L'intuition en tant que sentiment meta-cognitif: vers une théorie pragmatique de l'intuition

par Wjatscheslaw Loev

Projet de thèse en Sciences cognitives, neurosciences, psychologie

Sous la direction de Elisabeth Pacherie et de Jérôme Dokic.

Thèses en préparation à Paris Sciences et Lettres , dans le cadre de École doctorale École transdisciplinaire Lettres/Sciences (Paris) , en partenariat avec Institut Jean-Nicod (Paris) (laboratoire) et de École normale supérieure (Paris ; 1985-....) (établissement de préparation de la thèse) depuis le 01-09-2016 .


  • Résumé

    Intuition plays a key role in everyday life and shapes philosophical work at several stages. Accordingly, it has become a focus of empirically informed philosophical debate. But its nature remains elusive. E.g., in philosophy intuitions are made sense of either in terms of beliefs or perceptions. Crucially, philosophy focuses on the ‘surface of intuition'. Empirical work, in contrast, is mostly concerned with unconscious automatic processes generating ‘intuitive' judgements. Now, an aspect of intuition paramount to our everyday understanding of intuition but only recently considered by intuition research can relate the divergent work and establish a broader picture: intuitions understood as meta-cognitive feelings like the feeling of knowing or the feeling of rightness. By connecting intuitions to the philosophical and empirical literature on meta-cognitive feelings one can address critical blind spots within current philosophical and psychological theories, substantiate as yet under-determined accounts and strengthen cross-disciplinary links between philosophy, psychology and neuroscience. My project aims to develop an account of intuitions as a subset of meta-cognitive feelings that will make this possible. In order to do so I will adress the following questions: 1. Can intuitions be related to feelings? 2. If intuitions can be related to feelings, what are feelings? 3. If we have an idea of what feelings are, what kind of feelings are intuitions? I tackle these research questions by 1) reviewing and extracting the common ground in existing accounts of intuition in philosophy of mind, cognitive and social psychologie, and neuroscience; 2) laying out a theory of feelings based on recent action-oriented approaches that conceive feelings as bodily expressed evaluations of the relation between an agent and the opportunities perceived in her immediate environment (affordances), suggesting a specific way of acting about them; 3) locating in the broad class of feelings candidate feelings that are plausibly called intuitions by turning to meta-cognitive feelings and mental agency; 4) situating the understanding of intuitions as (a subset of) meta-cognitive feelings in relation to leading theories of intuition and presenting the advantages of the newly developed account.

  • Titre traduit

    Intuition experiences as meta-cognitive feelings: a pragmatic theory of intuition


  • Résumé

    Intuition plays a key role in everyday life and shapes philosophical work at several stages. Accordingly, it has become a focus of empirically informed philosophical debate. But its nature remains elusive. E.g., in philosophy intuitions are made sense of either in terms of beliefs or perceptions. Crucially, philosophy focuses on the ‘surface of intuition'. Empirical work, in contrast, is mostly concerned with unconscious automatic processes generating ‘intuitive' judgements. Now, an aspect of intuition paramount to our everyday understanding of intuition but only recently considered by intuition research can relate the divergent work and establish a broader picture: intuitions understood as meta-cognitive feelings like the feeling of knowing or the feeling of rightness. By connecting intuitions to the philosophical and empirical literature on meta-cognitive feelings one can address critical blind spots within current philosophical and psychological theories, substantiate as yet under-determined accounts and strengthen cross-disciplinary links between philosophy, psychology and neuroscience. My project aims to develop an account of intuitions as a subset of meta-cognitive feelings that will make this possible. In order to do so I will adress the following questions: 1. Can intuitions be related to feelings? 2. If intuitions can be related to feelings, what are feelings? 3. If we have an idea of what feelings are, what kind of feelings are intuitions? I tackle these research questions by 1) reviewing and extracting the common ground in existing accounts of intuition in philosophy of mind, cognitive and social psychologie, and neuroscience; 2) laying out a theory of feelings based on recent action-oriented approaches that conceive feelings as bodily expressed evaluations of the relation between an agent and the opportunities perceived in her immediate environment (affordances), suggesting a specific way of acting about them; 3) locating in the broad class of feelings candidate feelings that are plausibly called intuitions by turning to meta-cognitive feelings and mental agency; 4) situating the understanding of intuitions as (a subset of) meta-cognitive feelings in relation to leading theories of intuition and presenting the advantages of the newly developed account.