cars, pens, ovens, (but will in any case be limited to groups, members of which have spatio-temporal extension, excluding mathematical groups, logical groups etc). The status of such groups as objects is subject to various debates in metaphysics, but at least in the context of the relevant literature in Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of Science, there seems to be a tendency to treat such groups (at least as regards natural kinds) as unique individual objects, and thus subject to individual thoughts and reference albeit objects which are not spatio-temporally contiguous. Thus, Kripke argued that reference to natural kinds functions in the same way as do proper names, suggesting there is in the world a unique object ‘water' in the same way as there is in the world a unique object ‘Thomas Jefferson' (Kripke 1980). In a similar vein, Quine held that “any sum of parts which are water is water” (Quine 1960). This might represent the intuition that these groups constitute discrete singular objects about which singular thoughts can be formed, in some meaningful way that arbitrary mereological sums (say, the sum of a light-post in Paris, a door-knob in London and a cat in Cairo) do not. The proposed research will seek to maintain the position that non-arbitrary groups are objects about which singular thoughts can be formed, but will argue that this position has thus far been maintained in the literature by appealing to essential properties (such as the molecular structure H20 in the case of water or the atomic number 79 in the case of gold) as an individuating as well as reference-fixing principle (Kripke 1980). If this is true, it will emerge that even the historical champions of non-descriptivism in fact maintain crypto-descriptivist premises, at least with regard to non-arbitrary groups. The proposed research will therefore examine whether ER can provide a genuine non-descriptivist alternative to essential properties as a principle of individuation and reference fixing for non-arbitrary groups, qua singular objects that lack spatio-temporal contiguity. While the main thrust of the proposed research is in the field of Philosophy of Language rather than metaphysics and will therefore not include a comprehensive and substantive justification of the view that non-arbitrary groups are to be seen as singular objects. However, a brief survey of competing views with regards to groups will be provided as well as an explication of some key consequences of this view. In the course of this study, a number of pertinent problematic issues will have to be addressed. Notably, a tenable distinction will have to be elaborated between individuation or reference qua ‘specific immediate object' (pending a more rigorous designation), e.g. “this is Rosinante”, and individuation or reference qua member of a group (possibly sortal individuation), e.g. “this is a horse”. For instance, in the classic example of “it's a bird, it's a plane, its Superman”, there seems to be one level of reference at which the individuation – as it were, the sense of “it” – remains constant throughout all of the three successive identifications (we are still speaking of the same “it” whatever it may be), and another level of reference at which the object is re-individuated with each distinct identification (if “it” is a plane, it is not a bird, and if “it” is superman, it is not a plane). Prima facie, the research project will have made a substantive contribution if it can be shown that this second level of individuation and reference can be established to be relational. This would reinforce the theoretical value of the Mental Files framework by extending its applicability and explanatory power. Moreover, the research will have highlighted significant distinctions stemming from the distinction between individuation and reference to individual objects and groups, which seem to have been largely overlooked thus far. Such a clarification could potentially be brought to bear on additional significant issues related to groups-as-objects, such as the relation between numerical identity (as in, “these are two names for the same object”) and sameness of kind (as in “the same liquid was introduced into the two test-tubes” or “the two products were paid for with the same currency”). Finally, identifying and explaining possible exceptions to the hypothesized relational nature of singular thoughts and singular reference, may meaningful in the context of response to various criticisms posed to the mental files framework. Thus, the following provisional structure can be projected for the research: Provisional Bibliography Azzouni, J. (2011) Singular Thoughts (Objects-Directed Thoughts). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 85 : 45-61. Baxter, D., 1988, “Many-One Identity,” Philosophical Papers, 17(3): 193–216. Barcan, Ruth C. (1947). ‘The identity of individuals in a strict functional calculus of second order'. Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):. Beebee, Helen & Sabbarton-Leary, Nigel (eds.) (2010). The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge. Bealer, G., 1975, “Predication and Matter,” Synthese, 31(3–4): 493–508.. Burge, T., 1975, “Mass Terms, Count Nouns, and Change,” Synthese, 31(3–4): 459–478. –––, 1977, “A Theory of Aggregates,” Nous, 11(2): 97–117. Burke, M., 1992, “Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account,” Analysis, 52(1): 12–17. Campbell, J. (2006) Sortals and the Binding Problem. In F. McBride (ed) Identity and Modality, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 203-18 Chisholm, R., 1973, “Parts as Essential to Their Wholes,” Review of Metaphysics, 26(4): 581–603. –––, 1975, “Mereological Essentialism: Some Further Considerations,” Review of Metaphysics, 28(3): 477–484. Dasgupta, S., 2009, “Individuals: an essay in revisionary metaphysics,” Philosophical Studies, 145(1): 35–67. Denkel, A., 1989, “Matter and Objecthood,” Dialogue, 28(1): 3–16. Devitt, M. (1989) Against Direct Reference. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 : 206-40. Donnellan, K. (1966) Reference and Definite Descriptions. Reprinted in S. Schwartz (ed.) Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, pp. 42-65. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1977. Donnellan, K. (1970) Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions. Synthese 21 : 335-58. Evans, G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference (edited by J. McDowell). Oxford : Clarendon Press. Dummett, M., 1981, Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd edn., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ellis, B., 2001. Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. Fine, K., 1994, “Compounds and Aggregates,” Nous 28(2): 137–158. –––, 1999, “Things and Their Parts,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23(1): 61–74. –––, 2003, “The Non-Identity of A Material Thing and Its Matter,” Mind, 112(446): 195–234. Geach, P. (1962) Reference and Generality. Ithaca : Cornell University Presss. Goodsell, T. (2011) Mental File Explanations. Ms. Hacking, Ian (2007c), 'Putnam's theory of natural kinds and their names is not the same as Kripke's', Principia 11(1), 1–24 Hirsch, E., 1971, “Essence and Identity,” in Identity and Individuation, M.K. Munitz (ed.), New York: New York University Press. Kripke, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity. Oxford : Blackwell. Loar, B. (1976) The Semantics of Singular Terms. Philosophical Studies 30: 353-77. Lowe, J. (2007) Sortals and the Individuation of Objects. Mind and Language 22 : 514-33. McDowell, J. (1977) On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name. Mind 86: 159-85. Murez, M. (2011) Mental Files and the Dynamics of Identity. Peacocke, C. (1975) Proper Names, Reference, and Rigid Designation. In S. Blackburn (ed.) Perini-Santos, E. (2006) Perceptual Modes of Presentation and the Communication of De Re Thoughts. Facta Philosophica 8 : 23-40. Prior, A. (1959) Identifiable Individuals. Review of Metaphysics 12 : 521-39. Reprinted in his Putnam, H. (1975) The Meaning of Meaning. In his Philosophical Papers 2 : Mind, Language and Reality, pp. 215-71. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Pylyshyn, Z. (2003) Seeing and Visualising. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press/Bradford Books. Recanati, François, 2012. _Mental Files_. Oxford University Press. Recanati, F. (1993) Direct Reference : From Language to Thought. Oxford : Blackwell. Recanati, F. (1996) Domains of Discourse. Linguistics and Philosophy 19 : 445-75. Recanati, F. (2004) Literal Meaning. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Recanati, F. (2010a) Singular Thought : In Defence of Acquaintance. In R. Jeshion (ed.) New Essays on Singular Thought, pp. 141-89. Oxford : Clarendon Press. Recanati, F. (2011) Mental Files and Identity. In A. Reboul (ed.) Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Electronic publication, University of Geneva, Philosophy Department (http://www.philosophie.ch/kevin/festschrift/). Recanati, F. (2012a) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification : What It Is and Where It Comes From. In S. Prosser & F. Recanati (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification : New Essays, pp. 180-201. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Recanati, F. (2012b) Empty Singular Terms in the Mental-File Framework. In M. GarciaCarpintero & G. Martì (eds.) Thinking and Speaking about Nothing, pp. 00-00. Oxford : Roca-Royes, Sonia (2011). ‘Essential Properties and Individual Essences.' Philosophy Compass 6 (1): Russell B. (1910-11) Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 : 108-28. Sainsbury, M. (2002) Departing from Frege. London : Routledge. Sainsbury, M. (2005) Reference Without Referents. Oxford : Clarendon Press. Salmon, N. (1986) Frege's Puzzle. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press/Bradford Books. Salmon, Nathan U. (2005). Reference and Essence. Prometheus Books Schiffer, S. (1981) Indexicals and the Theory of Reference. Synthese 49: 43-100. Schiffer, S. (1995) Review of Direct Reference. Linguistics and Philosophy 19 : 91-102. Schroeter, L. (2008) Why Be an Anti-Individualist ? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 : 105-141. Strawson, P. (1997) Entity and Identity. Oxford : Clarendon Press. Sharby, Richard (1968) Why a Class can't Change its Members Noûs Vol. 2, No. 4 Sidelle, Alan (1989). Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. Cornell University Press Strawson, P.F., 1959, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, New York: J.W. Arrowsmith. –––, 1970, “Particular and General,” reprinted in Universals and Particulars: readings in ontology, Loux, M.J., (ed.), New York: Doubleday. Tahko, Tuomas E. (2015). Natural Kind Essentialism Revisited. Mind 124 (495): Treisman A. (1992) L'Attention, les traits, et la perception des objets. In D. Andler (ed.), Introduction aux Sciences Cognitives, pp. 153-91. Paris: Gallimard. Treisman, A. & Schmidt, H. (1982) Illusory Conjunctions in the Perception of Objects. Cognitive Psychology 14 : 107-42.