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Civil Society and State-Building in Palestine: Past Trends, Current Dilemmas, and Future Challenges Faced by NGOs

♦

La société civile et la construction de l'Etat en Palestine : Tendances passées, dilemmes actuels et défis posés aux ONG

THESE

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED

CESR: Center for Economic and Social Rights, New York

CS: Civil Society

CSO: Civil Society Organization

DFID: British Department for International Development

DOP: Declaration of Principles

EC: European Commission

EMHRN: Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network

EU: European Union

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GNP: Gross National Product

HAMAS: Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine

HDIP: Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute

HRW: Human Rights Watch

ILO: International Labor Organization

INGO: International Nongovernmental Organization

Intifada: Palestinian Uprising Against the Israeli Occupation

JICA: Japan International Cooperation Agency

KFW: Development Bank of the Federal Republic and Federal States (*Entwicklungsbank)*

MONGOA: Ministry of Nongovernmental Organizations Affairs or Commission

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

NNGO: Northern Non-Governmental Organization

PARC: Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees

PCHR: Palestinian Center for Human Rights

PCS: Palestinian Civil Society

PCSC: Palestinian Commercial Service Company

PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PHDR: Palestinian Human Development Report

PLC: Palestinian Legislative Council

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization

PNA: Palestinian National Authority

PNC: Palestinian National Council

PNGO: Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization

POTs: Palestinian Occupied Territories

PVOs: Private Voluntary Organizations

SNGO: Southern Non-Governmental Organization

UAWC: Union of Agricultural Work Committees

UHWC: Union of Health Work Committees

UN: United Nations

UNLP: Unified National Leadership of Uprising

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees

UNSCO: United Nations Special Coordinator in the POTs

UPMRC: Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committee

USA: United States of America

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

WBGS: West Bank and Gaza Strip

WB: World Bank

RÉSUMÉ DE LA THÈSE

La Palestine est une région située à l'ouest de la rivière Jordanie et s'étendant jusqu'à la Méditerranée, et du sud de l'Egypte jusqu'au Liban. Comme l'évoquaient déjà les anciens Grecs dans leurs écrits, la Palestine faisait partie de l'Empire romain. Elle a été une région distincte pendant des siècles et, était, en particulier, une province séparée des autres provinces syriennes au 10ème siècle, tout en étant la plus fertile de celles-ci. Vers la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale, la Grande-Bretagne occupa la Palestine. Le 29 novembre 1947, l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies approuva une résolution qui en vint à être connue sous le nom de « Plan de partition ». Ce plan instaurait un Etat juif indépendant au prix d'une division de la Palestine en deux Etats séparés. De 1948 à 1949, l'armée israélienne occupa une partie plus large de la Palestine que celle qui lui avait été allouée. Au lendemain du conflit militaire qui s'ensuivit, la bande de Gaza passa sous contrôle égyptien et la Cisjordanie sous contrôle jordanien.

Pendant la guerre de juin 1967, Israël occupa la Cisjordanie, la bande de Gaza et certaines parties des pays arabes. L'Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) et Israël signèrent une Déclaration de principes (DP) le 13 septembre 1993. La DP n'était pas un accord de paix, mais un simple cadre pour faciliter les accords négociés dans le futur. Aux alentours de mai 1994, le retrait militaire de la bande de Gaza et de Jéricho eut lieu et un transfert rapide de cinq domaines de responsabilité civile (à savoir, l'éducation, le tourisme, les services sociaux, la santé et la fiscalité) vers l'Autorité nationale palestinienne (l'ANP) fut mené. A la fin de l'année 1996, l'ANP contrôlait seulement des parties limitées de la Cisjordanie (les 6 principales villes) et environ deux tiers de la bande de Gaza.

La Cisjordanie et la bande de Gaza couvrent, ensemble, une superficie de 6000 kilomètres carrés. L'économie de la Cisjordanie et de la bande de Gaza a depuis cette période été, et est toujours, principalement orientée vers le secteur tertiaire. Une caractéristique frappante de cette économie est sa forte dépendance

à l'égard de l'économie israélienne. Depuis la première Intifada jusqu'aujourd'hui, des dizaines de milliards de dollars ont été dépensés dans les territoires palestiniens occupés (TPO) sous forme d'aide internationale au développement. Pour autant, le processus menant vers un Etat palestinien viable stagne, et ce pour une raison assez évidente : l'occupation impose des restrictions permanentes et si massives sur la vie quotidienne des gens ordinaires dans les territoires palestiniens occupés à travers des politiques de siège, de fermeture, et de blocus. En conséquence, l'économie palestinienne souffre d'une récession majeure et les palestiniens se trouvent au milieu d'une catastrophe humanitaire continue. Vers l'an 2000, la Palestine s'était muée en un monde d'apartheid dans lequel les Palestiniens se retrouvaient regroupés dans des bantoustans et privés du soutien politique international tant requis pour mettre fin à la colonisation israélienne.

La stratégie implicite consistait à créer « des réalités sur le terrain » en prévision du statut final, mais le seul résultat tangible fut une mosaïque confuse d'enclaves et de ghettos isolant les communautés palestiniennes les unes des autres. Le blocus et la fermeture séparant la Cisjordanie de la bande de Gaza et la fermeture plus étendue qui sépare aussi les communautés de Cisjordanie les uns des autres ont exacerbé cet isolement. Avant le processus d'Oslo, l'OLP était le défenseur légitime des droits nationaux palestiniens et d'un Etat palestinien. La déclaration de l'OLP de 1988 a été approuvée par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies et reconnue dans de nombreux accords bilatéraux avec l'OLP sur la base d'échanges diplomatiques. Le discours post-Oslo de déclaration d'un Etat par l'ANP et son inclusion dans l'agenda des négociations démontrent à quel point l'Autorité palestinienne a trahi les droits légaux palestiniens existants.

Le déclenchement de la première Intifada palestinienne en 1987 marqua un tournant dans le développement de la société civile palestinienne. Des organisations de société civile émergèrent en tant que mécanisme de mobilisation politique et comme des institutions indispensables pour fournir au peuple les services dont il a tant besoin. Les organisations de société civile qui émergèrent avant, durant et après la première Intifada émanaient principalement des partis politiques existants et étaient étroitement liées à ces partis. Le rôle des ONG dans la construction de la société civile, dans le maintien de la paix et dans la

construction d'un Etat ne doit pas être surestimé, cependant. Le monde contemporain abonde en exemples de situations récentes d'apparition ou de réémergence de conflits après une période de paix. Dans le cas palestinien, après des décennies de conflit et d'occupation et, notamment, dans le contexte actuel, un regard centré sur le rôle des ONG et de la société civile dans la pose des fondations d'un Etat est indispensable. Un Etat viable peut être construit et consolidé seulement sur la base d'une société civile saine et d'un réseau solide d'ONG. Par conséquent, cette contribution de la société civile et des ONG au processus politique et au développement doit constituer l'objectif initial de notre recherche.

Aujourd'hui, les experts en développement et les chercheurs en sciences sociales qui se consacrent aux questions de développement ne peuvent parvenir à des conclusions valables s'ils ne tiennent pas compte de l'histoire de la société civile et des ONG et de leur contribution au développement. La société civile et les ONG sont des acteurs importants dans le domaine du développement, des droits de l'homme et de la démocratie dans toute société démocratique. Les ONG sont considérées comme un véhicule pour la démocratisation de la société et comme un mécanisme sous-jacent essentiel à une société civile épanouie. Les ONG peuvent, certes, ne pas revendiquer ouvertement leur appartenance politique, mais elles doivent toutes être conscientes que leurs activités revêtent inéluctablement une dimension politique. Cette vision se distingue de celle de l'ANP selon laquelle les ONG n'ont plus de raison d'être à notre époque contrairement à ce qui fut le cas pendant l'occupation israélienne. Cependant, vers l'année 1995, la communauté des bailleurs et les agences d'aide finançaient déjà la majorité des projets issus de la société civile. Elles finançaient aussi et fournissaient leur aide à bon nombre des plus grands projets du gouvernement palestinien, comme la création de l'infrastructure législative et parlementaire de l'Autorité palestinienne et la restructuration de l'économie palestinienne.

Plus de 17 ans se sont écoulés depuis que l'Autorité nationale palestinienne (ANP) a été mise en place dans la bande de Gaza et en Cisjordanie. Avec la création de l'ANP en 1994, des changements importants eurent lieu dans l'environnement politique et socio-économique dans lequel les ONG

palestiniennes opéraient ; ces changements les incitèrent à revoir leurs politiques et leurs stratégies et à redéfinir leur rôle. Depuis, un débat a lieu entre l'ANP et les ONG afin de circonscrire clairement le rôle, les missions et les objectifs du secteur des ONG. La relation entre le secteur des ONG et l'ANP a été fluctuante et instable, et les ONG ont été contraintes d'opérer dans un cadre juridique ambigu qui les a rendues vulnérables aux pressions politiques. Les changements qui eurent lieu en Palestine après Oslo ont influencé le travail des ONG. Les ONG ont dû concevoir des stratégies différentes et plus appropriées pour promouvoir un développement pérenne. Notre recherche analyse et porte un regard critique sur le rôle de la société civile et, en particulier, le rôle joué par les ONG palestiniennes, pendant l'occupation militaire israélienne et la nouvelle ère qui dure depuis 1994. En outre, notre recherche envisage la mission et le rôle des ONG dans le futur de la construction d'une nouvelle Palestine.

Durant les années 1970, il s'est dessiné une forte tendance internationale en Europe et dans d'autres pays à la création d'organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) - aussi appelées organisations volontaires privées (OVP) aux Etats-Unis. Les ONG et les OVP sont définies comme des organisations privées, volontaires et à but non lucratif dont les membres unissent leurs compétences, leurs moyens et leur énergie au service de buts, d'idées et d'objectifs communs. Les ONG sont des organismes privés sans but lucratif qui se consacrent à l'aide internationale et à l'aide au développement, que ce soit au niveau national ou régional. L'expression englobe une grande diversité d'institutions et d'organisations. Les deux dernières décennies ont vu une augmentation considérable du nombre d'ONG travaillant dans les pays en développement. Le mouvement des ONG en Palestine est profondément enraciné dans la société. Des organismes de bienfaisance initièrent leurs activités au début du 20ème siècle et opérèrent dans le cadre juridique applicable aux ONG tel que stipulé dans la loi ottomane. Beaucoup de ces organisations caritatives fonctionnent toujours et sont encore aujourd'hui activement impliquées dans les activités de la société civile. D'après les estimations, elles constituent environ 10 pourcent du nombre total d'ONG en Palestine. A la fin des années 1970 et au début des années 1980, un phénomène nouveau est apparu dans le paysage des ONG en Palestine, à savoir, l'émergence d'organisations volontaires locales et

populaires. Ce nouveau mouvement commença à fonctionner dans différents domaines sur le terrain sans avoir obtenu la permission des forces militaires israéliennes et de ce qu'on appelle l'administration civile. Il se plaçait ainsi hors la loi, selon les ordres militaires israéliens. Ces nouvelles organisations visaient essentiellement à fournir des services à la communauté palestinienne et à construire l'infrastructure d'une résistance populaire. Elles ont exercé une influence sur les ONG et le mouvement de la société civile en Palestine ; ces dernières ont été contraintes de revoir leur perspective et de réajuster leur mission.

Après que l'armée israélienne ait commencé à occuper la Cisjordanie et la bande de Gaza en 1967, la société civile palestinienne était composée d'associations volontaires au niveau local, sous l'impulsion d'une jeune génération d'hommes et de femmes instruits et intéressés par la chose politique. Avant 1967, des groupes traditionnels et des entités existaient, mais pas de la même manière que les nouvelles ONG qui ont été contraintes d'émerger. À la fin des années 1970, elles s'étaient fondues politiquement dans la structure plus globale de l'OLP et formaient une partie distincte des mouvements politiques palestiniens. En l'absence d'une autorité gouvernementale palestinienne en Cisjordanie et dans la bande de Gaza et compte tenu du mépris flagrant d'Israël pour les besoins socio-économiques du peuple palestinien dans les territoires occupés, les organisations palestiniennes locales furent contraintes de travailler de manière indépendante pour promouvoir le développement de la communauté palestinienne. Etant donné leurs liens profonds avec la politique et la communauté palestinienne en général, ces organisations locales et les ONG ont également fourni l'espace politique pour la création d'une société forte et pluraliste en Cisjordanie et à Gaza. Entre 1987 et 1990, ces organisations locales, les ONG et des groupes politiques de gauche ont servi de force motrice et organisatrice derrière les comités populaires de l'Intifada tout en continuant à fournir des services à la communauté palestinienne. Le cas des ONG islamiques est différent et mérite quelques explications. La naissance du Hamas comme mouvement politique islamique au début de la première Intifada a été précédée de la participation active des militants islamiques dans la prestation de services aux pauvres et aux marginalisés dans les TPO.

L'Autorité palestinienne estime que les ONG ont joué un rôle politique et socio-économique très important au cours de l'Intifada et des 40 années d'occupation militaire israélienne. Cependant, elle pense qu'avec son arrivée dans les TPO, les ONG devraient lui laisser ces rôles à l'ANP, car elle est supposément plus capable et plus responsable que les ONG. De plus, l'Autorité palestinienne estime que les ONG devraient être associées à certains ministères en fonction de leurs missions et de leurs compétences. Les dirigeants de l'ANP pensent que les ONG rivalisent avec l'Autorité en matière de financement et aussi en faisant partie de l'opposition. Cependant, certains chercheurs ont fait valoir que pour que la société civile s 'épanouisse en Palestine, il est important de garantir la survie durable de formes relativement autonomes d'ONG car les ONG ont toujours joué un rôle fondamental en Palestine. En effet, les ONG ont été une composante essentielle de la scène politique nationale palestinienne et ont partagé la soif pour une Palestine libérée et indépendante. La vitalité et le dynamisme des ONG sont à l'origine de l'évolution des multiples facettes de la société civile palestinienne. La responsabilité du secteur des ONG dans la prestation des services au peuple ainsi que dans le processus global de développement n'a cessé de croître depuis le début de la première Intifada en 1987.

La naissance des ONG palestiniennes s'est opérée dans un environnement très différent de celui dans lequel sont apparues les autres ONG - que ce soit dans le Nord ou dans le Sud -, et ce, parce que les premières ont été créées principalement au cours de l'occupation militaire israélienne prolongée, période durant laquelle Israël tentait d'instaurer des politiques et des stratégies pour renforcer ses intérêts politiques et économiques en Palestine et au Moyen-Orient. Les ONG ont joué un rôle crucial dans la promotion, la consolidation et le soutien de la société palestinienne, d'une part, et dans la résistance à l'occupation israélienne, d'autre part. Pendant cette période les ONG palestiniennes sont passées par différentes phases en accord avec les changements au niveau politique. Par conséquent, leur programme et leurs objectifs ont été influencés par ces changements dans la situation politique. Par exemple, leurs objectifs, leur programme et leurs activités étaient très différents avant et après l'Intifada, respectivement, et sont aussi différents de ceux d'aujourd'hui - en particulier après le début de la seconde Intifada et les développements récents de la situation. Les

changements étaient essentiellement de nature politique pour la plupart des ONG et ont affecté le développement et les aides aux plus spécialisées d'entre elles.

Les ONG palestiniennes font partie intégrante de la société civile et de la politique nationale palestinienne. À l'heure actuelle, selon des sources locales, de 1000 à 2000 ONG fournissent des services sociaux, publics, agricoles, médicaux, et de logement au peuple palestinien. Pendant les périodes de vacance politique, elles ont également réussi à remplir le rôle qui revient traditionnellement à un gouvernement national. Cependant, les ONG ont été largement tributaires des aides financières étrangères - des pays arabes et d'autres nations. Cette dépendance a affecté leur développement et leur évolution à plus d'un titre. Pour pallier l'absence de services israéliens pour les Palestiniens, les ONG palestiniennes ont dû fournir à la population les services essentiels et minimums dans le secteur de la santé, de l'agriculture, de l'éducation préscolaire, de l'économie, de la formation, du crédit et des droits de l'homme. En Cisjordanie et dans la bande de Gaza, les ONG ont joué un rôle crucial et éminent au niveau politique et en matière de développement. Comme c'est le cas dans toute société, les ONG sont, et doivent être, des acteurs clés du développement de la Palestine. D'un côté, les ONG sont contraintes de jouer de multiples rôles parce qu'elles ont pour objet de répondre aux besoins des pauvres, des réfugiés et des personnes marginalisées, des groupes qui évoluent dans le temps et suivant les circonstances. C'est particulièrement vrai dans une société comme la Palestine où les besoins sont importants et où les structures locales sont encore en train de chercher les moyens d'y répondre. Cependant, il est très difficile d'être très bon ou excellent dans tous les domaines. D'un autre côté, les ONG doivent faire face à un ralentissement des flux d'aide de la part des bailleurs internationaux et de la communauté internationale.

Partout dans le monde, les ONG ont joué un rôle efficace et honorable dans les situations de secours et d'urgence. Dans le même temps, les ONG sont plus responsables dans la prestation de services efficaces et équitables dans de nombreux domaines, que ne le sont les organismes publics ou privés. Les ONG ne travaillent pas seulement pour répondre aux besoins des communautés pauvres et marginalisées, mais aussi pour les aider à formuler ces besoins. Les ONG sont

devenues de plus en plus importantes dans les pays développés et en voie de développement. Les ONG assument de plus en plus un rôle de meneur dans le domaine du développement. L'importance des ONG dans le développement au plan local est désormais largement admise. Les ONG locales et populaires sont plus proches des besoins en développement et des préoccupations de leur communauté et jouissent de la confiance et du respect de leur propre peuple qui est partie prenante du processus de développement. Mais, depuis l'accord de paix, les organisations internationales et les bailleurs de fonds ont diminué l'aide aux ONG palestiniennes locales qui fournissent des services essentiels aux palestiniens les plus pauvres. L'augmentation du nombre des ONG et l'élargissement de leur rôle en tant qu'acteurs importants dans le développement socio-économique et dans la formulation des politiques à travers le monde sont des tendances marquantes depuis la fin des années 1970. Cependant, ce nouveau rôle ne reflète pas nécessairement une action autonome, il est plutôt le produit de relations complexes entretenues par les ONG avec l'environnement national et international. A cet égard, le cas des ONG palestiniennes est révélateur. Malgré les initiatives autonomes intéressantes des ONG palestiniennes durant les trois dernières décennies et leur rôle significatif dans la construction de la société civile et de l'infrastructure d'Etat, leur agenda est probablement influencé par les politiques et les conditions imposées par les bailleurs de fonds. Une telle influence ne permet pas de faire une évaluation appropriée, et est perçue de manière négative. En outre, la possible participation active des ONG palestiniennes dans la formulation constructive de points de vue critiques sur les programmes socio-économiques nationaux et mondiaux n'est pas reconnue. Comme il en est de leur contribution dans tout le Moyen-Orient, les ONG en Palestine demeurent encore un terrain sous étudié, notamment en ce qui concerne leurs relations avec les organismes donateurs.

Depuis la signature de l'Accord d'Oslo en 1993, le volume et la nature de l'aide étrangère aux ONG au Moyen-Orient ont considérablement changé. Plus d'argent - venant principalement des gouvernements occidentaux - est maintenant disponible pour « renforcer la paix et la coexistence », c'est-à-dire, pour la normalisation des relations entre Israël et les Etats arabes. Depuis l'Accord de Wye en 1998, le financement américain des ONG a principalement visé à lutter

contre la « provocation » à l'égard de la sécurité d'Israël. Tandis que l'aide américaine était affectée au renforcement du « processus de paix », le financement des gouvernements européens aux ONG régionales subissait des changements avec l'apparition du service d'octroi de subventions de l'UE. Ceci est particulièrement visible dans le financement européen des ONG palestiniennes : en effet, le projet le plus admissible au financement actuellement est la documentation des violations des droits de l'homme commises par l'ANP.

Depuis la création de l'ANP et l'avènement du gouvernement du Hamas, ces deux corps gouvernants ont entretenu des relations conflictuelles avec la société civile palestinienne et, en particulier, les ONG. Avec le concours des bailleurs internationaux, les ONG palestiniennes ont fourni la plupart des services aux palestiniens alors qu'ils étaient sous occupation militaire israélienne. Cependant, après la signature des Accords d'Oslo en 1993 et l'avènement de l'ANP en 1994 et du Hamas en 2007, les choses ont changé. L'ANP et le Hamas s'attendaient à ce que la communauté des ONG abandonne sa mission de prestation de services en faveur des deux corps gouvernants. Or, telle n'était pas l'intention des ONG et elles accusèrent le gouvernement de vouloir avoir la mainmise sur ce secteur. Ce rejet mutuel a déclenché les premiers problèmes entre la communauté des ONG, l'Autorité palestinienne et le Hamas. Analystes et chercheurs ont soutenu que le conflit entre les ONG, l'Autorité palestinienne et le Hamas est essentiellement imputable à trois facteurs majeurs. Le premier facteur est le climat politique général en Palestine qui joue sur la relation entre les ONG et les deux organes gouvernants. Le deuxième facteur est l'agenda politique des bailleurs de fonds. Le troisième facteur est la solvabilité douteuse des deux organes gouvernants et des ONG qui se concurrencent pour attirer des fonds des mêmes bailleurs.

Etant donné l'histoire des ONG et de leur rôle dans les territoires occupés et la nature transitoire et incertaine du contexte politique en Palestine, la relation entre les ONG et l'ANP a traversé différentes phases. La première phase eut lieu directement après la création de l'ANP de 1994 et plus tard, lorsque le Hamas gouverna Gaza. Cette phase a essentiellement été caractérisée par l'incertitude entourant le rôle des ONG dans le nouveau contexte politique et la création des

deux corps gouvernants durant les deux périodes. Les deux corps tenaient des positions contradictoires à cet égard : d'une part, ils admettaient que les services fournis par les ONG comblaient une lacune née de l'incapacité des corps gouvernants à pourvoir ces mêmes services. D'autre part, ils considéraient les ONG comme des concurrents à leur système de prestation de services. La deuxième phase fut définie par une reconnaissance mutuelle entre l'ANP et les ONG à partir de 1996. Elle marqua l'ouverture du dialogue entre les ONG et l'ANP. En conséquence, les ONG commencèrent à formuler leur propre discours politique sur la société civile, la démocratie, les questions de développement et de l'Etat de droit. Durant cette phase, une partie importante du mouvement des ONG connut un changement dans les priorités de financement ; elle délaissa la prestation de services en faveur d'une approche programmatique mettant l'accent sur le genre, la démocratie et les droits de l'homme. Cela conduit à un changement dans les activités et les stratégies de certaines ONG. La troisième phase se caractérisa par l'émergence de la coordination et de la collaboration entre le Conseil législatif palestinien (CLP) et les ONG dans l'élaboration et l'approbation de la loi palestinienne concernant les ONG. La coordination et la coopération s'étendirent aux relations entre les ONG et les ministères concernés en dépit d'une certaine hostilité de la part de quelques ministères. La quatrième phase se produisit après 2007 et vit le début de la fermeture des ONG islamiques en Cisjordanie pour des raisons politiques et la réaction du gouvernement du Hamas par la fermeture et le contrôle des ONG affiliées au Fatah tout en essayant de contrôler d'autres ONG dans la bande de Gaza.

Finalement, en plus des politiques et des stratégies de l'occupation israélienne, le problème majeur auquel fait face actuellement la société palestinienne, en général, et la société civile et les ONG, en particulier, n'est ni le dé-développement comme l'a écrit Roy, ni la corruption, la démocratie, la transparence ou encore l'absence d'un Etat de droit. C'est davantage la séparation totale ou générale entre la Cisjordanie et la bande de Gaza, non pas à cause de l'occupation, mais à cause des deux corps gouvernants, le Fatah et le Hamas. Les deux organes tentent d'intervenir et de contrôler tous les aspects de la vie de la population, de la société civile et des ONG palestiniennes dans les deux régions. Avec leurs institutions civiles et sécuritaires parallèles, les deux entités violent,

d'un côté, les droits de l'homme, des citoyens et de l'opposition politique sur une base quotidienne. D'un autre côté, les dirigeants, les membres et les partisans de ces deux entités bénéficient de privilèges inconcevables de l'extérieur. Pendant ce temps, la société civile, ONG comprises, dispose d'une faible marge de manœuvre dans ces deux régions, sauf à être partisan de l'une ou l'autre entité. Par conséquent, pour de nombreux chercheurs, la tâche première et prioritaire de la société civile et des ONG est d'entreprendre tout ce qui est possible pour mettre fin à la séparation interne, parvenir à une réconciliation interne, et restructurer et développer l'ANP et l'OLP. La deuxième tâche consiste à développer la structure et la gestion des ONG, les doter d'un mandat clair (avec une assemblée générale, un conseil de direction et d'administration et une équipe dirigeante) en accord avec la loi et les pratiques de bonne gouvernance. La troisième tâche consiste à établir des relations de coopération et de coordination avec la masse populaire de manière à être de vrais représentants des communautés locales et de base et des bénéficiaires des activités des ONG, c'est-à-dire, être ce que j'appelle des organisations de société civile et des ONG populaires ou des organisations de société civile et des ONG du peuple.

1.1. INTRODUCTION GENERALE DE LA RECHERCHE

Le rôle des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) dans la construction de la société civile (SC)[1] et ainsi dans le maintien de la paix et la construction de l'État ne peut être surestimé. Jude Fernando (2011) observe que *La Cité de Dieu* de Saint Augustin en l'an 413 était la première articulation d'une théorie systématique de la compréhension chrétienne de la société civile[2] Azaal (1990) affirme pour sa part que « le concept de société civile est un ancien terme européen apparu dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle pour mettre en évidence la transformation de l'Europe occidentale du totalitarisme à la démocratie bourgeoise et le terme refait surface avec Antonio Gramsci après la Première Guerre mondiale après la victoire du Parti communiste russe afin de penser la sphère privée qui caractérise les mouvements communistes dans les sociétés avec une tradition de démocratie bourgeoise »[3] D'un autre côté, Salem (1995) fait remarquer que la société civile est considérée comme l'un des concepts les plus complexes et/ou controversés dans la théorie contemporaine de l'Etat et la théorie sociale[4]. Cependant, John Ehrenberg (1988) défend l'idée selon laquelle les deux développements de la société civile orientent la pensée sociale et politique moderne et les deux sont profondément ancrés dans la philosophie démocratique libérale. C'est Adam Smith qui a exprimé en premier la compréhension bourgeoise conventionnelle de la société civile comme une sphère marchande d'exigences orientée par la posture égoïste des propriétaires individuels. Ce faisant, Smith empruntait beaucoup à la vision antérieure de Locke selon laquelle la société civile existe par les biens, le travail, l'échange et la consommation. Le développement rapide des marchés encouragea bientôt les économistes politiques bourgeois à émettre l'hypothèse d'une société civile qui prendrait l'allure d'une sphère indépendante et autonome qui transformerait les aspirations personnelles en bienfait public. Hegel a construit sa théorie de l'État et de la société civile sur la base de cette compréhension, et les développements de Marx à la suite d'Hegel

[1] Lewis (2001)
[2] Fernando, Jude 2011
[3] Azaal (1990), p. 136 (la traduction est de nous).
[4] Salem (1995), pp. 7-30

continuent d'alimenter la pensée d'une grande partie de la gauche[5]. La société civile fait référence à une action conjointe autour de fins, de valeurs et d'intérêts collectifs. En théorie, ses formes institutionnelles sont différentes de celles l'État, de la famille et du marché, mais dans la pratique, les frontières entre l'État, la société civile, la famille et le marché sont souvent complexes, peu claires et négociées.

Le terme SC recouvre généralement une variété d'espaces, d'acteurs et de formes institutionnelles, variables dans leur degré de formalité, d'autonomie et de pouvoir. Les chercheurs ont adopté une première définition de travail qui vise à guider les activités de recherche et d'enseignement, mais cette définition ne doit en aucun cas être perçue comme rigide et définitive[6]. Comme l'écrit Salem (1995), la société civile est actuellement considérée comme l'un des concepts les plus complexes et/ou controversés dans la théorie de l'Etat et la théorie sociale. D'autres voient la SC comme une action collective autour d'intérêts communs. En principe, ses formes officielles sont différentes de celles l'État, de la famille et du marché, même si dans la pratique, les frontières entre l'État, la société civile, la famille et le marché sont souvent multiples, imprécises et discutées. La SC recouvre généralement une variété d'espaces, d'acteurs et de formes institutionnelles, variables dans leur degré formalité, d'autonomie et de pouvoir. John Ehrenberg (1998) argumente que c'est précisément l'appel du Manifeste communiste en faveur d'une activité politique vaste axée sur l'Etat qui est oublié dans la fascination actuelle pour la société civile. Il est sans doute vrai que les associations intermédiaires et les organisations volontaires limitent le pouvoir de l'Etat et effectuent de nombreuses tâches démocratiques essentielles. Sans elles, nous ne saurions pas grand-chose concernant le sort des baleines ou les dangers que soulèvent les mines anti-personnelles. Le problème est que les théoriciens de la société civile sont allés trop loin. Il n'est pas nécessaire d'être marxiste pour

[5] Ehrenberg (1998). John Ehrenberg détient la chaire du département des sciences politiques de l'université de Long Island (Campus de Brooklyn). Il a écrit longuement au sujet de la démocratie et de la théorie marxiste. Il est l'auteur de La dictature du Prolétariat : la théorie marxiste de la démocratie socialiste.

[6] http://wwww.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.

comprendre les limites de la célébration tocquevillienne de la société civile, et une critique de la société civile est, en fait, devenue le projet le plus important pour la gauche démocratique et socialiste[7]. Pour Diamond (1994), « la société civile » est conçue « comme la sphère de la vie sociale organisée qui est volontaire, auto-émergente, (largement) indépendante et autonome de l'Etat, et encadrée par un ordre juridique ou un ensemble de règles communes »[8].

Il y a différentes écoles de pensée parmi les chercheurs essayant d'identifier les mécanismes par lesquels les transitions démocratiques apparaissent et se consolident. On envisage généralement que la SC assume des rôles différents à différents stades du processus de démocratisation. La plupart des analystes opèrent la distinction entre la transition démocratique et la consolidation démocratique. Durant les transitions démocratiques, on considère que la société civile joue un rôle pour mobiliser et monter la pression politique en faveur du changement politique. Des étudiants organisés, des groupes de femmes, des organisations paysannes, des ONG, des syndicats, des associations professionnelles, des réservoirs de pensée, des organisations soucieuses du respect des droits de l'homme et des centres de recherche économique sont autant de sources du changement démocratique. La SC est conçue différemment d'un chercheur à un autre, ou d'une école de pensée à une autre. Elle est souvent incarnée par des associations telles que des organisations caritatives agréées, des ONG de développement, des communautés et groupes locaux et populaires, des organisations de femmes, des organisations confessionnelles, des associations professionnelles (comme les syndicats d'étudiants, d'enseignants, de médecins, d'universitaires et d'avocats), des syndicats, des groupes d'entraide, des mouvements sociaux, des associations d'entreprises, des coalitions et des groupes de défense. Pendant longtemps, les chercheurs en sciences sociales ont pensé que la sphère économique était réductible à deux secteurs : il y avait, d'un côté, le marché, et de l'autre, l'Etat. Nos grandes théories fournissent l'illustration de cette dichotomie, et presque toute notre énergie a été consacrée à l'exploration de ces deux ensembles institutionnels que sont le marché et l'Etat. Rien d'autre ne

[7] Ehrenberg (1998)
[8] Diamond (1994), p. 4

semblait avoir de l'importance. Durant les dernières décennies, le terme SC a été associé au terme d'ONG alors qu'ils ont deux significations différentes.

La question centrale ici est la suivante : si les ONG assument un plus grand rôle dans l'action sociale parce qu'elles disposent d'une plus grande latitude financière, alors, la légitimité de leurs revendications à travailler avec, et à représenter les intérêts, des pauvres et des démunis sur le plan politique, et de renforcer ainsi la société civile à grande échelle, est menacée. En effet, compte tenu de leur financement accru, la question de la responsabilité des ONG et de leur légitimité parmi la population locale et de base est devenue un thème dominant dans la littérature récente. Par exemple, l'accroissement du soutien financier aux ONG a favorisé la prolifération de certains types d'organisations avec des caractéristiques sociales et géographiques distinctes. Le phénomène social qui a nourri l'émergence des ONG n'est en aucun cas nouveau, que ce soit dans les pays européens ou les pays arabes. En France, les associations modernes datent du 19ème siècle, tandis que dans les pays arabes, elles sont apparues à la fin du 19ème et au début du 20ème siècle. Toutefois, le regain d'intérêt dans ce mouvement sous le nom « ONG » remonte aux années 1970 et se référait à l'époque essentiellement aux organisations du Nord travaillant dans quelques pays du Sud pour promouvoir leur développement social, économique et culturel[9]. Claire Mercer fait valoir que le rôle des ONG dans les politiques de développement est beaucoup plus complexe que ne le suggère la littérature sur les ONG, et elle appelle ainsi en faveur d'une approche plus contextuelle et moins porteuse de valeurs pour comprendre le rôle politique des ONG[10]. En outre, Michael Bratton (1989) affirme que les ONG sont des soutiens importants de la société civile en raison de leur approche participative et démocratique inhérente. Dans le cas palestinien, après des décennies de conflit et d'occupation, et en particulier dans le contexte actuel qui est tout à fait unique dans l'histoire mondiale avec le redéploiement des forces militaires israéliennes et des colons en 1994 et 2005 dans les territoires palestiniens occupés après la guerre de 1967, un regard centré sur le rôle des ONG et de la société civile dans la pose des jalons d'un État est indispensable. Un Etat viable devrait être construit et consolidé sur la base d'une société civile saine et d'un réseau solide d'ONG. Ce processus devrait

[9] Ben Néfissa (2001)
[10] Mercer

faire partie de l'objectif initial de toute recherche comme la nôtre qui analyse le processus politique et celui du développement dans le présent et dans le futur.

Les réalisations socio-économiques du peuple et des organisations palestiniennes tendent à être très particulières en raison de l'impact des nombreux hauts et bas sur le terrain politique sur leur vie durant le 20ème siècle. Ali (1998) soutient que le dé-développement économique des territoires occupés est la conséquence des politiques officielles d'Israël conçues pour s'assurer un contrôle militaire, politique et économique sur Gaza et la Cisjordanie afin de protéger ses intérêts nationaux[11]. En outre, Ali (1998) pense que la politique d'occupation militaire israélienne de désinstitutionalisation a eu lieu dans tous les secteurs sociaux et a affecté tous les fournisseurs de services, qu'ils soient publics, privés ou relevant des ONG. Par conséquent, les palestiniens ont souffert d'un accès restreint aux services tels l'éducation et les soins de santé, et le coût de maintien de ces services mêmes restreints a augmenté à cause de la duplication et d'inefficacité[12]. Dans leur combat pour la liberté, l'indépendance et l'autodétermination, les palestiniens se sont structurés sous une variété de lois pour sauvegarder et développer leur identité nationale. Plus de 14 ans se sont écoulés depuis que l'ANP a été mise en place à Gaza et en Cisjordanie. Avec la mise en place en 1994 des structures de l'ANP telles que les ministères, les commissions et d'autres organisations, des changements conséquents ont eu lieu dans le contexte socioéconomique et politique des territoires palestiniens occupés de Cisjordanie et de Gaza. Le contexte dans lequel les ONG palestiniennes opèrent depuis les 40 dernières années a donc aussi été affecté, ce qui les a conduit à revoir leurs stratégies et à redéfinir leur rôle.

Selon CESR (1998), durant la période d'occupation militaire israélienne, les factions politiques ont commencé à accroître leur activisme et leur mobilisation, ce qui a conduit à la création de structures locales populaires à l'origine de beaucoup des ONG actuelles[13]. Ces organisations locales et populaires, les ONG nationales et la société civile palestinienne ont été créées sur

[11] Ali (1998)
[12] Ali (1998)
[13] CESR et PNGO (1998)

une base volontaire par une jeune génération de palestiniens éduqués et sensibles à la chose politique. Leur stratégie se centrait sur la résistance à l'occupation. L'instauration de structures d'ONG assurant un développement durable et démocratique ainsi que la construction d'une société civile dynamique capable de poser les jalons d'un Etat palestinien indépendant figuraient aussi parmi les principales priorités du secteur. La responsabilité des ONG palestiniennes dans l'apport de services de secours ainsi que dans le processus de développement général s'est accru graduellement depuis le début de la première Intifada en 1987. Jarrar fait remarquer que les ONG palestiniennes sont parties intégrante de la société civile. Plus de 1400 ONG assurent à la population palestinienne des services sociaux, publics, industriels, agricoles, médicaux, et de logement. Pendant les périodes de vacance politique, elles ont aussi assuré le rôle qui revient traditionnellement à un gouvernement national[14]. Walker affirme qu'il y a aujourd'hui au moins 1200 ONG palestiniennes travaillant dans un espace géopolitique équivalent à la taille des états de Washington et du Delaware combinés. 400 sont des ONG locales et sont regroupées sous l'égide de l'Union générale des organisations de charité, 90 autres sont organisées sous l'égide du Réseau des organisations non gouvernementales palestiniennes et 200 autres sont réparties parmi quatre autres regroupements d'ONG. En dépit d'un nombre si important de fournisseurs d'aide sociale, d'organisations militant pour les droits humains, d'une documentation abondante et de qualité, de la profusion d'analyses juridiques, de recherches et de statistiques au sujet de l'occupation militaire israélienne, de l'histoire, de la politique et de la culture palestinienne, la situation actuelle continue de se détériorer en Palestine[15]. Cependant, Abdul Hadi pense que durant la première Intifada, les ONG ont développé de nouvelles méthodes et de nouvelles stratégies. Des projets concrets pour certains groupes-cibles et des comités populaires opérant dans les villages, les camps et les villes de Cisjordanie et de la bande de Gaza ont été ajoutés aux campagnes de masse généralisée et au travail volontaire de voisinage[16].

[14] Jarrar (2005)
[15] Walker (2005)
[16] Mahdi (1997)

La création de structures d'ONG assura un développement durable et démocratique ainsi que la construction d'une société civile dynamique. Cependant, d'après Abdul Hadi, le pluralisme a été une caractéristique de la vie palestinienne pendant presque trois décennies caractérisées par l'absence d'un gouvernement national, décennies durant lesquelles, des centaines d'ONG ont été créées – beaucoup d'entre elles pour des raisons politiques - en partie pour étendre leur influence sur la société à travers la prestation des services. Les ONG étaient actives dans une grande variété de domaines (par exemple, les syndicats d'étudiants et de travail, des associations professionnelles, charitables et de santé, les organisations de femmes, les réservoirs de pensée[17]). Les ONG palestiniennes comprennent les sociétés charitables, les coopératives, les associations, les organisations de développement et quelques autres groupes d'intérêts sociaux tels des syndicats représentant les handicapés, les organisations de femmes et les clubs et syndicats de jeunes. Les associations religieuses, qu'elles soient musulmanes ou chrétiennes, et d'autres groupes de ce genre sont enregistrées comme des ONG même si elles diffèrent de ces dernières puisque leurs intérêts vont plus loin que de simples aspects purement charitables et bénévoles. Ces ONG assurent tous types de services, promeuvent les principes démocratiques et mobilisent les masses pour faire progresser l'Intifada et ses exigences. Elles forment aussi des coalitions, des groupes de pression pour leur cause et ont essayé de faire converger l'opinion publique vers leurs idéaux.

La diversité des ONG et de leurs activités pendant la première Intifada et leur capacité à maintenir, et même d'accroître, les apports financiers ont grandement contribué à leur institutionnalisation au sein de la société en dépit des politiques d'Israël visant à les mettre hors la loi et à fermer des ONG palestiniennes et des comités populaires. Néanmoins, les ONG ont accompli le travail si essentiel de combler les lacunes du système public de services à la population. Selon les chiffres disponibles, il est permis de dire que le secteur des ONG couvre plus de 60% de tous les services de santé, 80% de tous les services de réhabilitation et presque 100% de l'éducation préscolaire. Cela se vérifie aussi dans d'autres secteurs comme l'eau et l'agriculture. Il est intéressant de noter que

[17] Mahdi (1997)

les ONG emploient plus de 20 000 personnes travaillant dans des domaines différents quand environ 150 000 personnes sont employées par le gouvernement.

En 1994, l'Autorité nationale palestinienne (ANP) a été établie après que les deux parties, l'OLP et Israël, aient signé la Déclaration de Principes (DP) et les accords relatifs. Selon CESR (1998)[18], la vérité est qu'Oslo et les illusions de paix ont fait oublier au monde les violations de droits de l'homme commises par Israël en Palestine occupée. Les gens ont oublié qu'Israël continue à occuper militairement 73 pourcents de la Cisjordanie et 40 pourcents de la bande de Gaza, qu'elle maintient un contrôle sécuritaire sur 24 autres pourcents de la Cisjordanie et étouffe les 3 pourcents restants via les fermetures. Quel que soit l'indicateur empirique retenu, les conditions de vie des palestiniens sont aujourd'hui bien pires qu'elles ne l'ont jamais été, et cet état de fait est la conséquence directe des politiques d'Israël durant les cinq dernières années de ce que l'on appelle le processus de paix[19].

Des changements dramatiques sont intervenus dans le contexte politique et socioéconomique en Palestine. Ces changements ont influencé le travail des ONG qui ont été contraintes de se tourner vers des stratégies et des programmes différents et plus appropriés. Les ONG ont aussi délaissé le travail de développement et de secours qu'elles effectuaient durant la période d'occupation militaire israélienne en faveur du développement durable. Les Palestiniens ont acquis un nouveau statut qui les contraint d'accomplir un grand nombre de fonctions d'un Etat même s'ils n'ont pas encore atteint le stade d'Etat formellement reconnu. Donc, les ONG palestiniennes travaillant dans la bande de Gaza et en Cisjordanie ont dû revoir leurs stratégies et redéfinir leur rôle. Depuis, les relations entre le secteur des ONG et le gouvernement ont été instables ; les ONG ont dû travailler dans les limites d'un cadre légal ambigu qui les a rendues vulnérables aux pressions politiques. D'après Hadi (2004), les ONG ne se considèrent pas comme étant de simples prestataires de services, mais aussi comme constituant un corps efficace dans le processus national et politique de

[18] CESR, Center for Economic and Social Rights, New York.
[19] Ali (1998)

lutte contre l'occupation[20]. Pour Sullivan (2001), nous avons ici affaire à un cas rare de construction d'un Etat, quelque chose qui n'arrive pas tous les jours. Il est ainsi normal, selon lui, que le corps gouvernant se heurte durant le processus d'élaboration des institutions et des cadres juridiques appropriés à ceux qui seront gouvernés.[21] Comme l'a fait remarquer Abdel Hadi, les ONG palestiniennes se sont retrouvées à un nouveau carrefour avec deux options majeures : 1) être 'absorbées' dans la structure de l'Autorité pour une ou plusieurs des raisons suivantes, ou 2) rester indépendantes et continuer à travailler hors des structures du gouvernement. Cette catégorie comprend principalement les ONG des factions opposées et celles qui ne sont pas directement liées aux activités de l'ANP et de ses ministères, tels les réservoirs de pensée, les instituts de recherche, les organisations militant en faveur des droits de l'homme, ou les organisations de femmes[22]. Jarrar ajoute qu'au début de cette période, il y a eu un appel en faveur de la réglementation de la relation entre les ONG et l'ANP, d'un côté, et entre les ONG et la communauté locale, de l'autre.

Est aussi apparu un besoin de redéfinition de la nature de la relation entre les ONG et le secteur privé et de la relation entre les différentes ONG[23]. Cela a provoqué de sérieuses discussions entre l'ANP, les organisations de la société civile, et le secteur des ONG représenté par le Réseau des ONG palestiniennes. Le débat a eu lieu pour définir clairement le rôle, la mission et les objectifs du secteur des ONG. Les relations entre le secteur des ONG, les autres acteurs et l'ANP ont été instables. Les ONG ont donc dû travailler dans le cadre d'un cadre légal ambigu qui les a rendues vulnérables aux pressions politiques.

[20] Izzat (2004)
[21] Sullivan (2001)
[22] Mahdi (1997)
[23] Jarrar (2005)

1.2. LA STRUCTURE DE LA RECHERCHE

Le premier chapitre formulera une introduction générale sur les ONG et la société civile, les ONG et le développement durable, et les relations entre les ONG et l'ANP. Il présentera aussi la structure générale de la recherche, les facteurs motivant cette recherche et, enfin, la méthodologie qui y est employée.

Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous offrirons un bref panorama de l'histoire de la Palestine depuis le début du 19ème siècle jusqu'à l'occupation militaire israélienne. Puis, nous examinerons la période précédant et suivant les Accords d'Oslo et du Caire en 1993, l'établissement de l'ANP, avant de terminer par le déclenchement de la seconde Intifada. Le chapitre donnera aussi un aperçu général du climat de l'économie palestinienne à la veille de l'Accord d'Oslo et de l'impact de l'occupation militaire israélienne sur cette économie avant de discuter ses dilemmes actuels et ses défis futurs. Nous passerons ensuite en revue le développement et le dé-développement économique, la politique israélienne envers les palestiniens via les enclaves, les cantons, les implantations et le mur de l'apartheid. Le chapitre passera aussi en revue la situation politique depuis l'occupation israélienne en 1948 jusqu'à l'aube des Accords d'Oslo et l'impact de ces accords et des accords s'y rapportant sur la Palestine et les palestiniens. Ensuite, nous analyserons la rencontre de Camp David, la seconde Intifada, la guerre israélienne de 2008-2009 contre la bande de Gaza et la Mission Goldstone.

Le troisième chapitre donnera une vue d'ensemble de la société civile tant en théorie que dans la pratique, examinera les différentes acceptions du terme ONG, analysera le rôle des ONG en Palestine avec un accent sur le développement, évaluera l'expérience et la performance des ONG pendant la première et la seconde Intifada avant d'analyser l'impact des politiques et des stratégies de l'occupation militaire israélienne sur les ONG palestiniennes. De plus, ce chapitre discutera et analysera les activités des ONG sous le règne de

l'ANP, les relations entre les ONG et les bailleurs de fond, avant de conclure par le rôle et les relations des ONG dans le futur. Ce chapitre portera aussi un regard critique sur les relations de travail et de partenariat des ONG avec la société civile au sens large, avec les bénéficiaires, les ONG du Sud et du Nord (c'est-à-dire, les ONG dans le tiers monde et leurs homologues dans le monde occidental), les donateurs, et l'ANP, et aussi entre elles. Le chapitre s'attardera aussi sur la période qui a suivi la victoire du Hamas lors des élections de 2006, période qui vit l'instauration de structures parallèles par ce parti.

Le quatrième chapitre synthétisera et analysera avec l'aide de tableaux et de diagrammes les réponses du conseil d'administration et de l'équipe dirigeante des ONG au questionnaire que nous leur avons soumis.

Le cinquième chapitre discutera les résultats de l'enquête menée auprès des bénéficiaires à qui nous avons soumis notre questionnaire concernant leurs relations avec les ONG.

Enfin, le dernier chapitre présentera les conclusions et fera des recommandations sur la manière dont les ONG peuvent améliorer leur réponse aux changements et aux défis. Nous ferons aussi des recommandations sur le rôle que devraient jouer les ONG pour contribuer à l'instauration d'une société civile saine dans le futur, notamment après les discussions animées entre les ONG et les ministères de l'ANP établis durant les derniers mois de 1996 concernant le rôle et les ressources des ONG.

A la fin de notre thèse, nous ajouterons cinq annexes abordant, respectivement, une déclaration des ONG concernant les financements étrangers destinés à l'ANP, la liste des ONG qui sont membres du réseau des ONG en Palestine, une déclaration concernant le mur de l'apartheid, le questionnaire soumis aux bénéficiaires des activités des ONG, et celui soumis au conseil d'administration et à l'équipe dirigeante des ONG.

1.3. LA JUSTIFICATION DE LA RECHERCHE

Ng'ethe (1991) observe qu'aujourd'hui, les experts en développement et les chercheurs en sciences sociales qui se consacrent aux questions du développement ne peuvent parvenir à des conclusions valables s'ils ne tiennent pas compte de l'histoire de la société civile et des ONG et de leur contribution au développement.[24] Edwards et Hulme (1996) affirment pour leur part que « la capacité des ONG à influer sur les processus de prise de décision au Nord et au Sud n'a jamais été aussi grande car leur rôle de plaidoyer continue de s'étendre et elles sont courtisées dans les débats concernant la politique et la pratique »[25]. Les ONG sont des acteurs très importants dans le domaine du développement, des droits de l'homme et de la démocratie dans toute société démocratique. Pour Jorgensen (1996), les ONG sont conçues comme des véhicules de démocratisation des sociétés et comme des composantes essentielles d'une société civile florissante. A son tour, une société civile florissante est considérée comme essentielle pour le succès du volet économique de l'agenda politique. Les ONG peuvent, certes, ne pas revendiquer ouvertement leur appartenance politique, mais elles doivent toutes être conscientes que leurs activités revêtent inéluctablement une dimension politique. Cette vision se distingue de celle de l'ANP selon laquelle les ONG n'ont plus de raison d'être à notre époque contrairement à ce qui fut le cas pendant l'occupation israélienne. Cependant, vers l'année 1995, la communauté des bailleurs de fonds et les agences d'aide finançaient déjà la majorité des projets issus de la société civile. Elles finançaient aussi et fournissaient leur aide à bon nombre des plus grands projets du gouvernement palestinien, comme la création de l'infrastructure législative et parlementaire de l'Autorité palestinienne et la restructuration de l'économie palestinienne.

[24] Ng'ethe (1991)
[25] Edwards et Hulme (1996), p. 3

L'augmentation du nombre des ONG et l'élargissement de leur rôle en tant qu'acteurs importants dans le développement socio-économique et dans la formulation des politiques à travers le monde sont des tendances frappantes depuis la fin des années 1970. Cependant, ce nouveau rôle ne reflète pas nécessairement une action autonome, il est plutôt le produit de relations complexes entretenues par les ONG avec l'environnement national et international. Comme le révèle un rapport de la Banque mondiale (2006), le nombre d'ONG dans le monde a augmenté de manière exponentielle du milieu des années 1970 à 1985[26]. D'après Jarrar (2005), les années 1960 et 1970 ont été témoins d'une augmentation substantielle du nombre d'ONG, la plupart d'entre elles étant des organisations charitables opérant au niveau régional. Le cadre légal approprié à ces organisations reposait sur la loi jordanienne qui était elle-même plus ou moins une extension de la loi ottomane[27]. Jarrar (2005) ajoute qu'à la fin des années 1970 et au début des années 1980, un phénomène nouveau est apparu dans le paysage des ONG en Palestine, à savoir, l'émergence d'organisations volontaires locales et populaires. Ce nouveau mouvement commença à fonctionner dans différents domaines sur le terrain sans avoir obtenu la permission des forces militaires israéliennes et de ce qu'on appelle l'administration civile. Il se plaçait ainsi hors la loi, selon les ordres militaires israéliens[28]. D'après Salem (1995), c'est ce réseau actif d'institutions de la société civile qui fut capable d'embrasser la cause de, et ensuite de coordonner, l'Intifada de 1987 à 1993[29]. Ces nouvelles organisations volontaires locales et populaires, dont le but principal était de construire l'infrastructure d'une résistance, ont influencé les ONG et le mouvement de la société civile en Palestine. Ces dernières ont été incitées à améliorer leur vision et à réajuster leur mission.

Beaucoup a été écrit au sujet des ONG, et des ONG de développement, et de leur rôle dans la promotion de la démocratie et du changement social. Elles en sont venues à être considérées comme une partie constituante de la société civile dans beaucoup de pays, et dans cette mesure, comme un contrepoids au pouvoir

[26] World Bank (2006a)
[27] Jarrar (2005)
[28] Jarrar (2005)
[29] Salem (1995), pp. 138-139

de l'Etat[30]. Walker (2005) pense qu'étant donné leurs liens profonds avec la politique et la communauté palestiniennes dans son ensemble, ces organisations locales et populaires ont aussi fourni l'espace politique pour la création d'une société puissante et pluraliste en Cisjordanie et à Gaza. Durant la période s'étendant de 1987 à 1990, ces organisations locales et populaires ont servi de force motrice et organisatrice derrière les comités populaires de la première Intifada tout en continuant à servir la société palestinienne[31]. Le cas palestinien est révélateur à cet égard : en dépit des initiatives autonomes intéressantes des ONG palestiniennes durant les 40 dernières années et leur rôle significatif dans la construction de la société civile et de l'Etat, leurs agendas sont probablement influencés par les politiques et les conditions imposées par les bailleurs de fonds. En outre, la possible participation active des ONG palestiniennes dans la formulation constructive de points de vue critiques sur les programmes socio-économiques nationaux et mondiaux n'est pas reconnue. Comme il en est de leur contribution dans tout le Moyen-Orient, les ONG en Palestine demeurent encore un terrain sous étudié, notamment en ce qui concerne leurs relations avec les organismes donateurs.

Depuis la création des premières ONG en Palestine, la relation entre les ONG locales a été évolutive. L'établissement de l'Union des sociétés charitables en Cisjordanie et dans la bande de Gaza a représenté une nouvelle étape dans la coordination des ONG locales. Les développements politiques et la reconnaissance de l'importance du secteur et du fait que les ONG dans leur ensemble font partie du cadre large de la société civile ont conduit certaines de ces organisations à former le premier réseau d'ONG en Palestine (le Réseau des ONG palestiniennes) pour essayer de faciliter la mise en réseau et la coordination parmi certaines des ONG membres. Durant les années 1990, quatre autres réseaux d'ONG ont été créés, trois dans la bande de Gaza et un en Cisjordanie. Récemment, une coalition de corps d'ONG en Cisjordanie composée du Réseau des ONG palestiniennes, de l'Union des organisations charitables et de la Ligue pour les institutions nationales a été formée et un document spécifiant les grandes

[30] Hadenius et Uggla (1996), et Van Rooy (1998), cités dans Lewis (2001)
[31] Wallker (2005)

lignes de la coopération envisagée a été signé. Ce premier mécanisme consultatif structuré parmi les ONG – impliquant à la fois des ONG cisjordaniennes et de la bande de Gaza - a été facilité par le Fond fiduciaire des ONG de la Banque Mondiale, dont le conseil d'administration comprend des représentants actifs des différents groupes d'ONG palestiniennes. Il reste évidemment beaucoup à faire dans le domaine de la coopération par-delà les initiatives déjà prises pour promouvoir la coopération sectorielle entre les ONG.

L'Autorité palestinienne estime que les ONG ont joué un rôle politique et socio-économique très important au cours de l'Intifada et des 40 années d'occupation militaire israélienne. Cependant, avec son arrivée dans les TPO, les ONG devraient lui laisser ces rôles, car elle est prétendument plus capable et plus responsable que les ONG. De plus, l'Autorité palestinienne estime que les ONG devraient être associées à certains ministères en fonction de leurs missions et de leurs compétences. Les dirigeants de l'ANP pensent que les ONG rivalisent avec l'Autorité en matière de financement et aussi en faisant partie de l'opposition. Bishara (1996)[32] argumente que les ONG palestiniennes ont joué un rôle dans le développement ainsi qu'un rôle politique comme par le passé. Mais elles jouent aussi un troisième rôle, à savoir, celui de créer une société démocratique libre de violations des droits de l'homme. Giacaman (1995)[33] soutient que si on veut voir la société civile s'épanouir en Palestine, il est alors essentiel de garantir l'existence durable de formes relativement autonomes d'ONG. Jarrar (2005) souligne que les ONG ont toujours joué un rôle vital dans la société palestinienne. Depuis sa création, le secteur des ONG a fait partie intégrante du paysage politique national et a partagé la soif pour une Palestine libérée et indépendante. Son dynamisme et sa vitalité sont au fondement de l'évolution des multiples facettes de la société civile palestinienne. La responsabilité du secteur des ONG

[32] Rana Bishara est le premier directeur du Réseau des ONG palestiniennes.

[33] Giacaman (1995). George Giacaman est membre du comité de pilotage du Réseau des ONG palestiniennes. Il est aussi le doyen de la faculté des arts de l'Université de Birzeit et professeur associé de philosophie. Il est membre du conseil d'administration et co-fondateur de Muwatin, l'Institut palestinien pour l'étude de la démocratie.

dans la prestation de services à la population ainsi que dans le processus général de développement a cru constamment depuis la première Intifada en 1987.

Avec l'avènement de l'ANP, les ONG se retrouvèrent confrontées à de nouvelles réalités politiques et à de nouveaux défis. C'était le cas non seulement en Palestine, mais aussi dans toute la région arabe où les gouvernements devinrent plus hostiles envers les ONG – notamment, celles qui promeuvent les droits de l'homme et la démocratie - et eurent recours à divers moyens pour déstabiliser et discréditer leurs efforts. En plus, les gouvernements de la région réexaminèrent, modifièrent ou réécrivirent les lois concernant l'établissement, l'enregistrement et le fonctionnement des ONG. De vifs débats eurent lieu entre l'ANP, la société civile et les ONG représentées par le Réseau des ONG palestiniennes. Cependant, Sullivan (1996) indique que la signature des Accords d'Oslo en 1993 et l'avènement de l'ANP ont modifié la donne. L'ANP s'attendait à ce que la communauté des ONG délaisse son rôle de fournisseur de services au profit de gouvernement[34]. D'après Jarrar (2005), depuis lors, il y a une concertation régulière entre les ONG et le gouvernement, la première d'entre elles ayant été facilitée par la Banque mondiale[35]. La relation entre les ONG palestiniennes et l'ANP a été controversée depuis l'établissement de cette dernière en 1994[36]. Al-Shouli pense que le conflit ne tourne pas seulement autour de l'attribution de rôles et de juridictions, mais est ancré dans des problématiques plus profondes[37]. Dès lors se fait ressentir le besoin de créer un cadre légal dans lequel les ONG pourraient travailler et maintenir une relation régulière et saine avec les structures concernées tout en aidant à créer une structure démocratique interne en accord avec la loi et les pratiques de bonne gouvernance. Les ONG ont commencé à s'impliquer dans le renforcement du système juridique, la création de capacités institutionnelles pour une administration équitable de la justice, la protection et la promotion de la démocratie, des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales ainsi que la valorisation de l'Etat de droit en Cisjordanie et dans la bande de Gaza. Cependant, ces efforts ont rencontré plusieurs obstacles découlant dans une grande mesure de l'absence d'une séparation claire des pouvoirs.

[34] Sullivan (1996), pp. 93-100
[35] Jarrar (2005)
[36] Hammami (2000)
[37] Al-Shouli (2006)

Notre recherche va tenter de répondre aux questions suivantes : comment les ONG répondent aux changements et aux défis qui ont eu, et ont toujours, lieu ? Que sera le rôle des ONG dans le processus de développement ? Nous ferons aussi ensuite quelques recommandations quant au rôle des ONG dans le futur.

1.4. LA METHODOLOGIE DE LA RECHERCHE

Notre thèse étudiera et portera un regard critique sur le rôle des ONG palestiniennes durant les 40 dernières années. En particulier, elle se penchera sur les changements intervenus dans leur rôle pendant la Nouvelle Ere, c'est-à-dire, de 1994 à maintenant. Cela soulève certaines questions auxquelles notre thèse tentera de répondre : Quel sera le rôle des ONG et de la société civile en Palestine dans le futur ? Y a-t-il une différence quelconque entre le rôle joué par les ONG pendant l'occupation militaire israélienne et celui qu'elles jouent pendant la Nouvelle Ere ? Quelle devrait être la relation entre les ONG, l'ANP et les nouvelles structures administratives qui vont émerger ? D'autres questions encore trouveront réponse : Quel type de relation existe entre les ONG palestiniennes et les bénéficiaires de leurs activités dans la bande de Gaza et en Cisjordanie ? Y a-t-il de la coordination, de la coopération et une mise en réseau entre les ONG palestiniennes ? Y a-t-il un partenariat entre les ONG palestiniennes et les ONG du Sud ? Y a-t-il une relation de travail ou de partenariat entre les ONG palestiniennes et les ONG internationales travaillant dans la bande de Gaza et en Cisjordanie ? Qui prend les décisions, les ONG ou les bailleurs de fonds ? Et, quelle est la relation entre les ONG palestiniennes et l'ANP ?

En outre, la recherche examinera et discutera le rôle et la mission à venir des ONG dans la construction de l'Etat et de la société civile en Palestine. Nous accomplirons cela, d'abord, à travers l'étude de la littérature se rapportant aux ONG et la littérature complémentaire. Deuxièmement, la recherche analysera de manière critique les réponses aux questions évoquées ci-dessus dans l'arrière-plan

et la structure de l'étude. Troisièmement, la recherche analysera les réponses aux deux questionnaires qui ont été préparés, l'un soumis au conseil d'administration et à l'équipe dirigeante de 50 ONG palestiniennes opérant dans des secteurs divers, et l'autre soumis à 100 bénéficiaires des activités des ONG dans différentes parties des territoires occupés. Tout ceci sera supplémenté par des entretiens avec des représentants d'ONG, de l'ANP et de bénéficiaires dans les territoires palestiniens occupés.

CONCLUSION ET RECOMMANDATIONS

> *« Le cycle ne peut être brisé que par le biais de vastes initiatives politiques plutôt que par des initiatives économiques fragmentaires. »*
> Sara Roy (2007)[38]

A travers les chapitres précédents, notre thèse a tenté de dresser le panorama de la situation économique et politique en Palestine ; nous avons aussi donné des informations générales sur la société civile et les ONG tant au niveau théorique qu'au plan pratique. Notre recherche a ensuite essayé d'analyser les conditions et la situation de la société civile, ONG incluses, en Palestine depuis 1920, avec une emphase sur la période caractérisée par l'occupation militaire israélienne. Un rapport récent de Human Rights Watch qui couvre cette période révèle que « les politiques discriminatoires d'Israël contrôlent de nombreux aspects de la vie quotidienne des palestiniens qui vivent dans des zones sous contrôle exclusif israélien et ces politiques n'ont aucune justification valable du point de vue de la sécurité ».[39] Nous avons ensuite étudié la période d'Oslo et l'instauration de l'ANP jusqu'à la réunion de Camp David et le déclenchement de la seconde Intifada, le redéploiement de Gaza, avant de conclure par la prise de contrôle du Hamas.

[38] Roy (2007), p. 332
[39] HRW Report (2010), p.2, hrw.org

Le nœud du problème pour les palestiniens demeure l'occupation et à cet égard, Roy (2007) conclut "[qu']en fin de compte, la seule solution au conflit se trouve dans le rétablissement de ce qui a été perdu par les deux peuples, à savoir, la dignité. Et la seule façon de faire cela est de mettre fin à l'occupation et de recréer l'ordinaire pour que les palestiniens et les israéliens puissent mener une vie normale ».[40] Il est largement admis que la colonisation israélienne en Cisjordanie, Jérusalem est inclus, viole le droit humanitaire international qui interdit au pouvoir occupant de transférer sa population civile dans les territoires occupés. Israël semble être le seul pays à ne pas reconnaître l'illégalité de ses colonisations. Human Rights Watch continue d'être d'accord avec la position quasi universelle selon laquelle Israël devrait cesser ses violations du droit humanitaire international et retirer ses citoyens de la Cisjordanie.[41]

L'impact socio-économique et politique des politiques et des stratégies de l'occupation tel que décrit dans notre recherche met en évidence le rôle capital et néfaste des politiques d'Israël dans la séparation des gens et des communautés et dans l'établissant de zones tampon à travers la colonisation, le mur d'apartheid et les postes de contrôle. De plus, ces politiques ont des conséquences dramatiques sur la croissance embryonnaire, les conditions sur le marché du travail, les termes de l'échange, et les conditions de vie des familles dans les territoires palestiniens occupés à court et à moyen terme. Ces politiques mettent aussi en évidence les liens entre les économies palestinienne et israélienne et, en particulier, la position bien plus vulnérable de la première par rapport à la seconde. Pour Ali (1998), la simple vérité est qu'Oslo et les illusions de paix ont fait oublier au monde les violations des droits de l'homme perpétrées par Israël dans les territoires occupés. Les gens ont oublié qu'Israël exerce encore et toujours une occupation militaire directe sur 73% de la Cisjordanie et sur 40% de la bande de Gaza, maintient un contrôle de sécurité sur 24 autres pourcents de la Cisjordanie et étouffe les 3% restants à travers les fermetures. Quel que soit l'indicateur empirique retenu, les conditions de vie des palestiniens sont bien pires

[40] Roy (2007)
[41] HRW Report (2010)

maintenant à cause des politiques israéliennes qu'elles ne l'étaient avant les cinq dernières années de ce que l'on nomme le processus de paix[42].

Les restrictions imposées aux points de passage commerciaux entre la Cisjordanie et Israël ont dramatiquement affecté les liens commerciaux entre les importateurs et les exportateurs palestiniens et le reste du monde. Les restrictions ont aussi touché les industriels qui dépendent des matières premières importées. Les dégâts sont particulièrement grands à la lumière de la dépendance de l'économie palestinienne à l'égard du commerce extérieur qui constitue environ 80% de son PIB. La fermeture des points de passage fait aussi du tort au commerce intérieur entre la Cisjordanie et Gaza. Les citoyens et les biens palestiniens se voient refuser l'entrée à l'intérieur de la Ligne verte, ou la sortie des territoires occupés confinés. La mobilité dans les territoires palestiniens contrôlés est aussi réduite. Si les dommages aux biens physiques et en termes de vies humaines sont aussi pris en considération, les pertes sont encore plus grandes. D'après des rapports qui donnent des estimations de l'impact des restrictions, environ 21% des palestiniens vivaient en dessous du seuil de pauvreté – c'est-à-dire, avec $2 ou moins par jour – avant la deuxième Intifada, et à la fin de 2002, ce chiffre était passé à 60%.

L'occupation continue de contrôler tous les types de mouvements à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de Gaza, y compris les importations et les exportations. Le commerce extérieur de Gaza se fait presque exclusivement avec l'occupation ou est mené via les ports de l'occupant. Depuis la prise de Gaza par le Hamas en juin 2007, la bande de Gaza est sous blocus total. L'occupant a modifié les conditions de passage aux points sous son contrôle (Beit Hanoun, Al Montar, Shajaiaa, El Qarar, and Karm Abu Salem) et sauf dans de rares cas, ne permet ni aux personnes, ni aux biens de traverser entre Gaza et la Ligne verte. Le point de passage d'Al Montar, « la ligne de vie de Gaza », à travers lequel la plupart des biens entrent à, ou sortent de, Gaza est presque complètement fermé, ce qui paralyse beaucoup de secteurs du commerce et crée des crises économiques

[42] Ali (1998)

grandissantes[43]. Les restrictions sur les déplacements des travailleurs et des biens sont importantes et de durée indéterminée. À cause des conséquences graves sur les palestiniens, cette stratégie viole une variété de droits que l'occupant doit respecter sous la Convention des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels : le droit de gagner sa vie, le droit à un niveau de vie adéquat –ce qui comprend la nourriture, l'habillement et le logement -, et le droit au standard le plus élevé possible en matière de santé mentale et physique[44].

Dans le contexte du conflit judéo-arabe en Palestine, les lieux et leur nom ont acquis une importance considérable dans les efforts pour revendiquer des droits historiques particuliers à la terre. La capacité à attribuer des noms à des endroits donnés est un des indicateurs les plus parlants du pouvoir politique et culturel.[45] La route d'Oslo commença avec les premières vagues de colonisation sioniste en 1880 et s'étend sur plus d'un siècle de lutte. Ce fut une histoire jalonnée de succès limités et de défaites majeures. Dans son livre sur la révolte de 1936 à 1939, Kanafani écrit que dans toute l'histoire de la lutte palestinienne, la révolte populaire armée n'a jamais été aussi proche de la victoire que durant les mois séparant la fin de l'année 1937 du début de l'année 1939[46]. Les exigences et les attentes palestiniennes sont devenues de plus en plus modestes au fil du temps : d'une tentative de retrouver la totalité de la Palestine perdue à un Etat

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43 http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Economy.asp

44 http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Economy.asp

45 Benvenisti (2000), notamment le chap. 1; Enderwits (2002), chap. 4; et Khalidi (1997), chap. 2,, qui souligne les différents usages non seulement entre les juifs et les arabes, mais aussi entre les musulmans et les chrétiens arabes avec une approche différente. Voir aussi Lewis (1980); Biger (1990), pp. 2-4; Biger (2004), chap. 1. Pour le rôle de l'archéologie dans cette compétition pour les droits historiques et les revendications politiques, voir aussi Silberman (1989), *Between Past and Present: Archeology, Ideology and Nationalism in the Modern Middle East*, et Al-Haj (2002), *Archeological Practical & Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society*.

46 Kanafani (1970), *The 1936-1939 Revolt in Palestine*, Arab Institute of Studies and Publications, Beirut. Voir Newjerseysolidarty.org

démocratique pour les palestiniens et les juifs, à la solution de deux Etats, à une autonomie limitée sous les accords d'Oslo, et, enfin, à des négociations qui présagent un futur sombre pour les palestiniens. L'illusion sur l'endurance du régime colon s'est avérée être moins illusoire, du moins en Palestine, que beaucoup des aspirations et des espoirs au début des années 1970. « La violence systématique contre le peuple et sa terre est clairement une stratégie pour priver les palestiniens de leur terre et pour effacer leur culture, leur géographie, leur identité, leur société et leur histoire, en fait, leur existence. »[47] Pourtant, les facteurs plus immédiats qui ont rendus possible les accords d'Oslo sont apparus, paradoxalement, avec les résultats de l'Intifada palestinienne en 1987.

Une lettre à l'éditeur de la *Consumer Association of Penang* en juin 2010 affirme que « Israël continue à étendre sa colonisation dans les territoires palestiniens occupés, ce qui est illégal selon le droit international. Israël a construit un mur de séparation à l'intérieur des terres palestiniennes ce qui est illégal et immoral selon la Cour de Justice Internationale. »[48] L'occupation israélienne continue, même après les accords d'Oslo, fut la cause sous-jacente de la seconde Intifada. Les palestiniens pensaient que les accords d'Oslo de 1993 les auraient menés vers une vie meilleure, de plus grandes libertés, la fin du contrôle israélien et, à la fin des cinq ans (1998), à un Etat palestinien. Oslo fut pensé pour signifier la fin de l'occupation israélienne et le début de l'autodétermination palestinienne. A cause d'un processus de paix profondément défaillant et très conflictuel, auquel on doit ajouter les frustrations et les humiliations quotidiennes infligées aux palestiniens dans les territoires occupés, ces derniers convergèrent en septembre 2000 pour ajouter de l'huile sur le feu et déclencher la seconde Intifada. Quand de tels changements ne se matérialisèrent pas et que la situation sur le terrain se détériora au milieu et à la fin des années 1990, beaucoup de palestiniens se mirent à penser que le processus diplomatique était dans une impasse et que de nouvelles confrontations étaient la seule alternative. Cette

[47] www.consumer.org

[48] Lettre du 12 juin 2010 à l'éditeur de la Consumers Association of Penang: "Why We Need to Support Palestine." www.consumer.org

dynamique explique beaucoup le support populaire de la seconde Intifada[49]. Said pense que la paix ne peut arriver qu'après la fin de l'occupation[50] et Nazzal (2005) termine en disant : « Une Palestine démocratique pour tous est la seule solution qui puisse arrêter le cycle de violence dans la région. »[51]

Depuis 1967, quand la Cisjordanie a été saisie de la Jordanie pendant les hostilités et sous une variété de gouvernements depuis que le parti de droite Likoud est arrivé au pouvoir en 1977, Israël a exproprié les Palestiniens de leurs terres et leurs infrastructures pour la colonisation juive-israélienne, a refusé des permis de construire aux palestiniens et a démoli des constructions palestiniennes 'illégales'[52]. Durant la période intérimaire du processus d'Oslo, la situation socioéconomique s'est détériorée de façon dramatique, ce qui a affecté tous les aspects de la vie des gens. En plus, les sources clés de la croissance et du développement économique, particulièrement à Gaza, étaient improductives et donc non viables sur le long terme. Sous l'occupation israélienne et après le redéploiement et le blocus, la bande de Gaza est restée l'une des parties les plus pauvres du monde.

Comme cela apparaît clairement dans notre thèse et dans réalité, le terrain politique palestinien diffère de celui dans la plupart des autres pays en ce qu'il comprend des communautés palestiniennes avec des structures socioéconomiques, d'Etat et de société civile différentes, non seulement en Palestine historique (les territoires occupés en 1967 et Israël), mais aussi dans la diaspora (*al-shatat*) générée par la Catastrophe de 1948 (*Nakba*)[53]. Comme ce fut le cas lors des guerres de 1948 et de 1967, la société palestinienne dans les territoires occupés est entrée dans une ère nouvelle faite des développements suivants : des changements démographiques extrêmes et vastes mesurés en termes de centaines de milliers de déplacés et de réfugiés, et une occupation de force des

[49] Pressman (2003), "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *Journal of Palestine Study*, p. 118
[50] Said (2002), "A New Current in Palestine", www.thenation.com
[51] Nazzal (2006), "Commemorating the Nakba: A Democratic Palestine for All the Only Viable Solution"
[52] HRW Report 2010
[53] Hilal (2010), p. 24

territoires palestiniens par Israël. En conséquence de ces développements, une nouvelle phase de la lutte a commencé pour réorganiser la population palestinienne et la placer en position de revendiquer ses droits nationaux et de développer sa lutte contre l'occupant. Les principaux protagonistes de ce processus étaient les factions et les unions politiques jusque vers la fin des années 70 le début des années 80. Après la guerre du Liban de 1982, l'OLP se concentra dans les territoires occupés en 1967. Les factions politiques ont commencé à accroître leur activisme et leur mobilisation, ce qui a mené à la création d'organisations locales et populaires qui ont constitué l'origine de beaucoup des ONG actuelles. Les syndicats étudiants devinrent aussi très actives à ce moment-là, et eurent recours aux élections comme outil de mobilisation sociale. Ces secteurs de la société civile palestinienne ont travaillé remarquablement pendant cette période. Ils se sont aussi formés hors du territoire national, pas sous l'impulsion d'un Etat, mais par des mouvements de libération nationale et des factions politiques qui apparurent dans la diaspora palestinienne. Depuis le début, alors, et dans l'absence d'un Etat souverain, le terrain politique palestinien a été sujet à de puissantes influences et pressions extérieures.

Les sanctions ne marchent généralement pas à Gaza ; le blocus imposé par l'occupation et l'isolation n'ont pas affaibli le contrôle du Hamas. Ce contrôle n'a en réalité fait que croître depuis que les blocus furent imposés. En réalité, ils ont même fait accroître ses revenus car le parti gouvernant collecte des taxes sur les biens passés en fraude via les tunnels souterrains disséminés sous la frontière Egypte-Gaza. Après trois ans de siège et une guerre de trois semaines avec des incursions et des bombardements en 2008 et en 2009 – suivant lesquels, les Gazaouis n'ont pu reconstruire à cause des restrictions sur l'importation de matériaux de construction - Gaza est complètement dévasté. Hamid (2010) indique que depuis l'assaut hivernal israélien, les Gazaouis ont perdu l'accès à 46% de leurs terres agraires, soit à cause de la destruction due aux bombardements israéliens soit parce qu'Israël ne leur permet pas de cultiver une terre considérée comme « zone tampon ». De nombreux pêcheurs des territoires côtiers ont perdu leurs moyens de subsistance car la zone dans laquelle ils peuvent

pêcher est très limitée et parce qu'ils se retrouvent souvent sous les feux de patrouilles israéliennes[54].

Derrière la fermeture et le blocus, les perspectives pour un développement économique à court et à moyen terme ne sont pas brillantes. Certes, des fonds internationaux arriveront pour des projets limités et des capitaux bilatéraux et multilatéraux continueront à être investis dans des infrastructures et le secours, mais pas dans le développement des ressources humaines qui sont pourtant le premier, si ce n'est le seul, atout dont disposent les Palestiniens. Etant donné la situation politique incertaine, les blocus et les fermetures, les investissements privés palestiniens ont diminué bien plus que prévu. De plus, le capital privé qui a été investi semble avoir été placé dans des projets où les investisseurs sont soit assurés de bénéficier d'une situation de monopole (par exemple, les télécommunications), ou sont sûrs de glaner des profits considérables (par exemple, le logement). Cependant, de tels investissements sont peu à même de renforcer les secteurs productifs de l'économie ou d'encourager des réformes économiques.

Le développement dans les territoires occupés ne dépendra finalement pas d'un meilleur système d'égouts, ni d'une plus grande utilisation de l'eau - même si ce sont des choses importantes -, mais de la volonté et de l'habileté des palestiniens à planifier et à mettre en œuvre leur futur de manière autonome. Sous les termes de la DP et de l'accord intérimaire, ils ne disposent pas d'une telle liberté. La corruption de l'ANP rend pires les troubles existants et impose des contraintes additionnelles. Il y a des impératifs clairs pour les territoires occupés. Premièrement, au niveau économique, il y a un besoin pressant de créer des emplois directs et durables suivi par une restructuration économique particulièrement axée sur le développement de l'industrie et de l'agriculture palestinienne. Deuxièmement, au niveau politique, le gouvernement de l'occupation doit cesser le blocus et les fermetures, et l'ANP doit travailler à réformer son gouvernement anti-démocratique actuel. Le type de pression requis ne peut venir que du peuple et de la communauté internationale, particulièrement

[54] Bayan (2010), www.merp.org

des Nations Unies, des Etats Unis et de l'Union Européenne. Au niveau social, il y a un besoin impérieux d'investir dans le capital humain à travers des formations, l'éducation et la santé. Plus d'attention doit être portée à restaurer la famille et la communauté en insistant sur les programmes de développement communautaires et locales.

Le développement économique dans les territoires occupés dépend des conditions suivantes : une stabilité politique interne et externe stable ; le retrait de l'occupation militaire ; l'instauration d'une paix durable d'abord, comme Roy l'a mentionné, puis d'un Etat de droit ; un environnement financier et commercial accueillant ; de meilleures infrastructures économiques ; un accès normal aux marchés et aux ressources au-delà des frontières ; un système d'éducation et de santé bien géré qui produit et assure une population et une force de travail productives. Malheureusement, dans les territoires occupés, peu, voire aucune, de ces conditions n'est remplie. Malheureusement et peut-être paradoxalement, les conditions économiques n'ont jamais été si sensibles et les prévisions pour un changement positif n'ont jamais été aussi mornes. En dernier lieu, et non des moindres à cet égard, à travers plus de 17 ans de dévastations, de fermetures partielles ou totales, l'ANP ne semble avoir jamais sérieusement oeuvré pour y mettre fin. Le mieux qu'elle ait fait est se plaindre des pertes économiques et de la situation inhumaine.

La détérioration de la situation dans les territoires occupés a fait grandir le scepticisme au niveau interne quant à une restructuration et un développement réels et complets de l'ANP et de ses institutions. Si les circonstances actuelles s'empirent, cela menacera l'ensemble de la société palestinienne et affaiblira la lutte pour le démantèlement de l'occupation et pour la construction d'un Etat démocratique indépendant. En conséquence, les palestiniens et la société civile palestinienne devraient penser que le processus de développement est une responsabilité globale qui doit engager toutes les couches de la société, la société civile, les partis et les mouvements politiques compris, ainsi que les palestiniens en général.

Les racines du terme ONG remontent aux années 1920. Selon le *Dictionary of Civil Society, Philanthropy and Non-Profit Sector*[55], le terme est d'abord apparu à la Société des Nations dans les années 1920, puis est arrivé aux Nations Unies[56]. L'expression est utilisée internationalement pour décrire des organisations sans but lucratif travaillant dans le domaine des relations internationales, de l'environnement, des droits de l'homme, de l'assistance humanitaire et de la coopération au développement. Aussi, les ONG sont un sous-secteur du secteur non lucratif ou un secteur tiers[57]. De plus, beaucoup d'ONG et d'organisations de développement ont essayé de rendre opérationnel le concept théorique de société civile et de le rendre pertinent. Cependant, il faut savoir que même si toutes les ONG sont des OSC (organisations de la société civile), toutes les CSO ne sont pas des ONG. Prenons l'exemple des OCV (organisations civiles volontaires) qui incluent des clubs civiques, des groupes communautaires locaux et populaires, des syndicats de travailleurs, des organisations de charité, des organisations confessionnelles, des associations de professionnels, des fondations, et bien sûr, les ONG.

Développer la société civile est une étape majeure pour induire le changement et influer sur le niveau d'information et le potentiel du travail d'équipe. La société civile est une composante majeure du développement et de la durabilité d'un système démocratique. La démocratie n'est pas un objectif politique qui peut être atteint rapidement. C'est un processus actif qui doit être maintenu et développé continuellement[58]. Et à travers ses institutions, la société civile joue le rôle d'intermédiaire entre l'individu et l'Etat, elle accomplit une tâche organisationnelle au sein de la société. L'utilisation du terme ONG varie d'un endroit à l'autre et se réfère habituellement aux organisations qui canalisent des fonds externes et fournissent une assistance technique dans les domaines du développement social et économique. Habituellement, une organisation sans but lucratif qui apporte d'autres types de services publics – par exemple, les syndicats, les clubs sociaux et les groupes religieux, pour n'en citer que certains – n'est pas

[55] un.org. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_society & www2.lse.ac.uk/CCS/home.aspx & dictionary.reference.com/browse/civil society& http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Civil_society

[56] un.org

[57] Lewis (2001), p. 38

[58] Al-Shani

considérées comme une ONG, mais comme une OSC[59]. De plus, nous pouvons définir les ONG comme des organisations ou des groupes d'organisations engagés dans le développement et la réduction de la pauvreté au sein de communautés locales, nationales et mondiales. Beaucoup a été écrit au sujet des ONG et particulièrement des ONG de développement et de leur rôle de promotion de la démocratie et des changements sociaux[60]. Et durant les deux dernières décennies, beaucoup a été écrit aussi sur l'émergence des OSC, incluant les ONG, et sur le rôle important qu'elles peuvent jouer dans le développement politique et économique d'un pays[61]. De plus, les OSC jouent un rôle vital dans le maintien de la stabilité sociale dans les pays en voie de développement. Ces organisations sont indépendantes de l'Etat, et leur liberté est garantie par la constitution du pays[62]. Abdel Samad ajoute que le secteur de la SC a historiquement toujours fourni des services sociaux et contribue maintenant aussi au développement sociétal, et parfois aux stratégies et aux structures nationales[63].

Qu'en est-il de la question du rôle des ONG durant l'occupation et actuellement ? En Palestine, pendant la période prolongée d'occupation militaire, la société civile, ONG incluses, a joué un rôle crucial. Depuis la fin des années 70, le rôle des ONG en tant qu'acteurs actifs dans le développement socio-économique et dans l'élaboration des politiques fut marquant. En 2005, Barghouthi fait remarquer qu'à travers leur expérience, les ONG palestiniennes se sont efforcées de mettre en valeur et d'organiser les capacités de la société et ont offert leur support pour résister à l'occupation.[64] Dans les territoires occupés de Cisjordanie et de Gaza, les ONG ont joué un très important rôle politique et de développement. Comme c'est le cas dans toute société, les ONG sont, et doivent être, des acteurs clés dans le développement de la Palestine. Pendant la lutte contre l'occupation, les ONG et la société civile prirent la forme non seulement de résistance populaire, mais aussi d'efforts collectifs pour offrir, souvent gratuitement, un panel de services en développement et de secours. Le secteur des

[59] Anheier et List (2005)
[60] World Bank Report (2006f)
[61] Elbayar (2005)
[62] Burhan (2001)
[63] Ziad (2007)
[64] Barghouthi (2005)

ONG a traditionnellement joué un rôle singulier concernant la délivrance de services économiques et sociaux dans les territoires occupés particulièrement aux les plus nécessiteux. Le commencement de la première Intifada en 1987 a marqué un tournant dans le développement de la société civile palestinienne. Les OSC ont émergé comme un mécanisme pour la mobilisation politique ainsi qu'en tant qu'institutions nécessaires pour fournir les besoins les plus importants aux gens. Les OSC qui ont émergé avant, pendant et après la première Intifada émanaient principalement des partis politiques existants et étaient associées à eux. Pour cette raison, les activistes de ces OSC étaient des activistes politiques dépêchés par leur parti politique pour assumer le rôle de meneur dans le cadre des nouvelles infrastructures institutionnelles. Après la signature des accords d'Oslo et l'établissement de l'ANP, les OSC et leurs activistes ont démarré le processus de ce qui est appelé la « dépolitisation » de leurs mouvements politiques et de leurs partis pour devenir des entités indépendantes. Cette nouvelle ère fut caractérisée par une crise profonde des partis politiques, une polarisation de la société et une ingérence lourde de la part des pays donateurs et des organisations internationales. Les objectifs des OSC se sont détournés de la politique vers la fourniture de services. Et le processus de « dépolitisation » des activistes des OSC a eu lieu. En dépit de ce processus, l'ANP a vu en la société civile une menace envers sa politique de pouvoir centralisé et de contrôle de tous les aspects de la société palestinienne. Le déversement de fonds aux ONG par la communauté des donateurs et qui avait débuté pendant la première Intifada s'est intensifié après l'établissement de l'ANP et l'accélération du processus de dépolitisation. Les nouveaux activistes ont réalisé que leur pouvoir découlait de leur nouvel accès aux sources financières de la scène internationale, et non de leur affiliation à des partis politiques.

Abedul-El Hadi (1996) écrit : « je ne veux pas discuter le rôle important et crucial qui attend les ONG palestiniennes dans un futur proche. Cependant, je voudrais souligner l'importance de ce rôle dans la détermination du contenu de l'actuel processus de construction. »[65] Herbert-Copley pense que les ONG sont

[65] Abdul El-Hadi est le directeur du Bisan Center for Research and Development. Il est membre du comité de pilotage de la Palestinian NGO Network.

devenues des acteurs éminents sur le terrain du développement[66]. Edwards et Hulme pensent eux que les ONG jouent un rôle distinct dans le développement et font face à différentes palettes de choix et de stratégies[67]. En plus, elles constituent un mécanisme d'action volontaire du peuple capable d'améliorer la démocratie, de protéger les droits de l'homme, de renforcer la planification à un niveau local, de promouvoir la justice sociale et la viabilité de la société, et de mettre fin à l'exploitation dans le développement[68]. D'un côté, les ONG sont obligées de jouer de multiples rôles parce qu'elles doivent répondre aux besoins des pauvres, des réfugiés et des marginaux qui eux-mêmes changent selon le moment et les circonstances. C'est particulièrement vrai dans une société comme la Palestine où les besoins sont intenses et les structures locales sont encore en train de chercher comment faire pour les satisfaire. Cependant, il est très difficile d'être très bon partout (Edwards (1996))[69]. D'un autre côté, ce nouveau rôle ne reflète et ne reproduit pas nécessairement une action indépendante ; c'est en quelque sorte le produit de relations multiples des ONG avec la sphère nationale et internationale. A cet égard, le cas des ONG palestiniennes est éclairant. En dépit des initiatives autonomes intéressantes de la part des ONG palestiniennes pendant les 40 dernières années ainsi que leur rôle solide dans la construction d'une société civile et d'un Etat, leurs programmes sont malheureusement influencés par les politiques et les conditionnalités des donateurs. Une telle influence ne permet pas une évaluation appropriée de leurs actions, et est vue assez négativement. De plus, il n'y a pas de recherches sur la possible contribution active des ONG palestiniennes dans le développement constructif de perspectives significatives dans les programmes socioéconomiques nationaux et globaux. Alors que les ONG palestiniennes ont réussi des actions professionnelles comme fournir des soins de santé et publier des rapports fiables sur les dommages causés aux palestiniens par les opérations militaires israéliennes ou les violations humanitaires, ils n'ont pu développer de synergie avec les forces politiques (que ce soit les partis politiques, le Comité Islamique National pour l'Intifada ou les syndicats), ni avec la population. Donc, les ONG ont utilisé leur reconnaissance internationale pour plaider des causes et pour rendre disponible une information stratégique au sujet

[66] Herbert-Copley (1987)
[67] Edwards et Hulme (1992)
[68] Korten (1982), Biggs et Neame (1995)
[69] Edwards (1996)

des attaques israéliennes, mais localement, elles ont peu contribué à rassembler les énergies de la société pendant la période de lutte nationale. Finalement, leur impact sur la direction du soulèvement a été minimale[70]. En même temps et comme dans toute la région, les ONG en Palestine restent sous-étudiées, en particulier leurs relations avec les donateurs. Durant la période d'Oslo, la société civile était considérée comme la solution à tous les maux politiques, mais il est indéniable que la société civile n'a pas été capable d'accomplir ce que l'on attendait d'elle. Peut-être que Nakhleh avait raison lorsqu'il déclarait qu'émergeant de l'état actuel, on peut observer un nombre important de ce qui peut être appelé initiatives individuelles et collectives de la société civile, insistant sur le besoin d'une stratégie à long terme pour explorer les approches afin de "sauvetage" de la situation[71]. Le manque pour les ONG d'avoir une base massive et un objectif sur les problèmes de contrôle et de développement les rend incapables d'organiser au niveau des masses. La plus active des organisations parapluies, le Réseau des ONG palestiniennes, a limité ses actions, jusqu'à maintenant, à des appels dans la presse locale au boycott des aides financières américaines et contre la participation continue des organisations dans les projets communs israélo-palestiniens. De plus, ils ont mis en place un nombre de tâches dont l'une est de développer des stratégies pour la situation interne. Beaucoup des 120 organisations membres revoient leurs activités dans le but de les rendre pertinentes à la crise actuelle.

Le cas des ONG islamiques est différent et mérite quelques explications. La naissance du Hamas en tant que mouvement politique au début de la première Intifada a été précédée par une implication active des activistes islamiques dans la délivrance de services aux pauvres et aux marginalisés dans les territoires occupés. Depuis les années 1970, l'occupation israélienne a embarqué sur une stratégie de construction et de support d'alternative au leadership palestinien de l'OLP. Des mouvements politiques islamiques qui ne faisaient pas, de fait, partie de la scène politique après l'occupation militaire de 1967 ont commencé à sortir, abordant les problèmes sociaux et religieux et prêchant l'éthique islamique contre

[70] Hanafi, Sari and Tabari, Linda (2005), T"he *New Palestinian Globalized Elite"*, Jerusalem Quarterly 24 (13)
[71] Nakhleh (2008)

les factions nationales de l'OLP et du Parti Communiste qui étaient particulièrement actifs dans les territoires occupés et hors de Palestine. Ceci fut un développement attendu et la séparation des Palestiniens dans leur vision des autorités occupantes, qui a vu en cela l'occasion de faciliter l'émergence d'un nouveau pouvoir politique qui délivrerait un message social et religieux opposé du message nationaliste de l'OLP. Pour cette raison, les forces d'occupation ont facilité et toléré l'installation d'un réseau d'institutions sociales dans la bande de Gaza par une ONG islamique appelée la société islamique ou « Al mujam'a al islami", les géniaux précurseurs du Hamas. Tout cela s'est produit à un moment où les forces occupantes déniaient le leadership de l'OLP dans la création de sociétés civiles et sociales. Les sociétés islamiques à ce moment maintenaient un profil politique très bas, restant fidèles aux règles du jeu de ne pas embêter les autorités occupantes. Leurs activités dépassaient les limites de la délivrance de services et ils commencèrent à étendre leur éducation via l'école, le collège et l'université où ils sont devenus progressivement la seconde force après le Fath sur la scène politique.

Les OSC islamiques et leurs activistes maintinrent un profil politique bas jusqu'à la fin de la première Intifada quand le Hamas fut déclaré mouvement politique : « … les islamistes palestiniens ont au moins pour la décennie avant l'Intifada construit pour eux-mêmes les infrastructures sociales, religieuses et politiques qui leur ont permis de gagner en influence. Quand la première Intifada a commencé, les islamistes palestiniens ont joui d'une présence significative dans de nombreuses régions des territoires occupés. La base de leur pouvoir était liée à un réseau large de services sociaux et d'assistance qui les a aidés à étendre leur pouvoir de la fin '80 à aujourd'hui. Comparant les expériences des OSC marxistes et islamistes pendant la première Intifada, nous pouvons trouver deux tendances opposées : les sociétés civiles islamiques activistes qui ont émergé comme leader politiques associés au Hamas et les leaders politiques des factions laïques nationales qui ont émergé comme activistes de la société civile graduellement se retirant de leurs affiliations politiques avec le processus de dépolitisation.

Cela fait partie des plus grandes nécessités, dans le but de faire sortir la société palestinienne de cette crise imprédictible, que des actions générales et

unifiées soient prises. Les Palestiniens et la SC palestinienne pensent qu'un front et une coalition internes sont fondamentaux pour relancer la bataille des Palestiniens et de la société civile vers l'autodétermination pour finir avec l'occupation et établir un Etat palestinien indépendant et démocratique fondé sur le respect des lois, des droits humains et de la démocratie. La capacité des OSC incluant les ONG à fournir des services et à fournir une alternative nationale à l'actuel système israélien a relancé le rôle des OSC et des ONG dans le développement de la société palestinienne et dans le renforcement de la société civile durant la période post-Oslo. Le niveau d'information du secteur des ONG et sa maturité apparaissent clairement concernant le rôle qu'elles jouent et ont joué dans la société palestinienne. La démocratisation, l'indépendance et la libération de la société palestinienne reste l'un des défis majeurs auquel les OSC et les ONG sont confrontées. Un défi d'importance égale continue d'être la capacité, la structure et la représentation des ONG à jouer un rôle actif dans le processus de développement dans toutes ses dimensions et donc de dessiner le contour futur de la société palestinienne.

La question des relations entre la SC et les ONG avec l'occupation, l'ANP et les donateurs est ainsi résumée : la SCP depuis son établissement fait face à de difficiles circonstances dues à l'occupation étrangère. En plus, la SC, pendant Oslo, a souffert plus encore à cause des politiques de toutes les parties; la société palestinienne est en fait en train de passer ses pires années. L'occupation israélienne déforme sa configuration au niveau démographique, l'ANP et plus tard le Hamas déforment sa configuration au niveau structurel et les donateurs déforment sa configuration au niveau fonctionnel. Pour le futur de la SC et des ONG et dans le but de jouer un réel rôle historique, les ONG palestiniennes et la SC en Palestine n'émergeront qu'à condition de participation active de milliers de citoyens . cela ne peut être accompli que si les gens ont une compréhension suffisante du rôle controversé et contradictoire des ONG globales et de la région. Les leaders des ONG doivent constamment travailler à élever le niveau de conscience et de compréhension du secteur. Des publics plus larges considèrent que le rôle des ONG est crucial pour l'élargissement du secteur et le développement de ses relations avec le gouvernement et le secteur public – sa place dans la société palestinienne sous l'occupation israélienne prolongée.

Deuxièmement, les ONG doivent fréquemment faire toutes les tentatives pour atteindre les plus hauts standard de bonne autogouvernance avec une réelle participation des gens : transparence, responsabilité, gestion saine et comportement éthique. Les ONG peuvent seulement servir d'avocat convaincant et de garde fou des gouvernements et des affaires si elles maintiennent les principales croyances et étiques auxquelles elles espèrent que secteurs public et privé adhèrent. Maintenant, une meilleure transparence et responsabilité des ONG portera aussi leurs propres défis dans le développement des relations et des connexions entre la SC et les gouvernements. Néanmoins, la bonne gouvernance apportera la meilleure preuve d'être la meilleure police d'assurance pour une flexibilité à long terme du secteur non gouvernemental.

La stratégie consiste à créer des "réalités sur le terrain" qui pourraient anticiper le statut final et qui résulteraient en une mosaïque confuses d'enclaves et de ghettos isolant les communautés palestiniennes les unes des autres. La politique de blocus et de fermetures séparant Gaza et la Cisjordanie a exacerbé cette isolation comme l'ont fait les fermetures plus précises qui séparèrent aussi les différentes communautés de Cisjordanie. Avant le processus d'Oslo, l'OLP était le défenseur légal des droits nationaux palestiniens. La déclaration de 1988 de l'OLP fut reconnue par l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies et reconnue par de nombreux accords bilatéraux avec l'OLP sur base d'échanges diplomatiques. Le discours post-Oslo de déclaration d'un Etat par l'ANP et son inclusion dans l'agenda des négociations démontre jusqu'où l'autorité à directement trahi l'existence des droits des palestiniens.

Les évènements menant aux accords d'Oslo ont vu l'OLP perdre tous ses revenus. Premièrement, dans le cadre de l'ANP, la manière de diriger a vu le boycott de l'OLP qui peut maintenant à peine fonctionner. Ensuite, le budget de l'UNRWA a été sévèrement diminué. Les envois de fonds de l'étranger ont pratiquement cessé.

Troisièmement, le nombre de palestiniens qui peuvent entrer en Israël a été réduit de moitié. Quatrièmement, un nouveau super fournisseur « donateurs internationaux » a pris en charge de fournir le support financier pour la

subsistance gouvernementale et sociétale. Cinquièmement, le droit, la bonne gouvernance et le développement devinrent les objectifs déclarés de l'un des plans les plus larges de développement global, politiquement dirigé par les USA et volontairement approvisionné par l'UE et les pays de l'UE.

Pour examiner les mécanismes et fonctions des politiques ci-dessus mentionnées, nous devons porter notre regard sur les performances de trois acteurs de base : Israël, l'ANP et les donateurs dans le contexte d'Oslo. Comme mentionné plus haut, Israël a commencé ses blocus et sa politique de fermeture en 1993 en activant un blocus d'Etat et une fermeture générale où les territoires palestiniens occupés sont scellés ; les mouvements sont interdits entre eux et entre eux et Israël, ce qui inclut l'accès à Jérusalem également à moins d'avoir un permis. Le blocus et la fermeture générale sont encore en effet aujourd'hui et les critères d'éligibilité pour un permis de déplacement sont variables et appliqués arbitrairement. Cette politique interdit tout mouvement de biens et de personnes entre la Cisjordanie, Jérusalem et Gaza. Ceci peut être levé par la volonté d'Israël pour une « fermeture partielle » ce qui signifie que certaines zones mais « pas toutes » et certaines personnes mais «pas toutes » peuvent se déplacer. Le dernier de ces fils barbelés sociaux est la politique de fermeture interne qui suit la carte d'Oslo et est dirigée pour fermer (A) zones des autres et enfin, le mur d'Apartheid.

Le processus d'Oslo a créé un Etat incertain de juridictions pour les individus et les institutions qui se retrouvent face à des circonstances changeantes et dès lors des juridictions sur le terrain. La thèse démontre que le timing de ces changements est déterminé seulement par Israël comme l'est l'étendue des échanges. En examinant le mécanisme de redéploiement et ensuite les catégories de juridictions qu'Oslo a établies. Le DP a clairement décrit le transfert graduel de terres et d'autorité à prendre place dans une phase intérimaire qui était supposée délivrer « toute la Cisjordanie et la zone de Gaza », « à l'exception des territoires soumis aux négociations pour le statut final ».

Les personnes, les institutions et les communautés palestiniennes se sont retrouvées à la merci d'un processus arbitraire de changements légaux et

administratifs quand des changements politiques se produisent sur le terrain. Si ce que nous avons déjà mentionné ci-dessus n'était pas suffisant, Israël a décidé, et les Palestiniens ont prudemment accepté de trancher les composants de la juridiction, de juridictions géographiques, fonctionnelles et personnelles. Ceci fut fait pour s'accommoder aux plans asymétriques de redéploiement, mais derrière, cela a produit de lui-même une nouvelle dynamique. Les Palestiniens n'ont pas vraiment apprécié le luxe de tomber sous une seule juridiction en Cisjordanie.

La société palestinienne ressemble actuellement à des groupes d'îles et des communautés totalement séparés, comme cela a été explicité dans le second chapitre, ne sachant pas quand ni comment ils seront reconstitués. Cela explique le phénomène d'institutions doubles dans le secteur public et le cauchemar de la coordination dans la société privée et civile. Comme mentionné plus haut, les relations organiques des secteurs de la SC palestinienne avec l'OLP, les partis, les unions professionnelles, les syndicats professionnels et les ONG ont été dépendants de l'OLP au niveau des stratégies de direction, de la représentation, de la coordination, de la protection et du financement. Tous ces composants furent perdus quand l'ANP fut établie et plus encore quand la division entre la Cisjordanie et Gaza eut lieu. L'ANP ne s'est pas présentée comme une alternative à l'OLP parce qu'elle n'était pas supposée l'être. L'ANP – étant différent de l'OLP, l'OLP avait très peu de mandat autre que la commande dans les débuts. De 1993 à maintenant, l'ANP n'a que son contenu de base seul : l'exécutif. L'ANP n'a pas de rôle dans les négociations, gérées par la communauté internationale de part le monde, et par ses partenaires. Les branches et les forces sécuritaires et la bureaucratie ne peuvent, après tout, que se comporter d'une certaine manière.

Du point de vie de la SC et des ONG, les choses sont à peu près pareilles, notamment en termes d'arrestations. Ce n'est que quand les donateurs et les gouvernements occidentaux devinrent réellement enthousiastes sur le sujet des droits de l'homme en Palestine qu'ils mirent les actes avant les paroles en intervenant pour le compte des ONG en accroissant les supports financiers. Le résultat de ce spectacle fut la destruction structurelle des unions et des syndicats.

Il est important de garder à l'esprit que l'autorité a eu environ deux ans avant de tenir ses premières élections. Très vite après l'instauration du Conseil Législatif Palestinien (CLP), il devint clair que l'exécutif en place depuis deux ans n'était pas prêt à partager son pouvoir avec de nouveaux arrivants. Les limites du CLP ont été vite mises en lumière en termes de problématiques liées à Israël et en termes de sa fonction principale : la législation. Les pouvoirs législatifs complets ont été retenus par les deux présidents. Ce système gouvernemental a commencé par démanteler la société civile, ce qui a conduit à la paralysie du système juridique dans son ensemble.

17 ans après Oslo, nous sommes dans une situation bien pire au niveau du système légal dans son intégralité. L'Autorité a opté pour la gouvernance par décret et administration. Il est étrange de voir que même dans le choix de l'administration, l'autorité, puis les autorités, n'ont pas essayé d'unifier les mesures prises dans les territoires occupés de Gaza et de Cisjordanie. Elles ont préféré suivre des politiques administratives différentes dans les deux zones sur des questions comme : la consommation d'alcool, les stations de TV locales et autres libertés civiles qui sont strictement bannies dans la bande de Gaza. Deux autorités contrôlant les ONG furent établies dans les deux zones et violèrent quotidiennement les droits de l'homme et des citoyens.

Comment répondre à la question du futur rôle des ONG ? Il est clair que les ONG peuvent jouer un rôle significatif dans la société civile comme cela est largement explicité dans la recherche, mais le « truc » est de pouvoir jouer UN rôle et non pas vouloir les jouer tous. Car c'est à ce moment-là que les ONG deviennent un danger, participant à la marginalisation de certaines communautés. Le nombre d'ONG n'a pas seulement doublé mais elles ont aussi grandi en taille, en budget et en bureaucratie. Quelques ONG en Palestine ont plus de personnel et de budget que les partis politiques. Les ONG en Palestine sont reconnues pour n'avoir pas d'autre constance et consistance que les membres de leur conseil. Dès lors, les ONG existent et représentent la société mais ne se répondent qu'à elles-mêmes et aux bailleurs de fonds bien entendu. Beaucoup d'ONG, en fait, représentent les donateurs plus que tout parti, en Palestine ou ailleurs. Etant donné le facteur de séparation et d'isolation démographique tel que mentionné et

explicité plus haut, les ONG ont abandonné les plaidoyers pour l'autodétermination et les droits nationaux. D'un autre côté, et après des centaines de millions de dollars, la Palestine manque de mouvements ou de coalitions pour les droits humains qui puissent sérieusement engager un établissement légal de droits.. N'ayant pas de consistance pour le support et la défense, manquant d'institutions constitutionnelles pour protéger et tombant dans le piège du high tech et de l'équipement de pointe, les ONG sont dépendantes du support financier des donateurs, de la protection politique, des formations et même des évaluations, puisque personne d'autre n'a le droit de le faire. Des douzaines de milliers de formations et de cours ont commencé à agiter les gens, à leur donner quelque chose à faire comme chercher un billet d'avion, réserver un hôtel, etc. Au niveau communautaire, les gens ne sont plus intéressés par les droits humains, la démocratie ou le développement.

Concernant la question du travail en réseau entre les ONG nationales ou internationales, la réponse, comme mentionnée plus haut, se résume ainsi : étant en compétition pour attirer l'argent des donateurs, les ONG ne sont pas tentées de travailler ensemble, sauf dans de rares cas comme la rédaction de la loi sur les ONG (pour des raisons évidentes). On pourrait penser que décider de l'importance et l'adéquation d'un projet donné vient d'abord, et avant les questions liées à la levée de fonds. Et bien, ce n'est pas la manière de procéder à l'heure actuelle. Les thèmes sont décidés par les donateurs qui sous-traitent ensuite aux ONG qui les mettent en œuvre. Il n'est pas nécessaire de mentionner le nombre de projets répétitifs ou dupliqués.

Les donateurs et les gouvernements donateurs ont une responsabilité directe dans cette tragédie humaine. Entre autres choses, ils ont créé deux élites : l'élite formelle de l'ANP et les élites informelles des ONG telles qu 'elles ont été définies par Sari Hanafi et Linda Tabar. Elles avaient toutes deux la même fonction, mais usaient de moyens différents. Ces fonctions sont une mauvaise représentation et la marginalisation de la société palestinienne. Même si toutes deux ont joué un rôle de pourvoyeur de services auprès du public palestinien, ce n'est pas suffisant pour justifier les graves erreurs commises. Nous devrions à

présent savoir que le meilleur moyen de composer avec l'occupation est d'y mettre fin, pas de la ménager, comme l'a dit Roy en 2007.

L'analyse et l'évaluation de la société civile incluant les ONG et d'autres formes d'organisations dans et hors Palestine reçoivent plus d'attention pour la raison qu'il est acquis que la société civile et les ONG devraient émerger et travailler localement. Les leaders extérieurs peuvent faire pression et former ce processus, mais, mais ils ne sont pas les bienvenus à rester. La société civile incluant les ONG doit adopter et mener des politiques et stratégies de direction propres plus fortes et se lancer dans leur constitution. Elles doivent le faire aussi vite que possible et encourager la participation réelle de leurs bénéficiaires, du peuple et des communautés de base dans les villages, les camps et dans les zones pauvres des villes dans la détermination de ces politiques et ces stratégies.

Finalement, en plus des politiques et des stratégies de l'occupation israélienne, le principal auquel fait face actuellement la société palestinienne, en général, et la société civile, en particulier, n'est ni le dé-développement comme l'a écrit Roy, ni la corruption, la démocratie, la transparence, ou encore l'absence d'un Etat de droit, mais plutôt la séparation totale ou générale entre la Cisjordanie et la bande de Gaza non pas à cause de l'occupation, mais à cause des deux instances de contrôle, le Hamas et le Fatah. Ces deux entités essayent d'intervenir et de contrôler tous les aspects de la vie des Palestiniens et de la SC et des ONG dans les deux zones. D'un côté, les deux instances, avec leurs institutions civiques et sécuritaires parallèles, violent quotidiennement les droits de l'homme, des citoyens et de leurs oppositions politiques respectives. D'un autre côté, leurs dirigeants, leurs membres et leurs supporters ont des privilèges qu'un non initié n'imagine même pas. Et il y a un très petit espace pour les ONG et la SC dans les deux zones, sauf si elles supportent l'une ou l'autre instance politique. Dès lors, la première tâche pour les ONG et la SC d'après de nombreux chercheurs est de faire tout ce qu'elles peuvent pour en finir avec cette séparation interne, parvenir à une réconciliation, et restructurer l'ANP et l'OLP. La seconde tâche consiste à développer la structure des ONG afin qu'elles deviennent de réels représentants des communautés locales, des bases, des masses et des bénéficiaires en étant ce

que j’appellerais des Organisations de la Société Civile et des ONG Populaires ou du peuple.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Palestine is an area located to the west of the Jordan River up to the Mediterranean Sea, and to the south of Egypt up to Lebanon. As already mentioned in the writings of the Ancient Greeks, Palestine constituted a part of the Roman Empire. For centuries, it was a distinct area; in particular, in the 10th century, it was both a separate and the most fertile of Syrian provinces. Towards the end of the First World War, Great Britain occupied Palestine. On the November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution that became known as the Partition Plan. This plan made provision for an independent Jewish State at the price of the division of Palestine into two separate States. From 1948 to 1949, the Israeli army occupied a larger area of Palestine than the one it had been allocated. In the aftermath of the ensuing military conflict, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank came under Egyptian and Jordanian control, respectively. During the War of June 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well as parts of Arab countries. On September 13, 1993, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel signed a Declaration of Principles (DP). The DP was not a peace agreement, but a mere framework upon which further negotiations were to be based. By May 1994, military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho took place and an early transfer of five areas of civil authority (namely, education, tourism, welfare, health, and taxation) to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was conducted. By the end of 1996, the PNA controlled only limited areas in the West Bank (the 6 main cities, actually) and about two-thirds of the Gaza Strip.

The West Bank and the Gaza Strip cover a combined area of about 6,000 square kilometers. The economy of the West Bank and Gaza has since then been, and still is, mainly services-oriented. A striking feature of this economy is its heavy dependence on the Israeli economy. Since the First Intifada till now, dozens of billions of dollars have been spent in the POTs under the guise of international aid and development. Yet, the process towards a viable Palestinian State is stagnant. The reason for this state of affairs is quite clear: the Occupation places so massive and continuous restrictions on the daily lives of ordinary people in the

POTs through policies of siege, closure, and blockade. As a result, the Palestinian economy suffers from a major depression, and the Palestinian people are in the midst of an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe. By year 2000, Palestine had morphed into an apartheid-like world in which Palestinians found themselves corralled into Bantustans and deprived of the international political support much needed to put an end to Israeli colonization. The underlying strategy consisted in creating "realities on the ground" in anticipation of the final status, but the only visible result was a confused patchwork and mix of enclaves and ghettos isolating Palestinian communities the ones from the others. The policy of blockade and closure separating the West Bank from the Gaza Strip as well as the more comprehensive closure that also separated West Bank communities from each other exacerbated this isolation. Prior to the Oslo process, the PLO was the legitimate advocate of Palestinian national rights and Palestinian statehood. The 1988 declaration by the PLO was acknowledged by the General Assembly of the United Nations and recognized in numerous bilateral agreements with the PLO on the basis of diplomatic exchange. The post-Oslo discourse of State-declaration by the PNA and its inclusion within the agenda of negotiations demonstrate the extent to which the Palestinian authority has directly betrayed existing Palestinian legal rights.

The outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987 marked a turning point in the development of Palestinian civil society. Civil society organizations (CSOs) emerged as a mechanism for political mobilization and as institutions that could be relied upon to provide to the people the much-needed services. The CSOs that emerged before, during and after the First Intifada were mostly an offspring of existing political parties and they were closely linked to the latter. The role of NGOs in building civil society and in thus contributing to peacemaking and State-building cannot be over-estimated, however. The contemporary world abounds with instances of conflicts and reemergence of conflicts after a peacekeeping period. In the Palestinian case, after decades of conflict and occupation, and especially in the present context, a focused look at the role of NGOs and civil society in laying the foundations for statehood is critical. Indeed, a viable state can be built and maintained only on the basis of a healthy civil society and NGO network. Thus, the contribution of civil society and

NGOs to the political and developmental process must be the initial focus of our research here.

Today, both development experts and social scientists engaged in the study and research on development issues can hardly arrive at valid conclusions if they do not take into account the history of CS and NGOs and their role in development. The CS and NGOs are very important actors in the field of development, human rights and democracy in any democratic society. NGOs are considered as vehicles for the democratization of society and as a vital underlying mechanism of a thriving civil society. NGOs can of course legitimately claim not to be openly political, but they must all be aware that their work takes on a political dimension. This view challenges the conventional thinking of the PNA according to which the new era no longer calls for the activities of NGOs in contrast to the period marked by Israeli occupation. By 1995, however, the donor community and aid agencies were funding the majority of civil society projects. They were also funding and assisting many of the largest projects of the Palestinian government such as the creation of the Palestinian Authority's legislative and parliamentary infrastructure and the restructuring of the Palestinian economy.

More than 17 years have passed since the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was set up in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. With the establishment of the PNA at that time, substantial changes took place in the political and socio-economic context in which Palestinian NGOs had been operating. They were thus obliged to revise their policies and strategies and redefine their role. Since then, a debate has been taking place between the PNA and NGOs so as to determine the clear role, mission and objectives of the NGO sector. The relationship between the NGO sector and the PNA has been volatile and unstable, and NGOs have had to operate within an ambiguous legal framework that rendered them vulnerable to political pressure. The changes that took place in Palestine after Oslo have influenced the work of NGOs. The NGOs had to devise different and more appropriate strategies to promote sustainable development. Our research studies and critically examines the role of civil society, mainly the role played by Palestinian NGOs during Israeli military Occupation and during the New Era that

started in 1994 and lasts till now. In addition, our research considers the future role and mission of NGOs in building a new Palestine.

In the 1970s, there emerged a massive international trend in Europe and in other countries towards the creation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), also called Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in the United States of America. NGOs and PVOs are defined as private, voluntary, non-profit organizations whose members combine their skills, means and energies to promote common goals, ideas and objectives. NGOs are private, non-profit agencies devoted to international aid and development assistance, or national or regional development. The phrase embraces a wide diversity of institutions and organizations. The last two decades have witnessed a tremendous increase in the number of NGOs working in the developing countries. In Palestine, the NGO movement is deeply rooted within society. Charities started their activities at the turn of the 20th century and operated within the legal framework applicable to NGOs as stipulated in Ottoman law. Many of these early charity organizations are still functioning and actively involved in civil activities. They are currently estimated to constitute about around 10 percent of the total number of NGOs in Palestine. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new phenomenon appeared in Palestine on the NGO scene, namely, the emergence of voluntary grassroots organizations. The new movement started to function in different fields on the ground without the permission of the Israeli military forces and the so-called civil administration. This fact placed them outside the law, according to Israeli military orders. These new organizations basically aimed at providing services to the Palestinian community and at building the infrastructure of a popular resistance. They made an impact on the NGOs and the civil society movement in Palestine, and urged them to revise their outlook and readjust their mission.

When the Israeli army started occupying both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, Palestinian civil society was made up of voluntary, grassroots associations led by a young, educated, and politically-motivated generation of men and women. Prior to 1967, traditional groups and entities did exist, but not in the same manner as the new NGOs which were forced into life. By the late 1970s, they had coalesced politically into the broader structure of the PLO and formed a

distinct part of the Palestinian political movements. Due to the absence of a Palestinian governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to Israel's blatant disregard for the socio-economic needs of the Palestinians in occupied territories, Palestinian grassroots organizations were forced to work independently to foster the development of the Palestinian community. Due to their deeply-rooted connection to politics and to the Palestinian community at large, these grassroots organizations and NGOs also provided the political space for the creation of a strong and pluralistic society in the West Bank and Gaza. Between 1987 and 1990, these grassroots organizations, NGOs, and leftist political groups served as the driving and organizing force behind the popular committees of the Intifada while continuing to provide services to the Palestinian community. The case of Islamic NGOs is different and deserves some amplification. The birth of the Hamas as an Islamic political movement at the onset of the First Intifada was preceded by the active involvement of Islamic activists in service delivery to the poor and marginalized in the POTs.

The PNA argues that NGOs have played a very important political and socio-economic role during the Intifada and the 40 years of Israeli military occupation. But, with the arrival of the PNA in the POTs, the NGOs should relinquish their previous role to the allegedly more capable and more accountable PNA. Further, the PNA suggests that NGOs should be linked to certain ministries according to the areas in which they have competencies. The officials of the PNA believe that NGOs compete against the PNA for funding and by also being part of the opposition. However, some scholars argue that if civil society is to flourish in Palestine, then the prolonged survival of comparatively autonomous forms of NGOs is to be ascertained as NGOs have always played a fundamental role in Palestine. Indeed, NGOs have been an essential component of the Palestinian national political landscape and shared the thirst for a liberated and independent Palestine. The vitality and dynamism of NGOs are at the root of the evolution of Palestinian civil society in its multifaceted aspects. The responsibility of the NGO sector in the provision of services to people as well as in the overall development process has been steadily growing since the onset of the First Intifada in 1987.

Palestinian NGOs were nurtured in a very different environment than other NGOs, whether in the North or in the South. Indeed, they were essentially established during the prolonged Israeli military occupation, a period during which Israel tried to enforce policies and strategies to enhance its political and economic interests in Palestine and in the Middle East. NGOs have played a crucial role in strengthening, fostering and supporting the Palestinian society, on the one hand, and in resisting the Israeli occupation, on the other. Throughout this period, Palestinian NGOs have transited through different phases following the evolution of a complicated political situation. Their program and objectives have been influenced by these changes in the political situation. For example, their program, objectives and activities were very different before and during the First Intifada, respectively, and are also different from those of today – especially, following the start of the Second Intifada and contemporary developments. The changes were mainly political in nature for most of the NGOs and affected development and aid to the specialized ones.

Palestinian NGOs are an integral part of civil society and national politics in Palestine. According to local sources, there are presently from 1,000 to 2 000 NGOs that provide social, agricultural, medical, housing and public services to the Palestinian people. During times of political vacuum, they have also managed to fulfill the role traditionally played by a national government. However, NGOs in Palestine have been heavily dependent on foreign financial support - both from Arab and other nations -, a fact that has affected their development and evolution in more than one way. In the absence of Israeli services to the Palestinian people, the Palestinian NGOs provided the latter with the basic and minimum services in the field of health, agriculture, pre-school education, economics, training, credit, and human rights. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, NGOs have played a very crucial and distinguished political and developmental role. As is true of any society, NGOs are, and should be, key players in the development of Palestine. On the one hand, NGOs are forced to play multiple roles because they are committed to responding to the needs of refugees, poor and marginalized people, who are themselves changing sets over time and according to circumstances. This is especially true in a society like Palestine where needs are acute and local structures are still searching their way in trying to meet them. However, it is very

hard to excel at everything. On the other hand, NGOs are faced with decreasing aid flows from foreign donors and the international community. In addition, NGOs are characterized by the absence of internal control mechanisms, and fail to comply with practices of good governance. The leaders, managers and directors behave as if they were the owners of the NGOs.

All over the world, NGOs have played an effective and competent role in relief and emergency efforts. At the same time, NGOs are more accountable than public or private agencies in providing effective and equitable services in many areas. The NGOs are not just working to meet the needs of the marginalized and poor communities, but also to help them articulate those needs. NGOs have become increasingly important in both developing and developed countries. NGOs are more and more assuming a leadership role in the development arena. The importance of NGOs in grassroots development is now widely acknowledged. The grassroots and local NGOs are most proximate to the development needs and concerns of their communities and enjoy the trust and respect of their own people who are stakeholders in the development process. But, ever since the Peace Accord, international organizations and donors have been diverting aid away from local Palestinian NGOs that provide vital services to the poor. The expansion in the number of NGOs worldwide and their widening role as important players in socioeconomic development and in the formulation of policies has been striking since the late 1970s. However, this new role does not necessarily reflect autonomous action. It is, rather, engendered by the complex relationships NGOs entertain with the domestic and international spheres. The Palestinian case is revealing in this regard. Despite the interesting self-reliant initiatives by Palestinian NGOs during the past three decades and their significant role in the construction of civil society and state infrastructure, their agendas are possibly influenced by donor policies and conditionality attached to funding. Such influence is not, however, properly assessed, and is mostly viewed negatively. Furthermore, the possible active participation of Palestinian NGOs in the constructive formulation of critical perspectives on national and global socioeconomic agendas is not acknowledged. As is true of their contribution in the whole Middle East, NGOs in Palestine still remain an understudied terrain, especially as regards their relations with donor agencies.

Since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the volume and nature of foreign aid to NGOs in the Middle East have changed dramatically. More money is now available, primarily from Western governments, for the purpose of "strengthening peace and coexistence", that is, of normalizing relations between Israel and the Arab states. Since the Wye Agreement in 1998, US funding for NGOs has primarily aimed at combating "incitement" against the security of Israel. While US aid was being channeled towards buttressing "the peace process," European governments' funding of regional NGOs changed with the advent of the EU's grant-making department. This is particularly noticeable in the EU's funding of Palestinian NGOs: indeed, currently the most fundable project is the documentation of violations of human rights committed by the PNA.

Ever since the inception of the PNA and the Hamas government in Gaza, these governing bodies have entertained conflicting relations with Palestinian civil society, and, in particular, with NGOs. The Palestinian NGOs funded by international donors have been providing most of the services in Palestine while it was under Israeli military occupation. However, after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the advent of the PNA in 1994 and of the Hamas in 2007, things changed. The PNA and the Hamas expected the NGO community to step down from its role in service delivery and relinquish it to the two governments. However, the NGOs were not ready to give away that role and accused the government of attempting to control the sector. This mutual rejection sparked the first flicker of problems between the NGO community, on the one hand, and the PNA and the Hamas, on the other. Analysts and scholars have argued that the conflict between the three entities is imputable to three main factors. The first one is the overall political landscape in Palestine, including the relationship between NGOs and the two governing bodies. The second is the political agenda of donors. The third is the lack of financial sustainability of the two governing bodies and the NGOs who compete all three to attract funding from the same sources.

Being given the history of NGOs and their role in the occupied territories and being given also the transitional and uncertain nature of the political context in Palestine, the relationship between NGOs and the PNA has gone through

different phases. The first phase took place directly after the creation of the PNA in 1994 and later, when Hamas ruled over Gaza. This phase was mainly characterized by uncertainty shrouding the role of NGOs in the new political context and the creation of both governmental organizations in the two eras. The two bodies held two contradictory positions in this regard: on the one hand, they recognized that the services provided by NGOs filled a gap created by the governing bodies' inability to provide these same services. On the other hand, NGOs were considered as competitors to the service-delivery system of the two governing bodies. The second phase was defined by mutual acceptance between NGOs and the PNA as from 1996. It marked the initiation of dialogue between the NGOs and the PNA. As a matter of fact, NGOs started to formulate their own political discourse on civil society, democracy, development issues and the rule of law. In this phase, a big part of the NGO movement experienced a shift in its funding priorities away from service delivery to a program approach laying emphasis on gender, democracy and human rights. This led to a change in the activities and strategies of some of these NGOs. The third phase was characterized by the emerging coordination and collaboration between the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the NGOs in drafting and endorsing the Palestinian law concerning NGOs. Coordination and cooperation were extended to the sphere of relations between the NGOs and the relevant ministries in spite of hostilities from some ministries. The fourth phase was the period that followed 2007 and saw the start of the closure of Islamic NGOs in the West Bank for political reasons and the Hamas government reacting by closing and controlling NGOs affiliated with the Fatah while simultaneously trying to control other NGOs in the Gaza strip.

Finally, in addition to Israeli occupation policies and strategies, the main problem facing Palestinian society, in general, and, civil society and NGOs, in particular, at the present time is neither de-development as Roy stated, nor corruption, democracy, transparency, or the absence of the rule of law. It is, rather, the total or general separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip not because of the occupation, but because of the two sets of controlling bodies – the Fatah and the Hamas. These two bodies try to interfere with and control all aspects of the life of the Palestinian people and Palestinian civil society and NGOs

in the two areas. The two sets of bodies with parallel civic and security institutions are, on the one hand, violating human and citizen rights of the people and the political opposition on a daily basis. On the other, the leadership, members and supporters of these two governing bodies enjoy privileges that seem unbelievable to outsiders. While there is very little space for civil society organizations, including NGOs, to work in the two areas excluding the ones who are supporting the two in their areas. Therefore, according to many scholars, the first and priority task for civil society and the NGOs is to endeavor to put an end to the internal separation, arrive at internal reconciliation, and restructure and develop the PNA and PLO. The second task consists in improving the management of NGOs, endowing them with a clear mandate and structure (general assembly, board of directors or trustees and management team) that comply with the law. The third task consists in nurturing relationships, cooperation and coordination with the masses so as to be the real representatives of local communities, grassroots, and beneficiaries, in other words, to be what I call Popular CSOs and NGOs or People CSOs and NGOs.

1.1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH

The role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in building civil society (CS)[72] and in thereby contributing to peacemaking and State-building cannot be over-estimated. Azaal (1990) states that "the concept of civil society is an old European term drafted in the second half of the eighteenth century to highlight the transformation of Western Europe from totalitarianism to bourgeois democracy and it re-emerged with Antonio Gramsci after the First World War with the victory of the Russian Communist Party in order to think of the privacy that characterizes communist movements in the societies with a tradition of bourgeois democracy"[73]. On the other hand, Salem (1995) points out that civil society is regarded as one of the most complex and controversial concepts in contemporary State and social theory[74]. However, Ehrenberg (1998) argues that two developments of CS direct the modern school of social and political thought, and both are deeply rooted in liberal democratic philosophy. It was Adam Smith who first expressed the conventional bourgeois understanding of civil society as a market-oriented sphere of requirement driven by the self-interested posture of individual owners. In arguing thus, Smith borrowed heavily from Locke's earlier position following which CS manifests itself through belongings, labor, exchange and consumption. The rapid development of markets soon encouraged bourgeois political economists to hypothesize civil society as an independent self-governing sphere that can convert individual strivings for specific benefits into public good. Hegel constructed his theory of the State and civil society on this understanding, and Marx's developments of Hegel continue to inform the thinking of much of the left[75]. Civil society refers to joint action around collective interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are different from those of the State, the

[72] Lewis (2001)
[73] Azaal (1990), p. 136
[74] Walid (1995), pp. 7-30
[75] Ehrenberg (1998). John Ehrenberg is the Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Long Island University (Brooklyn Campus). He has written extensively on democracy and Marxist theory and is the author of *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat: Marxism's Theory of Socialist Democracy*.

family and the market. In practice, however, the boundaries between the State, civil society, the family and the market are often complex, unclear and negotiated.

The phrase CS generally embraces a variety of spaces, actors and institutional forms, changeable in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Scholars adopted an initial working definition of civil society that was meant to guide research activities and teaching, but it is by no means to be interpreted as a rigid and definitive statement[76]. As Salem (1995) points out, CS is to be regarded as one of the most complex and controversial concepts in contemporary State and social theory. Others see CS as collective action around common interests. In principle, its official forms are different from those of the State, the family and the market, though in practice, the borders between the State, civil society, the family and the market are often composite, unclear and discussed. CS commonly concerns a variety of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. John Ehrenberg (1998) argues that "[i]t is precisely The Communist Manifesto's call for comprehensive state-oriented political activity which is lost in the current fascination with civil society." It is undoubtedly true that intermediate associations and voluntary organizations constrain State power and perform many vital democratic tasks. We would not know much about the plight of whales or the dangers of land mines without them. The problem is that theorists of civil society have overplayed their hand. One doesn't have to be a Marxist to understand the limits of Tocqueville's celebration of civil society, and a critique of civil society has indeed become the most important project for democratic and socialist left alike[77]. And Diamond (1994) points out that 'civil society' is conceived "as the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules."[78]

There are different schools of thought among analysts trying to identify the mechanisms through which democratic transitions occur and become entrenched. CS is thought to play different roles at different stages of the democratization

[76] http://wwww.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.
[77] Ehrenberg (1998)
[78] Diamond (1994), p. 4

process. Most analysts differentiate between democratic transition and democratic consolidation. During democratic transitions, civil society is thought to play a major role in mobilizing and mounting pressure for political change. Organized students, women's groups, farmers' organizations, NGOs, trade unions, professional unions, think-tanks, human rights guardians and economic research centers are crucial sources of democratic change. CS is conceived differently from one social scientist to another, or from one school of thought to another. It is often incarnated by associations such as registered charities, development NGOs, community and grassroots committees or groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations (such as students unions, teachers, doctors, academics and lawyers), trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups. For long, social scientists deemed that the economic sphere was reducible to a two-sector world: on the one hand, there was the market, and, on the other, the government. Our great theories provide an illustration of that dichotomy, and virtually all our energy was dedicated to exploring the two institutional complexes of the market and the State. Nothing else seemed to matter much. During the last decades, the phrase CS has been associated with the term NGO despite the fact that they have two different meanings.

The central issue here is that, if NGOs are assuming greater roles in social welfare activities as more donor funding becomes available, then, the legitimacy of their claims to work with, and represent the interests of, the poor and disenfranchised at a political level and thereby build a broad-based civil society comes under threat. Indeed, the question of NGO accountability to, and legitimacy among, the grassroots given their increased funding has become a dominant theme in the recent literature. For example, increased financial support to NGOs has encouraged the proliferation of particular types of organizations with distinct social and geographical characteristics. The social phenomenon that nurtured the emergence of NGOs is by no means new, whether it be in European or Arab countries. In France, modern associations date from the 19th century, while in Arab countries, they appeared in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, the renewed interest in this movement under the name "NGO" can be traced back to the 1970s and referred at that time essentially to organizations from the North working in some countries in the South to promote their social, economic and

cultural development.[79] Claire Mercer argues that the role of NGOs in development policy is far more complex than what much of the NGO literature suggests, and she thus calls for a more contextualized and less value-laden approach to the understanding of the political role of NGOs.[80] Furthermore, Bratton (1989) argued that NGOs are significant bolsterers of civil society by virtue of their inherent participatory and democratic dimension. In the Palestinian case, after decades of conflict and occupation, and especially in the present context which is very unique in world history with the redeployment of Israeli military forces and settlers in 1994 and 2005 within the Palestinian Occupied Territories after the War of 1967, a focused look at the role of NGOs and civil society in laying the foundations for statehood is essential. A viable state should be built, and maintained, on the basis of a healthy civil society and NGO network. This fact should thus be the initial focus of any research like ours that delves into the actual and future political and development processes.

The socioeconomic achievements of the Palestinian people and organizations tend to be very distinct because of the ups and downs in the political sphere that constituted and affected their lives during the 20th century. Ali (1998) states that the economic de-development of the Occupied Territories was the consequence of official Israeli policies designed to secure military, political, and economic control over Gaza and the West Bank to protect this country's national interests[81]. In addition**,** Ali (1998) believes that the Israeli military occupation policy of de-institutionalization has occurred in all social sectors and has affected all service providers, including government, private and NGO ones. As a result, Palestinians have suffered from reduced access to basic services such as education and health care, and the cost of maintaining even reduced services has increased due to duplication and inefficiencies[82]. In their fight for liberty, independence, and self-determination, Palestinians structured themselves under a variety of rulers to safeguard and develop their national identity. More than 14 years have passed since the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was set up in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. With the establishment in 1994 of the PNA's bodies such as ministries, commissions and other organizations, substantial changes took place in

[79] Ben Néfissa (2001)
[80] Mercer
[81] Ali (1998)
[82] Ali (1998)

the political and socioeconomic landscape in the POTs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in which the Palestinian NGOs had been operating during the last 40 years, forcing them to revise their policies and strategies and redefine their role.

According to CESR (1998), during the period of Israeli military occupation, political factions began to enhance their activism and mobilization leading to the establishment of grassroots structures that constituted the origin of many current NGO's[83]. These grassroots organizations, national NGOs and Palestinian civil society (PCS) were constituted on a voluntary basis, and led by a young, educated and politically-minded generation of Palestinians. Their strategies focused on resistance to the occupation. The establishment of NGO structures that would ensure long-term, sustainable and democratic development, and the building of an energetic civil society capable of preparing the way for the emergence of an independent Palestinian State were also among the sector's main priorities. The responsibility of Palestinian NGOs in the provision of relief services as well as in the overall development process has been gradually growing since the onset of the First Intifada in 1987. Jarrar points out that Palestinian NGOs are an integral part of civil society. Over 1,400 NGOs have been providing social, industrial, agricultural, medical, housing and public services to the Palestinian population. During times of political vacuum, they also managed to fulfill the role usually played by a national government[84]. Dr Walker (2005) states that today, there are at least 1,200 Palestinian NGOs working in a geo-political space equivalent to the combined size of Washington D.C. and Delaware. 400 of them are local NGOs and are organized under the umbrella of the General Union of Charitable Organizations, 90 others are organized under the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations' Network (PNGO) and a couple hundred others are divided among 4 other NGO Unions. Despite such a high number of social welfare providers, human rights organizations, and the abundance of high-quality documentation, legal analysis, research and statistical information about Israeli military occupation, Palestinian history, politics, and culture, the current situation in Palestine continues to deteriorate.[85] However, Hadi believes that during the years of the First Intifada, the NGOs developed new strategies and methods.

[83] CESR and PNGO (1998)
[84] Jarrar (2005)
[85] Walker (2005)

Tangible projects for certain target groups and popular committees operating in the villages, camps, and towns of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were added to the widespread mass campaigns and voluntary neighborhood work[86].

The creation of NGO structures ensured long-term, sustainable and democratic development, as well as the building of an energetic civil society. However, according to Hadi, pluralism has been a feature of Palestinian life for almost three decades marked by the absence of a national government and during which hundreds of NGOs have been established - many of them obeying to political motivations - partly in order to extend their influence on society by providing services. The NGOs were active in a variety of fields (for example, labor and student unions, professional, charitable and health associations, women organizations, think-tanks)[87]. The PNGOs include charitable societies, cooperatives, associations, development organizations and some other social interest groups such as unions representing the disabled, women's organizations and youth clubs and unions. Religious associations, whether Islamic or Christian, and other related bodies are registered as NGOs though they differ from them insofar as their concern extends beyond the purely charitable or benevolent aspects. Those NGOs provided all different kinds of relief services, promoted democratic principles, and mobilized the masses to advance the Intifada and its demands. They also constructed coalitions and lobbied their cause and tried to bend public opinion in the direction of their aspirations.

The diversity of NGOs and of their activities during the First Intifada as well as their ability to maintain and even increase funding sources contributed a great deal to their institutionalization within the Palestinian society, despite Israeli policies of outlawing and closing down Palestinian NGOs and grassroots committees. Nevertheless, NGOs have been performing the much-needed job of filling the gaps left by the government's service delivery system. According to available data, it is believed that the share of the NGO sector in service provision covers over 60 percent of all health-care services, 80 percent of all rehabilitation services, and almost 100 percent of all preschool education. The same is true of

[86] Mahdi (1997)
[87] Mahdi (1997)

other sectors such as agriculture and water. It is worth noting that the NGO sector employs more than 20,000 people in different areas, whereas the government employs around 150,000 people.

In 1994, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was established after the two parties signed the Declaration of Principles (DP) and the subsequent agreements between the PLO and Israel. For CESR (1998)[88], the simple truth is that Oslo and the illusion of peace made the world forget about the violations of human rights by Israel in occupied Palestine. People forget that Israel still exercises direct military occupation in 73% of the West Bank and 40% of the Gaza Strip, that it maintains security control over an additional 24% of the West Bank, and suffocates the remaining 3% through closures. By any empirical standard, Palestinian living conditions are much worse now than they were before as a direct consequence of Israeli policies during the five years of the so-called peace process[89].

Substantial changes have occurred in the political and socioeconomic context in Palestine. These changes have influenced the work of NGOs, forcing them to shift to different and more appropriate programs and strategies. NGOs have also given up the relief and development work they carried out during the period of Israeli military occupation in favor of sustainable development. Palestinians have acquired a new status that obliges them to perform many of the functions of a State, even though they have not attained formal statehood. Therefore, the Palestinian NGOs working in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had to revise their strategies and redefine their role. Since then, the relationship between the NGO sector and the government has been volatile and unstable, and NGOs have had to operate within an ambiguous legal framework that left them vulnerable to political pressure. According to Izzat (2004), NGOs do not consider themselves to be mere service providers, but also as constituting an effective body in the national and political process of struggle against the occupation.[90] For Sullivan (2001), this is a rare case of State-building, something that does not happen everyday. Sullivan further explains that it is normal for the governing

[88] CESR, Center for Economic and Social Rights, New York
[89] Ali (1998)
[90] Izzat (2004)

body to clash with those who are to be governed during the process of elaboration of the appropriate institutions and legal frameworks.[91] As Izzat notes, the Palestinian NGOs found themselves at a new crossroads with two major options: 1) to be 'absorbed' within the authority's structure for one or more reasons; or 2) to remain independent and continue to work outside the government structure. This category comprises mainly NGOs from the opposition factions and those that are not directly related or linked to the activities of the PNA and its ministries, for example, think tanks, research institutes, human rights or women's organizations.[92] Jarrar adds that in the wake of this era, there was a call for the regulation of the relationship between the NGOs and the PNA, on the one hand, and between the NGOs and the local community, on the other.

The need for the redefinition of the nature of the relationship between NGOs and the private sector and of the relationship among the individual NGOs also arose at that time.[93] As a result, serious discussions took place between the PNA, civil society organizations (CSO), and the NGO sector represented by the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGO). The debate took place in order to determine the clear role, mission and objectives of the NGO sector. The relationship between the NGO sector, other players, and the PNA has been volatile and unstable, and NGOs have had to operate within an ambiguous legal framework that left them vulnerable to political pressure.

[91] Sullivan (2001)
[92] Mahdi, 1997
[93] Jarrar (2005)

1.2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

The first chapter will provide a general introduction on NGOs and civil society, NGOs and sustainable development, and the relationship between NGOs and the Palestinian National Authority. It will also provide the general structure of the research, the rationale behind it, and, finally, the methodology of the research.

In the second chapter, we shall provide a brief overview of the history of Palestine since the early 1990s, including the Israeli military occupation, the period preceding and following Oslo and the Cairo Agreement in 1993, the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, and the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The chapter will also provide a general background of the Palestinian economy on the eve of the Oslo Accords and the impact of Israeli military occupation on the economy before discussing the current dilemmas and future challenges it faces. We shall then review economic development and de-development, discuss Israeli policy towards the Palestinians through enclaves, cantons, settlements and the Apartheid Wall. The chapter will also review the political situation from the Israeli occupation in 1948 to the eve of the Oslo Accords and the impact of the Oslo Accords and related agreements on Palestine and the Palestinians before discussing the Camp David meeting and the Second Intifada, the 2008-2009 Israeli War against the Gaza Strip, and the Goldstone Mission.

The third chapter will provide an overview of civil society in theory and in practice, examine the various understandings of the phrase NGOs, discuss the role of NGOs in Palestine with a focus on development, and then review and examine the experience and performance of NGOs during the First and Second Intifada as well as the impact of Israeli military occupation policies and strategies on them. In addition, the chapter will discuss and analyze the activities of NGOs during the PNA period, the relations between NGOs and the donor community, before concluding about its future role and relations. The chapter will also critically examine the working relations and partnerships of NGOs with civil society in its broadest sense, as well as with the beneficiaries, among themselves, the Southern and Northern NGOs (that is, NGOs in the Third World and their counterparts in the West), the donors and the PNA. The chapter will also focus on

the period that followed the Hamas' victory during the elections in 2006, a period that saw the establishment of parallel structures by this party.

The fourth chapter will analyze the survey of the board of directors and management team of the NGOs with tables and diagrams synthesizing their answers to our questionnaire.

The fifth chapter will discuss the survey of the beneficiaries and their relation with NGOs by analyzing their answers to our questionnaire.

Finally, the last chapter will draw conclusions and make recommendations on how NGOs could improve their response to changes and challenges. We shall also delve into the question of the role NGOs should play in order to contribute to a healthy civil society in the future, especially after the tussle concerning the roles and resources of the NGOs and the PNA ministries established in the last months of 1996.

At the end of this research, we will add five annexes dealing respectively with a statement of NGOs concerning foreign funding to the Palestinian National Authority, a list of NGOs that are members of the NGO network, a statement concerning the Apartheid Wall, the questionnaire submitted to beneficiaries of the activities of NGOs, and the one submitted to the board of directors and management team of NGOs.

1.3. THE RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH

Ng'ethe (1991) points out that both development experts and social scientists engaged in the study and research on development issues can hardly arrive at valid conclusions if they do not take into account the history of NGOs and their role in development programs.[94] Edwards and Hulme (1996) state that "[t]he access of NGOs to decision-making in both North and South is greater than ever before, as their advocacy role continues to expand and they are courted in debates over policy and practice"[95]. NGOs are very important actors in the field of development, human rights and democracy in any democratic society. For Jorgensen (1996), NGOs are conceived as vehicles for the democratization of societies and as essential components of a thriving civil society. A thriving civil society is in turn seen as essential to the success of the economic dimension of political agendas. NGOs can of course legitimately claim not to be openly political, but they must all be aware that their work takes on a political dimension.[96]. This view challenges the conventional thinking of the PNA according to which the new era no longer calls for the activities of NGOs in contrast to the period marked by Israeli occupation. By 1995, however, the donor community and aid agencies were funding the majority of civil society projects. They were also funding and assisting many of the largest projects of the Palestinian government such as the creation of the Palestinian Authority's legislative and parliamentary infrastructure and the restructuring of the Palestinian economy.

Since the end of the 1970s, the expansion of the number of NGOs worldwide and their widening role as actors in socioeconomic development and in the formulation of policies have been striking. However, this new role does not necessarily equate with autonomous action; it is rather the product of complex relationships between NGOs and the national and international environment. A World Bank study (2006a) reveals that the number of NGOs in the world has increased exponentially from the mid-1970s to 1985.[97] According to Jarrar (2005), the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a substantial increase of the number of NGOs,

[94] Ng'ethe (1991)
[95] Edwards and Hulme (1996), p. 3
[96] Jorgensen (1996)
[97] World Bank (2006a)

most of which were charitable organizations operating at the regional level. The legal framework appropriate to these organizations was based on Jordanian law, which was itself more or less an extension of Ottoman law[98]. Jarrar (2005) adds that throughout the late 1970s and the early 1980s, a new trend appeared in the NGO landscape, namely, the emergence of voluntary grassroots organizations. These organizations started to function in different fields on the ground without obtaining the due authorization from the so-called Israeli civil administration. This fact placed them outside the law from the Israeli legal perspective.[99] According to Salem (1995), it was this active network of civil society institutions that embraced and then coordinated the Intifada from 1987 to 1993[100]. These new grassroots organizations, which mainly aimed at building the infrastructure of the resistance, made an impact on the activities of NGOs and civil society in Palestine; the latter were indeed led to improve their outlook and readjust their mission. This influence is not, however, properly assessed, and is mostly viewed negatively.

A great deal has been written about NGOs, especially development NGOs, and their role in promoting democracy and social change. NGOs have come to be seen as a constitutive part of civil society in many countries, and in this vein, as a balance to the power of the State.[101] Dr Walker (2005) believes that due to their deeply-rooted connection to politics and the Palestinian community at large, these grassroots organizations also provided the political space for the creation of a strong and pluralistic society in the West Bank and Gaza. During the period ranging from 1987 to 1990, the grassroots organizations served as the driving and organizing force behind the popular committees of the First Intifada while continuing to provide services to the Palestinian society.[102] The Palestinian case is revealing in this regard: despite the interesting self-reliant initiatives by Palestinian NGOs during the past 40 years and their significant role in civil society and State-building, their agendas are possibly influenced by donor policies and conditions attached to funding. Furthermore, the possible active participation of Palestinian NGOs in the constructive formulation of critical perspectives on

[98] Jarrar (2005)
[99] Jarrar (2005)
[100] Salem (1995), pp.138-139
[101] Hadenius and Uggla (1996) and Van Rooy (1998) as quoted in Lewis (2001)
[102] Walker (2005)

national and global socioeconomic agendas is not acknowledged. As is true of their contribution in the whole Middle East, NGOs in Palestine still remain an understudied terrain, especially as regards their relations with donor agencies.

Since the creation of the first NGOs in Palestine, the relationship among local NGOs has been subject to an evolutionary process. The establishment of the Union of Charitable Societies in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip represented a new development in the coordination of local NGOs. Political developments, the realization of the sector's importance and of the fact that the NGOs as a whole were part of the larger framework of civil society, led some of the organizations to form the first NGO network in Palestine – (the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) - as an attempt to facilitate networking and coordination among certain member NGOs. During the 1990s, four additional NGO networks were created, three in the Gaza Strip and one in the West Bank. Recently, a coalition of NGO bodies in the West Bank consisting of PNGO, the Union of Charitable Societies and the League for National Institutions was formed and a position paper outlining the envisaged cooperation was signed. The first structured consultative mechanism among NGOs - involving both West Bank and Gaza NGOs - was facilitated by the World Bank NGO Trust Fund, whose board of governors comprised active representatives of different groups of Palestinian NGOs. Naturally, a lot of work still needs to be done in the area of cooperation beyond the many initiatives already taken to promote sectorial cooperation among NGOs.

The PNA argues that NGOs have played a very important political and socio-economic role during the Intifada and the 40 years of Israeli military occupation. But, with the arrival of the PNA in the POTs, the NGOs should relinquish their previous role to the allegedly more capable and more accountable PNA. Further, the PNA suggests that NGOs should be linked to certain ministries according to the areas in which they have competencies. The officials of the PNA believe that NGOs compete against the PNA for funding and by being part of the opposition. Bishara (1996)[103] argues that NGOs have played a role in economic development as well as a political role as they did in the past. But, they have a third role, namely, to build a democratic society free of human rights violations.

[103] Rana Bishara is the first Director of the Palestinian NGO network.

Giacaman (1995)[104] argues that if civil society is to flourish in Palestine, then, the prolonged survival of comparatively autonomous forms of NGOs is to be ascertained as NGOs have always played a fundamental role in Palestine. Indeed, Jarrar (2005) stresses that NGOs have always played a vital role in Palestinian civil society. Since its inception, the NGO sector has been an essential component of the Palestinian national political landscape and shared the thirst for a liberated and independent Palestine. The vitality and dynamism of NGOs are at the root of the evolution of Palestinian civil society in its multifaceted aspects. The responsibility of the NGO sector in the provision of services to people as well as in the overall development process has been steadily growing since the onset of the First Intifada in 1987.

With the advent of the PNA, NGOs found themselves confronted with new political realities and challenges. This was not only the case in Palestine, but also in the whole Arab region where governments became more hostile towards NGOs – especially, those working to promote human rights and democracy - and employed a diverse tool-kit of plans to destabilize and discredit the efforts of NGOs. In addition, governments throughout the region reviewed, modified or rewrote laws governing the establishment, registration and operation of NGOs. Intensive debate took place between the PNA, CS, and NGOs, which were represented by the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGO). However, Sullivan (1996) states that the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the advent of the PNA have changed the reality. The PNA expected the NGO community to step down from its role in service delivery and hand that role to the government[105]. According to Jarrar (2005), since then, there has been an on-going policy dialogue between NGOs and the government, the first of which was facilitated by the World Bank[106]. The relationship between Palestinian NGOs and the PNA has been controversial since the establishment of the latter in 1994[107].

[104] Giacaman (1995). George Giacaman is a member of the Steering Committee of the Palestinian NGO Network. He is also the Dean of the Faculty of Arts at Birzeit University and an Associate Professor of philosophy. He is a board member and co-founder of Muwatin, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy.
[105] Sullivan (1996), pp. 93-100
[106] Jarrar (2005)
[107] Hammami (2000)

Al-Shouli believes that the conflict is not simply a matter of allocating roles and jurisdictions, but is rooted in deeper issues[108]. There thus arises the need of creating a legal framework within which NGOs could operate and maintain a regular and healthy relationship with the relevant structures, while at the same time helping to create a democratic internal structure in accordance with the rule of law and practices of good governance. NGOs became engaged in the strengthening of the legal system, the creation of institutional capacity for the fair administration of justice, the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the enhancement of the rule of law in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, these efforts have met with various obstacles originating largely from the absence of a clear separation of powers.

The research will try to answer to the following questions: How do NGOs respond to the changes and challenges that took, and are taking, place? What will be the role of NGOs in the development process? We shall also make some recommendations concerning the role of NGOs in the future.

[108] Al-Shouli (2006)

1.4. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

The research will study and critically examine the role of Palestinian NGOs during the last forty years. In particular, it is going to focus on the changes in their role during the New Era, that is, from 1994 to the present time. This raises a number of questions to which our research will try to answer: What will be the role of NGOs and civil society in the future Palestine? Is there any difference between the roles played by NGOs during the Israeli military occupation and the New Era, respectively? And, what should be the relation between NGOs and the PNA and the new administrative structures that will emerge? Some additional questions will be answered: What kind of relationship is there between Palestinian NGOs and beneficiaries in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Is there coordination, cooperation and networking among Palestinian NGOs? Is there a partnership between Palestinian NGOs and Southern NGOs? Is there a working relationship or partnership between Palestinian NGOs and International NGOs working in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Who is the decision-maker, Palestinian NGOs or donors? And, what is the relationship between Palestinian NGOs and the Palestinian National Authorities?

In addition, the research will discuss and consider the future role and mission of NGOs in building the State and civil society in Palestine. This will be achieved, firstly, through a study of the NGO literature and secondary resources. Secondly, the research will critically analyze the answers to the questions above in the background and the structure of the study. Thirdly, through the two questionnaires which we have prepared, one for the management team and board members of NGOs that was handed to 50 Palestinian NGOs from different sectors, and the other for 100 beneficiaries of the activities of NGO in different areas of the occupied territories. This will be supplemented by an interview with representatives of NGOs, PNA, and beneficiaries in the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON PALESTINE

2.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PALESTINE

Palestine is a small country, a land of 27,000 square kilometers[109] that has long been a territorial designation on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea[110]. It may be regarded as a mountainous country, with the loftiest and most impressive mountains located in the north.[111] As part and parcel of Greater Syria, Palestine has a few natural landmarks, and aside from the Mediterranean Sea, it has natural borders.[112] During its long history, its area, population and ownership varied greatly. The name Palestine refers to a region that ranges from the east of the Mediterranean Sea to Jordan in the west, and from Egypt in the south to Lebanon in the north. The divisions of Palestine differed following the ages. In the time of Patriarchs, the country was divided among the tribes or nations that were descendants of the sons of Canaan.[113] Palestine has been settled continuously for tens of thousands of years. Fossil residues of *Homo erectus*, *Neanderthal* and intermediary types between *Neanderthal* and modern man have been discovered there. Archeologists have also found hybrid Emmer wheat at Jericho dating from before 8,000 B.C. that makes this city one of the oldest sites of agricultural activity in the world[114]. Amorites, Canaanites, and other Semitic peoples related to the Phoenicians of Tyre entered the area about 2,000 B.C. The area became known as the Land of Canaan.

Man's first influx into the district goes back approximately to around 500,000 to 600,000 years. However, the original known inhabitants were the

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[109] http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Palestine
[110] Quigley (2010)
[111] Kitto (2005)
[112] Benvenisti (2000), esp. chap. 1; Enderwits (2002), chap. 4; Khalidi (1997), chap. 2. See also Lewis (1980), Biger (1990), pp. 2-4; Biger (2004), chap. 1; and Silberman (1989, 2002).
[113] Kitto (2005)
[114] http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_early_palestine_name_origin.php

Phoenicians, referred to as Canaanites (the name given to merchants in Semitic); they migrated from the Red Sea around 3, 500 B.C.. The Canaanites took advantage of their location at the heart of routes connecting three continents and built trading ties with the peoples of Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, and Egypt's Old Kingdom dynasties. The Canaanites are the earliest known inhabitants of Palestine. They are thought to have lived in Palestine in the third millennium B.C.. Palestine's prime location made it the focus of territorial conflicts and occupation. As part of the Fertile Crescent extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Arab Gulf, and from Taurus and Zagros Mountains in the north to the Arabian Desert in the south, Palestine has always been a land of passage. For this reason, it was also a site of cultural encounter and exchange. As part and parcel of Greater Syria, Palestine has a few natural landmarks, and aside from the Mediterranean Sea, it has natural borders.[115] Palestine has always been relatively poor in natural resources, but it has been a strategic location on the crossroads of the ancient world. Human history here goes back to 500, 000 to 600, 000 years or more. Palestine has been a crossroads for religion, culture, commerce, and politics. Armies and caravans passed over its roads and lands for millennia, often meeting there and engaging in battles.[116] Both the political status and the geographic area designated as Palestine have changed considerably over the last three hundred years. But historically, it is known as the area ranging from the west of River Jordan and extending to the edge of the Arabian Desert.[117]

Prior to 1880, the Jewish population of Palestine lived almost entirely in its holy cities, namely, Jerusalem, Tiberias, Safad and Hebren. The Jewish population of Palestine increased by 55,000[118] between 1880 and 1910. After the nineteenth century, new political circumstances animated Jewish social and political life. The release of European Jews, signaled by the French revolution, brought Jews out of their "ghetto" and exposed them to the modern world and its ideas. The liberal concepts introduced by the release as well as modern nationalist ideas were blended with traditional Jewish ideas about Israel and Zion. There, the tradition of living in the land of the Jews and returning to Zion had remained

[115] Kramer (2007)
[116] www.palestinefacts.org
[117] Homayon (2010)
[118] Kayyali (1978)

practical goals rather than messianic aspirations, and Hebrew was a living language. Rabbi Yehuda Alcalay, who lived in what is now called Yugoslavia, published the first Zionist writings in the 1840s. They were adopted by a few European Jews as the starting point in their ideal quest. The release of Jews triggered a new type of dynamic anti-Jewish political and social movement in Europe, mainly in Germany and Eastern Europe. Beginning in the late 1800s, the repression of Jews in Eastern Europe had stimulated the emigration of Jews to Palestine. 75% of the world's Jews lived in Eastern Europe during the nineteenth century and most of them did so within the boundaries of the Russian Empire[119]. At roughly the same time, the early Zionists arrived as missionaries. Zionism was a European phenomenon and thus shared other Westerners' disregard for the local population.[120] Jews continued to travel to the area, and never stopped coming in small numbers all throughout history to what they called "the Holy land" or Palestine. Palestine also remained the core of Jewish worship and a part of Jewish culture. However, the Jewish connection with the land was mostly theoretical and dreamy.

The new Zionist movement became an official organization in 1897 when the first Zionist congress was organized by Theodor Herzl and held in Basle. Herzl's grandfather was familiar with the writings of Alcalay, and it is very possible that they had an influence on him. The Zionists' wish was to create a "Jewish State" in Palestine under Turkish and German occupation. Ilan Pappé claims that Theodor Herzl "attempted to enlist British help in installing a temporary Jewish state (i.e., one that would eventually be moved to Palestine) in British Uganda, an offer which was seriously considered by some in Whitehall," only to have his plan foiled by Weizmann. In fact, it was the British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, not Herzl, who conceived of the East African idea. Nor was the "Uganda plan" foiled by Herzl's opponents, least of all Weizmann. Herzl narrowly got the plan passed by his last Zionist Congress in 1903, overriding the opposition of such Zionist leaders as Menahem Ussishkin and

[119] Gelvin (2005)
[120] Pappé (2004)

Yehiel Chlenov. It was only after Herzl's death in July 1904 that the idea was unceremoniously buried.[121]

In the beginning, the majority of Zionists were not worried about the Arab population; they utterly ignored it, or thought it would agree to move voluntarily to other Arab countries. In any case, they envisioned the population of Palestine in terms of the millions of European Jews who would soon form a decisive majority in the land. The Zionists established farm communities in Palestine at "Petah Tikva, Zichron Jacob, Rishon Letzion" and elsewhere. Later, they established the new city of Tel Aviv in the north of Jaffa. At the same time, Palestine's population was growing rapidly. By 1914, the total population of Palestine stood at about 700,000. About 615,000 were Palestinian Arabs, and 85,000 to 100,000 were Jews. "For the indigent Arab population of Palestine, the British Balfour Declaration of 1917 - proposing their country to the Zionist movement as national homeland - was the first act of aggression against their interests."[122] At the time of the Balfour Declaration, Palestinians comprised 70 percent of the population and owned more than 90 percent of the land[123]. Kanafani asserts that "it is certain that this stage of revolt was directed substantially, if not entirely, against the British rather than the Zionists." [124]

The foundations of the Zionist military apparatus were laid under British supervision. The present conflict between Zionist Jews and Palestinians dates back to the 1910s. The Zionists emigrated mainly from Europe and Russia and came to the ancient homeland of the Jews to establish a Jewish national State. The Palestinians wanted to stop Zionist immigration and set up a secular democratic Palestinian State. Beginning in 1929, Palestinians and Zionists openly fought in Palestine. "The Zionist movement entered the forties to find the field practically clear for it with the international climate favorable following the psychological and political atmosphere caused by Hitler's massacres of the Jews." [125] As a result of the Holocaust in Europe, many Jews illegally entered Palestine during World

[121] Karsh (2004)
[122] Pappé (2005)
[123] Morrison (2010), November, www.onlineopinion.com
[124] Kanafani (1970)
[125] Kanafani (1970)

War II. At the end of World War II in 1945, the United States embraced the Zionist cause. Despite strong Arab opposition, the United Nations voted on November 29, 1947 for the partition of Palestine and the creation of an independent Jewish state[126].

2.2. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY ON THE EVE OF OSLO

2.2.1. The General Background and the Impact of the Israeli Occupation

The Palestinian Occupied Territories (POTs) of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip cover a combined area of about 6,000 square kilometers. According to a World Bank Report published in 1994, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had a GNP of about US$ 2.9 billion and a GNP per capita of US$ 1 715. In UNSCO's perspective[127] (Quarterly Report, Autumn 1996, ii), their real GNP was approximately equal to US$ 3.9 billion and their per capita GNP o about 1 480 compared to US$ 2 425 in 1992 and US$ 1 715 in 1994. An ILO report in 1993 estimated that 2.1 million people lived inside and 3.5 million outside the Occupied Territories and UNSCO (1996) estimated that 2,609,300 inhabitants live in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. UNSCO reported in 1996 that the Palestinian labor force grew at a rate of 5.6 percent during the first half of 1996. At mid-year, the total labor force amounted to some 521,600 persons. By mid–1996, the average unemployment rate stood at 29.2 percent in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Between 1992 and 1996, real GNP had declined by 22.7 percent, mainly as a result of the loss of employment and closure. According to the 2004 World Bank Report, the Palestinians were suffering from "the worst economic depression in modern history", 75 percent of them were impoverished, and the unemployment rate ranged from 60 to 70 percent in Gaza and 30 to 40 percent in the West Bank.[128]

[126] http://www.history.com
[127] UNSCO Report (1996)
[128] World Bank Report (2004)

The economy of the West Bank and Gaza was during that period, and still is today, mainly service-oriented. In 1991, the agricultural sector accounted for about 30 percent of GDP, industry about 8 percent, construction about 12 percent, and the remaining 50 percent were contributed by the services sector. A striking feature of this economy is its heavy dependence on the Israeli economy. Usher points out that since 1967, and precisely in order to forestall the possibility of an independent economic basis that would promote Palestinian self-determination, industry in the POTs has been systematically de-developed by "Israel"[129]. Walker states that, "[b]y year 2000, billions of international aid and development dollars had been spent in the OPTs — yet the movement towards a viable Palestine state was stagnant. The reason was quite clear. Behind the façade of state-building and peacemaking, the one obstacle to a viable Palestinian state, Israel's colonial project, had become solidified. By 2000, it had morphed into an apartheid-like reality in which Palestinians found themselves corralled into Bantustans with none of the international political support that was truly needed to end Israeli colonization."[130] According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, for every dollar produced in POTs, 45 cents flow back to Israel.[131] The Occupation's policy of opening its economy to unskilled Palestinian labor after 1967 had deep impacts on the Palestinian local economy: it increased income levels and private consumption, but at the same time deepened dependence on occupation and further weakened the indigenous economy.[132] Income, consumption and living standards more than doubled in real terms between 1968 and 1988.[133] However, these economic benefits were not the consequence of the reform and restructuring of the Palestinian economy, but can rather be accounted for by the external income generated by Palestinian labor in Israel and increased remittances from Palestinians working in the Gulf.[134]

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[129] Usher (1995)
[130] Uda Olabarria Walker is the Political Education and Delegations Director for the Middle East Children's Alliance in Berkeley, California.
[131] Ghada (2005) and UNCTAD (2005)
[132] UNCTAD (1996), p. 13
[133] State of Israel (1989), p. 30. See also Rekhess (1975), p. 412.
[134] UNCTAD (1986, 1987), p. 11 & p. 1, respectively

According to the Bank of Israel, from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, the number of laborers from the POTs working in the Green Line increased by almost 400 percent, from 22,800 to 109,400. In the Gaza Strip, earnings and income from "Israel" accounted for almost 50% of GNP by 1987. As a direct result, the level of domestic employment fell dramatically between 1968 and 1987.[135] The decline in domestic employment signaled the transformation of the Palestinian economy from a labor-surplus to a labor-scarce economy unable to compete with the superior income-earning opportunities available in "Israel". In this way, labor integration denied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the full use of their own human and economic resources and established the conditions for structural unemployment after "Israel" restricted the flow of Palestinian labor and the Palestinian economy revealed itself unable to absorb the workers.

During the first two decades of occupation, Palestinian GDP and GNP grew under the impulsion of private expenditure and investment. In Gaza, for example, GDP grew from $ 183.5 million in 1972 to $ 481.2 million in 1987, an increase of 162 percent. GNP grew similarly by 223 percent between 1972 and 1987, rising from $ 256.5 million to $ 828.8 million respectively.[136] Looking at the performance of Palestinian GDP retrospectively, three trends stand out: (1) agriculture's share continued to decline, while industry's share was always minimal; (2) construction and services generated a disproportionate share of GDP; and (3) the growth of GDP was fuelled largely by external resources and consumption from Palestinian labor in Israel and abroad.

The meager contribution of agriculture and industry to GDP indicates that productive sectors played a minor role in Palestinian economic growth and

[135] Roy, p. 212, and Sadan (August 1991), p. 69

[136] Data in this section are derived from the UNCTAD Secretariat: "Prospects for Sustained Development of the Palestinian Economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Quantitative Framework, 1991-2010," Geneva, Switzerland, December 1991, pp. 14-32; and "Prospects For Sustained Development of the Palestinian Economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1990-2010: A Quantitative Framework," Geneva Switzerland, April 1992, pp. 17-32. Quoted and referenced with permission of the Director of the Special Economic Unit for the Palestinian People, UNCTAD, Geneva, Switzerland.

development. By contrast, the construction and services sectors enjoyed a rapid rise in output between 1967 and 1987, with growth rates that often exceeded those of GDP. The overall services sector accounted for over 50 percent of domestic output from 1967 to 1987. But this strong performance was linked to the following two factors, none of which was indicative of rational structural change: first, the desperate need for housing in the Gaza Strip, and, second, the dearth of investment opportunities outside residential construction. Moreover, private earnings and remittances, and not locally generated revenue or government investment, funded most of the activities in this sector. International assistance mainly focused the construction of facilities and systems and the rehabilitation of infrastructure and provided sub-optimal funding in areas such as the environment health, mental health, the training of health and educational personnel, early childhood and informal education, refugee housing, projects for the camp population, rural development, agriculture, agricultural water, and industry. Indeed, the neglect of the productive sectors of the Palestinian economy, especially industry, is striking. To be sure, one can pinpoint to specific important projects in these areas and to the necessity of drawing priorities, especially in a context where 30 to 40 percent of the labor force is unemployed – with the majority of unemployed Palestinians being unskilled -, where growing numbers of people are malnourished and, to varying degrees, traumatized, where health and education services are inadequate and deteriorating due, in part, to poorly-skilled professionals, and where sectoral conditions continue to deteriorate.

According to the World Bank, there are several key factors that are critical to the success of industrial zones, among which, political and social stability, macroeconomic policies, infrastructure, the legal/regulatory framework and institutions, and access of the country to foreign markets.[137] At present, the POTs exhibit none of these factors. Moreover, "no matter how attractive a country's economic opportunities, it will always be difficult to stimulate investment in the face of unstable political and social conditions. Failures have occurred when non-economic criteria [were] used."[138] Consequently, the creation

[137] World Bank (1997), Foreign Investment Advisory Service, p. 41
[138] *Ibid* and p. 43

of industrial zones does not necessarily equate with industrial development.[139] For the POTs, if the possibility of creating 100,000 jobs as planned materializes, it will certainly constitute a crucial and vital step in efforts to alleviate poverty in the short-term. On the other hand, insofar as Palestinian industrial and economic development is concerned, industrial zones hold little promises since they will be largely comprised of Israeli export concerns which employ cheap Palestinian labor engaged in product design, marketing, and quality control,. Even though backward linkages to the local economy (for example, under the form of increased consumer spending) will inevitably occur, they will not avail local industry with the capital, free market access, investment environment, or suitably trained workforce upon which its own internal development depends.[140]

Arguably, industrial estates could reveal themselves damaging to local industry because they provide a competitive problem for those Palestinian businessmen who do not use them and remain subject to the constraints of closure, further precluding the possibility of sectoral reform. Moreover, by allowing a certain amount of unrestricted trade to occur, industrial zones will legitimize and solidify the border closure as an economic fact of life.

2.2.2. The Palestinian Economy: Current Dilemmas and Future Challenges

Since 1948, occupation planners, politicians, and military leaders have strived to de-develop the Palestinian economy through the confiscation of land and resources. They have also undermined its potential growth by rendering the economy dependent upon the occupation. In recent years, agencies like the World

[139] *Ibid* and pp. 47-48

[140] However, the PNA has proposed a series of local and municipal industrial estates located in the interior of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. See "Municipal Industrial Complexes and Support for Small-Scale Industries," in *Palestinian Investment Program 1995-1998 - Project Proposals*, World Bank (1995), Washington, D.C.. See also *Industrial Estates and Enabling Environment for Private Sector Development for West Bank and Gaza*, The World Bank (1995), Washington, D.C., June.

Bank, the British Department for International Development (DFID), KFW and JICA have eased these efforts at de-development. All these actors worked together with the PNA to implement so-called "development" schemes that treated the occupier as a partner, rather than what it is – an occupier.[141] The 1967 occupation of the POTs brought their economy into direct contact with that of the occupier and represented the second major dislocation of the POTs' economy since 1948. Being small, unorganized, and largely agricultural, this economy was insufficiently equipped to withstand the weight of a highly industrialized and technologically advanced economy such as "Israel's". By 1967, the total GNP of the POTs combined equaled 2.6 percent of the "Israeli" GNP.[142] The economic performance of the PNA since 1994 has also been a source of frustration for the Palestinians. Despite generating over 110,000 jobs within the structure of the PNA, the public sector could not absorb most of the unemployed, or create the means of absorbing them productively. Most of the jobs created are in the police force or in duplicated ministries formed in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank. In 1999, the public sector employed 13 percent of those working in the West Bank. In Gaza, over 26 percent of persons employed work for the PA, making it the largest employer after "Israel", but wages are typically half as large as in the latter country.[143] The public sector gives desk jobs to unemployed Palestinians with higher education, but generates a net loss of revenue to the economy in so far as these professionals could earn much higher incomes in other positions, even if these are located outside of the Territories.

The PNA has failed to develop a transparent legal system and promote private sector development. Rather, it established and encouraged the development of more than 30 monopolies and deepened its financial reliance on the occupation. The customs union established by Oslo between the occupation and the POTs forced the activities of the Palestinian economy to depend on goods passing via occupation and heading for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Two thirds of total PNA revenue over the period ranging from 1994 to 1998 were accounted for by customs duties, but the returns have not been used to encourage

[141] The Palestinian Grassroots Anti-apartheid Wall Campaign, www.stopthewall.org
[142] Benvenisti (1984)
[143] MAS (2000)

productive economic investment. A limited class of PNA-affiliated companies and individuals are monopolizing rent and benefiting from the occupation. The Palestinian Commercial Service Company (PCSC), fully owned by the PNA, holds the majority of shares in the 34 major Palestinian monopolies.[144] In 1999, a joint statement by a group of Palestinian intellectuals, political leaders, and dissidents denounced the corruption of the PNA, the humiliation and abuses against the people.[145] In 1999, the PCSC held assets totaling $345 million, the equivalent of eight percent of total GDP.

Though multifarious factors impact on the economic situation in the West Bank, it is generally undisputed that the sweeping restrictions on movement since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada are the major reason behind the deterioration of the Palestinian economy and the increase in unemployment and poverty. If the occupier's refusal of the Oslo accords and of its economic premises persists, the viability of the economic relations between the PTOs and the occupation will arise in the future. The reality on the ground suggests that such a separation might resemble more to economic apartheid than to economic autonomy or independence. Such a formula is likely to create more instability in the region, rather than peaceful coexistence.

Closure, siege, and blockade refer, correspondingly, to the regular occupation authorities' strategies, policies and practices of closing off the Palestinian Occupied Territories (POTs) to movement within the POTs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and into occupied land since 1948. The years since the Oslo accords have seen a marked deterioration in Palestinian economic life and an accelerated de-development process. The significant economic features of the post-Oslo period, namely, blockade and closure, have exacerbated the main characteristics of this process. The closures inflicted on the Palestinian population of the occupied territories are a form of collective punishment which violates Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and also the right to the freedom of movement enshrined in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[146] The consequences of these closures are enclaves, such as those

[144] PNA Paper (2000), June 7-8
[145] Brown (2003)
[146] LAW (1998), September

that can be observed in the physical separation of the West Bank and Gaza - the fading of economic relations between the Palestinian and occupation economies, and growing segmentation of the Palestinian labor market. Being given these circumstances, the prospects for sustained economic development are bleak and will remain so as long as the policy of closure continues.[147] Closure is implemented via a widespread network of roadblocks, curfews and military checkpoints. Since the Oslo Accords, the POTs have been incessantly subjected to the policy of closures implemented by the occupier. This policy of closure resulted in strict restrictions on circulation, and because of the nature of the current stage of the agreement - following which Palestinians control fragmented areas that do not form a contiguous entity -, the Palestinian cities, towns, refugee camps and villages are easily isolated. It is well known that the occupation authorities have enforced what could be called comprehensive blockades that render the movement of the people almost impossible and impede on the free flow of benevolent aid. However, after the Oslo Accords, political economists observed that six major elements have aggravated the economic situation of Palestinians living in the POTs: first, the worsening of standards of living; second, the increased dependency on the occupier; third, the misuse of donors' financial and project assistance to the Palestinians; fourth, the corruption of the PNA leadership and of its institutions; fifth, the disintegration of Palestinian land and economy; and, sixth, the way government channels national revenue to a few private interests. All six elements are critical if we are to understand why Palestinians are rejecting the Oslo accords.

Blockade and closure as an occupation policy and strategy cause significant economic suffering by denying to the Palestinian workforce the ability of getting to their workplace - whether in POTs or "Israel" - in order to get a living. According to IPS Correspondents, the unemployment rate in the Palestinian areas, where 57 percent of the population is under 20 years old, fell in the mid-nineties, but has risen sharply since the Second Intifada in 2000. From 11.8 percent in 1999, it grew to 25.5 percent in 2000 and to some 31.3 percent in 2002[148].

[147] Roy (1999)
[148] http://ipsnews.net

Blockades and closure frequently result in the waste of Palestinian agricultural products - vegetables and the likes rot - and the interdiction made on fishermen going to sea in the Gaza Strip, thereby denying them the opportunity of earning money as they are unable to find other sources of revenue. This has had an overwhelming impact on national industry. Blockades also routinely impede the work of the medical, social and relief emergency services, and thus deny urgent care to the population. According to the World Bank, since 2000, "average Palestinian incomes have declined by more than one third. (...) More than 600,000 people (16 percent of the population) cannot afford even the basic necessities for subsistence." The blockades imposed on the Palestinian people of the POTs constitute a form of collective punishment that violates Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and also the right to the freedom of movement enshrined in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[149].

The policies and strategies which severely restrict the movement of people to schools, hospitals, and places of work, were recently described by the World Bank as the "precipitator of today's economic crisis," as these closures "fragment the Palestinian economic space, raising the cost of doing business and disrupting the predictability needed for orderly economic life." According to available estimates, each day of ongoing closure represents a loss of $8.45 million to the Palestinian economy.[150] These figures assume a 50 percent reduction in normal economic activities. The occupation-imposed blockade on the POTs after the Al-Aqsa Intifada started in September 2000. This strategy was implemented at a time when the Palestinian economy was starting to overcome the decline that had afflicted it since the Oslo Accords in 1993. In 1999, the GDP grew by 6.1 percent, compared to declines of 5.1 percent in 1996 and 0.7 percent in 1997, and a slight rise in 1998. Unemployment fell from a high level of 32 percent in 1996 to less than 11 percent in the first half of 2000. Per capita income registered a slight increase, rising to $1,775.[151] After Oslo, per capita income fell by 17 percent between years 1994 and 1996. In 1998, the number of people living in

[149] LAW (1998), September
[150] UNSCO (2000), October
[151] Financial Times (2000), November 6, and http://www.pcbs.org/english

poverty - those earning less than $2.10 per day – was equivalent to 37.2 percent of the population in the Gaza Strip and 15.4 percent of that in the West Bank.[152]

Unemployment, which before 1993 hovered at 5 percent, soared to over 28.4 percent in the POTs in May 1996. Unemployment is an especially acute issue as the Palestinian population is a young one. Over 47 percent of the population is under the age of 15 and fertility rates are among the highest recorded in the Middle East. Every unemployed person represents a six-person family without a source of income.[153] The occupation strategy and the policy of closure initiated and formalized in 1993, and later institutionalized with Oslo, have been the major factors accounting for the deterioration of living standards in the area. Blockade and closure entail the prohibition of the movement of labor, goods and factors of production between the POTs and the land occupied in 1948, as well as between and within, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Closures and blockade have an overwhelming impact on the Palestinian economy because of their inclusiveness and their unpredictability. One study estimated the total cost of closures over the period 1993-96 at $2.8 billion. The Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR) estimates the losses to Palestinian Economy generated by Oslo, including foregone potential income-generating opportunities, as amounting to $6.4 billion.[154] The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that the occupied territories have "lost at least one fifth of [their] economic base over the past four years as a consequence of war and occupation," and that "72% of Palestinian households" now live below the poverty line.[155] For the World Health Organization, levels of malnutrition and anemia among **"**children under five years of age, women, expectant mothers, and especially mothers practicing breastfeeding, are tragic by any international or humanitarian standard."[156] This dire situation is the direct result of the daily realities of the Occupation. Curfews, roadblocks and checkpoints severely restrict the movement of goods and people to schools, hospitals, and places of work. Villages are cut off from each other; crops and farmland are destroyed to make way for settlements and settler roads; and

[152] Diwan and Radwan (2000) and World Bank (1999)
[153] Farsakh (1998)
[154] CESR (2000)
[155] http://www.waronwant.org/?- http://www.arabmediawatch.com/
[156] http://www.waronwant.org

large areas of agricultural land are appropriated and razed.

2.2.3. Palestinian Economy and De-development

Roy argues that "not only is economic development difficult, if not impossible, to achieve inside the territory, but [it] may in fact be precluded by "de-development." De-development is defined as a process which undermines or weakens the ability of an economy to grow and expand by preventing it from accessing and utilizing critical inputs needed to promote internal growth beyond a specific structural level."[157]

The dependency of the Palestinian economy has increased during what is called the interim period between Oslo and today. The POTs continue to rely on the occupation as the principal market for absorbing their labor and goods. In 1998, the occupation absorbed 96 percent of exports from the West Bank and Gaza, up from 90 percent in the 1980s. Israel remains the source of 76 percent of all imports. Trade with Arab and European countries has increased in volume since 1997, but amounts to less than seven percent of all Palestinian trade.[158] This dependency is not simply the result of the 33-year long economic domination of the POTs by the occupier, but also the outcome of the occupation's unilateral control of borders and its regulation of Palestinian economic life with an institutionalized permit system henceforth: workers, merchants and managers seeking to enter Israel or to take goods through Israel must gain security clearance from the Israeli military, and abide by controls at border checkpoints – otherwise, they risk imprisonment. Apart from its dehumanizing aspect, the permit system entails high transaction costs and losses. A study conducted in 1998 found that Palestinian businesses seeking to export or import through Israeli ports face transaction costs that are on average 35 percent higher than for Israeli firms in the same industry.[159] The substantial support of the international community for the establishment of industrial estates, in particular, the Gaza Al-Muntar Industrial

[157] Roy (1987), pp. 56-88
[158] Astrup and Dessus (2000)
[159] UNSCO (2000)

Estate Project, is but the consequence and the reflection of the lack of support by the occupier for industrial development in Palestine, a typical feature of Israeli military occupation policy. Industrial estates, categorized as "islands of rationality in a sea of regulatory chaos,"[160] are designed as a short-term measure to attract foreign investment and strengthen the private sector in an underdeveloped investment environment. Such zones "establish a separate (often geographically) regime outside the regular legal and economic framework . . . [and operate] with policies and institutions that are insulated from, and more favorable to investment, particularly foreign investment, than those of the regular investment regime."[161]

In the Palestinian case, industrial estates, some of which are intended and planned as border estates, are likewise expected to encourage foreign (especially Israeli) investment in a highly constrained environment characterized by weak regulatory and legal systems and closure restrictions on the free movement of labor and goods.[162] However, industrial estates are also meant to "create employment, keep Palestinian workers in Gaza and the West Bank [and out of Israel], and keep [Palestinian] labor cheap for Israel."[163] Within the West Bank, the restrictions make it very difficult for Palestinians to get to their jobs and to transport goods from one enclave to another; this leads to an increase in transportation costs and, consequently, to lower profits. Trade from one section to another in the West Bank has become expensive, uncertain, and inefficient. The economy in the West Bank has been split into smaller, local markets. Restrictions on the access of farmers in the West Bank to their lands in the “seam zone” and in the Jordan Valley have severely harmed the farming sector in these areas. Tourism which began to flourish after the Oslo Agreements has also suffered greatly because of the inability of Palestinians to access vacation sites.

Palestinian labor also remains dependent on the occupation’s economy. Before Oslo, over one-third of the workforce in Gaza and the West Bank was employed in the land occupied in 1948 and essentially in the construction sector.

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[160] Roy (1995), p. 72

[161] *Ibid*, pp. 72-73. See also The World Bank (1995),*Overview and Strategy for Private Sector Development for West Bank and Gaza*, Washington, D.C..

[162] Roy (1995), p. 73

[163] Roy (1995)

With blockade and closure, the number of workers dropped from a high of 116,000 in 1992 to less than 36,000 in 1996. The reduction in the number of days of closure since 1997 has helped increase the inflow of Palestinian workers into the land occupied in 1948, but the strong correlation between closure and unemployment remains. At the beginning of 2000, a total of 125,000 Palestinians were working in "Israel", the highest figure registered since 1970. The rate of unemployment meanwhile was less than 11 percent, and the average daily wage for a Palestinian worker in "Israel" ($27.40) remained twice as high as in the domestic economy ($13.40)[164], thereby enhancing the incentive for people to seek employment beyond the Green Line. Not all workers seeking to enter the area occupied in 1948 can do so. Occupation policies have proven to be more preventive and discriminating towards workers from the Gaza Strip than the West Bank. Since 1994, West Bank workers have composed the dominant share of Palestinian labor flows into Israel. Only 30,000 Gazan workers (less than 15 percent of the total labor force) were working in the 1948 land in March 2000. In the West Bank, as much as 25 percent of the workforce could rely on work in Israel. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate in the Gaza Strip has been typically twice as high as in the West Bank over the period 1994-2000.

Another important development in Palestinian labor dependency on the markets of the occupation is the increasing Palestinian employment in the 200-plus Jewish settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. According to available figures on permit holders, a quarter of all Palestinian workers is employed in the settlements, up from 17 percent during the period lasting from 1996 to 1999. The growth of such employment is particularly alarming because of the illegality of settlement construction and their contribution to the fragmentation of the West Bank. During the period ranging from 1994 to 1999, over 50,000 new settlers inhabited over 15,000 housing units.[165] Settlements and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza violate the Fourth Geneva Convention regulating the behavior of occupiers, as well as the Oslo agreement which pledged to halt new construction. Occupation has facilitated the supply of Palestinian workers to the settlements by making work permits easier to obtain there than beyond the Green

[164] PCBS, *Labor Force Surveys*, http://www.pcbs.org/english
[165] UNSCO (2000)

Line. Workers seeking employment in settlements must not be married or older than 25, as are workers going to the Green Line. Employers in the settlements are exempted from paying workers any of the benefits - pensions, insurance, and allowances - that they are obliged to pay for Palestinian or settlers employees inside the Green Line. Moreover, settlements are often closer to workers' villages and refugee camps than the 1967 border checkpoints at which workers have to stand in line for hours. With a flash of their magnetic IDs to the soldier guarding the entrance of the settlement, workers can get a daily job they cannot find elsewhere.

2.2.4. Cantons, Enclaves and Bantustans

Bogert (2010) states that Palestinians face systematic discrimination merely because of their race, ethnicity, and national origin. On these grounds, they are deprived of electricity, water, schools, and access to roads, while nearby Jewish settlers enjoy all these benefits provided by the State. While Israeli settlements flourish, Palestinians under Israeli control live in a time warp - not just separate, not just unequal, but sometimes even pushed off their lands and out of their homes.[166]

The occupation divests the Palestinians of their home, land and resources, keeps them imprisoned in ghettos, and controls every aspect of their lives. The Oslo Accords predetermined that "both parties view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period." Yet, this territory has been further fragmented and divided into enclaves as highlighted in our research. Since the accords, the POTs of the West Bank and Gaza have continuously been subjected to closures. Mansour (2001) points out that during the ten years following the conclusion of the Oslo Accords, Israel's exercise of control over Palestinians not only deepened, but also metamorphosed into an apartheid regime of checkpoints, a permit system, settler by-pass roads, and settlements encircling and besieging Palestinian cantons of

[166] Bogert (2010)

'territoriality'.[167] Hanafi and Tabari state that by late 2003, there were 83 separate 'Bantustans' in the West Bank and Gaza for which travel to and from was possible only for those Palestinians with permits. This was all carried out as money flowed into the occupied Palestinian territories, allegedly for laying the groundwork of statehood.[168] The occupation policy of blockade and closure results in severe restrictions on every movement, and also explains the fact that Palestinian so-called controlled areas do not form a contiguous entity. Palestinian towns and villages are indeed fragmented and can be easily isolated. The mobility of the Palestinian labor force into the occupied and controlled areas reproduces the prototype of territorial redefinition pursued by occupation over the past seven years. The physical partition of the Gaza Strip from the Green Line and the West Bank has been further entrenched. It is more difficult for workers and goods to cross the Beit Hanoun or El Montar crossing in and out the Gaza Strip than for people in the West Bank to cross checkpoints. Borders between the West Bank and the Green Line have become more permeable as workers and goods escape "illegally" into the Green Line. Employment in the settlements has further consolidated the presence of the occupation and adds to fears about the occupation's plans for annexing chunks of land in the West Bank.

After the redeployment in 1999, the occupation remained in full control of more than 50 percent of the West Bank (Area C). Area C includes all settlements and over 400 kilometers of bypass (settlers') roads that divide the West Bank into four Palestinian cantons: Jericho cut off from all directions; the northern Nablus-Jenin area cut off from Ramallah by the "Shomron" settlement bloc and the "Trans-Samarian Highway"; the Ramallah region, separated from the south by "Maale Adumim"; and the settlement bloc around Jerusalem, and the Bethlehem-Hebron south, segmented by the "Gush Etzion" settlement bloc and "Kiryat Arba". Even within these cantons, the occupation controls bypass roads, has more than 600 checkpoints, and has separated the villages and the camps from the cities. The final status map presented by the occupation government to the

[167] Mansour (2001), "Israel's Colonial Impasse." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, No. 4

[168] Hanafi and Tabari (2003), "The New Palestinian Globalized Elite." *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 24 (13)

Palestinians in May 2000 confirms these divisions. The map illustrates the occupation's territorial solution to the conflict: five Palestinian cantons (the Gaza Strip plus four in the West Bank) separated by occupation-controlled areas.

The fragmentation of Palestinian land (through the creation of enclaves and cantons) coupled with the policy of blockade and closure has jeopardized the economic potentialities of the Palestinian State whatsoever that emerges in the end. The PNA does not control water, land, resources or borders. The economy has failed to diversify or industrialize, and continues to rely on subcontracted activities linked to the occupation. In 1998, Palestinian industry represented less than 15 percent of GDP compared with 27 percent in Jordan. Agricultural production is meager, and services, essentially public and commercial ones, make up 67 percent of GDP. Trade between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank fell by 22 percent over the period 1992-96 and signaled that the ties between the two central parts of the Palestinian economy had been severed further. By 2000, Palestine had morphed into an apartheid-like reality with Palestinians corralled into Bantustans and deprived of the much-needed international political support required to put an end to Israeli colonization.[169]

2.2.5. Conclusion

Since it seized the West Bank from Jordan during the hostilities in 1967 — and under a variety of governments since the right-wing Likud party first came to power in 1977 —, Israel has expropriated land from the Palestinians for Jewish-Israeli settlements and their supporting infrastructure. It has also denied Palestinians building permits and demolished "illegal" Palestinian construction.[170] In August 2009, *The Electronic Intifada* wrote that "Israel's stranglehold over Palestinian economic resources is ongoing. Israel occupies or controls Palestinian land, airspace and electromagnetic spectrum used for telecommunications."[171]

[169] Walker (2005), NGO's and Palestine, Middle East Children's Alliance, Berkeley, California
[170] HRW Report (2010), p. 4
[171] http://www.Intifada-palestine.com/2009/08/israel-still-strangles-the-palestinian-economy

Palestinians are as eager as anyone to see constructive economic development for their beleaguered country. But, they fully recognize that real economic progress will intervene only after their liberation from military occupation and blockade of POTs. The Occupation places so massive and constant restrictions on the daily lives of ordinary people in the POTs through policies of siege, closure, and blockade. As a result, the Palestinian economy suffers from a major depression and the Palestinian people are in the midst of an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe. For instance, as a result of the comprehensive closure on the POTs that the Occupation imposed at the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000, tens of thousands of Palestinians lost their jobs inside the Green Line. Before the Intifada, more than 120,000 Palestinians were employed inside the Green Line and the settlements. Since then, the number of Palestinians entering the Green Line border to work has fluctuated according to the number of entry permits issued and the degree to which closures are enforced. However, the number of Palestinians entering the Green Line border to work is much inferior to what it was prior to the Second Intifada.

The restrictions imposed on the commercial crossing points between the West Bank and Israel have critically impaired trade ties between Palestinian importers and exporters and the rest of the world. The restrictions also affect manufacturers who rely on imported raw materials. The harm is especially serious in light of the dependence of the Palestinian economy on foreign trade, which constitutes about 80 percent of its Gross Domestic Product. The closing of the crossings also harms internal trade between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Leila Farsakh observes that Palestinian persons and goods were refused entry inside the Green Line or exit from the confines of the PTOs. Mobility within Palestinian-controlled areas was also curtailed. If damage to physical assets and loss of human lives were also taken into account, the losses would be still higher.[172] A World Bank Report published in 2003 estimates the impact of the restrictions on Palestinians and concludes that while approximately 21 percent of

[172] Farsakh (1998), *Palestinian Labor Flows to Israel: 1967-1998*, Ramallah: MAS

Palestinians lived below the poverty line – that is, $2 per day or less - before the Second Intifada, the figure had skyrocketed to 60 percent by the end of 2002.[173]

The occupation still controls all kinds of movements in and out of the Gaza Strip, including imports and exports. Gaza's foreign trade is almost exclusively with the Occupation or is conducted via the Occupation's ports. Since the takeover of Gaza by the Hamas in June 2007, the Gaza Strip has been under total blockade. The Occupation changed the crossing arrangements at the five border crossings under its control (Beit Hanoun, Al Montar, Shajaiaa, El Qarar, and Karm Abu Salem) and, except for a few cases, does not allow persons or goods to cross between Gaza and the Green Line. The Al Montar Crossing, also known as "Gaza's lifeline," through which most of the goods come into or leave Gaza, is almost completely closed, paralyzing many trade sectors and creating growing economic crises.[174] The restrictions on the movement of workers and goods are sweeping and indefinite in duration. This strategy breaches a variety of rights that the Occupation must respect under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, namely, the right to gain a livelihood, the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate nutrition, clothing, and housing, and the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.[175] The consequences of the violation of these rights are severe for the Palestinian people.

2.3. THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF PALESTINE

2.3.1. From the Eve of the Occupation in 1948 to the Road to Oslo

After 1948, Israel occupied about 78% of Palestinian land. According to John Mearsheimer, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago,

[173] World Bank (2003), *Two Years of Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment*, Washington, D.C..

[174] http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Economy.asp

[175] http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Economy.asp

"[t]he Nakba is one of the great crimes of modern history. But the greatest tragedy is that what happened in the 1940s has not been talked about; Israelis had a deep-seeded interest in hiding the crimes they committed against the Arabs."[176] The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 to represent the Palestinian people and their interests.[177] According to Brown, a new set of political institutions was created in exile, most of which were coordinated, if not dominated, by the PLO after its establishment in 1964.[178] Ahmadi opines that the PLO was formed at the Arab Summit meeting held in Cairo in 1964.[179] During the Six Day War of 1967, "Israel" crushed the military forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and occupied the territories of East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and all of the Sinai Peninsula. As Albalagh writes, during the so-called Six Day War, "Israel" had occupied the West Bank, including all of Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.[180] Since then, ""Israel" occupies all the land from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, bounded by Egypt in the south, Lebanon in the north, and Jordan in the east. Since then, precisely to forestall the possibility of an independent economic basis for Palestinian self-determination, industry in OPTs has been systematically de-developed by "Israel"".[181] Brown notes that Israeli policies greatly constricted the opportunities for Palestinian institutions to operate.[182]

By December 1987, Palestinians in the POTs started a mass Intifada or uprising against the Israeli military occupation. This Intifada or uprising was not initiated or orchestrated on the basis of a decision made by PLO leadership in Tunis. To a certain extent, it was a popular mobilization that drew on the organizations and institutions that had developed under the occupation. The First Intifada involved hundreds of thousands of people, many with little previous resistance experience, including children, teenagers and women. During the first few years, it involved many forms of civil disobedience, including massive

[176] Khalidi and Mearsheimer (2010), May 18, and Khalidi and Mearsheimer (1997), p. 172
[177] http://www.albalagh.net
[178] Brown (2003)
[179] Homayon (2010)
[180] http://www.albalagh.net
[181] Usher (1995)
[182] Brown (2003)

demonstrations all over the POTs, general and comprehensive strikes, refusal to pay taxes, boycotts of Israeli products, political graffiti and the establishment of popular education in underground schools. It also comprised burning vehicles and tyres, stone throwing, throwing of Molotov cocktails and the erection of barricades and caltrop barriers to impede the movement of Israeli military forces. Usher explains it as a mass popular movement against the occupation that started in 1987 with the First Intifada. It inaugurated a new era in Palestinian mass mobilization with the emergence of the Unified National Leadership of Uprising (UNLP) or Intifada[183] against the Israeli military occupation described thus by King-Irani: "Israeli occupation is a strange survival of colonialism in the 21st century."[184] Intifada activism was structured through popular committees spread all over the POTs under the umbrella of the UNLU. The UNLU was a coalition of the four PLO parties active in the POTs: the Fatah, the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front of Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Palestinian People Party (PPP, formerly, the Communist Party). This broad-based resistance drew extraordinary and unprecedented international focus and attention on the situation faced by Palestinians in the POTs of West Bank and Gaza, and it also challenged the military occupation as never before.

The Intifada initiated a fresh and direct challenge for the occupation. The first priority in the field was military repression, but this could not be fully implemented without high civilian casualties amongst Palestinians (over 1,000 Palestinians killed, including over 200 under the age of sixteen), much more than was politically acceptable given world awareness. By 1990, most of the UNLU leaders had been arrested and the Intifada lost its cohesive force, notwithstanding which it continued for several more years. For the first time, the political divisions and violence within the Palestinian community, especially the growing rivalry between the various PLO factions and Islamist organizations (Hamas and Islamic Jihad), had been noticed and they escalated. The First Intifada was for that reason able to break the political stasis needed by the “Israeli” occupation since its incursion of Lebanon in 1982, which had pushed the PLO leadership to a more

[183] Usher (1995)
[184] Marsa (2001), p.11

distant exile in Arab countries. The First Intifada could not be totally restrained by Israeli military means alone, and political initiatives became necessary.

The PLO leadership was adamant to make the most of the political opportunity created by the First Intifada. It encouraged the formalization of its recognition of "Israel" as a State, an arrangement it adopted slowly but surely as from 1974 through the 'two-State' solution.[185] The history of the proposed Palestinian State - to be formed from the land of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - began with the British Mandate of Palestine. The shift brought it closer to entrance in the political process since recognition of "Israel" as a State within the 1967 borders was understood to be a minimum condition during the conference of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) in November 1988 in Algiers where the existence of an independent Palestinian State was declared.[186] This was not the creation of the due process by majority vote, but the beginning of the breakdown of the due process altogether in the political life of the PLO. Thus, when the Oslo Accords were signed, the PNC was never called to ratify it. Whatever life it possessed before then rapidly expired, especially after the election of a new Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in January 1996 under the terms of the Oslo Accords.

In response to the Intifada, and with the Gulf War as an important additional contributing factor, the Bush Administration in turn perceived the need for political maneuvering. The former Secretary of State James Baker had already initiated a process of shuttle diplomacy several months before the eruption of the Gulf War, anchoring his move on the Shamir Plan of May 1989. US prodding as a result of the Intifada had submitted a 'Peace Plan' that envisioned a 'two-track' approach to peace, namely, an Arab track and a Palestinian track. However, after announcing the plan, Mr. Shamir never tired of repeating that its main item dealt with peace with the Arab States rather than with Palestinians. The Madrid Conference started at the end of October 1991 - with the Palestinians represented as part of the Jordanian delegation – and it laid out the 'Madrid formula'. In the following years, ten rounds of negotiations took place, but they remained

[185] Qattamesh (2010)
[186] Brown (2003)

deadlocked, in part because the PLO leadership was not directly involved in the negotiations. In contrast to the Likud-led government, a Labor government under Rabin and Peres was willing to deal acknowledgment of the PLO with an accord it could secure nationally.

2.3.2. Palestine on the Eve of Oslo Accords

Usher points out that a series of 14 secret meetings was held in late January 1993 between PLO officials and Israeli government advisors and academics.[187] The highly secretive talks resulted in the Oslo Accord. The accord stipulated a five-year plan according to which Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would gradually become self-governing. On September 13, 1993, Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin signed the historic "Declaration of Principles" (DP). Brown believes that the Oslo Accords negotiated between 1993 and 1995 can be read as the construction of a new entity to administer the Palestinian in the POTs.[188] The DP was not a peace agreement, but only a framework for further negotiations. Usher (2000) states that the signing of the Oslo Agreements between Palestine and Israel in 1993 was hailed as a historic moment inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence for both parties.[189] By May 1994, military redeployment from the Gaza Strip and Jericho[190] took place as well as an early transfer of five areas of civil authority (education, tourism, welfare, health, and taxation) to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). By the end of 1996, the PNA controlled only limited areas in the West Bank (the 6 main cities) and about two-thirds of the Gaza Strip and assumed some governmental duties. Oslo 2 divided the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) into three administrative areas—A, B, and C. As modified by subsequent agreements, Area A, which includes Palestinian cities and covers approximately 18 percent of the land of the West Bank, was transferred to the civil and military control of the PNA. Israel retained military control over Area B - which covers 22 percent of the

[187] Usher (1995), p. 7
[188] Brown (2003)
[189] Usher (2001)
[190] Jericho is a small city in the West Bank.

territory, including most of the built-up areas of the Palestinian villages - but transferred civil control to the PA. Israel retained full control of security, planning, and building in the remaining 60 percent of the West Bank (some 340,000 hectares of land), known as Area C, which includes Israeli settlements, main roads, and smaller Palestinian villages and agricultural lands. Most Palestinians live in Areas A and B; some four percent live in Area C. The rationale for the division was, in part, that the agreement granted the PA control of the majority of the Palestinian population, while leaving sparsely populated, but extensive, areas under Israeli control. [191]

The Oslo Accords have exacerbated Israeli abuses of Palestinians' legal, social, political, and economic rights in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. As planned, these accords have clearly created an apartheid-like situation in the POTs (similar to the apartheid situation already present within "Israel"). Yes, apartheid. Israeli human rights activist Jeff Halper notes that there are several essential components of apartheid: exclusivity, inequality, separation, control, dependency, violation of human rights, and suffering. All of these characteristic traits have been exacerbated since the inception of the Oslo Accords[192]. The main characteristic feature of the Oslo agreements is that they ushered in a new reality, and from this day forward, any "Israeli"-Palestinian contestation over land, rights, sovereignty and the future would necessarily have the agreements as one of its main points of reference.

The West Bank is divided into four areas (A, B, C, and D), Al-Khalil/Hebron is divided into two areas (H-1 and H-2), and the Gaza Strip is divided into four areas (Yellow, Green, Blue, and White areas).[193] According to the Oslo agreement signed at the end of September 1995, Area A (3% of the West Bank) was under autonomous Palestinian jurisdiction; Area B (27%) was run jointly, and area C (73%) was ruled by the Israelis.[194]

[191] HRW Report (2010), available at hrw.org
[192] Masra (2001)
[193] Farsakh (2003), in *L'Atlas du Monde Diplomatique*, Paris
[194] *Ibid.*

At present, on account of the concluded agreements, the West Bank is divided into various "Areas", A B and C. The PNA enjoys full control over Area A which consists of the major urban centers totaling just 3% of the territory in the West Bank and around 60% in the Gaza Strip. Area B in the West Bank which is jointly controlled consists of 27% of the territory and Area C again in the West Bank, a total 70%. Israel maintains sole control of Area C. Similarly, East Jerusalem, which is a contiguous part of the West Bank, has been left to the final status negotiations and like much of the West Bank, remains under Israeli occupation. In the Gaza Strip, Israel ostensibly controls 40% of the territory. So-called open green spaces - that is, confiscated Palestinian land in which Palestinians are not allowed to build homes - now cover more than half of occupied Palestinian East Jerusalem. There is no freedom of movement between these disconnected Bantustans. To the extent that Palestinians can travel at all, they cannot do so freely to and from the areas in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Al-Khalil/Hebron, and Jerusalem.[195]

LAW added in 1998 that "Oslo led to the territorial fragmentation of the POTs. Although the PNA was supposed to control most of the West Bank by 1996, it only had jurisdiction over 19%, or less, of the West Bank by July 2000 (area A). It can be argued that political opposition to Oslo - manifested in suicide bombings and their repercussions on the Israeli political establishment (the murder of Yitzhak Rabin and the election of Binjamin Netanyahu) - was a reason for the failure to ensure adequate Israeli redeployment. But the Palestinian jurisdiction before the Al-Aqsa Intifada was fragmented and excluded 59% of the West Bank (other than East Jerusalem) and 30% of the Gaza Strip".[196] The interim agreements are: the Protocol on Economic Relations which formed Annex IV of the Gaza-Jericho agreement signed in Paris on April 29, 1994 (the so-called Paris Protocol); the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area signed on May 4, 1994 in Cairo (the so-called Cairo Agreement); the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed at Erez on August 29, 1994 (the so-called Erez Agreement); the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip signed on September 28, 1995 (the so-called Taba Agreement); the

[195] Masra (2001)
[196] LAW (1998)

Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron signed on May 9, 1996 (the TIPH Agreement); and the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron signed on January 7, 1997 (the so-called Hebron Protocol).[197]

2.3.3. Camp David and the Second Intifada

In year 2000, the concentrated negotiations that took place in Camp David, USA, between Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Arafat under the tutelage of the American President Bill Clinton remained deadlocked over occupied East Jerusalem. On September 28, Likud leader Ariel Sharon visited al-Haram al-Sharif – known as the 'Noble Sanctuary' to Palestinians and as 'Temple Mount' to Jews - in the company of 300 armed guards. In the aftermath of July's tense Camp David negotiations over Jerusalem's holy places, and being given Sharon's well-known willingness to annex East Jerusalem to Israel, this visit aroused large Palestinian protests in East Jerusalem. By September 28, 2000, the Palestinian community had enough. The realities of Oslo were stark and impossible to ignore. The Al-Aqsa Intifada exploded into the streets as a direct response to the continuing occupation, but, more importantly, it signaled a total rejection of the *status quo* of Oslo and the offshoots of that project, including the Palestinian Authority and the Oslo NGO generation.[198]

The Israeli military occupation forces erroneously assumed that Israel's slow and indecisive early response to the First Intifada had been interpreted as a sign of weakness that had encouraged greater Palestinian mobilization. As a result, the IDF prepared itself to react more quickly in the event of a second outbreak of violence. The IDF thus responded to these early protests with excessive force, and Israeli soldiers killed seven unarmed protesters and injured more than 200 others. Instead of discouraging Palestinian riots, these killings inaugurated over a month of demonstrations and clashes across the West Bank

[197] LAW (1998)
[198] Walker (2005), NGOs and Palestine, Middle East Children's Alliance, Berkeley, California

and Gaza. For a brief period, these demonstrations spread into Palestinian towns inside Israel. The Al-Aqsa Intifada lost its momentum because of the absence of a unified leadership, a consequence, among other things, of the decision of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to shun the command role in order to avoid the international repercussions that would have followed had they assumed formal leadership in sparking the uprising.

One of the basic facts about the eruption of the Intifada is undoubtedly the failure of the Camp David meeting in 2000. The meeting had been touted as an opportunity to reach a significant settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, and its collapse turned the area into a political tinderbox. As tension mounted on September 28, Ariel Sharon took hundreds of Israeli policemen to the Dome of the Rock compound to declare that Israel would never give up its hold over all of "unified" Jerusalem. Clashes erupted between Palestinian protesters and the Israeli police and army; and when they took a bloody turn on the day following Friday prayers, the Second Intifada was born. Some viewed the outbreak of the Intifada as an opportunity to advance Palestinian interests and called for the mobilization of fighters against Israel. Others believed that it was the result of the lack of Palestinian statehood nearly 14 years after the start of the first uprising: "We tried seven years of Intifada without negotiations, then seven years of negotiations without Intifada. Perhaps it is time to try both simultaneously."

In November 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Barak (of the Labor Party) approved a plan to build an apartheid wall, a plan that further included land confiscation and the uprooting of trees. The building of the wall began in June 2002 in the west of Jenin. As of October 2009, 60% of the wall had been completed. The Jordan Valley is almost completely isolated from the rest of the West Bank. The wall is not being built on, or in most cases near, the 1967 border, but rather cuts deep into the West Bank, expanding Israel's theft of Palestinian land and resources. In total, 85% of the wall is located in the West Bank. When

completed, the wall will *de facto* annex some 46% of the West Bank, isolating communities into Bantustans, ghettos and "military zones."[199]

On August 15, 2005, the redeployment of some 8,000 Israeli settlers and Israeli army forces from Gaza began. The Palestinian Center for Human rights (PCHR) expressed grave concerns regarding the "Disengagement Plan" proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on April 14, 2004, for military redeployment in the Gaza Strip, including limited redeployment in some areas of the West Bank. "Israel will continue to maintain a military presence along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (the 'Philadelphi Route'). (…) At certain locations, security considerations may require some widening of the area in which the military activity is conducted."[200] Two years earlier, Sharon had announced his plan for Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. In turn, Israeli Occupation was to hold on to large blocks of land in the West Bank and deny the "right of return" to Palestinian refugees. The evacuation concerned 21 Gaza settlements as well as four of the most isolated of the West Bank's 120 settlements. Gaza, which has the world's highest population density, gained 25% more land and planned to replace the settlers' single-family houses with apartment buildings to alleviate a severe housing shortage.

The declaration of unilateral "disengagement" or redeployment plan[201] by the government of "Israel" sparked a series of reactions across the world to the

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[199] Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign: www.stopthwall.org

[200] PCHR (2004)

[201] Ariel Sharon first announced his plan at the 4th Herzliya Conference on 19 December 2003, sponsored by the Institute for Policy and Strategy. Failing to gain public support from senior ministers, Sharon agreed that the Likud party would hold a referendum on the plan in advance of a vote by the Israeli Cabinet. The referendum was held on May 2, 2004 and ended with 65% of the voters against the disengagement plan, despite most polls showing approximately 55% of Likud members supporting the plan before the referendum. Under the disengagement plan adopted on June 6, 2004, the IWF would have remained on the Gaza-Egypt border and could have engaged in further house demolitions to widen a 'buffer zone' there (Art 6). However, Israel later decided to leave the border area, which is now controlled by Egypt and the Palestinians, through the PNA. Israel will continue

effect that peace was on the march and hope on the way. The redeployment plan was portrayed as an end to the occupation, seen by some Palestinian groups as a victory and by the Israeli right wing as a submission to "terrorists". In fact the plan was neither: instead, it compounded and continued the belligerent Israeli occupation that is now in its thirty-seventh year. The plan reflected the strategy of the Israeli Prime Minister which aimed, on the one hand, at deflecting the focus on the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the Palestinian Occupied Territories generated by continued violations by Israeli forces, and, on the other, to creating time and space to prevent the implementation of the ICJ Advisory Opinion by creating new facts on the ground in the West Bank.[202] When "Israel's" occupation wall is completed, a significant proportion of the West Bank, along with East Jerusalem, will be on the Israeli side, cut off from the rest of the West Bank. The World Bank predicts that this will further tighten closure as West Bank ID holders on both sides of the barrier face serious difficulties in reaching jobs and services in East Jerusalem, and *vice versa*.[203]

In the summer of 2002, the occupation began the construction of a wall or a 'separation barrier' between the "West Bank and Israel". This wall is being erected quickly and does not follow the 'Green Line' - the 1967 border between Israel and the occupied territories. In some places, the wall is found to be up to six kilometers inside the West Bank, and is built on Palestinian land taken by the military authorities who also demolish any homes they find on the wall's path. Critics argue that the wall will not prevent suicide attacks on Israelis, and that it simply adds to the suffering of Palestinians, many of whom can no longer access schools, workplaces, health care and other social services.[204] The first stages of building the wall have "involved extensive land requisition and clearing". Owners of agricultural land have suffered a major "economic loss" as a result, and are likely to suffer further as a result of being cut off from their land. The UN

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to control Gaza's coastline and airspace and reserves the right to undertake military operations when necessary (Art 3.1). Egypt will control Gaza's Egyptian border. Israel will continue to provide Gaza with water, communication, electricity, and sewage networks (Art 8)

[202] PCHR (2004)

[203] www.stopthwall.org

[204] United Nations (2003)

estimates that 280,000 Palestinians in 122 towns and villages will be adversely affected through the loss of their farmland and orchards and the further strangulation of local economies.[205]

Parliamentary elections held in Palestine on January 25, 2006, resulted in an astonishing and unexpected massive victory of the Hamas (it gained 74 of the 132 parliamentary seats) over the ruling Fatah Party. Ahmadi points out that the Hamas Islamic group unexpectedly defeated the Fatah during the elections held in 2006 and took over power.[206] By February 2006, Hamas leader Ismail Haniya, became the Prime Minister of the Palestinian government. In March 2007, the leaders of the Hamas and the Fatah finally agreed on a coalition government that was later approved by the Parliament. The platform that outlined the Hamas-dominated government did not abide by the conditions Western countries wished to be satisfied before resuming their aid to the Palestinian government. Indeed, the platform did not recognize Israel, nor did it respect earlier Israeli-Palestinian accords, and nor still did it renounce violence. Despite the breakthrough, Prime Minister Haniya and President Abbas remained divided on important issues regarding Israel. Fighting between the Hamas and the Fatah movements intensified in June 2007, with the former taking effective control of the Gaza Strip. In response, Palestinian President Abbas dissolved the government, fired Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, and declared a state of emergency. Salam Fayyad, an economist who was serving as Finance Minister, took over as interim Prime Minister.

During a Middle East Peace Conference hosted in Annapolis[207] by the United States, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas

[205] www.stopthwall.org
[206] Homayon (2010)
[207] Senior officials from nearly 50 countries and international organizations gathered in Annapolis, Maryland near Washington, D.C. for a conference aimed at launching final-status peace negotiations between "Israel" and the Palestinians. The meeting, the product of months of Middle East diplomacy by the Bush administration, was intended to reopen peace talks between the two sides for the first time in seven years.

decided to work together to broker a peace agreement by the end of 2008.[208] A joint statement read: "We agree to engage in vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations, and shall make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008. (…) We agree to immediately launch good-faith bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty, resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues without exception, as specified in previous agreements."[209]

Israeli occupation and the Hamas signed an Egyptian-brokered cease-fire in June 2008. The fragile agreement held for most of the remainder of 2008. Israel continued its yearlong blockade of Gaza, however, and the humanitarian and economic crisis in Gaza intensified. In addition, the Occupier's prolonged development of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank stalled the process.

2.3.4. The Gaza Attack and the Goldstone Mission

By the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, "Israel's" war army launched its war and air strikes against the Gaza Strip. Prime Minister Olmert said that the goal of the operation was not to reoccupy Gaza, but to "restore normal life and quiet to residents of the south [of Israel]". And by the end of 2008 and early 2009, Israel had just invaded the Gaza Strip incurring criticism for overreaching in its tactics. Television viewers watched bombs fall on urban communities in densely populated Gaza.[210] After a week of intense air and land strikes, the Israeli occupation army crossed the border into Gaza, launching a ground war against the population in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli army aircraft continued to attack the people of Gaza uncontrollably. After three weeks of fighting, more than 1,300 Gazans, most of them civilians, had been murdered and about a dozen Israelis had been killed. Ahmadi added that hundreds of children were killed or injured during the war.[211]

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[208] Myers and Cooper (2007), 27, and Gollust (2007), p. 27
[209] Haaretz (2007) and Best, Hanhimaki, Maiolo, and Schulze (2004)
[210] Quigley (2010)
[211] Homayon (2010)

"Israel" deployed its navy, air force and army in the operation it code-named "Operation Cast Lead". The portal attack on the Gaza Strip included two main phases - the air phase and the air-land phase - and lasted from December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009. The incursion began with a weeklong air attack from December 27 to January 3. The air force continued to play an important role in assisting and covering the ground forces from January 3 to January 18. The occupation army was responsible for the ground invasion which began on January 3, 2009 when ground troops entered Gaza from the north and from the east. The available information indicates that the Golani, Givati and Paratrooper Brigades and five Armored Corps Brigades were involved. The navy was used in part to shell the Gaza coast during the operation.[212]

In September, Richard Goldstone, a South-African jurist, released an UN-backed report on the invasion war in Gaza. The report accused both the Israeli military and Palestinian fighters of war crimes, on the alleged grounds that both had targeted civilians. However, Goldstone reserved much of his criticism for Israel and said that its incursion was a "deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate, and terrorize a civilian population."[213] In September 2009, the UN Fact-Finding Mission headed by Judge Richard Goldstone found "that there was evidence indicating serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law (…) committed by Israel during the Gaza conflict, and that Israel committed actions amounting to war crimes, and possibly crimes against humanity."[214] Israel denounced the report as "deeply-flawed, one-sided and prejudiced." Goldstone recommended that both Israel and the Palestinians launch independent investigations into the war. If they refused, Goldstone recommended that the Security Council then refer both to the International Criminal Court. The UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution in October that endorsed the report and its recommendation regarding the investigations. In November, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed

[212] United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (2009), p. 1
[213] United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (2009)
[214] www.consumer.org

a similar resolution. Both Israel and the U.S. said that continued action on the report could further derail the peace process.[215]

2.3.5. Conclusion

In the context of the Jewish-Arab conflict over Palestine, places and place-names have acquired great significance in all efforts to legitimize particular historical rights to the land. The ability of conferring names to given places serves as one of the most telling indicators of political and cultural power.[216] The road to Oslo started with the first waves of Zionist settlement in the 1880s and spans over more than a century of struggle. It has been a history of limited successes and major defeats. In his book about the 1936-1939 revolt, Kanafani wrote that "in the whole history of Palestinian struggle, the armed popular revolt was never closer to victory that in the months between the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1939."[217] Palestinian demands and expectations increasingly grew more modest as time went by: from an attempt to retrieve the whole of a lost Palestine to a democratic State for Palestinians and Jews, to the two-State solution, to a limited autonomy under the Oslo accords, with further negotiations presaging a bleak future for Palestinians. The delusion of endurance of settler regimes turned out to be less illusory, at least in Palestine, than many inspirations and hopes in the early 1970s. "The systematic violence against the people and their land is clearly a strategy to deprive Palestinian of their lands and to wipe out their culture, geography,

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[215] http://www.factmonster.com

[216] Benvenisti (2000), esp. ch. 1; Enderwits (2002), ch. 4; Khalidi (1997), ch. 2, highlights the different usages, not only between Jews and Arabs, but also between Muslims and Christian Arabs with a different approach. See also Lewis (1980); Biger (1990), pp. 2-4; Biger (2004), ch. 1. For the role of archaeology in this competition over historical rights and political claims, see also Neil Asher Silberman (1989), *Between Past and Present: Archeology, Ideology and Nationalism in the Modern Middle East*, and Al-Haj (2002), *Archeological Practical & Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society*, Chicago.

[217] Kanafani (1970), *The 1936-1939 Revolt in Palestine*, Arab Institute of Studies and Publications, Beirut. See Newjerseysolidarty.org

identity, society and history, indeed their existence."[218] Yet, the more proximate factors that made the Oslo accords possible began, paradoxically, with the results of the Palestinian Intifada in 1987.

A letter to the editor of the Consumer Association of Penang in June 2010 stated that "Israel continues to expand settlements in the POTs which is illegal under International Law. It has built a separation wall inside Palestinian land which is illegal and immoral according to the International Court of Justice."[219] The continuing Israeli occupation, even after the Oslo agreements, was the underlying cause of the Second Intifada. Palestinians had thought that the 1993 Oslo agreement would lead to better lives, greater freedoms, the end of Israeli control, and, at the end of five years (in other words, in 1998), to Palestinian statehood. Oslo was thought to entail the end of Israeli occupation and the start of Palestinian self-determination. Because of the deeply-flawed, enormously conflicting so-called peace process initiated at Oslo, to which must be added the daily frustrations and humiliations inflicted upon Palestinians in the occupied territories, Palestinians in the POTs, converged in late September 2000 to add fuel to the fire of the Second Intifada that had started. When such changes failed to materialize and when the situation on the ground worsened n many ways in the mid- and late 1990s, many Palestinians started to believe that the diplomatic process was a dead end and only renewed confrontation was the alternative. This dynamic explains much of the popular support for the Second Intifada.[220] Said believes that " [p]eace can come only after the occupations ends"[221]. And Nazzal (2005) concludes by saying: "A Democratic Palestine for all is the only solution that can stop the cycle of violence in the region."[222]

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[218] www.consumer.org

[219] Letter to the editor, June 12, 2010, Consumer Association of Penang, "Why We Need to Support Palestine". Accessible at: www.consumer.org

[220] Pressman (2003), "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *Journal of Palestine Study*, p. 118

[221] Said (2002), "A New Current in Palestine", www.thenation.com

[222] Nazzal (2006), Commemorating the Nakhba: A Democratic Palestine for All the Only Viable Solution", May 17, accessed at: http://www.aljazeerah.info/

While Palestinian NGOs have undertaken very successful forms of professional action such as providing medical services and issuing reliable reports on Palestinian casualties and damage caused by Israeli military operations and other human rights violations, they have not developed a synergy with the political forces (whether the political parties, the Islamic and National Committee for the Intifada or the unions) or with the population. Therefore, while NGOs have used their international recognition to plead the Palestinian cause and to make strategic information about the Israeli attacks available, they have contributed little locally to harness society's energies during a period of national struggle. *In fine*, their impact on the direction of the uprising has been minimal.[223]

[223] Hanafi and Tabari (2005), "The New Palestinian Globalized Elite." *Jerusalem Quarterly* 24 (13)

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

3.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NGOs

3.1.1. The Concept and Structure of Civil Society

According to researchers and scholars, the concept of civil society (CS)[224] dates back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For many of them, it is an 'old-new' concept in the political and social arena all over the world - whether in the developed or less developed countries or regions (the North or the South). John Locke was probably the first to use this term after the English Revolution of 1688. Many philosophers, social scientists, and Western politicians including Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel, have analyzed the concept[225]. As Lewis (2001) says, the concept of civil society first emerged in the West during the eighteenth century when philosophers and political scientists like Friedrich Hegel were trying to explain what was happening in the space between the family and the State.[226] According to humanists, civil society promotes a civil style of life[227]. Bishara (1996) explains that CS comes from the word civil, which means citizen (or citizenship) in German, and not from civilizing or civilization, as some believe.[228] Civil society is one of the most up-to-date concepts in all of the social sciences that touch on the political arena. This is the case, first of all, because in recent years, so many countries have claimed that they have established more democratic regimes. We have indeed witnessed a renewed interest in popular participation in the political arena and everything else that relates to the way political cultures or basic values and beliefs affect the way a State is governed. During the recent years, there has also been a greater interest in how the growth of civil society can contribute to the settlement of conflicts

During the last two decades, much has been written about the emergence of civil society organizations (CSOs) and the important role they can play in a country's economic and political development. CSOs work on an array of causes

[224] For more information on civil society organizations and civil society generally, see Salamon (2004).
[225] See Gramsci (1990)
[226] Lewis (2001)
[227] The Columbia Encyclopedia (2001-2005), Sixth Edition
[228] Bishara (1996)

and issues and appear in many different forms, but they all share the attributes of being private, non-profit, self-governing organizations that individuals are free to join or support voluntarily[229]. In his book, Challand (2009) writes that a study of Western history tends to show that some forms of CS existed well before the founding of modern democratic States, with the establishment of guilds, corporations and the likes, and that CS tends to refer to the product of democratic institutional arrangements.[230] CS was born in the midst of a complete transformation that occurred in Europe from the Dark Ages to the age of modern States and systems. It later contributed to the transformation of Eastern Europe, emerging in Poland in 1982 when the Solidarity trade union, a civil society organization, assumed a leading role in liberating Poland from communist rule. This reflects the development of the concept of CS in the modern Western experience starting with Thomas Hobbes and ending with Gramsci. From the Eastern point of view, the significance of the idea of CS does not lie in some degree of definition of political life in European societies. It also represents an opportunity of comparing Eastern and Western societies. In this perspective, one can say that the terms that philosophers and scholars employed since the Age of Enlightenment in Europe till the prison autobiography of Gramsci have mainly reflected the ideological contrast between the East and the West. This phrase expressed the frequent insight that, in history, the East has embodied the State more than it has embodied society. In other words, the history of the East is in a large measure that of the State, and the history of the West is to a large extent that of society. According to this hypothesis, the East lacks liaison organizations between individuals and the State. The absence of civil society presented an appropriate environment for the growth of political control in the East. This ideological stance that talks about the absence of civil society in the East and in its religion, Islam, is unfounded.

This evolution has concluded with civil society as a collective political mobilization (*civitas*) that can influence the State. Scholars have viewed civil society as carrying the values of society, among which, individual freedom, a State governed by the rule of law, and neutral taxation. When scholars talk about

[229] Elbayar (2005), and Salamon and Sokolwski (2004)
[230] Challand (2009) and Black (1984), p. 239

CS, they frequently refer to the space in which there exists a number of executive actors that are not part of the household, the State (as a governing body), or the market. A similar definition is also put forward by the World Bank (WB) as it uses the term CS to refer to the broad collection of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have an existence in community life, and express the welfare and moral values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, and religious considerations.

Philosophers and social scientists presented different thoughts about CS. Anheier (2004) locates CS between the State and the market, and considers that it monitors the powers and the roles of each so as to assure a balance between them. However, and especially in developing countries, it is important to consider the family as a third frontier to civil society[231]. Lary Daymond (2005) defines civil society as "a space of organized social life characterized by voluntary, self-motivated work independent from the state and governed by a set of laws and common rules."[232] There are many definitions of civil society. Ziad uses the definition given by the London School of Economics and Political Science which states that civil society is "the arena of un-coerced collective action around common interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are separate and different from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated."[233] Also, Kandil (2004) defines civil society as "any entity that is nongovernmental, not an extension of the family and not an extension of the state."[234] Hilmi (2006) defines civil society as a "group of free voluntary organizations filling the public space between the individual and the State. Its aim is to provide citizens with services or to achieve their interests or to practice different humanitarian activities."[235]

The structure of CSOs includes non-governmental, non-profit organizations, including welfare, charitable, developmental, and environmental

[231] Anheier (2004)
[232] Daymond (2005)
[233] Ziad (2010)
[234] Kandil (2004)
[235] Hilmi (2006)

organizations. They may be professional and worker's trade unions, farmer and peasant groups, or social movements that reflect the needs of groups such as young people, students, and women. According to some researchers, they include political organizations and parties as well.[236] Moreover, CSOs include charitable foundations, civic associations, non-governmental organizations, volunteer groups, trade unions, professional organizations, and social movements — everything from medical charities, sports clubs, and environmental groups to women's and human rights groups — that make up the "third sector" of modern life, separate from both the government and the marketplace.[237] In addition "CS normally embraces a variety of spaces, actors and institutional forms, unstable in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. CSs are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups."[238] In other words, these definitions may clarify the idea that CS is as an arena between the State, the market and the family and thus the individual actors, and also the institutional forms active within this arena. Lastly, fostering relations between CS and think tanks, research centers and academia is an important factor in their endeavor to enlarge their influence and disseminate information and knowledge among society. Ways should be devised to make this relation more interactive and institutionalized both for the sake of mutual benefit and for the positive impact it may have on society as a whole.

3.1.2. Civil Society, NGOs, and Their Controversial Role

Governments consider that CSOs are a real threat to their authority, while opposition political movements, groups and parties accuse them of being responsible for the divisions and weaknesses amongst them. During the last two

[236] Ziad (2007)
[237] Salamon and Sokolowski (2004)
[238] Centre for Civil Society (2004)

decades, the term CS has been associated with the term NGO. For example, if one looks at the documents of the World Bank, the two terms are attached together to mean one thing. According to the WB, CSOs have also become "important channels for the delivery of social services and the implementation of other development programs." In addition, Lewis considers that NGOs in the development industry have been claiming to speak for CS, and the two terms have been used interchangeably.[239] The idea that civil society must by definition be pro-democratic has been strong in conventional civil society theory, and this is to a large extent reflected in the writings on global or transnational civil society too[240]. In empirical case studies, there is a very strong bias towards movements and networks campaigning for causes which most people (including undoubtedly the researchers) consider good,[241] although the problem of representation and the lack of accountability and transparency are sometimes mentioned in such case studies.[242] However, Anheier points out that civil society organizations include voluntary organizations, NGOs, non-profit organizations, foundations, charities, social movements, networks, and informal groups that make up the infrastructure of civil society. Individuals are participants in civil society through membership, volunteering, the organization of events, or the support lent to causes[243].

The roots of the term NGO date back to the 1920s. According to *The Dictionary of Civil Society, Philanthropy and Non-Profit Sector*, the term first originated in the League of Nations in the 1920s, then came to the United Nations (UN) system[244]. The phrase is used cross-nationally to describe nonprofit organizations working in the field of international relations, environment, human rights, humanitarian assistance and development co-operation. Therefore, NGOs are a sub-sector of the nonprofit or third sector[245]. Moreover, many NGOs and development organizations have been trying to operationalize the theoretical concept of civil society and comply with it. However, one should be aware that

[239] Lewis (2001), p. 44
[240] Grugel and Uhlin (2009)
[241] Smith *et al*. (1997); Keck and Sikkink (1998); Florini (2000), as quoted in Grugel (2009)
[242] Edwards and Gaventa (2001)
[243] Anheier (2004)
[244] un.org
[245] Lewis (2001), p. 38

even though all NGOs are CSOs, not all CSOs are NGOs. Examples of CSOs include civic clubs, community-based groups, labor unions, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, foundations, and, of course, NGOs.

The use of the term NGO varies from one place to another; it usually refers to organizations that channel external funding and provide technical assistance in the fields of social and economic development. Usually, a nonprofit organization that provides other kinds of public services, like unions, social clubs and religious groups, to mention a few, is not considered as an NGO, but rather as CSOs[246]. In addition, one can define NGOs as an organization or a group of organizations engaged in development and poverty reduction work at local community, national and global levels around the world. A great deal has been written about NGOs, and particularly development NGOs, and their role in promoting democracy and social change.[247] And in the last two decades, much has been written about the emergence of CSOs, including NGOs, and the important role they can play in a country's economic and political development.[248] Furthermore, CSOs play a vital role in maintaining social stability in developed countries. These organizations are independent of the State, with their freedom guaranteed by the country's Constitution[249]. Abdel Samad adds that the CS sector historically provided social services; it now also contributes to societal development, and sometimes, to national strategies and structures.[250]

The role of the actors of civil society in global politics has received much scholarly attention during recent years. There has been a tendency to idealize the actors of "civil society" as democratic forces.[251] The argument concerning the role of CS, including NGOs, thus weighs in this direction, and NGOs have thus come to be seen as part of CS in many countries in order to balance the power of the

[246] Anheier and List (2005)
[247] World Bank Report (2006f)
[248] Elbayar (2005)
[249] Ghalyoun (2001)
[250] Ziad (2007)
[251] Grugel and Uhlin (2009)

State[252]. Hence, civil society seeks to create an equilibrium between the authorities of the State and the rights of individuals in society. Accordingly, developed countries have diversified professional unions, labor unions, charitable societies, religious organizations, free clubs, cultural and technical associations, and neighborhood and area societies. In addition, they have advocacy groups of all kinds, youth and women's organizations, and private-sector trade and industry associations. Neither the aforementioned groups, nor the press is subjected to unreasonable State intrusion.[253] Furthermore, civil society plays an active role in influencing social and political change through enhanced political awareness, collective work, political skills, and the sharing of expertise in defending general rights and achieving collective benefits.

Developing civil society is a major way of inducing change, influencing the level of awareness and, increasing the potential of teamwork. It is a major component of the sustainability and the development of the democratic system. Democracy is not a political aim that can be achieved overnight. It is an active process that must be maintained and developed continuously.[254] And through its institutions, civil society plays the role of an intermediary between the individual and the State, and performs an organizational task within society. From this perspective, CS can be seen as a rational way of organizing society and its relationship with the State. In her research, White writes that "at the other end of the political spectrum is Marx's well-known statement in the Communist Manifesto: The executive of modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. Later, Marxists have modified this rather stark identification of the state with particular class interests to introduce the notion of relative autonomy. This recognizes that the state may at times act against bourgeois interest in the short term, but ultimately serves to ensure the reproduction of the capitalist system as a whole."[255] On the other hand, others believe that civil society works to expose the failure of the government to respond to the needs of citizens. As Challand (2009) points out, there are many parts of the

[252] Hadenius and Uggla (1996), and Van Rooy (1998), as quoted in Lewis (2001)
[253] Karajah (2008)
[254] Al-Shani (2006)
[255] White (1999), p. 318

assumption of CS as a contributor to democratization that need to be questioned. First, one should question the automatically democratic, representative and accountable character of NGOs.[256] And Halliday points that "they are self-righteous at best, elitist at worst. Despite their noble claims, NGOs can easily be re-baptized as either BINGOs (Business-Influenced NGOs), RINGOs (Reactionary or Royal NGOs), MANGOs (Male-controlled NGOs), or even TINGOs (Tribal NGOs). Are NGOs really part of this allegedly autonomous sphere of Civil Society?"[257] Bishara is very critical of the notion of CS in the Arab world and develops the most critical and special discourse of all. For him, CS does not, and cannot, exist in Arab nations for the simple reason that individuals lack basic freedom and autonomy.[258] Bishara is still very critical of the view that accords NGOs the central place within civil society activism: NGOs, this is not the civil society in totality; NGOs are not the almighty civil society, as some researchers claim.[259]

More constructive criticism comes from a third position that offers systematic analyses of democratic problems and prospects for actors of civil society. During the last decade, there has been a tendency to pay more attention to the democratic shortcomings of NGOs (Fisher (1997); Hudock (1999)) and the concept of "uncivil society" (Kopecky and Mudde (2003); Ahrne (1998); Chambers and Kopstein (2001)) has been introduced. To some extent, this debate has also influenced the study of transnational or global civil society actors. For example, Alison Van Rooy (2004) offers a clear and systematic overview of different aspects of transnational civil society actors' democratic legitimacy (see also Nelson (2002); Collingwood and Logister (2005); Frangonikolopoulos (2005)). The workshop will depart from this third position, and engage in empirically-grounded analyses of the democratic qualities of different types of civil society actors and their interaction with regional or global governance institutions. At the same time, we hope to extend the empirical discussion of civil society, democracy and global governance to an analysis of different and emerging governance regimes, including human rights regimes. A vibrant civil

[256] Challand (2009)
[257] Halliday (2001), pp. 22-23
[258] Bishara (1996), p. 10
[259] Bisharah (1996), pp. 49-50

society is essential for good governance. A strong civil society serves to strengthen democracy, build public confidence, enforce public accountability, and ensure that the voices of traditionally excluded actors are heard. Empowered and active citizenship, a critical part of social capital, is an end in itself, and essential for inclusive growth and national ownership.[260]

3.1.3. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) refer to a broad of collection of organizations, including community groups and non-governmental organizations. The debates about the origin and the evolution of the concept are now well-known and rehearsed (Ghalioun et al. (1993); Abu Amr (1995); Kaviraj and Khilalni (2001); and Wagner (2006)), and Hilal's paper contributes to unpacking the different (normative, descriptive and ideological) layers that the concept conveys.[261] Many scholars, including some of those just mentioned, have also questioned some of the reductive assumptions underpinning the logic and the aims of CS: Some criticize the functionalist view according to which CS has a clear and linear role to play in democratization and in development, and related to this, some underline the problematic teleological assumptions following which CS is an aim in itself and its support has to be based on this end. Some attack the wishful thinking behind the redeeming work that a group of professional civil society embodied by NGOs is supposed to perform in perfect autonomy both from the State and from the sphere of production and reproduction. Finally, a last point that needs to be dismissed is the culturalist view that assumes that civil society is a Western concept alien to other cultures, and, in particular, to Arab Muslim cultures. I have argued elsewhere that the crux of donors-NGOs interaction is not about the existence of a Western model of civil society that needs to be 'exported' to places where there has been no civil society historically.

It is in the early 1990s that the topic of civil society emerged in the Arab world, both in academic circles and in public debates. For example, Al-Hayãt, a London-

[260] Gebrezghi (2010)
[261] Hilal (2010), pp. 4-18

based daily, published in August and September 1993 various articles on civil society in the region (Moussalli (1995), p. 79f)). The concept of *al-mujtama al-madani* (civil society) started appearing in day-to-day parlance in Palestine around 1993. Books mentioning the concept of civil society were published in Palestine as from 1993 onwards (Ghalioun *et al.* (1993); Abu Amr (1995); Muslih (1993)). A book published in Jerusalem in 1995 by the International People's Health Council (IPHC) is a perfect illustration of the powerful discursive impact made by the phrase 'civil society': this collection of articles is the proceedings of a conference held in 1992 where UPMRC hosted international health activists from around the globe. In none of the nine keynote speeches and twelve country analyses is the phrase 'civil society' explicitly mentioned, though many times the spirit of civil society was invoked. Thus, there is mention of grassroots, community-based organizations, calls for greater NGO influence in national policy-making, as well as the invocation of the democratic mission for mass-based organizations as opposed to State-led centralization, but no occurrence of the phrase 'civil society' can be found. The only place where it appears is in the editor's note and in the small introduction on 'The Palestinian Context', written two years after the conference (IPHC (1995), p. x, xii). So, even if in its final form, its two-page introduction manages to uses three times the phrase 'civil society' in half a page, it never appears in the 120 pages of text produced by various speakers in 1992. It could be concluded that this book is a testimony to the process of connection to a wider universalizing discourse, that of neo-liberalism that has emerged as the triumphant ideology – one just needs to think of Fukuyama's *The End of History*. There are two counter-examples pre-dating 1993: Salim Tamari uses the concept analytically in two short articles in the Middle-East Report (MERIP) in 1990 and 1992.

During history, more philosophers became interested in the idea of civil society, including Alexis de Tocqueville who wrote about associational life in the United States. In addition, Mansour Al-Jamari (2003) defines civil society as "a wide range structure of labor unions, nongovernmental organizations, religious groups and societal institutions and organizations in the civil society".[262] Moreover,

[262] Mansourr (2003)

Jamil Hilal (2004) defines civil society as "a group of civil and social institutions and a series of channels and means by which the modern society expresses its interests and purposes and is able to defend it when opposed to the authoritarian rule of the political institution represented by the state."[263] The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization defines civil society as "all groups working outside the framework of governments such as societal groups, nongovernmental organizations, labor unions and organizations that express the interests of social groups and raise awareness on major issues in order to influence public policies and decisions."[264] Farid Basil Al-Shani (2006) defines civil society as "a group of political, social, economic and cultural organizations working in different fields with a relative independence from the state and the profits of companies in the private sector, i.e., civil society is civil institutions that do not practice authority and do not aim at economic profits. They contribute to the formulation of policies outside the political institutions and have professional aims such as the protection of the economic interests, upgrading the level of the profession and expressing the interests of their members.[265]

3.1.4. History of Civil Society and NGOs Worldwide and in Palestine

Azmi Bisharah relates the doubts raised regarding the sudden interest in civil society to the relaxation of the political elites who found themselves living in a state of political unemployment after the collapse of the communist and socialist bloc. He considers civil society as a process of dissolving the political struggle for democracy and forming an alternative to it. In this sense he considers it a process of political abortion.[266] Volkhart (2004) points out that over the past two decades, the number of civil society actors at community, national and global levels has grown significantly, as has their influence in public life. Many scholars and policy-makers now see civil society as an important factor in consolidating and sustaining democracy, fostering poverty-reduction development policies,

[263] Hilal (2004)
[264] The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, www.fao.org
[265] Al-Shani (2006)
[266] Bisharah (1998), *Civil Society*, Center of Arab Unity Studies, Beirut

achieving gender equality and fighting corruption. Consequently, the interest in the topic is burgeoning. Interestingly, civil society is praised by proponents of very different ideologies, ranging from neo-liberal thinkers to radical democrats, communitarians, and neo-Marxists.[267] During the last decade there has been a tendency to pay more attention to the democratic shortcomings of NGOs[268], and the concept of "uncivil society"[269] has been introduced. To some extent, this debate has also influenced the study of transnational or global civil society actors. For example, Alison Van Rooy (2004) offers a clear and systematic overview of different aspects of transnational civil society actors' democratic legitimacy.[270] The "Third Sector" consists of organizations that are neither part of the government apparatus, nor part of the business sector. NGOs gained universal, legitimate recognition in article 71 of the UN charter, which granted NGOs formal standing with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. Article 71 was adopted following a stringent lobbying effort by over 1 200 NGOs which were represented at the San Francisco Conference of 1945. Because NGOs were perceived as the representatives not of governments, not of organizations or businesses, but of "the People," they were assumed to be the fulfillment of the opening statement of the UN Charter: "We the people." Fifty years later, NGOs seem more likely than ever to have fulfilled this mission. An interesting metaphor suggested by Marc Nerfin presents the 'prince' as the government, responsible for the maintenance of public order; the 'merchant', as the private and the business sectors, responsible for the production of goods and services; and the 'citizens', represented by NGOs, who are responsible for the accountability of the prince, and the responsiveness of the merchant.[271]

The history of the development of civil society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Western Europe, in particular, was a history of struggle for the achievement of specific rights. The rights of unionization, association,

[267] Volkhart (2004). See also Cohen and Arato (1992); Chandhoke (1995); Etzioni (1995); Gellner (1994); and Putnam (2000)
[268] Fisher (1997) and Hudock (1999)
[269] Kopecky and Mudde (2003); Ahrne (1998); Chambers and Kopstein (2001)
[270] Van Rooy (2004). See also Nelson (2002); Collingwood and Logister (2005); and Frangonikolopoulos (2005)
[271] Weiss *et al*. (eds.) (1996), p. 19

freedom of speech, free press, but, most importantly, the right to organize political parties and to vote, were all denied to large sections of the populace, principally, the working classes. It took large-scale general strikes in Austria in 1896 and 1905, in Finland in 1905, in Belgium in 1902 and 1913, and in Sweden in 1902, to secure universal voting rights. In Britain, the first Reform Act of 1832 left five out of six adult males (let alone women) without the right to vote, and only in 1918 was universal political citizenship recognized. Securing social and economic rights was no less a matter for struggle. Some success was achieved, but conditions varied from one country to another with ebbs and flows continuing to the present day[272]. Giacaman argues that the history of the development of civil society in the West is instructive and, in some of its aspects, relevant to the Palestinian situation. The rights of citizenship that are now taken for granted in many countries in the West came about gradually and as a result of the struggle of groups and classes that were denied those rights.

In the 1970s, there emerged a massive international trend towards the creation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Europe and other countries – or what are calledd Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in the United States of America. NGOs and PVOs are defined as private, voluntary, non-profit organizations whose members combine their skills, means and energies in the services of common goals, ideas and objectives. NGOs are private, non-profit agencies devoted to international aid and development assistance, or national or regional development.[273] As for the role of NGOs, scholars note that the classical representation mechanisms are presently in crisis, and NGOs are positioning and appointing themselves as mediators. Thus, they tend to take the place of political representation, play a social role and influence the way we see the world. They have distinguished themselves from associations in general, and forced the respect for a third sector that is operating between the private and public sectors. Edwards and Hulme point out that the term embraces a huge diversity of institutions and organizations.[274] The last two decades have witnessed a tremendous increase in

[272] Giacaman (2008)
[273] Thomas (1992a)
[274] Edwards and Hulme (1992)

the number of NGOs working in the developing countries[275]. "By any standard, the 1980s and 1990s have seen as an explosion in the numbers of NGOs and grassroots organizations active in relief and development".[276] The OECD listed more than 4,000 NGOs involved in development work. In Japan where the NGOs were recently established, the number increased from 131 to 257 within one year - from 1985 to 1986[277]. In France, 54,000 new associations have been established since 1987. In Italy, 40 percent of all associations have been set up within the last 15 years. In developing countries, within a short span of time, 10,000 NGOs have been established in Bangladesh, 21,000 in the Philippines and 27,000 in Chile[278]. Currently, approximately 20,000 NGOs from every part of the world entered into some type of relationship with the United Nations system.[279]The NGO movement in Palestine is deeply rooted within Palestinian society. Charities started their activities at the turn of the 20th century and operated within the legal framework applicable to NGOs as stipulated in Ottoman law. Many of these early charity organizations are still functioning and actively involved in civil activities. They are currently estimated to constitute around 10 percent of the total number of NGOs in Palestine[280].

WB points out that NGOs contribute to the advancement of civil society; in other words, it is seen as a mechanism to empower people, balance the power of the government, and advocate for the poor and marginalized. Moreover, the WB, the world's largest source of development assistance to the South, defines NGOs as "private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development.[281] The term NGO is typically used in the international development literature to refer to local organizations in the developing world, the Global South, or international organizations from the North but operating in the South. Furthermore NGOs have become widely recognized by the international organizations to seek wider social and political participation

[275] Garilao (1987)
[276] Edwards and Hulme (1995), p. 3
[277] OECD (1988)
[278] Thomas (1996)
[279] UNESCO (1992)
[280] Giacaman (2008)
[281] WB cited in Duke (2006)

to increase their effectiveness and legitimacy. The WB claims that this is true especially in areas where "government presence is weak, in post-conflict situations, or where civil society experience and expertise complements government action."[282] A good example of this case is Palestine. During the years of Israeli occupation, CSOs, including NGOs, provided almost one-third of education services, more than half of primary health care services and hospital care and nearly 100% of all agricultural extensions[283]. Giacaman mentions that the NGO sector in Palestine is genuinely deep-rooted within Palestinian communities. Charities started their programs and activities at the turn of the 20th century and operated within the legal framework relevant to NGOs as set in Ottoman law. Many of these early associations are still working and enthusiastically involved in civil activities[284]. However, the role the Palestinian NGOs assumed created a debate after the establishment of the PNA in 1993. The debate was whether NGOs are considered as civil society agents or are replacing the government by providing services to the population.[285] Azmi Shuaibi, Commissioner General of the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN), considers that the limitations of CSOs are as follows: they are closed organizations, not mass movement organizations; run by professionals elites not by their constituents; and characterized by the absence of networking and solidarity between them.[286]

Surely, the left has found in the concept of CS an ideal way of framing its opposition to the emerging PNA and to click to the buzzwords favored by international donors around 1994 and 1995. But, this somehow artificial divide between leftist groups and the PNA made of the phrase CS a sort of distinctiveness marker suggestive of broadly-speaking the secular left groups in Palestine, while those openly opposing the importance of CS were those in power until 2006. Those who have been conspicuously silent about CS can be placed in the Islamic and charitable sectors.

[282] World Bank (2006f)
[283] Sullivan (1996)
[284] Giacaman (2008)
[285] Sullivan (1995)
[286] Maannews.net, July 21, 2010

3.2. HISTORY OF NGOs AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN PALESTINE

According to many scholars and social scientists, it is cleat that CS, including NGOs cannot flourish without the protection of democratic structures. This is the lesson to be drawn if one were to study the condition in many countries all over the world, including the vast majority of Arab countries. Hence, in the Palestinian case, the question concerning the prospects for the development of CS can be rephrased as a question concerning the prospects for democracy in that society. Political and other figures in the Arab world did not show interest in the concept of CS until the 1990s. Arab political leaders and others recognized CS as a force because of the disappointment among the political and intellectual elites as regards the lack of progress in the institution of democratic practices, including wider dispersion of authority and free expression. Though one has to keep in mind that chronological analogies can be confusing, there are nonetheless grounds to argue that Palestinian society at the present stage of its development is, at least in one aspect, similar to some European societies during the nineteenth century. The development of CS in the Palestinian perspective will only come about as a consequence of the work and great effort of dynamic organized groups and communities in society. Foreign authors, scholars, local intellectuals and activists play a very important role in the dissemination of the phrase CS in the Palestinian realm. Large international donors then contribute to the dissemination of the discussion of CS via high-profile conferences and the publication of pamphlets. Not all share the same views on civil society, but there are two points of convergence between these authors and institutions. First, the debate is framed in political terms as a clear opposition between the State and civil society. Second, there is a shared understanding of civil society as reducible in some measure to professional NGOs that have to manage the transition, development or the democratization process. This has two consequences that bring us to the next section: first, within the field of those who speak in the jargon of civil society, there is an increased opposition between the PNA and leftist factions. Second, a whole disciplining apparatus funded by certain large donors promotes a very managerial understanding of ‘civil society’. It is in this vein that one could observe in the second half of the 1990s a flurry of conferences on the topic, a series of teaching modules for NGO activists, introductory courses to the Log-

Frame analysis, cycle management for civil society, and tailored courses to learn how to do fund-raising.[287]

Modern forms of association based on voluntary membership increased in the twentieth century. The Zionist-Palestinian conflict was a contributing factor in this increase. In the inter-war period, new political parties emerged whose main focus was the continuing and increasing Zionist colonization of Palestine. However, these parties were largely led by well-known land-owning or urban families. As a result, political life and rivalry acquired a traditional family and clannish coloring. Nevertheless, this period witnessed an increase in other forms of association such as unions, charitable societies, clubs, professional associations and the likes. The earliest Palestinian NGOs were formed during the British mandate and focused generally on grassroots promotion of the nationalist struggle[288]. Hammami, Hilal and Tamari (2001) agree also that the first 'modern' civic organizations in Palestine emerged in the 1920s during the British Mandate. At that time, the majority of CSOs were limited to narrow membership and representation.[289] After 1948, a large variety of organizations was formed on behalf of women, students, doctors, and others. Though formed earlier than the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), many of these organizations worked with it or on its behalf in the project of building the State of Palestine. According to Hammami, Hilal and Tamari (2001) and Giacaman, the Palestinians continued to establish CSOs, but they became more professional and relief-oriented, especially after the disposition in 1948. Additional relief organizations were created to respond to unions. Both types of CSOs still exist.[290] Because the PLO did not constitute a fully sovereign State, Palestinian NGOs were able to operate with a relatively free hand in seeking funding from regional and international donors, such as the wealthier Arab states and the World Bank. After Israeli military occupation occupied the remaining areas of Palestine - both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - in 1967, Palestinian CS was made up of voluntary, grassroots associations led by a generation of young, educated and politically-motivated Palestinian men and women,. Then, the Palestinian CSOs, in general, and NGOs, in particular, started

[287] Challand (2010)
[288] Brown (2003), p. 4
[289] Tamari, Hammami and Hilal (2001)
[290] Tamari, Hammami, and Hilal (2001), and Giacaman (2000)

new policies and strategies. During the first decade of the occupation, the Palestinians were confronted with four major challenges, which reflected and shaped their CSOs and NGOs: first, the Israeli military occupation strategies, policies and practices which endangered their national identity and survival, and left their future unclear; second, the presence of united national leadership to lay down strategies and lead the local confrontation; third, the fight to continue and build up their connection with the Arab world; and fourth, the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into two different entities.

The Palestinians both in the POTS of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip adopted a strategy of steadfastness that guided their lives during the first two decades under Israeli military occupation. They succeeded in developing their human resources in order to provide much-needed services to their communities. They also managed to secure the funding access for their NGOs from different sources. Prior to 1967, traditional groups and entities did exist, but not in the same manner as the new NGOs which were forced into life. By the late 1970s, they had coalesced politically into the broader structure of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and formed a distinct part of the Palestinian political parties and movements. The establishment of the PLO brought about very important and significant changes to specific aspects of the Palestinian political sphere and organization. It brought political diversity and a clearer definition of ideological pluralism within Palestinian society and introduced parties with a clear focus on Palestinian national issues. Membership in the movements and parties within the PLO was open, and for good or for bad, upward mobility within the parties was possible on the basis of the rules of the game of party politics. This was not always a democratic process, but success did not require a pedigree. Thus, it was possible for many from rural backgrounds or from refugee camps or from the ranks of the poor to rise to positions of prominence in the PLO and within Palestinian society in OPTs. Due to the lack of a Palestinian governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Israel's blatant disregard for the socio-economic needs of the Palestinian in occupied territories, Palestinian grassroots organizations were forced to work independently for the development of the Palestinian community. Due to their deeply-rooted connection to politics and to the Palestinian community at large, these grassroots organizations and NGOs also provided the

political space for the creation of a strong and pluralistic society in the West Bank and Gaza. As Giacaman states, "ten years through occupation this translated itself into an ideology of "steadfastness", endurance, continued presence on land. And "steadfastness" was not conceived in passive terms as the phrases I have used might suggest. On the contrary, it required organization, service delivery, networking, mobilization, and the creation of "support systems" of various types ranging from day-care centers to income-generating projects." [291]

And by the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new phenomenon emerged in Palestine on the NGO scene, namely, the emergence of voluntary grass-roots organizations. The new movement started to function in different fields on the ground without obtaining the permission of the Israeli military forces and the so-called civil administration. This fact placed them outside the law according to Israeli military orders. These new organizations - which basically aimed at providing services to the Palestinian community and building an infrastructure of popular resistance - influenced the NGOs and civil society movement in Palestine, leading them to revise their outlook and readjust their mission. The role of Palestinian NGOs is still ambiguous. The following section discusses NGOs in Palestine in more detail.

After the First Intifada, the situation changed and well-organized factions formed the Palestinian Unified Leadership of the Uprising and a wide range of popular and neighborhood committees were established, which, together with the foundation of various independent organizations, research centers and other institutions, increased the number of NGOs to over 2,000. During period lasting from 1987 to 1990, these grassroots organizations, NGOs, and leftist political groups served as the driving and organizing force behind the popular committees of the Intifada while continuing to provide all the services the Palestinian community needed. It is within this open context that the founding of a new generation of organizations seeking to fulfill the needs of Palestinians people under Israeli military occupation was witnessed. As Hammami, Hilal and Tamari (2001) stated, following the First Intifada in the late 1980s, Palestinian civil society

[291] Giacaman (2000)

witnessed an expansion in the number of mass organizations like CSOs that were voluntary, locally-based and called "popular committees". These committees also known as neighborhood committees organized food distribution and garbage collection under curfews and provided education to compensate for the closed schools and universities under Israeli occupation.[292] The work of the old generation of charitable organizations continued throughout this period, but the new NGOs appeared different in more than one respect, including the fact that they were often more specialized in areas such as development, economic activities, education, health, agriculture, and human rights.

In spite of the historical and other similarities with other CSOs and NGOs in the world, the Palestinian NGOs were nurtured in a very different context than the other NGOs – whether in the North or in the South. This is because they were established mainly during the prolonged Israeli military occupation, a period during which Israel tried to enforce policies and strategies to enhance its political and economical interests in Palestine and in the Middle East. The Palestinian NGOs developed in OPTs for three reasons. First, NGOs in Palestine have played a historic role in advancing the socio-economic needs of the local communities as well as those of the entire Palestinian society. Second, in the absence of a national governmental body with institutions to provide direct assistance to the people, Palestinian NGOs in effect took on the additional task of filling the gap. Third, the activists behind the establishment were politically-oriented, well-educated and very motivated. Gicaman points out that, within this broad historical and political context, the development of civil society in Palestine was influenced by two main developments: the onset of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, and the establishment of the first Palestinian National Authority in Palestine in 1994.[293] And Abdul-Hadi (1995) points out that Palestinian NGOs have played a crucial role in strengthening, fostering and supporting the Palestinian society, on the one hand, and in resisting the Israeli army occupation, on the other. Throughout this period, Palestinian NGOs have passed through different phases in accordance with the very different and

[292] Tmari, Hammami and Hilal (2001)
[293] Giacaman (2000)

complicated political situation.[294] Therefore, their program and objectives have been influenced by these changes in the political situation. For example, their objectives, programs and activities during the First Intifada were very different from those before it, and are also different from those of today – especially, after the start of the Second Intifada and contemporary developments. The changes became mainly political in nature for most of the NGOS and affected development and aid to the specialized ones.

Palestinian NGOs are an integral part of civil society and of the Palestinian national arena. Over 1,400 NGOs have been providing the Palestinian people with social, agricultural, medical, housing and public services. During times of political vacuum, they have also managed to fulfill the role traditionally played by a national government. Walker (2005) states that today, there are at least 1,200 Palestinian NGOs operating in a geo-political space equivalent to the size of Washington D.C. and Delaware combined. According to the World Bank, 200 of these are foreign run, 400 are local and organized under the umbrella of the General Union of Charitable Organizations, 90 are organized under the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGO) and a couple hundred others are divided among 4 other NGO Unions.[295] However, NGOs have been heavily dependent on outside financial support both from Arab and international sources, a fact that has affected their development and evolution in more than one way. However, according to Barghouti (1995), there are approximately 800 NGOs inside Palestine, which means and average of one NGO for every 3,000 people, mainly in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and a few in the Gaza Strip[296]. In the absence of the occupation's provision of services to the Palestinians, the Palestinian NGOs provided them with basic and minimum services in the field of health, agriculture, pre-school education, economic, training, credit, and human rights. But Barghouti points out that "in the health field for example, NGOs are in charge of no less than 60% of primary health care services, and about 49% of secondary and tertiary care. NGOs also manage 100% of the pre-school program."[297]

[294] Abdul-Hadi (1995)
[295] Walker (2005)
[296] Barghouthi 1995
[297] Barghouthi 1995

3.3. THE ROLE OF NGOs IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

Palestinians established different types of CSOs - including NGOs - such as cultural centers and clubs to advocate on community policy issues and to organize the people to achieve their objectives under the Ottoman law. In addition, throughout the British occupation, they have established a combination of religious, family-related and political organizations to build up certain projects in the socio-economic field as well as to articulate and keep under wraps their political aspirations. During this period, the CSOs maintained conventional relations to the main tribes and well-known figures. However, from 1948 to 1967, the situation changed. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, professional and charitable organizations or NGOs and other types of CSOs were established to deal with the requirements of certain social entities and to either give a hand, or counter the ruler's policies. The leadership of the CSO-like bodies no longer came from the conventional environment, but from new, cultured, and politically influential people. This trend continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s, spurred especially by the dispossession of 1948. Many organizations, groups, and charitable societies were formed to minister to the needs of the Palestinian people, especially those that became refugees. These organizations continue to operate to the present day.[298] Abedel Samad believes that two issues in particular have had a strong impact on CSOs in Palestine. First, the foreign occupation of the society strongly affects the role, the objectives, and the performance of civil society organizations. Second, Palestine is a State under construction, with limited sovereignty, independence, and capacity for social services.[299]

The strategies of Palestinian NGOs have focused on resistance to the Israeli occupation. The creation of structures ensuring long-term, sustainable and democratic development and the building of an energetic civil society in preparation for the emergence of an independent Palestinian State were also among the sector's main priorities. The arrival of the PNA presented the NGOs with new political realities and new challenges. An example is the formation of a

[298] Giacaman (2000)
[299] Ziad (2008)

legal framework within which NGOs could work while maintaining a regular and strong relationship with the important governmental structures, and helping alongside create a democratic internal structure in accordance with the rule of law and good governance. Since the 1960s, the POTs witnessed a significant increase in the number of CSOs, including NGOs, most of which were charitable associations and NGOs working regionally. The major parties within the PLO from left and right had extensions in the POTs and followers in mass organizations such as professional unions, workers unions, student groups in the universities and schools, women's groups and various committees. The PLO also gave a boost to the formation of new NG0s and benevolent societies whose main task was service delivery and relief work for different sectors in Palestinian society. Generally, it can be said that the PLO and its parties gave support to the process of societal organization of wide-ranging forms under occupation. On the one hand, this was also accompanied by competition between the groups of which the PLO was composed, a competition that often hindered the work of civic organizations, or duplicated it unnecessarily. On the other hand, organized groups working within the developing sphere of CS became a clear characteristic of Palestinian society, especially during the past three decades. Resistance, steadfastness, determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian service-delivery system were the main characteristics of the NGO sector under Israeli military occupation. During the occupation time, Palestinians managed to establish hundreds of NGOs to deliver a wide range of basic services and managed to survive in spite of numerous occupation policies and strategies to prevent them from doing so. The legal framework appropriate to these associations was based on Jordanian law in the West Bank – which is more or less an extension of Ottoman law -, but in the Gaza Strip was still based mainly on Ottoman law. After the military occupation in 1967, the Palestinians' demand for the provision of services increased; charity associations played the very important role of providing the needy services in social, educational, agricultural and health sectors. As it was mentioned in the first chapter, after about 10 years of occupation, a new trend took place on the NGO scene, namely, the emergence of grassroots organizations. The new movement started to function in different sectors on the ground, without seeking authorization from the so-called Israeli civil administration. The case of Palestinian NGOs provides an interesting

comparison. "The importance of NGOs to the economy of the West Bank is clearly recognized. (…) The World Bank estimated that over 1,200 Palestinian NGOs and 200 international NGOs are active. (…) In early 1996, it was estimated that NGOs provided about 60% by value of all primary health care services and up to one-half of secondary and tertiary health-care. All disability and preschool programs are run by NGOs, as well as most agricultural services, low-cost housing and micro-enterprise credit schemes"[300].[301]

In the POTs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the NGOs have played a very important, crucial and distinguished political and developmental role. As is true of any society, NGOs are, and should be, key players in the development of Palestine. During the struggle against the occupation in the OPTs, NGOs and SC took the form not only of popular resistance, but also of collective efforts to deliver - often free of charge - and collect relief and development services. The NGO sector has traditionally played a precious role in delivering economic and social services in the OPTs, particularly, for the most needy people. Abedul-El Hadi (1996)[302] states: "I do not want to discuss the important and crucial role awaiting the Palestinian NGOs during the coming period. However, I would like to point out the importance of this role in determining the content of the current building process." Herbert-Copley believes that NGOs have become prominent actors in the development field[303]. Also, Edwards and Hulme believe that NGOs play a distinctive role in development and face a different range of choices and strategies.[304] In addition, they are a mechanism of voluntary people's action capable of improving democracy, protecting human rights, strengthening local-level planning, promoting social justice, self-reliance, sustainability and the

[300] For more details on credit sector, see Abedlkarim (2002).
[301] Giacaman's article was originally published in the book "After Oslo" - a collection of articles by local and international experts. Topics covered include Palestinian civil society, the geography of Oslo and the Palestinian political system. Contributors include Jan de Jong, Fouad Moughrabi, Graham Usher and Azmi Bishara.
[302] Abdul-El-Hadi is the Director of the Bisan Center for Research and Development. He is member of the Steering Committee of the Palestinian NGO Network
[303] Herbert-Copley (1987)
[304] Edwards and Hulme (1992)

exclusion of exploitation in development programs [305]. On the one hand, NGOs are forced to play multiple roles, because they are committed to responding to the needs of poor, refugees, and marginalized people who are themselves changing sets over time and according to circumstances. This is especially true in a society like Palestine, where needs are acute and local structures are still searching their way in trying to meet them. However, it is very difficult to be very good at everything (Edwards (1996)[306]). On the other hand, NGOs are faced with decreasing flows of external funding from international communities.

3.4. NGOs AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The most important factor that has influenced the development of civil society in Palestine was the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. With this establishment, Palestinians now faced a host of new issues revolving around the nature of the relation between government and society, and the type of political system that will be established. Certain elements will affect the sustainable development of CS in Palestine, the most significant of which is the permanence and sustainability of the sector of civil society itself. This in turn depends on the nature of the political system, and on the existence of structural guarantees. Edwards, Hulme and Wallace state that generalizing the roles of NGOs is a bit dangerous due to the many levels at which they function. They also argue that typologies can vary according to local needs or donors[307]. And, on the other hand, Lewis (2001) suggests that in the field of development, the roles of NGOs can be broadly summarized in three sets of activities: implementer, catalyst, and partner.[308] Political scientists and scholars believe that one most important anxieties was whether the highly centralized decision-making process in the PLO on the eve of the Oslo accords would translate into dictatorial tendencies in the PNA. Another similarly important concern was whether the structure of the PLO would be transposed to govern the Palestinians on their land, given that the model does not

[305] Korten (1982), and Biggs and Neame (1995)
[306] Edwards (1996)
[307] Edwards, Hulme and Wallace, as quoted in Lewis and Wallace (2000)
[308] Lewis (2001)

distinguish between government and civil society. This is mainly because the PLO was not only composed of political parties, but also contained within its structures labor unions, student unions, teachers unions, women's unions, writers' unions, productive enterprises, research centers, and NGOs.

CSOs, including NGOs, have been the stabilizing force of the Palestinian society. They managed to create the bridge that enabled the Palestinians to journey from one period to another. However, their practices are being criticized by different scholars, researchers and activists within and outside Palestine, not the least by NGOs themselves. Jad (2004) states that in order to effect comprehensive, sustainable development and democratization, different forms of organizations are needed with different locally grounded visions and more sustainable power basis for social change.[309] Therefore, the number of NGOs in the world has increased exponentially from the mid-1970s to 1985[310]. (Moreover, the total amount of development aid disbursed by international NGOs increased by ten-fold in that same period. In 1992, international NGOs channeled over $7.6 billion of aid to developing countries. It is estimated that over 15 percent of total overseas development aid is channeled through NGOs. While statistics about global numbers of NGOs are incomplete, the WB estimates that there is currently between 6,000 and 30,000 national NGOs in developing countries[311]. In Palestine, the number of NGOs in 1995 was estimated to range from 800 to about 1,200.[312] However, other resources estimated the number to be over 1,500.[313] Palestinian CSOs - including NGOs - provide what are essentially public services in many sectors – particularly in health, education, rural development, and agriculture - due to the absence of the State in these areas. In spite of that role, the CSOs including the NGO community does not think itself as a mere service provider, but also as a valuable body for sustainable development and in the national and political process of struggle against the occupation.

[309] Jad (2004)
[310] World Bank (2006f)
[311] WB in Duke; WB (2006)
[312] Hammami (2000)
[313] Sullivan (1996)

The NGOs have the duty of representing and conveying the community's views on the most critical social, economic and political developments in Palestine such as sustainable development, independent and the right to self-determination and right of return. According to Abdel Hadi (2004), "NGOs are attempting to work towards achieving complete national independence that will guarantee that the Palestinian people are able to exercise such Palestinian national rights as the right of return, self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State."[314] And in order to promote the concepts of empowerment and popular participation - empowerment which is brought about either by an outside professional facilitator or by the NGOs themselves -, Lewis identifies another key role of the catalyst NGOs, namely, advocacy. To Lewis, advocacy is crucial in building sustainable development and influencing policy change and it is usually an activity undertaken by NGOs. This is why NGOs have formulated a number of strategies: advocacy strategy which includes lobbying for change in laws and legislation, regulations, and procedures; gaining the support of regional and international public opinion for Palestinian national rights; and influencing the process of reform of the PNA institutions that is currently being carried out[315]. The catalyst role of NGOs is about empowering the beneficiaries of the NGOs, starting at the community level. According to Lewis, the word 'empowerment' has many different meanings. However, in the context of development, it means making people aware of the power dynamics in one's life, developing capacities and skills for further control without infringing others, and supporting empowerment of others in the community. Empowerment has become a central idea in the field of development.[316] The other strategies include: awareness building strategy; service provision strategy; institutional, organizational and human resource development strategy and, finally, networking, coordination, and consultation and cooperation strategy[317]. Other scholars argue that, on he one hand, some Palestinian NGOs are attempting to give some sense to a 'civil society role' in addition to providing services. On the other hand, other NGOs are attempting to advance agendas for social change backed by the foreign donor community. However, Shawa further argues that "the rhetoric used by

[314] Hadi (2004)
[315] Lewis (2001), Hadi (2004) and Shawa (2000)
[316] Lewis (2001)
[317] Lewis (2001) and Hadi (2004)

donors and some activists inside and outside the NGOs that NGOs are 'building civil society' has been somewhat overstated." And he explains that the reality is that Palestinian NGOs have "gradually shifted from being organizations which served the community in multiple ways … under Israeli Occupation are currently shifting towards a narrower NGO focus on service provision as a result of institutional and environmental pressures which have grown under the PNA and the peace process"[318]. Furthermore, Hanafi and Tabari point that, in regard to the role of NGOs in contributing to change, the current Intifada, meaning the Second Intifada reveals that many Palestinian NGOs are focusing on a short-term role, such as relief action. A long-term vision on how to promote change in society remains undeveloped. In addition, the Intifada exposes a disconnection between NGOs and popular movements in Palestine. It reveals Palestinian NGO activists as unable to navigate between their own professional and development requirements and Palestinian national aspirations for independence, as framed by the overarching national agenda.[319]

In brief, Palestinian CSOs and NGOs have been the most important players in promoting economic and social sustainable development in local communities while attempting to fill the empty space first created by the prolonged occupation and later, by the inability of the PNA to effectively allocate limited resources to a plethora of problem areas. However, they were pushed at times, directly and indirectly, by the PNA and the international donor community to assume sustainable development and empowerment roles in the civil society. In the following sections, the relationship between NGOs and the PNA and NGOs and donors will be discussed to see how these relations affected the role and future of Palestinian NGOs in State-building. NGOs took responsibility for delivering services to the majority of the Palestinian population in the absence of a governmental body before 1994 (MONGOA, (2005); Sullivan (1995)). For years, international donors - the UN and other multilateral agencies, governments and INGOs - have provided hundreds of millions of dollars directly to Palestinian NGOs under Israeli occupation since 1967. For example, the Union of Health Work Committees (UHWC) established in Jerusalem in 1985, the Health,

[318] Shawa (2000)
[319] Hanafi and Tabari (2003)

Development, Information and Policy Institute (HDIP) established in 1989, and the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) established in 1986 and the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee (PARC) established in 1983, and the Bisan Center for Research and Development established in 1983 are prominent NGOs focusing on research and advocacy work as well as service provision. These NGOs have long established relations with the donors to secure funding. Before the establishment of the PNA, the Palestinian NGOs were the only significant "entity" that could, and would, promote development projects for Palestinians suffering from the military occupation. However, after the signing of the Oslo Accords, the NGO community feared that Western donors would stop supporting them and divert funds to the PNA which would have had a significant and devastating effect on them. Also, they feared that the PNA would expect them to stop or limit their activities and take over the ones in the area of housing, education or health as they normally fall within the purview of government responsibility. The fears will be discussed in more details in the next sections.

3.5. PALESTINIAN NGOs AND THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY

> *"The relationship between Palestinian NGOs and the PNA has been contentious since the establishment of the PNA in 1994."*[320]
>
> Rema Hammami

According to Hammami (2000) and Brown (2003), the first confrontation between the PNGO and the PNA took place in 1995 as they disputed over the legal framework governing the work of NGOs. The PNA required that all existing NGOs, regardless of whether they had been already registered with the Israeli Military occupation, Jordan, or Egypt, renew their registration with the PNA. Failure to register would result in the cancellation of the registration (Brown

[320] Hammami (2000)

(2003)). The most prominent NGOs refused to register and this led the PNA to assert more direct control through the establishment of a 'Draft NGO Law' (Brown (2003)).

The NGO community, on the other hand, was not ready to give away this role and accused the government of attempting to control the sector. This mutual rejection sparked the first flicker of conflicts between the NGO community and the Palestinian Authority. This conflict was unique in many ways. For instance, it was widely publicized and discussed in the public arena domestically and internationally. Furthermore, the NGO community in Palestine is highly politicized. The conflict was not simply a matter of roles and jurisdictions, but was rooted in deeper issues.

According to Lewis, the implementer role is about mobilizing resources to provide goods and services such as healthcare, education, or emergency relief. This service could be part of the NGO's own program or that of a government or donor agency. Lewis identifies some problems associated with this role, in particular, that the relationship with the government is not well-defined: "…are those NGOs complementing, replacing or undermining the role of the government in providing the services themselves?" (Lewis (2001)). However, there is another side of the coin: some argue that when there is a gap, it should be filled regardless of the problems this creates. It is more important to judge the development impact when there is a need than to judge the relationship, especially when there are limited sources of public service provision (Lewis (2001)).

This is why we find many instances of mutual accusations of corruption between the two sides, or the call by pro-Fatah intellectuals for the realization, first of a viable state, and then only, of the reinforcement of the civil society sector (Abu Saif (2005)). Surely, donors have bought into this line of argument of a two-pronged opposition, zigzagging between giving priority to boosting the PNA (especially in the first years of the PNA) or giving credit to NGOs pressuring the PNA towards more accountability (like in 1998, when talks about corruption in the PLC and, even more conspicuously, in 2003 and 2004 when pressure mounted on Arafat to introduce the Basic Law and the position of a Prime Minister). But what such stories do not tell us is why the left, traditionally so strong in the civil

society sector (Robinson (1997)) has done so poorly in the last legislative elections of 2006 and how the Hamas (and per extension, the Islamist sector) which has been left out of such a State versus society narrative, has precisely managed to clinch such a stunning victory in these same 2006 elections.

After 1994, when the PNA started working, Palestinian NGOs already had a long history of providing many essential social services and working in the absence of the kinds of restraints typically imposed on NGOs in the Middle East[321]. But the PNA immediately attempted to assert the heavy-handed control over NGOs that was common in most Arab states, especially the neighboring states of Egypt and Jordan. The relations between the PNA and Palestinian NGOs declined precipitously.[322] Tensions between the PNA and the NGOs are most clearly obvious in the authority's moves to squeeze control of NGOs and their activities, and also a major part of their access to donor community. Underneath authoritarian regimes in the so-called Third World, in general, and in the Palestinian case, in particular, any dispersal out of the sphere of CS must attract attention. Unfair regimes do not, by and large, strive to lock up economic activity, in contrast to political activity, civil liberties and the right to organize. Any effort to implement change in society must therefore give preference to the safeguard of political and civil liberties and to respect of democracy, human and citizen rights and rule of law as the compulsory environment within which further change takes place in society. In the Palestinian context, political parties in the opposition, together with other organized groups with a vested interest in change and in the protection of civil liberties, democracy and human rights, appear as the main agents in the effort to expand the field of civil society. With the establishment of the PNA, an effective, secure and sound civil society and the democratization process became the new priorities of the Palestinian NGO sector. However, due to NGO experience and history and the intermediary and vague nature of the political situation in Palestine, the relationship between NGOs and the PNA has gone through four stepladders: the first one happened immediately after the arrival of the PNA. It was mainly characterized by hesitation about the role and the future of CSOs, including NGOs, in the emerging political situation and in the creation

[321] Elbayar (2005)
[322] Brown (2003), pp. 9-10

of PNA bodies. The PNA was of two opinions in this respect: on the one hand, it acknowledged the need for the socio-economic services provided by NGOs to fill the gap its inability to provide these same services created. On the other hand, NGOs were regarded as competitors to the service-delivery system of the PNA. The second one was defined by mutual recognition. It marked the start of the discussion between NGOs and the PNA. As a matter of principle, the NGOs started to prepare their own political discourse on civil society, democracy and the rule of law. In this stage, the NGO community witnessed a big shift in funding priorities. This led them to modifications in the activities and strategies of some of the NGOs. The third one was characterized by the emerging cooperation between the PLC and the NGO community related to the drafting and endorsement of the Palestinian NGO law. The fourth one was characterized by cooperation and fighting: in the beginning, there was cooperation between the NGOs and the relevant ministries and then, clashes took place between them. Then, the main concern of both the PNA and the NGOs was the creation of a legal framework to regulate the relationship between both parties.

The relationship between Palestinian NGOs and the PNA has been contentious since the advent of the PNA in 1994; however, the future of Palestinian NGOs was less certain even if one-and-a-half year after the arrival of the PNA, Palestinian NGOs still accounted for the majority of services in the POTs.[323] During the prolonged occupation and in the absence of governmental institutions, the Palestinian CSOs and NGOs provided health, educational, agricultural and other vital services. However, with the signing of the Oslo Accords and the arrival of the PNA, the reality changed. The PNA anticipated that the NGO community was going to step down from its role in service delivery and hand it to it while the NGOs predicted that some sort of coordination and cooperation would be in place between both sides. What happened in Palestine after Oslo, according to Sullivan (2001)[324], is a rare case of State-building, something that does not happen everyday. Sullivan explains that it is normal for the governing body, the PNA, to clash with those who are to be governed while it develops the appropriate institutions and legal frameworks. In spite of that, the Palestinians have been able

[323] Sullivan (1996)
[324] Sullivan (2001)

to manage very well since 1967 in the absence of a national and representative government and under Israeli military occupation in what Jarrar[325] (2005) called a 'political vacuum'. NGOs managed to fill the gap in the Palestinian society caused by the occupation. However, even now, after 17 years after the signing of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the PNA, the services of the NGO sector are still needed in addition to their role in the overall development process of Palestinian civil society. According to many scholars, social scientists and political figures, significant changes occurred in the political and socioeconomic context in which Palestinian NGOs had been working, leading them to improve their strategies and redefine their role after the establishment of the PNA. Because of all these elements, Shuaibi Azmi Commissioner General of the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN) believes that the PNA looks at CSOs as enemies, not as partners.[326] The relationship between the NGO community and the PNA has been unbalanced and, as a result, led the NGOs to operate within a vague legal framework that left them vulnerable to political pressure. However, the PNA and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) have worked on drafting the Law of Charitable Associations, Social Societies and Private Institutions that is a legal framework that regulates the activities of NGOs and their relationship with the PNA.

3.5.1. NGOs and the rule of law

CSOs are not all the same, and countries often ratify different laws for different types of organizations, and this is the source of misunderstanding in public administration. The role of CS is increasingly international as a result of the reduced ability of the State to make available services and guarantee social justice. In addition, modern societies are witnessing the development of social capital, increased interaction between people internationally, and increased awareness of human rights and tools for protecting them.[327] After the establishment of the PNA, the creation of a viable and strong civil society and the democratization process became the new priorities of the Palestinian NGO sector. At that time, the main concern of both the PNA and the NGOs was the creation of a legal framework in

[325] Jarrar (2005)
[326] Maannews.net, July 21, 2010
[327] Ziad (2007)

order to regulate the relationship between both parties. Brouwer explains that when Yasser Arafat returned to Palestine after a long exile, he sought to gain greater control of the new class of community leaders created during the Intifada. Thus, the PNA proposed a restrictive law modeled after Egypt's Law No. 32 of 1964. A less restrictive law was adopted in 1999 after protests by domestic and international civil society groups and foreign donors.[328] When the PNA produced a draft NGO law modeled on the highly restrictive Egyptian law, the reaction of Palestinian NGOs was swift and well-organized. Palestinian NGOs mounted a successful campaign domestically and, perhaps most effectively, used the international connections made in their long history to get donor States and international agencies – which provided the bulk of the PNA's funding – to pressure the PNA. After a protracted struggle between the PNA, which was rapidly developing a reputation of excessive authoritarianism, and the highly-organized and well-connected Palestinian civil society sector, the NGOs won what has been termed "a near total victory."[329] The latest attempt to develop an NGO law, in early 1998, arose out of a joint effort between the political sub-committee of the PLC and a coalition of NGOs. The resulting "Draft Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organizations" offers a sound framework for establishing a *modus operandi* between the PA and NGOs. Since 1998, the draft NGO law has been through four readings at the PLC, in the course of which several amendments were proposed by the Executive, mainly focused on the identity of the agency responsible for registering NGOs and overseeing their activities. The law drafted by the PLC designates the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) as the responsible agency, whereas the Executive has insisted on it being the Ministry of Interior (MOI). On May 25, 1999, the final reading of the law took place at the PLC. The PA amendment suggesting that the MOI be the responsible authority was rejected by 38 votes to 12.

Four years had gone before the PLC adopted the existing version of the Palestinian NGO law - the Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organizations. Additionally, a special ministry for NGO affairs was created by a presidential decree which defines the scope and role of the ministry. The NGO

[328] Imco Brouwer, reviewed by Sam Charron (2008)
[329] Brown (2003)

law was endorsed by the President and then sent to the relevant legislative and executive bodies to be translated into rules and regulations. Governance and the internal legal framework of NGOs are supposed to be consistent with the articles of this law. However, the coherence between the general articles of the law and the principles and rules contained in the regulatory mandate adopted by the Ministry of the Interior is still up for discussion. With the adoption of the new law, the NGOs embarked on a process of drafting and redrafting of their own internal constitutions or by-laws compliant with the NGO law. This stipulated a clear definition of roles and division of responsibilities of the different organs. Organizational and financial systems were either endorsed or developed while others were changed to meet the required standards. In point of fact, many NGOs had already been reviewing their by-laws and laws between 1998 and 2000, that is, before the new law was officially adopted.

NGOs began to focus on the strengthening of the legal system, the establishment of institutional capacity for the fair administering of justice, the endorsement and guard of human rights and basic freedoms, as well as the development of the rule of law in the POTs. These efforts, however, have met with a variety of obstacles for the most part due to the absence of a clear division of powers. President Arafat signed the NGO Law delineating the relationship between the PNA and Palestinian NGOs on January 2000. Although the place of NGO registration remains with the Ministry of Interior instead of the Ministry of Justice, an alteration that is incompatible with the PLC's procedures, we welcome this event as a major achievement for Palestinian civil society and its numerous NGOs and community organizations. With the official signature, this NGO Law became, in most of its articles, the most progressive law of this kind in the Middle East. The current challenge is to ensure that the rule of this new law will prevail in guiding future government and NGO relations.[330]

Law 1/2000 is as some say a perfect NGO law, but no one can escape what appears to be a regional propensity to require the licensing of all groups, formal and informal. NGOs that operate in Palestine, regardless of their need or desire to

[330] Claudet (1999)

seek formal legal incorporation, must obtain a license from the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) before they can "practice any of their activities."[331] But as Nathan Brown puts it, "Palestine is, in short, a model democracy. Its most significant flaw is that it does not exist."[332] The drama of Palestine is that on paper it has many of the institutions and measures of a democratic self-governing State, but in reality, it remains caught between the Intifada, crippling unemployment, growing insecurity, and Israeli military occupation. Palestine is almost a picturesque negative of its Arab neighbors: whereas most Arab states have overwhelmingly dominant State institutions but no democracy, Palestinians are up-to-date in the methods and measures of democracy, but their institutions have not been able to take root "in the midst of one of the world's most intractable conflicts."[333] Thus, as with many Palestinian laws, the civil society statute is on paper very close to a model of good governance; but the practical realities of life in the highly unstable, occupied country make it difficult to ascertain. Encouragingly, the evidence indicates that both the PNA and most Palestinian NGOs comply with Law 1/2000. The Palestinian NGO Network, one of the oldest and well-respected NGO networks in Palestine, is licensed and complies with the law, and requires each of its 92 affiliated NGOs to do the same[334]. Nonetheless, because the law requires the MOI to keep a public log of rejected applications, including the reasons for their rejection, it appears unlikely that the MOI acts in a totally arbitrary manner without eliciting a major outcry from the ever-vigilant Palestinian NGO sector.

The PLC introduced a bill to modify the NGO Law in 2005. The modification would represent a major blow to the Palestinian NGO community by converting NGO law in Palestine into one of the most restrictive in the region. The modification tries to insert a new article into the Law banning NGOs from "engaging in any political activity." Furthermore, in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is difficult to envision an NGO whose work would not constitute *some* kind of political activity or statement. Nonetheless, the amended law would

[331] Law 1/2000 (Palestine), Art. 7

[332] Brown, 2005, p. 3, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP59.brown.FINAL.pdf

[333] Elbayar, Kareem, 2005

[334] Email to Kareem Elbayar, from Palestinian NGO Network, 26 May 2005, See www.pngo.net

impose severe criminal punishments on any violation of the ban on political activity. The proposed amendment would also create a government "Commission for Non-Governmental Organizations and Human Rights" with the power of supervising, monitoring, and directing all NGO activity, which could entail increased government interference in the daily affairs of NGOs. The amendment was greeted with enthusiastic censure and opposition from the Palestinian NGO community. Thanks to the work of groups such as the Palestinian NGO Network, the amendment has currently been placed on hold. Just as it did when the PNA first attempted to impose a restrictive NGO law in 1994, the international community should work with domestic Palestinian NGOs to oppose this amendment?[335]

The Ministry of the Interior did not publish the guidelines, it appears that they enforce conditions which borrow from the letter and the spirit of the new law, for example, by requiring that elections of new board members be approved by the Ministry and that minutes of NGO board meetings be made available on request. At the same time, the new Ministry of NGO Affairs has drafted its own guidelines, which are reported to require NGOs to specialize in only one field of work and to seek the ministry's approval before raising funds. The Palestine NGO Network (PNGON) has obtained the opinion of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' rights (PICCR) to the effect that the Ministry of the Interior's guidelines is incompatible with the new NGO law, but this opinion is of advisory value only.[336]

3.5.2. The PNGO Network and the PNA

As a result of the funding cut-backs and of PNA attempts to control the NGO community, a group of 42 NGOs in the POTs created a network called the "PNGO Network". The Network set goals to "reinforce the role played by NGOs through contributing to the development and empowerment of CS within an independent Palestinian State based on the principles of democracy, social justice

[335] Palestinian NGO Network Letter
[336] Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa 2000

and respect for human rights. The Network represented over 80 other organizations which were not officially members of it. According to Brown (2003), the PNGO restricted its membership to the larger, more internationally-oriented and secular NGOs making it a leftist and oppositional network. Thus, the PNGO Network excluded grassroots organizations, Islamic NGOs, and those supported by the PNA.[337] Other more locally-based NGOs, charitable organizations and unions formed their own network, namely, the General Union of Palestinian Charitable Societies (PGUCS). PGUCS is composed of 385 members comprising almost one third of the Palestinian NGOs. However, according to Sullivan (1996), the PGUCS was originally established in the 1960s in Jordan then moved its headquarters to Jerusalem in 1991[338]. Most charitable organizations tend to be affiliated with one of the four regional Unions of Charitable Societies (Nablus, Jerusalem, Hebron, and Gaza). They differ from the larger secular NGOs in that they are led by local notables. Many were established under specific legislation, such as the Jordanian Law of Charitable Organizations Number 22 of 1955. Although most Islamic health organizations are charitable organizations, not all charitable associations are Islamic. Some are Christian and others secular. In all cases, however, they function conservatively and often work at the crossroads of various activities, for two reasons. Historically, charitable organizations were founded as early as the beginning of the twentieth century and provide an important segment of Palestinian civil society. The second is that with the second Intifada and the related economic difficulties, people have turned to more local sources of solidarity[339], a sector in which charities have had an important role. For this reason, Challand (2008) has argued elsewhere that we are probably witnessing a revival of charitable organizations.[340]

The PNGO Network states that in order to achieve its goal, it needs to strengthen harmonization within the NGO sector, reinforce democratic values within society and strengthen civil society's organizational capacities, but does not refer to any need to coordinate with the PNA.[341] However, in a different

[337] Brown (2003)
[338] Sullivan (1996)
[339] Al Malki (1994, 2001)
[340] Challand (2008)
[341] PNGO Network (1995), pngo.net

document, the Network stated its position concerning the PNA and the Oslo Accords and touched on the points of difference between the two parties. The document starts with a definition of the role of NGOs in democratic societies: NGOs in democratic societies play a balancing role to that of their governments. They act independently of governmental institutions, either because of the inability of the state to meet all the requirements and needs of the society, or because a number of these needs fall outside the scope of the government's obligations. Moreover, non-governmental organizations can also represent different, even opposing views, to those upheld by the State and its structure.

NGOs try to identify themselves through statements such as: "any institution, alliance, or grouping that works to provide services to citizens in different scientific, cultural, informational, charitable, developmental, legal, religious, or artistic spheres."[342] In addition, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs-NGO Monitor, defines NGOs as: autonomous, non-profit and non-party/politically unaffiliated organizations that advance a particular cause or set of causes in the public interest. The range of causes on which an NGO can focus is unlimited, but a cardinal principle is that NGOs operate in a manner consistent with the objectives for which they receive funds. Donations are an NGO's lifeline because they are independent organizations. Funding can come from governments, the UN, private trusts and philanthropies, individual donations, religious institutions, and, in many cases, other NGOs.[343] In addition it stresses that NGOs should perform freely without any interference from the PNA. The statements also voice the fears of NGOs concerning the Oslo Accords in relation to the aims and modes of operation of their institutions. The statements stress the necessity of the continual existence of NGOs, especially in certain social sectors that the PNA might not serve. It also calls for a respectful relationship between the PNA and the NGOs whereby the PNA should focus on the attainment of national independence and the building of Palestinian civil society, building upon the fact that the NGO community has built up substantial experience in the area over the years.

[342] PNGO Network 1993; pngo.net
[343] NGO Monitor- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

Several terms have been used to describe the troubled relationship between the NGO community and the PNA. Many have described it as a "battle", a "dispute", a "conflict", and some even called it a "war". Hammami describes the relationship as "…growing PNA authoritarianism towards the various NGO sectors and NGO's constantly evolving attempts to thwart the control."[344] Studies stated that instead of having a harmonizing role and a relationship of collaboration and trust, the relationship between NGOs and the PNA is characterized by competition for donor funds, throwing accusations of corruption, non-accountability, lack of professionalism, attempts from the Authority to control the NGOs sector and a reverse attempt from the NGOs to sustain their complete autonomy and independence from the government. The accusations of corruption reached such a degree that the PNA and other government-supported NGOs accused the NGO community of being 'fat cats' that are running after donor funds. This publicized antagonist relationship escalated over time on different occasions.

The conflict between PNA and CS and NGOs in Palestine is not an issue of roles and jurisdictions, but is deeply-rooted in several issues. Fundamentally, five main reasons have led to this fight. The first one is the political affairs that mark the Palestinian scene, including the relationship between the civil society and NGOs and the PNA. The greater part of Palestinian NGOs is associated with political parties and movements, including the leftist and Islamic ones. Both the leftist and Islamic parties are against the Oslo Process and use their associated NGOs to move ahead their political agendas to take a part in the political arena and try to sabotage the peace process and the negotiations. In addition, they attempt to provide evidence that they are more competent and more experienced than the PNA. The second one is the fight concerning the future of civil society and NGOs, on the one hand, and the PNA, on the other. The third one is the legitimacy on the ground and the community support of Palestinian society. The fourth one is that donor community has its own political agendas on supporting the political process and peace in the region. The fifth one is the inadequacy of

[344] Hammami (2000), p. 17

financial funds for both the PNA and the NGOs and civil society which will see in the next section in this chapter.

3.6. NGO-NGO RELATIONS AND THE DONOR COMMUNITY

> *"International aid is not development-oriented if development is defined as structural development of the economy. Assistance has mainly been focused to taking sides the PNA bureaucracy, infrastructure, and relief."*
>
> World Bank[345]

The story of the re-directed funding from a large number of popular committees - after the signing of the Oslo Accords - towards the PNA and the merger of part of them (namely, those close to Fatah) with the emerging Authority leading to a front between a pro-PNA camp and a leftist camp fighting for a large extent from within civil society organizations are well known as well (Hammami (1995)).[346]

An analysis of the implication of donors active in civil society promotion (Challand (2006, 2009a)) stresses that there has been (1) a tendency towards a significant increase in terms of the size and volume of funding given by donors, (2) a governmentalization of the sources of funding from 1994 onwards that has replaced smaller solidarity organizations, and (3) a specialization and/or professionalization in the types of organizations involved.[347] The WB's website discusses the importance of partnership or cooperation as part of the Bank's policy: "Partnerships between governments, businesses and CSOs are now one of the most effective ways to raise standards of living and achieve sustainable development."[348] As Lewis (2001) affirmed, not only is this true, but partnership

[345] World Bank, Bank Investment Projects, Palestine Economic Forum home page, updated June 1997, September 4, 1997.
[346] Hammami (1995)
[347] Challand (2006, 2009a)
[348] World Bank (2006f)

increases efficiency, transparency and beneficiaries' participation and fills the gap of culture, especially when NNGOs are involved in the development process.[349] By the time the Declaration of Principles was signed in September 1993, there was an estimated 200 international donors (mostly Western NGOs) providing funding in the POTs[350]. The increase of Western promises for funding peaked with the signing of the Oslo Accords and in the subsequent donor-pledging conference in Washington. Obviously, the larger share of funding (roughly, an average of US$ 500 million a year) was directed to the establishment of the PNA and to State-building measures[351]. It is usually accepted that the amount of funding earmarked for civil society dropped from about $170 million around 1990 to $100 million in 1994, and subsequently to $60 million in 1996.[352] Hanafi (2002) estimates the flow of international aid to NGOs at around $63m for the year 1998.[353] The impression of so-called partnership or cooperation between NGOs and donor community, governments, or countries has been very trendy in the international development field for political reasons and also because of what happened in Palestine.

Generally, and according to dozens of studies, researchers, academics, international development experts and NGOs activists – both nationally and internationally, CSOs, including the NGO community, have conventionally played a vital and crucial role in delivering and providing socio-economic services in OPTs, particularly to poor and improvised Palestinian people, whether in the camps, villages and the cities. In spite of that, the notion of 'partnership' between NGOs and donors, governments, or countries has been very popular in the international development field. Not only that, but partnership increases efficiency, transparency and beneficiaries' participation and to fill the gap of culture especially when NNGOs are involved in the development process.[354] After the establishment of the PNA, the donor community moved to channel their funds and support to the newly emerged authority for political reason related to the so-

[349] Lewis (2001)
[350] Curmi (2002)
[351] Brynen (2000)
[352] Sullivan (1998), p. 95 and Hammami (1995), p. 59
[353] Hanafi (2002), p. 12
[354] Lewis (2001)

called peace process. This shift had badly affected the CSOs and NGOs in the implementation of their programs and activities in OPTs.

The funds for the CSOs, including NGOs, have been decreasing dramatically and some of them closed programs and units while others tried to follow up the donors' agenda. Available data from many sources indicate that funding for NGOs fell down by more than 50 percent in the second half of the 1990s. For illustration, sources, studies and statistics estimate that total funds in 1995 stood only at about $60 million, 60 percent of which went to the health sector. These funds have risen modestly since 1995, but have also shifted away from grassroots development projects towards training programs, human rights and democracy-building initiatives. From 1994 to 1995, with the creation of the PNA and the establishment of World Bank programs tailored for CSOs, the number of publications on the theme of 'civil society' literally exploded. A whole set of expressions emerged around 1994, exactly at the time when new challenges emerged on the road to building an autonomous Palestinian State. CS is the leading example, but other concepts became as important in the following years. 'Empowerment', 'participatory schemes', 'civil society organizations', 'democratization' are all examples of this new paradigm.[355] Walker affirms that the impact of this shift in funding from supporting politicized, grassroots, professional, and community-based initiatives to the new super NGOs was dramatic. The international aid industry was instrumental in moving the Palestinian context away from one of resisting occupation to one of "peace-building." With this shift, the local reality - military occupation and dispossession - was de-contextualized. [356] In addition, Palestinian civil society also faces funding constraints. It is difficult to estimate the volume of charitable donations, since most of them go directly to philanthropic associations. Furthermore, the socioeconomic reality in Palestine limits the capacity for organizations to solicit local donations and affects the ability of individuals to volunteer or to join CSOs. At the same time, the sanctions imposed on the nation create a shortage in funding.[357] As super providers and political partners, Western governments and

[355] Challand (2010)
[356] Walker (2005)
[357] Ziad (2008)

donors (WGD) took a leading role in planning funding and evaluating governance policies in Palestine. It is through their sheer political and economic weight that the Oslo process was sustained. To better understand their policies and their effects and in light of the previous information, the chapter will go over the following points: It was not only the Authority that had almost 16 years to set the stage, but also the WGD working with the Authority on their own.

Throughout Oslo 1, and then Oslo 2 and other agreements related to the establishment of the structure, setting trends mattered most. Minimal attention, if any, was paid to workers unions, professional syndicates and grassroots establishment. They were left to reach their financial demise without any support. It is unexplainable how the bar association, physician syndicates, engineers, teachers evaded an agenda with the previous directives to date. Before and after elections, the partnership at the political and economic levels were developing other than the limited intervention on NGOs, the Authority was cheered for its coherent political wisdom and the first ever ballot free process in the Arab context. If the bit on the NGOs happen, one might have argued that they did not know about the whole sector or that they did not have enough power to intervene. Yet, events proved otherwise. To make things worse, it is proved that they went along and participated in the strategic marginalization of the judiciary and the legislature. Up to now, the funds have been directed most entirely to the bureaucracy in the civil sphere and the security apparatus.

The donor community continued its contribution to the contraction and fragmentation of PCS, including NGOs, by channeling vast amounts of funds into the NGO sector, judging it to be the vanguard of human rights and democracy. A phenomena of NGO mushrooming appeared in the post Oslo era, their number doubled and their ego got inflated to a degree where many of them were equating NGOs with civil society. Indeed, this was the only through which we could say that PCS was doing great. This was a brief history of the events that took place in the Oslo process and by its key players. We will now move to see the impact on the activism and discourse of the esteemed NGOs sector. Julia Pitter confirms that since Oslo, frustrations over the requirements of receiving grants have increased,

since most funding now comes with specific policy conditions attached.[358] As a consequence, local organizations have to scramble for funding with the emergence of the PNA in 1994 and there was an increased bureaucratization of aid resulting in the survival of predominantly larger NGOs. The story of the re-directed funding from a large number of popular committees towards the PNA with the signing of the Oslo Accords and the merger of part of them (namely, those close to Fatah) with the nascent Authority leading to a front between a pro-PNA camp and a leftist camp fighting for a large extent from within civil society organizations are well known as well.[359]

Challand conducted 37 interviews between 2002 and 2005 with international donor organizations (now, mostly governmental ones) during the Second Intifada. It comes out that there has been a significant re-increase of funding to Palestinian NGOs. The fact that interviews were carried out in the early months of 2003 and 2004, at a time of deep humanitarian crisis throughout the territories, might explain this increase. Out of the 37 donors interviewed (specializing in health and advocacy and therefore representing about a fourth of all donors to civil society), the total amount of funding disbursed for health and advocacy NGOs reached $100 million for the years 2003 to 2005. By extrapolating, the total amount of external aid to Palestinian civil society could reach an amount as high as $300 to $400 million a year over the period 2003-2005. This represents the current overall yearly average of international aid to Palestine for the Oslo years, but including multilateral aid and money given to the PNA. Note that over the last four years, this corresponds to the total amount of aid given only by the European Union to the PNA. Since 2006, the vast majority of EU money has been going to recurrent costs (budgetary support) of the PNA and humanitarian relief programs and from which the Hamas-led governments have never received a single penny.[360]

There are strong convergences in aids granted to civil society and the PAN, respectively, in the sense that large amounts of money have been disbursed

[358] Julia Pitner, www.merip.org
[359] Hammami 1995
[360] Challend 2006

not so much to improve the domestic political scene in Palestine, but rather to save a moribund and unfair peace process from 1994 onwards. Le More (2008) is right to say that a lot of money has been wasted in an attempt to cover the international community's political guilt towards the Palestinians, rather than addressing the roots of the problem between Israel and Palestine. Le More rightly challenges the view that there is an automatically positive and linear relation between aid and improvement of the political situation. The same applies for civil society promotion as we shall see. An analysis of the implication of donors active in CS promotion (Challand (2006, 2009a)) stresses that there has been (1) a tendency towards a significant increase in terms of the size and volume of funding given by donors, (2) a governmentalization of the sources of funding (with all that this means in terms of power of governments to influence the political negotiations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) from 1994 onwards replacing thus smaller solidarity organizations, and (3) a specialization and/or professionalization in the types of organizations involved.[361]

Palestinian people under prolonged military occupation are almost entirely dependent for their survival on aid from outside, and not on their own productive resources and energies. Nearly more than one and quarter million live on their PNA West Bank monthly salaries, and the Hamas government's allocations in Gaza, the dispensation of which is conditioned by the receipt of donations from outside on time. No less than 45000 live directly on their salaries from externally-funded NGOs and other international organizations, and many more thousands live on NGO programs. As a result, the source of revenue of most Palestinians who have stable income is mortgaged by political decisions foreign to them, and beyond their control. Recent appeals by active civil society organizations and individuals - through conferences and civil society's electronic networks - to re-direct and focus popular, grassroots energies on the unfair, unjust, and skewed distribution of financial resources by highlighting the plight of the impoverished population in Palestine.[362]

[361] Challand (2006, 2009a)
[362] Nakhleh (2008)

3.7. THE HAMAS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOs

The rise of political Islam in the Palestinian context has led to mixed reactions within the Palestinian society, in general, and CS, in particular. Those who are involved exclusively in anti-imperialist campaigns tend to see the Hamas as the Palestinians's last great hope to fight against imperialists and their allies in region. The Hamas is viewed as an ideologically tight and closely controlled organization that has consistently opposed the Oslo Accord and the so-called peace process and refused to renounce armed resistance in return for the kinds of privileges and special treatment from Israel military occupation that the PNA leadership enjoys. Hamas also has a different mix of territoriality and identity than PNA political parties. For the majority of refugee population of the POTs, Hamas is seen as less likely to bargain away the right of return or give up claims to Jerusalem. In any case, activists believe there are more people in favor of Palestinian self-determination than in favor of an anti-imperialist agenda. And more important for the people is the question of the type of society Palestinians want to build, a question that involves substantial economic, social, and cultural issues. Here, Hamas faces a problem. On the one hand, it has allowed many Palestinians to go beyond defenselessness and scarcity by combining social, moral, and political agendas in one political language and seeing to it that the infrastructure for realizing these agendas is provided at the neighborhood level. On the other hand, although Hamas won partly because it is the most effective organizer of grassroots civil society and self-help institutions in Palestine, its worldview and tactics pose a major problem for most international solidarity and civil society movements (labor, feminist, human rights, and so on), which are grounded in the principles of secular humanism and nonviolence.

Since the emergence of the Hamas as an Islamist political group within Palestinian political arena after the First Intifada, little has been written on the political evolution of Hamas's position on many political issues concerning the Palestinian problem. As Hroub 2006 points out, after the Hamas won the majority during the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006, its political positions as presented in the Western media harked back to its 1988 charter, with almost no reference made to its considerable evolution under the impact of political

developments. Perhaps the most important turning point in Hamas's political life has been its unexpected victory during the January 2006 PLC elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hamas went all out during the campaign for the 25 January PLC elections, expecting to win a significant bloc of seats, but not a majority. Surprised and even ambivalent about its victory, it was eager for a power sharing arrangement within the framework of a coalition government. There is no doubt that the wish of a coalition was at least partially motivated by a sense of ill-preparedness to move abruptly from the absence of representation in government to assuming full power. But there is also no doubt that the Hamas had long emphasized national unity and had long signaled its readiness to join PA structures and the PLO, albeit on its own terms. Thus, a national unity government was not only very much in line with Hamas's thinking, but was also seen as the best possible way forward.

According to Doumani (2007), the victory of the Hamas marks both the official end of half a century during which the Palestinian political scene was dominated by a secular political national movement and the beginning of a new stage of unknown duration during which an Islamist political culture will be an integral, if not dominant, part of the movement. The election was not in itself a major turning point.[363] Overnight, the Hamas was transformed from an opposition movement that had no part in the "national" governing structure to a party called upon to govern.[364]

Undoubtedly, the realities and challenges brought about by this new condition could only accelerate a shift in the movement's political thinking and practice, a shift already visible after the Second Intifada with the announcement of long Truce with the occupation by Shiakh Ahmad Yaseen, their position from Palestinian Independent State on 1967 border and finally by its decision to participate in the elections. Since is establishment, the Hamas had persistently refused to participate in any national elections, either for the PLC or for the presidency of the PNA. Because both structures grew out of the Oslo accords, which Hamas and others opposed and considered illegitimate. Later, Meshaal, the

[363] Doumani (2007)
[364] Hroub (2006), p. 6

chairman of the political Bauru, said he wanted "to send a message to the Israeli government that Hamas would be ready to talk if Israel met conditions that included a withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries. Hamas would then 'possibly give a long-term truce with Israel', he said. Others have suggested a 10- to 15-year truce."[365] And, he added: "Because of many factors, we now accept to build a Palestinian state within the borders of 1967. But that doesn't mean that we recognize Israel. But we are prepared to make a long-term truce with Israel. Accept the status of Israel without recognizing it."[366] In addition, Zahar, one of the leaders of the Hamas in Gaza said : 'We can accept to establish our independent state on the area occupied (in) '67'[367]". He added "Top Hamas official al-Zahar tells CNN 'long-term truce' possible if Israel withdraws to pre-1967 borders, releases Palestinian prisoners (…)."[368]

Hamas justified its participation in the legislative elections when announcing their platform in 2005 in the following terms: "obligated by our conviction that we are protecting one of the greatest ports of Islam; and by our duty to reform the Palestinian reality and alleviate the suffering of our people, reinforcing their steadfastness and shielding them from corruption, as well as by our hope to strengthen national unity and Palestinian internal affairs, we have decided to take part in the Palestinian legislative elections of 2006. The Change and Reform List (Hamas List) further stated that it believed that its involvement in the legislative elections at that time and in the present circumstances confronting the Palestine problem fell within its complete agenda for the liberation of Palestine, the right of return of the Palestinian people to their homeland, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital. This involvement was to be a means of being at the heart of the resistance and the Intifada program, which the Palestinian people had approved as its strategic option to end the occupation.

[365] Rainer Rupp, 18 December 2006, interview with Khaled Meshaal
[366] 21 April 2008, Guardian, Rory McCarthy interviews Khaled Meshaal
[367] In an interview with CNN, Mahmoud al-Zahar
[368] Butcher, Tim , 9 February 2006, Daily Telegraph

Concerning the CS Change and Reform, the Hamas stated that it will make an effort to build an advanced Palestinian civil society based on political pluralism and the rotation of power. The political system of this society and its reformist and political agenda will be oriented towards achieving Palestinian national rights. In all this we take into account the presence of the oppressive occupation and its ugly imprint on our land and people and its flagrant interventions in the details of the Palestinian life. By this statement, the Hamas obligated to govern the area with the presence of, and the full participation of, Palestinian CS for two reasons. First, the Hamas or Change and Reform statement pointed out that the list would endeavor to build an advanced Palestinian civil society based on political pluralism and the rotation of power. The political system of this society and its reformist and political agenda would be oriented towards achieving Palestinian national rights. [In all this we] take into account the presence of the oppressive occupation and its ugly imprint on our land and people and its flagrant interventions in the details of the Palestinian life. Presenting the platform of our list to you stems from our commitment to our steadfast masses that see in our course the effective alternative, and see in our movement the promising hope for a better future[369]. And the government of Hamas platform further affirmed: on civil society and public freedoms, the government promises to bolster civil society and develop its institutions (article 22); safeguard private and public liberties, assert free expression and the formation of parties, and outlaw political arrests (article 21); "reinforce the role and independence of media institutions, and protect the rights and freedom of the press and journalists, and facilitate their work" (article 38); activate and support the role of professional and general associations and unions (article 39); guarantee the safety of the citizen and homeland, individual and public property (article 29); and enhance the principle of equal opportunities and outlaw employment dismissals on political or partisan ground (article 23).[370] Second, concerning the presence of the so-called Islamic CS, Challand (2008) points out, "there was an Islamic civil society, but it was never really taken into consideration either in the analysis of social scientists, nor by donors. If we look at the composition of the Hamas-led 10th cabinet (March 2006-2007), one clearly sees that the ministers, much younger than previous

[369] See Change and Reform List Platform 2005
[370] For more details, see Hamas-Led Government Platform

cabinets' members stemmed in large part from civil society activism, but not from one that has been funded or even considered by donors."[371] Then, a major sticking point between Hamas and the factions, mainly Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), as noted above, was that the document stopped short of recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. The issue of Hamas joining the PLO had been under serious discussion in the intermittent Palestinian "national unity" dialogue since January 2005. What prevented the move was Hamas's insistence that its representation in the PLO's National Council should be proportional to its popular strength as measured in opinion polls, and, since the PLC elections, that it should have something between 40 and 50 percent of the seats. As the concept of proportional representation was denied, Hamas's position has been that the PLO cannot be called the "sole legitimate representative" if a group representing nearly half of the population is excluded from it. In light of this impasse, article 8 merely states that: "The government reiterates what has been agreed upon in the Cairo dialogue of March 2005 between the Palestinian factions on the subject of the PLO, and emphasizes the need to speed up the measures required to that end." The March 2005 understandings called on the PLO to undertake urgent and comprehensive reforms, including admitting Hamas, Islamic Jihad other factions, after which Hamas would recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative.[372] As was the case with the electoral platform, "reform" constituted a major theme in the proposed national unity document. Article 6 promises to "[u]ndertake comprehensive in-house reform; fight corruption; tackle unemployment; build a society and institutions on democratic foundations that guarantee justice, equal participation, and political pluralism; stress the rule of law with complete separation between powers where the independence of the judiciary should be guaranteed and human rights and basic liberties protected." Article 23 calls for "[d]eveloping administrative and financial reforms, strengthening the role of oversight and accountability, establishing court of complaints and injustices, activating the laws against illegal profiteering, corruption, and the squandering of public funds"; article 7 emphasized rebuilding institutions on democratic, professional, and nationalist foundations rather than on the basis of

[371] Challand (2008b)
[372] For more detailsn see the Cairo Agreement (2005)

"unilateralism" (a code word for one-man or one-party rule) and factional affiliation. Other articles called for "the independence of national Palestinian decision-making" (article 11), the peaceful rotation of power (article 15), reinforcement of the rule of law (article 18), and judiciary reform, including raising its performance standards and supporting the implementation of its decisions (article 20).[373]

The Palestinian election in January 2006 was celebrated by all political parties or lists. It was a therapeutic moment for Palestinians, the opinion poll was a more reliable reflection of the will of the people than most other elections in the region, and was deemed to have been free and fair by international and local observers. The 2006 elections have been, in our view, also a vote of protest against the left, in part, because of the too passive following of poor policies favored by western donors by left-wing NGOs. Surely, the meager results of the left are not only due to this and other factors have played against it. Yet, there is some ground to argue that the demise of the left is also due to the adherence of a politics ancillary to western donors' visions of an impoverished managerial vision of civil society and of a lack of political will to solve the asymmetrical imbalance between Israel and Palestine.[374] As they voted for the Hamas, the entire Palestinian population was deprived of international funding. Gaza embarked on the lock-down which over time has been tightened to make the strip one of the world's biggest and meanest prisons.[375]

The fight over the spaces of authority in Palestine was the main concern, more than the struggle for freedom from the occupation. For example, Hamas was quick to turn into an authority-less authority as much as the one in Ramallah already was, which in turn was being opposed by yet a good number of other political banners waiting in the wings to grab power sometime in the unforeseeable future. Regardless of their dogma or ideologies, such prematurely-born authorities are just this, premature. They harmed the Palestinian cause,

[373] See Change and Reform Platform (2005)
[374] Chlland on http://graduateinstitute.ch/ccdp
[375] McGeough (2010)

maybe almost beyond repair.[376] PCHR is gravely concerned by the continuous deterioration of the human rights situation in the POTs caused by Palestinian security services in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including attacks against civil society organizations, political arrests campaigns and attacks against journalists. PCHR calls upon the two Palestinian governments in Gaza and Ramallah for neutralizing the civil society from the conflict between Fatah and Hamas movements, and stresses the independence of the civil society and the vital role played by NGOs in providing social, economic, developmental and cultural services and to stopping such human rights violations and in ensuring respect for the Basic Law and international human rights standards. [377] Security services of the government in Gaza have continued their attacks against civil institutions belonging to the Fatah movement in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that Palestinian security services in Gaza and the 'Izziddin al-Qassam Brigades' (the armed wing of the Hamas) launched on July 26, 2008 a campaign against civil society organizations belonging to, believed to be close to, or even not linked at all to Fatah movement throughout the Gaza Strip. According to PCHR's documentation, the number of CSOs that have been attacked throughout the Gaza Strip since 2008 has increased to 162.

Domestic political divisions between PNA, the Fatah and the Hamas have shaped an enormously unpredictable and tense situation. The present catastrophe looms over the POTs and the failed reconciliation between the Fatah and the Hamas. All Islamic social, religious, educational, athletic, medical, and youth institutions were systematically closed or seized by PNA in Ramallah[378]. And, as mentioned before, 162 NGOs have been attacked by Hamas forces in Gaza[379]. In addition, there are daily human right violations in all spheres of life, both in the Gaza and in the West Bank, by the security forces from both sides. That civil society remains in part attached to political parties is inevitable and one should not shy away from this fact. But the main lesson from this overview of aid to civil society over the last decade and a half is that there is an increased need for all parts of Palestinian civil society to remain independent as much as possible

[376] Faisal (2010)
[377] PCHR (2008)
[378] Amayreh (2010)
[379] PCHR (2008)

from external donors' and the State's interferences, as well as to listen to the needs and priorities of the Palestinian population. Only thus will Palestinian civil society be united in its respect for internal diversity, and autonomous from possibly negative external influences.

To conclude, there are undoubtedly many people, whether politicians or civil society activists or academics, who remain highly skeptical of Hamas's new face, suspecting a strategy to gain power by concealing true agendas. Without doubt, the progressive de-emphasis on Islam as revealed in these three documents before and after elections can be viewed at least partly through an electoral (and post-electoral) lens, showing Hamas's aspiration to present itself as a reasonable Islamist movement worthy of trust by secular as well as religious Palestinians, not only through its programmatic content *per se*, but also by being determined to go beyond its own supporter constituencies. But, it is in the same way true that the new discussion of weak spiritual content - to say nothing of the movement's ever-increasing practicality and elasticity in the political sphere - reflects real and increasing changes within Hamas in theory. Furthermore, if this development has been led mainly by the middle ranking leadership with some of the more conventional elements having suspicions about the movement's relaxed or semi-secular policy, there has been no noticeable interior gap concerning the new direction, which was embraced and advocated by all members of the movement. This leaves open the questions of whether Hamas in power will be as Hamas in opposition or will able to function practically as in theory and the question may well continue a arguable point in light of the dizzying rate of change on the Palestinian ground since the elections and the swearing in of the Hamas-led government. After four years of rule by the Hamas platforms or the Change and Reform list or the Government, one can say that there are several remaining issues on paper, and what is going on on the ground is totally different, mainly when comes to CS, including NGOs, and human rights violations as it was clear in this section.

CHAPTER FOUR

SURVEY OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF NGOs QUESTIONNAIRE'S OUTCOME

The questionnaires have been distributed to 100 effective NGOs both in the West bank and Gaza from the Palestinian NGOs Network. There was a problem at that time in the West Bank because of the closure of cities of the west Bank although most of the main offices of the NGOs in Rammalla.

The results were as following:

4. THE NGO Board of Director and Management Team answers to our questionnaire show that :

4.1 Basic Information:

The table (1) shows the distribution of NGOs main office in the sample according to region or governorate in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza strip.

Frequency	Percent	
53.0	53	Gaza Strip
32.0	32	Ramallah
9.0	9	Hebron
3.0	3	Jerusalem
3.0	3	Bethlehem
100.0	100	**To**tal

The figure of table (1) shows the distribution of NGOs in the sample according to the main office 53% of the NGOs in the sample from the Gaza Strip and 47% from the West Bank (32% from Ramallah, 9% of Hebron, 3% Jerusalem, and the 3% from Bethlehem).

4.2 Demographic and social characteristics of the Board of Directors members:

Results indicate that all organizations in the sample are registered, here comes description of the sample according to demographic variables.

4.3 Distribution of the sample according to location of the main office of organization:

Results showed that the main office of 53.0% of the organizations is in Gaza Strip, while 32.0% is in Ramallah, and 9.0% is in Hebron, while 3.0% is in Jerusalem, as much as 3.0% is in Bethlehem, as shown in the following diagram:

Chart (1) the distribution of the sample according to location of the main office




Chart **1**

Table (2)
Control on Non-governmental Organizations


Frequency	Percent	
22.0	22	State control
78.0	78	Popular
100.0	100	**To**tal

Through the table and the figure (2) it is clear that 78% are popular control, while 22% State control of institutions

4.4: Distribution of the sample according to organization's control:

Results show that 78% of the control is Non Governmental, while 22.0% is Governmental, as shown in the following diagram:

Chart (2) distribution of the sample according to organization's supervisor



4.4 To which extent the organization have internal bylaw:

The majority of organizations (94%) have an internal bylaw, while 6% of organizations do not have any internal bylaw, the results shown through the following diagram and table:

Chart (3) **shows if the organization have internal bylaw**




Table (3)
NGO internal bylaws

Frequency	Percent	
94.0	94	Yes
6.0	6	No
100.0	100	**To**tal

From table (3) figures, it is clear that there are 94% of the NGOs have its own internal regulations, while only 6% of those have no internal bylaws.

Chart (3)




Table (4)

The institution registration

Frequency	Percent	
100.0	100	Yes
		No
100.0	100	**To**tal

4.5 The 4 shows that all the NGOs are registered in POTs


Table (5)

Do you use regulations in the management of the institution?

Percent %	**Frequency**	
89.0	89	Yes
11.0	11	No
100.0	100	Total

Through the table (5) and figure (4) shows that 89% used the institution regulations in management of the institution, while 11% do not use those regulations in the management of the institution.

Chart (4)



4.6 Distribution of sample according to ownership of organization's place:

The results show that 57% of the organizations places are tenant, while 43% have their own place, the results are shown in the following table and diagram:


Table (6)

The Property Ownership

Frequency	Percent	
43.0	41	Private
57.0	55	Tenant
100.0	100	Total

From table (6) and the figure (5) shows that 57% of institutions are building their own rent, while only 43% of institutions have private buildings

Chart (5) Distribution of sample according to ownership of organization's place:



4.7 The branches of organizations:

The results show that 54% of organizations have branches other than the main office, while 46% have no branches; the results are shown in the following diagram:

Figure 6 shows if the organization has other branches:





Table (7)

NGOs and Branches

Frequency	Percent	
54.0	54	Yes
46.0	46	No
100.0	100	Total

From table (7) and figure (6) shows that 54% of the branches of the institution other than the headquarters, while 46% of institutions have no other branches.

Figure (6)



4.9 The Queries of Study:

4.9.1 First query: How does the Board of Directors know the management and team in the organizations?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of Board of Directors responses to the items of the first domain (management and team in the organizations), also we determined the mean and relative weight of the responses to the items of the first domain, the results shown in the following table:

Table (1) Board of Directors responses to the items of the first domain (management and team in the organization), relative weight, mean and order of items of the domain:

No.	Items of the management and team in the organization	Yes%	Sometimes %	No%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Is it easy to reach to the organization?	92.0	8.0	0.0	2.9	97.3	2
2	Are the working hours of the organization well Known?	91.0	3.0	6.0	2.9	95.0	10
3	Is there any mailing address for the organization?	75.0	0.0	25.0	2.5	83.3	22
4	Is there any system for incoming and outgoing mail?	92.0	3.0	5.0	2.9	95.7	7
5	Is there any filing system in the organization?	92.0	5.0	3.0	2.9	96.3	4
6	Do you keep the records of meetings?	95.0	5.0	0.0	3.0	98.3	1
7	Is there any officer to list the office contents?	82.0	9.0	9.0	2.7	91.0	13
8	Is the use of instruments and equipment efficiently and are meticulously maintained	83.0	11.0	6.0	2.8	92.3	12
9	Is there any list of employees in the organization?	88.0	9.0	3.0	2.9	95.0	11
10	Does the organization use specific procedure in the procurement process	89.0	11.0	0.0	2.9	96.3	5
11	If personnel break the administrative rules, do you ask them to correct.	86.0	14.0	0.0	2.9	95.3	8
12	Is the format and content of the report clear to personnel?	83.0	14.0	3.0	2.9	95.3	9
13	Is it clear to workers to whom and when they should send reports.	90.0	10.0	0.0	2.9	96.7	3

14	Do all personnel have job contracts?	51.0	16.0	33.0	2.2	72.7	25
15	Are jobs suitable to their skills and experience?	61.0	33.0	6.0	2.6	85.0	20
16	Does every employee know who to report to and who give orders?	89.0	11.0	0.0	2.9	96.3	6
17	Do all personnel have specific job descriptions?	75.0	19.0	6.0	2.7	89.7	17
18	Do all workers have on job and outdoor training?	59.0	33.0	8.0	2.5	83.7	21
19	Do employees know activities of their colleagues and the relation between activities?	76.0	21.0	3.0	2.7	91.0	14
20	Does the manager encourage employees after completion of their tasks?	75.0	19.0	6.0	2.7	89.7	18
21	Is employment based on applications and resumes?	74.0	23.0	3.0	2.7	90.3	16
22	Is there a training plan for the organization?	58.0	23.0	19.0	2.4	79.7	23
23	Do salaries raises on clear basis?	49.0	24.0	27.0	2.2	74.0	24
24	Is there any review to the personnel tasks to be modified?	67.0	27.0	6.0	2.6	87.0	19
25	Do managers follow up their subordinates to assess their performance?	75.0	22.0	3.0	2.7	90.7	15

The results in the table above show that**:** First, 95% of Board of Directors ensure that they keep records of the meetings in their organizations this item got the first rank with a relative weight of 98.3%. Second, 92.0% believe that it is easy and well known to reach the organizations; this item got the second place with a relative weight of 97.3%. 90.0% think that it is clear to whom and when should the workers report, this item got the third place with a relative weight of 96.7%. Third, 92.0% ensure that there are filing systems to in their organizations, this item got the fourth place with a relative weight of 96.3%. Fourth, 89.0% believe that their organizations use specific procedures in the procurement process are using procedures specified in the procurement process, such as quotations, this item ranked fifth with a relative weight of 96.3%. Fifth, 89.0% think they know to whom they will send reports and one to take orders, this ranked sixth with a

relative weight of 96.3%. Sixth, 92.0% ensure that there is an incoming and outgoing mail system in their organizations; this got the seventh place with a relative weight of 95.7%. Seventh, 86.0% say that they correct personnel in their organizations if they break the administrative rules, this item came eight with a relative weight of 95.3%. Eighth, 83.0% believe that the format and content of reports is clear to personnel, this item got the ninth place with a relative weight of 95.3%. Ninth, 91.0% think that working hours in their organizations are clear and specific, this item ranked tenth with a relative weight of 95%. Ten, 88.0% ensure that there is a list of employees in their organizations, the place of this item was eleven with relative weight of 95%. Eleventh, 83.0% think that the use of devices and equipment efficiently, and are meticulously maintained, got the twelfth place with a relative weight of 92.3%. Twelfth, 82.0% ensure that there is an officer to list the contents of the office in their organizations, got the thirteenth place with a relative weight of 91%.

In addition the table shows that: First, 76.0% believe that colleagues know each other's activities and the relation between activities, got the fourteenth place with a relative weight of 91.0%. Second, 75.0% believe that the managers follow up their subordinates to assess their performance, this item ranked fifteenth with a relative weight of 90.7%. Third, 74.0% ensure that the employment is based on applications and résumés, this item ranked sixteenth with a relative weight of 90.3%. Fourth, 75.0% ensure that every one of the employees has a specific job description, this item ranked seventh with a relative weight of 89.7%. Fifth, 75.0% see that the officials encouraging employees after completion of their work, this item ranked eighteenth with a relative weight of 89.7%. Sixth, 67.0% say that they sometimes review the personnel tasks to be modified, this item ranked nineteenth with a relative weight of 87.0%. Eighth, 61.0% believe that jobs are suitable to the personnel’s skills and experience; this paragraph got the twentieth place with a relative weight of 85.0%. Ninth, 59.0% feel that they give all staff on job and outdoor training, this item ranked twenty-first with a relative weight of 83.7%.

Furthermore, the table shows that: First, 75.0% ensures that there is a postal address for their organizations; this item came twenty second with a

relative weight of 83.3%. Second, 58.0% ensure that there is a training plan for the organizations, this item ranked twenty-third with a relative weight of 79.3%. Third, 49.0% believe that salaries increase on clear basis, this item ranked twenty-fourth with a relative weight of 74.0%. Fourth, 51.0% ensure that the employees have job contracts, this item ranked twenty-fifth with a relative weight of 72.7%.

One can conclude that the members of Board of Directors have a great knowledge of the administrative work and personnel in the organizations that are representing and managing.

4.9.2 Second query: How does the Board of Directors know the Strategic planning process of the organizations?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of Board of Directors responses to the items of the second domain (strategic planning), also we determined the mean and relative weight of the responses to the items of the second domain, the results shown in the following table:

Table (2) Board of Directors responses to the items of the second domain (strategic planning), relative weight, mean and order of items of the domain

No.	Items of strategic planning	Yes%	Sometimes%	No%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Does the organization have a written mission talking about its purpose and beneficiaries?	91.0	6.0	3.0	2.9	96.0	2
2	Does the organization have a written plan for next year?	74.0	14.0	12.0	2.6	87.3	18
3	Is the planning process takes into account the organization's mission	86.0	11.0	3.0	2.8	94.3	5
4	Do any of personnel participate in the planning?	58.0	39.0	3.0	2.6	85.0	21
5	Does the organization have a written objectives for next three or five years?	64.0	11.0	25.0	2.4	79.7	23
6	Do the plans show what will be achieved?	79.0	13.0	8.0	2.7		1

						91.0	1
7	Whom?	70.0	19.0	11.0	2.7	88.7	16
8	From who?	69.0	20.0	11.0	2.7	88.3	17
9	When?	70.0	20.0	19.0	2.7	89.0	14
10	How?	44.0	9.0	9.0	2.6	85.3	20
11	Is the leadership capable of leading the staff to work on the same goals?	79.0	21.0	0.0	2.8	93.0	9
12	Does the leadership give tasks to the employees and make sure of completion?	81.0	19.0	0.0	2.8	93.7	8
13	Do they ask the personnel to participate in the planning?	68.0	32.0	0.0	2.7	89.3	13
14	Can personnel give suggestions and queries and problems with the management?	87.0	10.0	3.0	2.8	94.7	4
15	Do they make sure that the job done?	94.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	97.0	1
16	The possibility of success?	88.0	9.0	3.0	2.9	95.0	3
17	Do the decisions translated to work?	73.0	24.0	3.0	2.7	90.0	12
18	Do personnel know who decides in all issues??	86.0	11.0	3.0	2.8	94.3	6
19	Do personnel know who is going to do this or that?	79.0	18.0	3.0	2.8	92.0	10
20	Does everyone know where to go when there is a dispute?	62.0	26.0	12.0	2.5	83.3	22
21	Do leaders know about the work through reports or meetings?	84.0	14.0	2.0	2.8	94.0	7

22	Does leadership delegate personnel?	59.0	41.0	0.0	2.6	86.3	19
23	Does leadership help workers with skills and training?	71.0	24.0	5.0	2.7	88.7	15

The results in the table above shows: First, 94% of the board of directors believes that they ensure if work is done, this item got the first rank with a relative weight of 97.0%. Second, 91% say that their organizations have a written mission pointed out the purpose and beneficiaries, this item got the second place with a relative weight of 96.0%. Third, 88% say that they ensure the success of work in their organizations; this item got the third place with a relative weight of 95.0%. Fourth, 87% say that workers can give suggestions, queries and problems with the administration, this item got the fourth place with a relative weight of 94.7%. Fifth, 86% believe that the planning process from their point of view takes into account the organization's mission, this item ranked fifth with a relative weight of 94.3%. Sixth, 86% think that the employees know who decides in all issues, this item ranked sixth with a relative weight of 94.3%. Seventh, 84% say that they know about the work through reports or meetings, this item got the seventh place with a relative weight of 94.0%.

In addition the table shows that: First 81% thinks that they are given personnel tasks and make sure to complete, this item ranked eighth with a relative weight of 93.7%. Second, 79% believe that the leadership is capable to lead staff to work on the same goals, this item ranked ninth with a relative weight of 93.0%. Third, 79% believe that the personnel know who is going to do this or that, this item got place ten with a relative weight of 92%. Fourth, 79% ensure that the plans shows what will be achieved, this item ranked eleventh with a relative weight of 91.0%. Fifth, 73% believe that the decisions translate to actual work, this item ranked second with a relative weight of 90.0%. Sixth, 68% ensure that they are asking employees to participate in planning, this item ranked thirteenth with a relative weight of 89.3%. Seventh, 70% are sure that the plans show when will be achieved, this item fourteenth with a relative weight of 89.0%. Eighth,

71% ensure that they help personnel with skills and training, this item ranked fifth with a relative weight of 88.7%.

Furthermore, the table shows that: First, 70% ensure that plans show to who will be achieved, this item ranked sixteenth with a relative weight of 88.7%. Second, 69% ensure that plans show to whom will be achieved, this item ranked seventh with a relative weight of 88.3%. Third, 74% ensure that their organizations have a written plan for next year, this item ranked eight with a relative weight of 87.3%. Fourth, 59% say that they delegate leadership to the employees, this item ranked nineteenth with a relative weight of 86.3%. Fifth, 44% think that the plans show how to achieve, this item got the twentieth place with a relative weight of 58.3%. Sixth, 58% ensure that they share a number of employees in the planning process for the organizations, this item ranked twenty-first with a relative weight of 85.0%. Seventh, 62% think that everyone knows what to do at a dispute; this item came in the twenty second place with a relative weight of 83.3%. Eighth, 64% believe that their organizations have written objectives for three or five years, this item got the twenty with a relative weight of 79.7%.

The above mentioned points conclude that the members of Board of Directors have great knowledge about the strategic planning process of their organizations.

4.9.3 Third query: How does the Board of Directors know the Finance and Fundraising in the organizations?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of Board of Directors responses to the items of the third domain (Finance and Fundraising), also we determined mean and relative weight of the responses to the items of the third domain, the results shown in the following table:

Table (3) Board of Directors responses to the items of the third domain (Finance and Fundraising), relative weight, mean and order of items of the domain

No.	Items of Finance and fundraising	Yes%	Sometimes %	No %	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Does the financial manager follow up recording of expenses, invoices, cash expenses and the bank balance?	91.0	6.0	3.0	2.9	96.0	2
2	Do remittances consistently recorded with related vouchers, invoices, deliveries, contracts ... etc?	86.0	14.0	0.0	2.9	95.3	3
3	Do financial manager follow up cash box; daily, weekly or monthly?	86.0	14.0	0.0	2.9	95.3	4
4	Is there any bank account for the organization?	93.0	3.0	4.0	2.9	97.7	1
5	Do financial manager check the bank account weekly or monthly?	88.0	7.0	5.0	2.8	94.3	5
6	Do financial manager list the financial monetary requirements for the next phase?	74.0	18.0	25.0	2.7	88.7	10
7	Does the organization have a draft budget?	75.0	0.0	11.0	2.5	83.3	17
8	Does the financial manager make sure of payments with guidance and outline of the budget?	72.0	17.0	3.0	2.6	87.0	13
9	Do the organization keep records of different programs and projects	83.0	14.0	3.0	2.8	93.3	7
10	Do you prepare a monthly financial report shows total expenses according to outline of the budget?	76.0	11.0	13.0	2.6	87.7	12
11	Is there any fundraising official?	66.0	23.0	1.0	2.6	85.0	15
12	Does fundraising official know how to establish relations and how to write well?	62.0	21.0	17.0	2.5	84.7	16
13	Does organization try to diversify its sources of fundraising?	80.0	17.0	3.0	2.8	92.3	9
14	Do organizations know the objectives, policies and rules of project funding in the donors organizations?	80.0	20.0	0.0	2.8	93.3	8
	Do donors involved in the preparation						

15	of projects proposals?	48.0	35.0	17.0	2.4	78.3	18
16	Do the organization have any self-sources of funding?	43.0	30.0	27.0	2.2	72.0	19
17	Does the organization have any funding sources other than donor's organizations?	41.0	26.0	33.0	2.1	69.3	20
18	Does the organization try to develop the self-funding sources?	66.0	21.0	10.0	2.6	86.0	14
19	Does the organization try to get as much local sources as possible?	71.0	22.0	7.0	2.6	88.0	11
20	Do you send written funding projects to those interested in this?	83.0	17.0	0.0	2.8	94.3	6

The results in the table shows that: First, 93% of the Board of Directors ensures that there is a bank account number for the organizations, this item ranked first with a relative weight of 97.7%. Second, 91% believe that the financial officials follow up the recording of expenses, invoices, cash expenses and bank balance, this item ranked second with a relative weight of 96.0%. Third, 86% believe that remittances consistently recorded with related vouchers, invoices, deliveries, contracts ... etc. Fourth, 86% believe that the financial officials follow up the cash box daily, weekly and monthly. Fifth, 88% ensure that the financial official check the bank account: weekly or monthly.

The table added that: First, 83% ensures that they send written funding projects to those interested in this; this item got the sixth place with a relative weight of 94.3%. Second, 83% ensure that their organizations keep records of different programs and projects, this item ranked seventh with a relative weight of 93.3%. Third, 80% believe that their organizations know the objectives, policies and rules of project funding in the donors organizations, this item ranked eighth with a relative weight of 93.3%. Fourth, 80% think that the organizations try to diversify their funding sources. Fifth, 74% ensure that the financial official list the financial requirements of cash for the next phase. Sixth, 71% think that the organizations try to get as much local sources as possible. Seventh, 76% ensure

that a monthly financial report been prepared and shows total expenses according to outline of the budget. Eighth, 72% believe that the manager make sure of the payments with guidance and outline of the budget.

In addition the table shows that: First, 66% believes that their organization try to develop self-funding sources. Second, 66% ensure that there is a fundraising officer in the organization. Third, 62% believe that the fundraising officer know how to establish relationships and write well. Fourth, 75% ensure that their organizations have a draft budget. Fifth, 48% believe that the donors are involved in the preparation of project proposals. Sixth, 43% think that they have self-finance sources for funding. Seventh, 41% ensure their organizations have sources of funding other than the donor's organizations.

The results above conclude that the members of the Board of Directors have knowledge and awareness of what is going on in their organizations about finance and fundraising.

4.9.4 Fourth query: How does the Board of Directors know the Project Management in the organizations?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of Board of Directors responses to the items of the fourth domain (Project Management), also we determined mean and relative weight of the responses to the items of the fourth domain, the results shown in the following table:

Table (4) Board of Directors responses to the items of the fourth domain (Project Management), relative weight, mean and order of items of the domain

No.	Items of the project management domain	Yes%	Sometimes %	No%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Do you think that the project objectives helped to achieve the general objectives?	82.0	16.0	2.0	2.8	94.7	5
2	Do you think that the project objectives are clear?	87.0	11.0	2.0	2.9	96.3	3
3	A. Measurable?	81.0	17.0	2.0	2.8	94.3	8
4	B. Achievable?	76.0	20.0	4.0	2.8	92.0	16
5	Does the organization do an action plan to achieve the project objectives?	82.0	14.0	4.0	2.8	94.0	9
6	Does the plan explain who will do what? when, and where?	81.0	17.0	2.0	2.8	94.3	6
7	Did the organization use its own resources to start the project?	77.0	20.0	3.0	2.8	92.7	13
8	Did workers prepare accurate reports during the project?	90.0	5.0	5.0	2.9	96.3	2
9	Did the team identify and discuss the problems faced the project during implementation?	80.0	20.0	0.0	2.8	93.7	10
10	Did the organization think about importance of evaluation of the projects	81.0	17.0	2.0	2.8	94.3	7
11	Was evaluation a part of the action plan?	78.0	12.0	10.0	2.7	90.3	20
12	Did the organization considered those who will benefit from the project?	89.0	11.0	0.0	2.9	97.0	1
13	Do the organization use monitoring and evaluation to develop and modify the project?	75.0	23.0	2.0	2.8	92.3	14
14	Have need assessment of the community studies been prepared before project study?	78.0	20.0	2.0	2.8	93.3	11

15	Was the local community involved in setting priorities and preparation for the project study?	43.0	49.0	8.0	2.4	79.3	24
16	Did the organization prepare a plan to complete and continue the project after completion?	50.0	39.0	11.0	2.4	80.7	22
17	Have the organization prepared periodic reports of achievement compared with the plan?	76.0	19.0	5.0	2.7	91.3	18
18	Did the organization failed in achieving specific activities?	31.0	48.0	21.0	2.1	70.7	26
19	If yes, have you examined the reasons for not achieving these activities?	45.0	42.0	13.0	2.4	79.7	23
20	Did expenses vary from the budget?	37.0	46.0	17.0	2.3	75.0	25
21	If ye, Have the organization examined the cause of increase or decrease in expenses?	64.0	23.0	13.0	2.6	86.3	21
22	Does the organization study the problems it faced to find solutions in a proper time?	83.0	9.0	8.0	2.8	92.0	15
23	Do the organization study if the project had achieved objectives or not?	83.0	15.0	2.0	2.8	93.0	12
24	Do you learn from the lessons of the project for the future?	83.0	15.0	2.0	2.9	95.0	4
25	Does evaluation examine how results of the project help in achieving the objectives of the organization?	77.0	18.0	5.0	2.8	92.0	17
26	Does organization evaluate its objectives, plans and actions, to help it in monitoring and evaluation?	72.0	28.0	0.0	2.7	91.0	19

The results in the table above show that: First, 89% of the Board of Directors ensures that their organization considered those who will benefit from the project, this item ranked first with a relative weight of 97.0%. Second, 90%

believe that workers in their organizations prepared accurate reports during the project, this item ranked second with a relative weight of 96.3%. Third, 87% believe that the project objectives are clear; this item came in third place with a relative weight of 96.3%. Fourth, 83% feel that they learn from lessons of the project for the future, this item got the fourth place with a relative weight of 95.0%. Fifth, 82% believe that the objectives of the project helped to achieve the general objectives, this item ranked fifth with a relative weight of 94.7%. Sixth, 81% think that the plan they put explain who will do what, when and where, this item ranked sixth with a relative weight of 94.3%.

The table shows as well that: First 81% ensures that their organizations thought about the importance and necessity of project evaluation, this item got the seventh place with a relative weight of 94.3%. Second, 81% think that the project objectives are measurable, this item ranked eighth with relative weight of 94.3%. Third, 82% ensure that their organizations put an action plan to achieve the project objectives; this item got the ninth place with a relative weight of 94.0%. Fourth, 80% believe that workers in their organizations identified and discussed the problems faced the project during implementation, this item ranked tenth with a relative weight of 93.7%.

In addition the table shows that: First, 78% ensures that studies of community need assessments have been prepared before the projects study, this item ranked eleventh with a relative weight of 93.3%. Second, 83% ensure that their organization study if project have achieved objectives or not, this item got the twelfth place with a relative weight of 93.0%. Third, 77% think that their organizations used their own resources to start the project, this item ranked thirteenth with a relative weight of 92.7%. Fourth, 75% ensure that their organizations use monitoring and evaluation to develop and modify the project, this item came in the fourteenth place with a relative weight of 92.3%. Fifth, 83% think that their organization study the problems faced to find solutions in a proper time, this item ranked fifteenth with a relative weight of 92.0%. Sixth, 76% believe that the project objectives are achievable, this item ranked sixteenth with a relative weight of 92.0%. Seventh, 77% believe that evaluation in their

organization examines how the project results will help in achieving the objectives of the organization, this item got the seventeenth place with a relative weight of 92.0%.

Furthermore the table shows that: First, 76% ensures that their organizations prepared periodic reports about achievements compared with plans, this item ranked eighteenth with a relative weight of 91.3%. Second, 72% ensure that their organizations evaluate its objectives and action plans to learn lessons from monitoring and evaluation, this item ranked nineteenth with a relative weight of 91.0%. Third, 78% believe that evaluation was a part of the Action Plan in their organizations, this item twentieth place with a relative weight of 90.3%. Fourth, 64% answered that the expenses differed from the budget and they examined the reasons for the increased or decrease of expenses, this paragraph ranked twenty-first with a relative weight of 86.3%. Fifth, 50% believe that their organizations prepared a plan to complete and continue the project after completion, this item ranked twenty-second with a relative weight of 80.7%. Sixth, 43% believe that the local community participated in identify priorities and in preparation of the project study. Seventh, 37% believe that the expenses differ from the prepared budget, this item ranked twenty-fifth with a relative weight of 75.0%. Eighth, 31% of the board members think that their organizations failed to meet some specific activities,

The above mentioned results conclude that the members of the Board of Directors have a considerable knowledge in project management.

4.9.5 Fifth query: How does the Board of Directors know the (community relationships and sources of evaluation) in the organizations?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of Board of Directors responses to the items of the fifth domain (Community relationships and sources of evaluation), also we determined mean and relative weight of the responses to the items of the fifth domain, the results shown in the following table:

Table (5) Board of Directors responses to the items of the fifth domain (community relationships and sources of evaluation), relative weight, mean and order of items of the domain

No.	Items of domains of community relations and sources of evaluation	Yes%	Sometimes%	No%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Do the organization have a good relationship with the organizations and community leaders	97.0	3.0	0.0	3.0	99.0	1
2	Does the organization have relations with local and international organizations working in the same region?	92.0	8.0	3.0	2.9	97.3	2
3	Do the organization have relations with governmental organizations:	70.0	27.0	0.0	2.7	89.0	9
4	Do the organization give the local community clear information about the objectives and activities?	85.0	25.0	0.0	2.9	95.0	4
5	Does the organization try to influence decisions in the community and that will affect the project?	74.0	26.0	3.0	2.7	91.3	7
6	Do personnel recognize the external factors affecting the work of the organization?	62.0	35.0	3.0	2.6	86.3	10
7	Does the organization try to establish local support groups for continuation of projects and activities?	77.0	20.0	0.0	2.7	91.3	8
8	Does the organization participate in meeting of the organizations that work in the same sector?	88.0	12.0	0.0	2.9	96.0	3
9	Does the organization try to develop general guidelines with other organizations in aspects of its work?	82.0	18.0	3.0	2.8	94.0	5
10	Do the organization benefit from the training offers from other organizations?	79.0	18.0	12.0	2.8	92.0	6
11	Do the organization do promotional and propaganda activities?	52.0	36.0	18.0	2.4	80.0	11
12	Does the organization try to influence the government\s activities and decisions?	47.0	35.0	0.0	2.3	76.3	12

The results described in the previous table concludes that: First,97% of the Board of Directors believe that their organizations have good relations with the organizations and community leaders, this item got the first rank with the

relative weight of 99.0%. Second, 92% believe that their organizations have relationships with local and international organizations that work in the same region, this item ranked second with a relative weight of 97.3%. Third, 88% ensure that their organizations participate in the meetings of the organizations that work in the same sector; this item got the third rank with a relative weight of 96.0%. Fourth, 85% believe that their organizations give the local community clear information about its objectives and activities, this item won the fourth place with a relative weight of 95.0%. Fifth, 82% believe that their organization try to develop general guidelines with the other organizations in aspects of their work, this item ranked fifth with a relative weight 94.0%. Sixth, 79% believe that their organizations benefit from the training offers from other organizations, this item ranked the sixth with a relative weight of 92.0%. Seventh, 74% believe that their organizations try to influence decisions in the community that will affect the project; this item got the seventh place with a relative weight of 91.3%.

The table added that: First, 77% ensure that their organizations try to establish local support groups for the continuity of projects and activities, this item got the eighth place with a relative weight of 91.3%. Second, 70% ensure that their organizations have relations with governmental organizations, this item ranked ninth with a relative weight of 89.0%. Third, 62% think that the employees know what external factors affecting the work of their organizations; this item got the tenth rank with a relative weight of 86.3%. Fourth, 52% believe that their organizations have promotional and propaganda activities, this item ranked eleventh with a relative weight of 80.0%. Fifth, 47% think that their organizations try to influence the governmental activities and decisions, this item ranked twelfth with a relative weight of 76.3%.

The above mentioned results conclude that the members of the Board of Directors have a great knowledge about community relations and sources of evaluation in their organizations.

4.9.6 Sixth query: How does the Board of Directors know the (Organizational Values, Ethics and Laws) in the organizations?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of Board of Directors responses to the items of the sixth domain (Organizational values, ethics and laws), also we determined mean and relative weight of the responses to the items of the sixth domain, the results shown in the following table:

Table (6) Board of Directors responses to the items of the sixth domain (Organizational values, ethics and laws), relative weight, mean and order of items of the domain

No.	Items of the organizational values, ethics and laws	Yes%	Sometimes%	No%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Do board of directors members or officials involved in specifying the value of the organization?	89.0	8.0	3.0	2.9	95.3	8
2	Did the team discuss this value with the Board of Directors?	81.0	14.0	5.0	2.8	92.0	13
3	Did personnel agreed on the value of your organization?	89.0	8.0	3.0	2.9	95.3	6
4	Are the values and ethics written and reachable?	81.0	11.0	8.0	2.7	91.0	14
5	Do the organization taken into account at planning for programs.	86.0	8.0	6.0	2.8	93.3	11
6	Does the organization know that it need internal bylaw?	88.0	9.0	3.0	2.9	95.0	7
7	Does the organization know how to prepare an internal bylaw?	85.0	15.0	0.0	2.9	95.0	9
8	Does the organization know how to officially register?	94.0	6.0	0.0	2.9	98.0	1
9	Do the organization have own internal bylaw?	88.0	12.0	0.0	2.9	96.0	5
10	Do the internal bylaw used in the management of the organization?	82.0	18.0	0.0	2.8	94.0	10
11	Is the organization officially registered?	94.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	97.0	3
12	Does the organization have Board of Directors?	94.0	6.0	0.0	2.9	98.0	2
13	Are missions and roles role of the board of directors clear?	89.0	11.0	0.0	2.9	96.3	4
14	Does the Board of Directors have relations with the community?	81.0	16.0	3.0	2.8	92.7	12

The results described in the previous table concludes that: First, 94% of the board of directors believes that their organizations know how to

officially register; this item got the first rank with a relative weight of 98.0%. Second, 94% ensure that the organization has a Board of Directors. Third, 94% believe that the organizations in the sample are officially registered. Fourth, 89% believe that missions and roles of the Board of Directors are clear. Fifth, 88% believe that their organizations have own internal bylaw. Sixth, 89% ensure that they have agreed on values of the organization, this item got the sixth item with a relative weight of 95.3%.

The table added that: First, 88% believe that their organizations know they need to internal bylaw, this item ranked seventh with a relative weight of 95.0%. Second, 89% ensure that they are involved in specifying values of the organization, this item ranked eighth with a relative weight of 95.3%. Third, 85% believe that their organizations know how to prepare an internal Bylaw, this item ranked ninth with a relative weight of 95.0%. Fourth, 82.0% believe that the internal bylaw used in management, this item ranked tenth with a relative weight of 94.0%. Fifth, 86% think that they take into account values of the organization at planning for programs; this item got the eleventh place with a relative weight of 93.3%. Sixth, 81% believe that the Board of Directors of the organization has relations with the community. Seventh, 81% believe that the values and ethics of their organizations are written and reachable; this item got the fourteenth place with a relative weight of 91.0%.

4.9.7 Seventh query: How does the Board of Directors Know the Impact of Israeli occupation on activities and roles of the organizations?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of Board of Directors responses to the items of the seventh domain (Impact of Israeli occupation on activities and roles of the organizations), also we determined mean and relative weight of the responses to the items of the seventh domain, the results shown in the following table:

Table (7) Board of Directors responses to the items of the seventh domain (Impact of Israeli occupation on activities and roles of the organizations), relative weight, mean and order of items of the domain

No.	Items of the domain of Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of organizations	Yes%	Sometimes%	No%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Did you face any obstacles from the occupation when you registered your organization now or in the past?	38	15	47	1.91	63.7	12
2	Do you think activities and programs of organization affected by the Israeli occupation?	72	28	0	2.72	90.7	1
3	Do policies and strategies of the Israeli occupation affect the organization	72	25	3	2.69	89.7	4
4	Does the Israeli occupation intervene directly or indirectly in the organization's affairs?	52	24	24	2.28	76.0	10
5	Does the Israeli occupation affect free movement of organization's team?	53	35	12	2.41	80.3	8
6	Does the Israeli occupation prevent the implementation of some programs or projects?	50	36	14	2.36	78.7	9
7	Do the Israeli occupation delay implementation of some programs or projects?	51	41	8	2.51	83.7	6
8	Does the Israeli occupation intervene in defining programs or projects?	41	21	38	2.03	67.7	11
9	Does the Israeli occupation affect organization's fundraising?	58	32	10	2.48	82.7	7
10	Do you think the Israeli occupation has any influence on donors?	73	31	3	2.7	90.0	3
11	Do you think the Israeli occupation intervene in defining policy of the donors?	60	29	9	2.51	83.7	5
12	Do Israeli siege have negative impact on organization's activities?	71	0	0	2.71	90.3	2

The results described in the previous table concludes that: First,72% of the board of directors believes that there is effect of the occupation on the programs and activities of organizations, this item ranked first with a relative weight of 90.7%. Second, 71% believe that the Israeli siege has negative impact on the roles and activities of their organizations, this item ranked second with a

relative weight of 90.3%. Third, 73% considered that the occupation has a negative impact on the donors, this item ranked third with a relative weight of 90.0%. Fourth, 72% think that there is an impact of the occupation on the policies and strategies on roles of the organizations, this item ranked fourth item with a relative weight of 89.7%. Fifth, 60% think that the occupation intervene in the policy of fundraising, this item ranked fifth with a relative weight of 83.7%.

In addition the table shows that: First 51% believe that the occupation prevent implementation of some programs and projects in their organizations, this item ranked sixth with a relative weight of 83.7%. Second, 58% of the board members believe that the fundraising affected by the occupation, this item ranked seventh with a relative weight of 82.7%. Third, 53% ensure that there is an impact of the occupation on the team movement, this item ranked eighth with a relative weight of 80.3%. Fourth, 50% think that the occupation prevent the implementation of some programs or projects, this item ranked ninth with a relative weight of 78.7%. Fifth, 52% believe that the occupation intervenes directly or indirectly in the affairs of their organizations, this item ranked tenth with a relative weight of 76.0%.

Finally the table concludes that: First, 41% believe that the occupation intervenes in identifying some programs or projects, this item got the eleventh place with a relative weight of 67.7%. Second, 38% ensure that they faced obstacles in registration of the organizations by the occupation now and in the past, this item ranked second with a relative weight of 63.7%.

4.9.8 Eighth Query: What are the mostly known domains by the members of Board of Directors of the ten management domains of the organizations?

To investigate which domains are most important according to its roles in the organization's activities in Gaza Strip from the management's point of view, we determined means, standard deviations and relative weights of each domain and the total degree, as shown in the following table:

Table (8): mean and relative weight of the ten domains from the management point of view

Factor	N of item	Total degree	Mean	SD	Relative weight%	Order
Management in the organization	25	75	67.6	7.2	90.2	3
Strategic Planning	23	69	58.3	8.0	84.4	6
Finance	20	60	52.5	6.2	87.5	5
Project Management	26	78	70.0	7.1	89.7	4
Public relations and sources of evaluation	12	36	32.6	2.8	90.6	2
Organizational values and ethics	14	42	39.9	3.6	94.9	1
Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of the organizations	12	36	29.3	5.2	81.3	7
Total	132	396	348.8	6.3	88.1	

Relative weight is calculated by dividing the mean by the total degree and then multiplying by 100

From the previous table one can notice that, the domain of **values and ethics** rank first according to importance to members of the Board of Directors with a relative weight of 94.9%, followed by **public relationships and sources of evaluation** with a relative weight of 90.6%, then came **management in the organization** in the third place with a relative weight of 90.2 %, The fourth place was to **project management** with a relative weight of 89.7%, then the domain of **finance and fundraising** in fifth place with a relative weight of 87.5%, while the **Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and the roles of the organizations** ranked seventh with a relative weight of 81.3%.

4.10 Hypotheses of the study

4.10.1 Hypothesis I: There is no statistically significant relationship between the domains of organizational management and the total degree of the domains.

To verify this, one can determine Pearson correlation coefficient to study the relationship between the following domains of study (management in the organization, strategic planning, finance, project management, public relations and sources of evaluation, values and ethics of organizational, the Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of the organizations) and the total degree of domains from the members of Board of Director's point of view, it is shown in the following table:

Table No. (9) Results of the Pearson correlation coefficient to study the relationship between study domains and the total degree

Study Domains	Correlation coefficient	Significance level
Management in the organization	0.79	0.001 **
Strategic Planning	0.91	0.001 **
Finance	0.89	0.001 **
Project Management	0.95	0.001 **
Public relations and sources of evaluation	0.76	0.001 **
Organizational values and ethics	0.76	0.001 **
Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of organizations	0.53	0.001 **

**** P-value <0.01 * p-value <0.05 / / p-value> 0.05**

The results described in the previous table appears that: First, one can found a statistically significant positive relationship between the total degree of the domains and management in the organizations (r = 0.79, p-value <0.01), this indicates that the more knowledge about management in the organization lead to the more knowledge to the members of Board of directors in the management of the organizations and vice versa. Second, one can found a statistically significant positive relationship between the total degree of the domains and the strategic planning (r = 0. 91, p-value <0.01), this indicates that the more knowledge about

strategic planning lead to the more knowledge to the members of Board of directors in the management of the organizations and vice versa. Third, one can found a statistically significant positive relationship between the total degree of the domains and the finance (r = 0. 89, p-value <0.01), this indicates that the more knowledge about finance lead to the more knowledge to the members of Board of directors in the management of the organizations and vice versa.

In addition the results shows that, First, one can found a statistically significant positive relationship between the total degree of the domains and the project management (r = 0. 95, p-value <0.01), this indicates that the more knowledge about project management lead to the more knowledge to the members of Board of directors in the management of the organizations and vice versa. Second, one can found a statistically significant positive relationship between the total degree of the domains and the public relationships and sources of evaluation (r = 0. 76, p-value <0.01), this indicates that the more knowledge about public relationships and sources of evaluation lead to the more knowledge to the members of Board of directors in the management of the organizations and vice versa.

Finally one can found a statistically significant positive relationship between the total degree of the domains and the organizational values and ethics (r = 0. 76, p-value <0.01), this indicates that the more knowledge about organizational values and ethics lead to the more knowledge to the members of Board of directors in the management of the organizations and vice versa. And, can found a statistically significant positive relationship between the total degree of the domains and the Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of organizations (r = 0. 53, p-value <0.01), this indicates that the more knowledge about Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of organizations lead to the more knowledge to the members of Board of directors in the management of the organizations and vice versa.

4.10.2 Hypothesis II: There are no statistically significant differences in the domains of the nine organization management domains according to location of the organizations.

To verify this (One-Way ANOVA) test have been done to test the variance between the different locations of the main offices of the organization (Gaza - Ramallah - Hebron - Jerusalem - Bethlehem) to the nine domains of management, the results are shown in the following table:

Table (10) One-Way ANOVA test in degree of the domains according to location of the main office of the organization

Factor	Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Management in the organization	Between Groups	2,868.2	4	717.04	30.37	0.01 **
	Within Groups	2,242.9	5	23.61		
	Total	5,111.0	9			
Strategic Planning	Between Groups	4,270.5	4	1,067.61	48.57	0.01 **
	Within Groups	2,088.3	5	21.98		
	Total	6,358.8	9			
Finance	Between Groups	2,720.3	4	680.06	58.80	0.01 **
	Within Groups	1,098.7	5	11.57		
	Total	3,819.0	9			
Project Management	Between Groups	2,822.3	4	705.58	31.77	0.01 **
	Within Groups	2,065.7	3	22:21		
	Total	4,888.0	7			
Public relations and sources of evaluation	Between Groups	245.0	4	61.26	0.77	0.01 **

	Within Groups	540.3	5	5.69		
	Total	785.3	9			
Organizational values and ethics	Between Groups	473.3	4	118.32	14:48	0.01 **
	Within Groups	776.0	5	8.17		
	Total	1,249.3	9			
Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of the organizations	Between Groups	996.8	4	249.19	13.70	0.01 **
	Within Groups	1,727.4	5	18:18		
	Total	2,724.2	9			
Total	Between Groups	73,862.6	4	18,465.66	30.82	0.01 **
	Within Groups	56,911.1	5	599.06		
	Total	130,773.7	9			

**** P-value <0.01 * p-value <0.05 / / p-value> 0.05**

The above table shows that: one can found a statistically significant variance between the location of the main office in the management in the organizations, and to determine the variance between the groups, the post hoc LSD test have been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was noticed that members of the Board of Directors who live in Bethlehem have less knowledge of management in the organization than members who live in the following governorates (Gaza, Ramallah, Hebron, Jerusalem), while members who live in the Ramallah have more knowledge of the management in the organizations than members who live in (Gaza and Hebron), and the members who live in Hebron have less knowledge in the management in the organizations than the members who live in the (Gaza and Jerusalem), these variances are statistically significant, while there is no noticeable variance between location of the other main offices.

4.11 Table (11) Post hoc LSD test between different governorates, the main offices of the organizations and the Board of Directors in the organizations

	Main office Location	Mean	Gaza	Ramallah	Hebron	Jerusalem	Bethlehem
Management in the organization	Gaza	67.8	1	0.00 **	0.00 **	0.06 / /	0.00 **
	Ramallah	71.1		1	0.00 **	0.44 / /	0.00 **
	Hebron	61.2			1	0.00 **	0.00 **
	Jerusalem	73.3				1	0.00 **
	Bethlehem	41.7					1
Strategic Planning	Gaza	56.1	1	0.00 **	0.01 **	0.01 **	0.00 **
	Ramallah	63.8		1	0.05 *	0.78 / /	0.00 **
	Hebron	60.3			1	0.40 / /	0.00 **
	Jerusalem	63.0				1	0.00 **
	Bethlehem	27.0					1
Finance	Gaza	50.5	1	0.00 **	0.01 **	0.22 / /	0.00 **
	Ramallah	57.6		1	0.00 **	0.03 *	0.00 **
	Hebron	53.7			1	0.77 / /	0.00 **
	Jerusalem	53.0				1	0.00 **
	Bethlehem	29.0					1
Project Management	Gaza	69.0	1	0.00 **	0.12 / /	0.47 / /	0.00 **
	Ramallah	74.9		1	0.00 **	0.17 / /	0.00 **
	Hebron	66.3			1	0.14 / /	0.00 **
	Jerusalem	71.0				1	0.00 **

	Bethlehem	45.0					1
Public relations and sources of evaluation	Gaza	31.8	1	0.00 **	/ / 0.33	/ / 0.92	* 0.05
	Ramallah	34.8		1	0.00 **	/ / 0.06	0.00 **
	Hebron	31.0			1	/ / 0.53	/ / 0.21
	Jerusalem	32.0				1	/ / 0.13
	Bethlehem	29.0					1
Organizational values and ethics	Gaza	39.9	1	/ / 0.11	/ / 0.59	/ / 0.22	0.00 **
	Ramallah	40.9		1	/ / 0.15	/ / 0.53	0.00 **
	Hebron	39.3			1	/ / 0.16	0.00 **
	Jerusalem	42.0				1	0.00 **
	Bethlehem	28.0					1
Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of the organizations	Gaza	26.9	1	0.00 **	/ / 0.78	/ / 0.67	/ / 0.22
	Ramallah	33.8		1	0.00 **	* 0.03	/ / 0.14
	Hebron	27.3			1	/ / 0.82	/ / 0.35
	Jerusalem	28.0				1	/ / 0.57
	Bethlehem	30.0					1
Total	Gaza	39.4	1	0.00 **	/ / 0.98	/ / 0.12	0.00 **
	Ramallah	76.9		1	0.00 **	/ / 0.33	0.00 **
	Hebron	39.2			1	/ / 0.16	0.00 **
	Jerusalem	62.3				1	0.00 **
	Bethlehem	29.7					1

* Statistically significant at 0.05 ** statistically significant at 0.01

4.12 Correlate between factor and total


From table (15) it is clear that the relationship between the sub-factors (management and workers in the organization, strategic planning and effective leadership and decision-making, financial, finance, project management, community relations and the sources of the evaluation, values, principles and institutional laws, the Israeli occupation and its impact on the activity and the role of institutions) and between the total (Board of Directors and executive management in the organization) to these factors were different in terms of both strength of the link and was as follows :

The Correlate between management and workers in the enterprise and the total was a strong correlation and a covariant in the same direction was 0.79, while the link between strategic planning and the total is strongly and directly proportional reached 0.91, and after financing, and the total was strong as was .89 0, and the link between project management and the total is very strong as it hit .95, and the link between community relations and sources of evaluation was 0.76, a strong correlation, and the link when the values, principles and institutional laws had been strong and stood at 0.76, while the link between the occupation and its impact on the activity of the enterprises and the total average amounted to 0.53.

Table (15)

Total	The factors
0.794	Management and workers in the institutions
0.911	Strategic Planning
0.894	The financial and Funding
0.948	Project Management
0.753	community relations and sources of evaluation
0.764	institutional values and principles
0.529	Israeli occupation and its impact on the activity and the role of the NGOs

Scatter plot



4.13 The relative weight of the paragraphs

It is clear that when taking the relative weight of the paragraphs to detect the strength of those paragraphs in answer were as follows

4.13.1 : Management and workers in the institutions

Table (16)

%	Std. deviation	Mean	Paragraphs	Rank
0.98	0.22	2.95	6 – Does someone take minutes for the meetings?	1
0.97	0.27	2.92	1 - Is it easy to reach to the NGO?	2
0.97	0.30	2.90	13 - Is clear for staff to whom they will send reports and when?	3
0.96	0.40	2.89	5 - Is there a filing system?	4
0.96	0.31	2.89	10 - Do you have procurement system?	5
0.96	0.31	2.89	16- Do you know every staff member is reporting and who take instructions?	6
0.96	0.46	2.87	4 - Is there in and out trays?	7

0.95	0.35	2.86	11 – Do you write staff regulation?	8
0.95	0.35	2.86	12 - Is the format and content of the report clear to the staff?	9
0.95	0.50	2.85	2 - Is the work hours of the NGO well Known?	10
0.95	0.44	2.85	9 - Is there a list of employees?	11
0.92	0.55	2.77	8 – Do you have regular maintenance for the equipments?	12
0.91	0.62	2.73	7 - Is there an inventory system for the NGO?	13
0.91	0.51	2.73	19 - Do you know the activity of the employee and his association with some of the activities?	14
0.91	0.51	2.72	25 - Do you follow up to the discretion of the chairpersons of their subordinates?	15
0.90	0.52	2.71	21 - Is the employment-based applications and curricula vitae and transactions?	16
0.90	0.58	2.69	17 - Does the staff of each of a specific job description?	17
0.90	0.58	2.69	20 - Do you encourage the officials after the completion of their workers?	18
0.87	0.60	2.61	24 - Is the consideration of the staff functions at times to modify?	19
0.85	0.61	2.55	25 - Are commensurate with the job skills and experience?	20
0.84	0.64	2.51	18 - Are all the workers on the job training and overseas?	21
0.83	0.87	2.50	3 - Is there a mailing address for the NGO?	22
0.80	0.79	2.39	22 - Is there a training plan for the Foundation?	23
0.74	0.85	2.22	23 - Does the pension increase on the basis of clear?	24
0.73	0.90	2.18	14 - Does the employment contracts of all employees?	25

4.13.2 Strategic Planning

Table (17)

%	Std. Deviation	Mean	Paragraphs	Rank
0.97	0.38	2.91	15. Can you raise suggestions and queries?	1
0.96	0.41	2.88	1. Does the NGO have written vision and mission?	2
0.95	0.44	2.85	16. Do make sure to complete the work?	3
0.95	0.44	2.84	14. Do they ask for your participation in the planning process?	4

0.94	0.45	2.83	3. Does the planning process takes into account the mission of the Foundation	5
0.94	0.45	2.83	18. Are decisions until concrete action	6
0.94	0.44	2.82	21. Do you know where to go when there is a dispute?	7
0.94	0.39	2.81	12. Is the Management Team capable of leading the staff to work on the same goals?	8
0.93	0.41	2.79	11. How?	9
0.92	0.49	2.76	19. Do you know who decides on all issues?	10
0.91	0.60	2.73	6. Are the plans contain:	11
0.90	0.52	2.70	17. The possibility of success?	12
0.89	0.47	2.68	13. Does the management Team give you tasks and make sure of completion?	13
0.89	0.63	2.67	9. From Who?	14
0.89	0.57	2.66	23. Do you delegate command staff?	15
0.89	0.63	2.66	7. What will be achieved?	16
0.88	0.63	2.65	8. To whom?	17
0.87	0.69	2.62	2. Does the NGO have a written plan for next year?	18
0.86	0.49	2.59	22. Do you know about the work through reports and meetings?	19
0.85	0.74	2.56	10. When?	20
0.85	0.56	2.55	4. Did beneficiaries and workers participate in the planning process?	21
0.83	070	2.50	20. Do you know who is going to do this or that?	22
0.80	0.86	2.39	5. Does the NGO have a written plan for the coming three or five years?	23

4.13.3 The financial and funding

Table (18)

%	Std. deviation	Mean	Paragraphs	Rank
0.98	0.33	2.93	4. Does the Foundation bank account number?	1
0.96	0.41	2.88	1. Do you follow the financial director registration expenses, invoices and expenses and the movement of cash the bank?	2
0.95	0.35	2.86	2. Do remittances recorded consistently supported vouchers, invoices and delivery contracts, etc. ...?	3
0.95	0.35	2.86	3. Do you follow the financial director in cash - - on , - A week, monthly?	4

0.94	0.49	2.83	5. Is the Director shall examine the financial bank account weekly Or monthly?	5
0.94	0.38	2.83	20. Do you finance projects in writing or sent to interested ???? So?	6
0.93	0.47	2.80	9. Does the institution kept records of the various programs and projects different?	7
0.93	0.40	2.80	14. Is aware of the goals of institutions and policies and rules of project funding for financial institutions?	8
0.92	0.49	2.77	13. Does the institution is trying to diversify its sources of funding?	9
0.89	0.62	2.66	6. Do you attend the Chief Financial and monetary paper requirements for the next phase?	10
0.88	0.61	2.64	19. Is the Foundation to try to provide as much local sources?	11
0.88	0.71	2.63	10. Is the preparation of monthly financial report shows total expenditures by the outline of the budget?	12
0.87	0.68	2.61	8. Is the Chairman or the Director of the batches with the guidance and with the broad outlines of the budget?	13
0.86	0.67	2.58	18. Are you trying to develop sources of funding the institution of self?	14
0.85	0.69	2.55	11. Does the institution responsible for funding?	15
0.85	0.70	2.54	12. Do you know how to finance an official resident relations and write well?	16
0.83	0.87	2.50	7. Does the draft budget of the institution?	17
0.78	0.72	2.35	15. Do you participate in the preparation of studies funded projects?	18
0.72	0.83	2.16	16. Does the institution own sources of funding?	19
0.69	0.86	2.08	17. Does the institution funding sources other than financial institutions?	20

4.13.4 Project Management

Table (19)

%	Std. deviation	Mean	Paragraphs	Rank
0.97	0.29	2.91	12 - Does the institution that will benefit from the project?	1
0.96	0.40	2.89	8 - Are the reports accurate staff attended during the period of the project work?	2
0.96	0.32	2.89	2 - Do you believe that the project objectives clear?	3
0.95	0.36	2.85	24 - Does the project benefit from the lessons for the future?	4
0.95	0.37	2.84	1 - Do you think that the objectives of the project helped to achieve the general objectives?	5
0.94	0.38	2.83	6 - Does the plan is clearly speaking about the will	6

			of what? And when, and where? ?????	
0.94	0.38	2.83	10 - Do you think the importance of the institution and the need to evaluate projects	7
0.94	0.38	2.83	3. Quantifiable?	8
0.94	0.44	2.82	5 - Does the institution plan of action designed to achieve the objectives of the project and the one after the other?	9
0.94	0.40	2.81	9 - Did the staff and discussed the problems encountered during project implementation?	10
0.93	0.41	2.80	14 - Is the preparation of studies and the needs of the community before the project work?	11
0.93	0.54	2.79	23 - Does the institution is considering whether the project has achieved its objectives or not?	12
0.93	0.44	2.78	7 - Does the institution used its own sources for the start of the project?	13
0.92	0.43	2.77	13 - Does the institution use the method of monitoring and evaluation to develop and modify the project?	14
0.92	0.50	2.76	22- Do you examine the problems faced by the institution to exist solutions in a timely manner?	15
0.92	0.48	2.76	4. Are achievable?	16
0.92	0.50	2.76	25 - Does the evaluation examines how the results of the project to assist in achieving the goals of the institution?	17
0.91	0.50	2.74	17 - Does the institution has prepared periodic reports on the achievements in comparison with the plan?	18
0.91	0.44	2.73	26 - Does the institution evaluate the objectives and work plans and an assessment of the use of monitoring and evaluation?	19
0.90	0.61	2.71	11 - Do you attended as part of the evaluation plan of action?	20
0.86	0.64	2.59	21 - Does the institution has examined the reasons for the increase in expenditure or lack of?	21
0.81	0.66	2.42	16 - Does the institution attended and plan to complete the project after the completion of it?	22
0.80	0.64	2.39	19.If the answer is yes, is considered the reasons for the lack of these activities?	23
0.79	0.60	2.38	15 - Is the community involved in identifying priorities and preparing for the study of the project?	24
0.75	0.68	2.25	20 - Do you have increased or decreased expenses on the budget prepared?	25
0.71	0.71	2.12	18 - Does the institution have failed to achieve a specific activity?	26

4.13.5 Community relations and sources of evaluation

Table (20)

%	Std. deviation	Mean	Paragraphs	Rank
0.99	0.17	2.97	1 - Is the institution a good relationship with the institutions and community leaders?	1
0.97	0.27	2.92	2 - Does the institution's relations with local and international institutions working in the same region?	2
0.96	0.33	2.88	8 - Does the institution participate in the meetings of the institutions operating in the same sector?	3
0.95	0.36	2.85	4 - Does the institution give clear information on its objectives and activities of the community?	4
0.94	0.39	2.82	9 - Are you trying to develop the institution with the general orientations of the other aspects of their work?	5
0.92	0.49	2.76	10 - Does the institution to benefit from the training offered by other institutions?	6
0.91	0.44	2.74	5 - Is the institution trying to influence decisions in the community and which would affect the project?	7
0.91	0.50	2.74	7 - Are you trying to establish a foundation of local support groups for the continuity of projects and activities?	8
0.89	0.53	2.67	3 - Does the institution have good relations with government institutions?	9
0.86	0.55	2.59	6 - Do you know of external factors affecting the work of the institution?	10
0.80	0.70	2.40	11 - Is the institution of promotional activities and propaganda?	11
0.76	0.76	2.29	12 - Are you trying to influence the institution's activities and decisions of the government?	12

4.13.6 Institutional values and principles

Table (21)

%	Std. deviation	Mean	Paragraphs	Rank
0.98	0.24	2.94	8. Do you know the way the institution of official registration?	1
0.98	0.24	2.94	12. Does the Foundation Board of Directors?	2
0.97	0.38	2.91	11. Is the institution officially registered?	3

0.96	0.31	2.89	13. Are the functions and role of the board and clear?	4
0.96	0.33	2.88	9. Does the institution for its own internal regulations?	5
0.95	0.43	2.86	3 - Are the staff and members agreed on the value of the institution?	6
0.95	0.44	2.85	6. Do you know the institution they need to internal regulations?	7
0.95	0.43	2.86	1 - Are the members of the Governing Council or the officials involved in determining the value of the institution?	8
0.95	0.36	2.85	7. Do you know how to attend the institution internal regulations?	9
0.94	0.39	2.82	10.Are you using the rules of procedure in the management of the institution?	10
0.93	0.53	2.80	5 - in the planning of programs, is taken into account the value of the institution?	11
0.93	0.48	2.78	14. Is the Council's relations with the community?	12
0.92	0.53	2.76	2 - Does the Panel discussed the value with the Governing Council?	13
0.91	0.60	2.73	4 - Is the value and principles of written and people can read?	14

4.13.7 Israeli occupation and its impact on the activity and the role of the NGOs

Table (22)

%	Std. deviation	Mean	**Paragraphs**	**Rank**
0.91	0.45	2.72	2 - Do you think activities and programs of NGOs affected by the Israeli occupation?	1
0.90	0.46	2.71	12 – Does Israeli blockade have negative impact on NGOs activities?	2
0.90	0.52	2.70	10 - Do you think the Israeli occupation has an influence on donors to fund or not certain NGOs?	3
0.90	0.53	2.69	3 – Do policies and strategies of the Israeli occupation affect the NGOs?	4
0.84	0.66	2.51	11 - Do you think the Israeli occupation intervene in determining the policy of donors' countries?	5
0.84	0.56	2.51	7 – Does the Israeli occupation delay the implementation of some programs or projects?	6
0.83	0.67	2.48	9 – Does the Israeli occupation affect NGOs fundraising?	7
0.80	0.70	2.41	5 – Does the Israeli occupation affect free movement of NGOs staff?	8
0.79	0.72	2.36	6 - Does the Israeli occupation prevent the implementation of the NGO programs or projects?	9

0.76	0.83	2.28	4 - Does the Israeli occupation intervene directly or indirectly in the NGOs affairs?	10
0.68	0.89	2.03	8 - Does the Israeli occupation intervene in defining programs or projects?	11
0.64	0.92	1.91	1 - Do you think there are obstacles caused by the Israeli Occupation?	12

4.14. Test questions and hypotheses

Are there significant differences between the total (Board of Directors and executive management in the organization) and between the headquarters of the organization?

Upon examination, the test shows us that there are statistical differences between the total (Board of Directors and executive management in the organization) and between the headquarters of the organization? Saluting the significance level was less than 0.05. In a study for any area of the differences proved it was of the Ramallah area, followed by the Jerusalem area.

Table (23)

ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	73862.642	4	18465.660	30.824	.000
Within Groups	56911.068	95	599.064		
Total	130773.710	99			

Descriptive

Table (24)

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Gaza Strip	53	339.3962	30.74857
Ramallah	32	376.8750	15.63856
Hebron	9	339.2222	4.52155
Jerusalem	3	362.3333	.57735
Bethlehem	3	229.6667	.57735
Total	100	348.7700	36.34483

To finalize one can found a statistically significant variance between the location of the main office in the strategic planning domain, to determine the variance between the groups, the post hoc LSD test have been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was noticed that members of the Board of Directors who live in Bethlehem have less knowledge of strategic planning than members who live in the following governorates (Gaza, Ramallah, Hebron, Jerusalem), while members who live in the Ramallah have more knowledge of the strategic planning than members who live in (Gaza and Hebron), and the members who live in Gaza have less knowledge in the management in the organizations than the members who live in the (Hebron and Jerusalem), these variances are statistically significant, while there is no noticeable variance between location of the other main offices.

Furthermore, the results shows a statistically significant variance between the location of the main office in the finance, and to determine the variance between the groups, the post hoc LSD test have been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was noticed that members of the Board of Directors who live in Bethlehem have less knowledge of finance than members who live in the following governorates (Gaza, Ramallah, Hebron, Jerusalem), while members who live in the Ramallah have more knowledge of finance than members who live in (Gaza, Hebron and Jerusalem), and the members who live in Ramallah have less knowledge in the management in the organizations than the members who live in the (Hebron), these differences are statistically significant, while there is no noticeable variance between location of the other main offices.

Moreover, the results shows a statistically significant variance between the location of the main office in project management, and to determine the variance between the groups, the post hoc LSD test have been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was noticed that members of the Board of Directors who live in Bethlehem have less knowledge of project management than members who live in the following governorates (Gaza, Ramallah, Hebron, Jerusalem), while members who live in the Ramallah have more knowledge of the

management in the organizations than members who live in (Gaza and Hebron), these differences are statistically significant, while there is no noticeable variance between location of the other main offices.

And one can found a statistically significant variance between the location of the main office in the public relationships and sources of evaluation, and to determine the variance between the groups, the post hoc LSD test have been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was noticed that members of the Board of Directors who live in Bethlehem have less knowledge of public relationships and sources of evaluation than members who live in the governorates of Gaza and Ramallah, while members who live in the Ramallah have more knowledge of public relationships and sources of evaluation than members who live in (Gaza and Hebron), these differences are statistically significant, while there is no noticeable variance between location of the other main offices.

As well as the results shows a statistically significant variance between the location of the main office in the organizational values and ethics, to determine the variance between the groups, the post hoc LSD test have been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was noticed that members of the Board of Directors who live in Bethlehem have less knowledge of organizational values and ethics than members who live in the governorates of (Gaza, Ramallah, Hebron and Jerusalem), these differences are statistically significant, while there is no noticeable variance between location of the other main offices.

Finally, one can found a statistically significant variance between the location of the main office in the Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of the organizations, to determine the variance between the groups, the post hoc LSD test have been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was noticed that members of the Board of Directors who live in Ramallah have more knowledge of Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of the organizations than members who live in the governorates of (Gaza, Hebron and Jerusalem), these differences are statistically significant, while there is no noticeable variance between location of the other main offices.

To discuss the outcome research ameeting with effective NGOs directors, chairmns and the steering commitee of PNGO in Gaza has been conducted in the PNGO office. The participants in the meeting agreed and supported the majorty of the results and recommend more meetings in the future to discuss the research outcome with the NGOs in Gaza and west Bank to benifit from the research in future work of NGOs and civil society orgnasations.

CHAPTER FIVE

SURVEY OF THE NGOs BENEFICIARIES QUESTIONNAIRE'S OUTCOME

The questionnaires have been distributed to 100 benificiaries of the projects and program of NGOs both in the West bank and Gaza from benefciaries of the Palestinian NGOs Network. There was a problem at that time in the West Bank because of the closure of cities of the west Bank during the period of the study.

5. Outcome of the Study: Analysis, Explanation and Argument

"The 'target' groups do not participate in decision-making or drawing up policy either. In many women's NGOs, the staff had nothing to do with the general budget of their organization, and do not know how it is distributed."

Islah Jad (2006)

5.1- Beneficiaries from the organization's activities and programs.

5.1.1 Demographic and social characteristics of the sample:

The sample has been selected from POTs, description of the sample according to demographic variables:

- **Distribution of sample according to age groups:**

Results show that 35% of the beneficiaries are (32 – 39) years old, while 34% are (40 – 47) years, and 16% are (24 – 31) years, while 12% are (48 – 55) years, and 3% of the beneficiaries are between 56 and 62 years old, as shown in the following diagram (1) and table (1):

Chart (1) distribution of the sample according to age groups

Chart (1)




Table (1)

	Frequency	Percent
From 24-31 year	16	16.0
From 32-39 year	35	35.0
From 40-47 year	34	34.0
From 48-55 year	12	12.0
From 56-62 year	3	3.0
Total	100	100.0

• **Distribution of the sample according to marital status:**

The majority of beneficiaries (90%) are married, while 10% of beneficiaries are non-married, the results shown in the following diagram (figure 2) and table (2):

Chart (2) distribution of the sample according to marital status




Table (2)

	Frequency	Percent
Married	90	90.0
Not married	10	10.0
Total	100	100.0

5.1.2 Distribution of the sample according to level of education:

The results show that 64.0% of the beneficiaries have General Secondary, while 20.0% of the beneficiaries have university degree, and 16 .0% have diploma, as shown in the following diagram (figure3) and table (3):

Chart (3) distribution of the sample according to level of education




Table (3)

	Frequency	Percent
Secondary	64	64.0
Diploma	16	16.0
University	20	20.0
Total	100	100.0

• **Distribution of the sample according to governorate:**

The results show that 44.0% of the beneficiaries live in the northern Gaza, while 24.0% live in Gaza, and 15.0% live in the middle area, while 10.0% live in Khan Yunis, but 7.0% live in Rafah governorate, as shown in the following diagram:

Chart (4) Distribution of the sample according to governorate




Table (4)

	Frequency	Percent
Gaza north	44	44.0
Gaza	24	24.0
Central Region	15	15.0
Khan youns	10	10.0
Rafh	7	7.0
Total	100	100.0

5.2 The Queries of study:

5.2.1 First query: How do beneficiaries from their services know management in the organizations?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of beneficiaries' responses to the items of the first domain (management in the organization), also we determined the mean and the relative weight of the responses to the items of the first domain, the results are shown in the following table:

Table (5) beneficiary's responses to the domain items of management in the organization, mean, relative weight and order

No.	Items of Management in the organization	Yes%	No%	To some extent,%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Is it easy to reach to the organization?	98.0	0.0	2.0	2.96	98.6	1
2	Is the work hours of the organization well Known?	97.0	0.0	3.0	2.94	98.0	2
3	Is there a mailing address for the organization?	52.0	30.0	18.0	2.34	78.0	3

The results in the table above shows that 98.0% of beneficiaries believe that it is easy to reach the organizations, this item got the first rank with a relative weight of 98.6%, while 97.0% know clearly and Precisely the working time in the organizations, this item came second with a relative weight of 98.0, and 52.0%

said that they know the mailing address of the organizations, thus, the results indicate that the beneficiaries from services of organizations have a good knowledge about management in the organizations, this indicates that the organizations team share the beneficiaries in their internal and managerial affairs.

5.2.2 Second query: how do beneficiaries know the strategic planning process in the organizations?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of beneficiaries' responses to the items of the second domain (Strategic Planning), also we determined mean and relative weight of responses to the items of the second domain; the results are shown in the following table:

Table (6) descriptive statistics, mean, relative weight and order of the items of the strategic planning process of the organizations

No.	Items of the strategic planning	Yes%	No%	To some extent,%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Does the organization have a written vision and mission?	89.0	9.0	2.0	2.87	97.0	1
2	Does the organization have a written plan for next year?	41.0	35.0	22.0	2.32	77.0	9
3	Do beneficiaries and personnel participate in the planning process?	71.0	16.0	13.0	2.62	87.0	5
4	Does the organization have written objectives for the coming three or five years?	52.0	25.0	23.0	2.33	78.0	8
5	Do the plans contain: What will be achieved?	69.0	16.0	15.0	2.63	88.0	4
6	To whom?	46.0	40.0	6.0	2.87	96.0	2
7	From Who?	29.0	14.0	3.0	2.57	86.0	6
8	When?	36.0	14.0	2.0	2.65	89.0	3
9	How?	39.0	11.0	5.0	2.62	86.0	7

The results in the above table show that the majority of beneficiaries (89.0%) believe that their organizations have a written mission showing purpose and target groups, this item ranked first with a relative weight of 97.0%, while 46.0% know whom the plans target, this item came second with relative weight of 96.0%. 36.0% know when the plans will take place, while 69.0% know what the plans will be about, 71.0% are involved in the planning process, while 29.0% know from who the plans are, and 39.0% know how these plans will take place, while 52.0% ensure that the organizations have written objectives for three or five years, and 41.0% of the beneficiaries know that there is a written plan of the organization to the next year.

From previous results one can concludes that, beneficiaries from services of the organizations have a great knowledge and are involved in the process of strategic planning, which indicates that organizations' management team share the beneficiaries in the process of strategic planning.

5.2.3 Third query: how do beneficiaries know the Finance of the organization that benefit from their services?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of beneficiaries' responses to the items of the third domain (Finance), also we determined the mean and the relative weight of the responses to the items of the third domain; the results are shown in the following table:

Table (7) descriptive statistics, mean, relative weight and order of the items of finance domain in the organizations.

No.	Items of financial situation	Yes%	No%	To some extent,%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Is there any bank account for the organization?	72.0	25.0	3.0	2.68	89.0	1
2	Have you seen the draft budget for the organization?	31.0	57.0	12.0	2.21	74.0	3
3	Is the draft budget accessible for you?	26.0	57.0	17.0	2.12	71.0	4
4	Are the financial reports accessible for you?	36.0	55.0	9.0	2.28	76.0	2

The results in the table above show that 72.0% of the beneficiaries know that the organizations have bank account number, this item got the first rank with a relative weight of 89.0%, while 36.0% have been informed about the financial reports of the organization, 55.0% have not been informed about the financial reports of the organizations.

It is also noticed that 31.0% of beneficiaries have seen the draft budget of the organizations that benefit from, while 57.0% did not see the draft budget of the organizations.

Also finds that 26.0% of beneficiaries have been briefed on the draft budget for the organizations, while 57.0% have not informed about the proposed budget. This item got the fourth place with a relative weight of 71.0%.

One can concludes that the beneficiaries from the services of organizations have a limited knowledge about finance in the organizations, which indicates that the organizations' management team do neither share nor brief the beneficiaries on the financial reports of their organizations.

5.2.4 Fourth query: how does organizations' management team share beneficiaries in the effective leadership and decision-making?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of beneficiaries' responses to the items of the fourth domain (effective leadership and decision-making), also we determined the mean and the relative weight of the responses to the items of the fourth domain; the results are shown in the following table:

Table (8) shows responses of beneficiaries on the items of the effective leadership and decision-making domain, the relative weight of each item separately and order

No.	Items of effective leadership and decision-making	Yes%	No%	To some extent,%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Is the Management Team capable to lead the staff to work on the same goals?	95.0	3.0	2.0	2.93	98.0	1
2	Does the management Team give you tasks and make sure of completion?	91.0	5.0	4.0	2.87	96.0	3
3	Do they ask for your participation in the planning process?	65.0	11.0	24.0	2.44	81.0	7
4	Can you give suggestions and queries?	92.0	6.0	2.0	2.9	97.0	2
5	Do you know who decides in all issues?	64.0	4.0	22.0	2.41	80.0	8
6	Do you know who is going to do this or that?	49.0	32.0	19.0	2.3	77.0	9
7	Do you know where to go when there is a dispute?	86.0	6.0	8.0	2.78	93.0	5
8	Do you know about the work through: a. reports? b. meetings?	86.0	2.0	12.0	2.74	91.0	6
9	Does the Management Team train you on necessary skills?	89.0	3.0	8.0	2.81	94.0	4

The results in the above table shows that, the majority of beneficiaries believe that the management team is capable to lead the staff to work on the same goals, also found that 92.0% of beneficiaries believe that they can give suggestions, queries and problems with leadership, was also noted that 91.0% believe that leadership gives them tasks and make sure of completion, 89.0% see that the organizations executive management give training in the necessary skills, and 86.0% believe know where to go in the a dispute.

The results shows that 86.0% of the beneficiaries know about the work through the initial reports meetings, this item got the sixth place with a relative weight of 91.0%, while 65.0% say that the leadership asks them to participate in planning, and 64.0% say they know who decides in all issues in the organizations, and 49.0% of the beneficiaries know who will do this or that.

From the foregoing, one can conclude that the beneficiaries have a great knowledge about the process of decision-making and effective leadership in the organizations that benefit from.

5.2.5 Fifth query: How do beneficiaries know about the fundraising of the organizations that benefit from?

To verify that, one can determined the percentage of beneficiaries' responses to items of the fifth domain (Fundraising), also we determined the mean and the relative weight of the responses to the items of the fifth domain; the results are shown in the following table:

Table (9): Beneficiaries answer to the items of fundraising domain, relative weight and order of each item.

No.	Items of the fundraising	Yes%	No%	To some extent,%	Mean	The relative weight%	Order
1	Do you know who is responsible for fundraising?	70.0	14.0	16.0	2.53	84.0	4
2	Do you know if he/she can make good public relations?	84.0	4.0	12.0	2.73	91.0	1
3	Does the organization try to diversify its sources of funding?	80.0	10.0	10.0	2.7	90.0	2
4	Do you participate in the preparation of project proposals?	44.0	38.0	18.0	2.27	76.0	7
5	Does the organization try to develop self-funding?	56.0	24.0	18.0	2.34	78.0	6
6	Are all sources of fundraising well- known?	42.0	35.0	23.0	2.2	73.0	8
7	Does organization develop their sources of fundraising?	80.0	10.0	10.0	2.7	90.0	3
8	Does the organization look for local sources?	67.0	8.0	25.0	2.42	81.0	5

The above table show that 84% of beneficiaries believe that the fundraising official knows how to establish relationships and write well, while 80.0% believe that the organizations try to diversify fundraising sources, and 80% believe that the organizations try to develop their self-fundraising sources. The results show that 70.0% believe that they know that there is a fundraising official in the organizations, 67.0% believe that they know that the organizations try to localize funding as much as possible. 56.0% believe that the organizations have sources of self-fundraising, while 44.0% believe they are involved in the

preparation of project studies, and 42.0% know that the organizations have other sources than donors.

From the foregoing, one can conclude that the beneficiaries have a great knowledge about the sources of funding for organizations that benefit from.

5.2.6 Sixth query: How do beneficiaries know about projects management in organizations that benefit from?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of beneficiaries' responses to the items of the sixth domain (Project Management), also we determined mean and relative weight of the responses to the items of the sixth domain; the results are shown in the following table:

Table (10): Beneficiaries answer to the domain items of project management, the relative weight and order of each item.

No.	Items of Project Management	Yes%	No%	To some extent,%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Do you think that the project objectives help to achieve the overall objectives?	87.0	2.0	11.0	2.76	92.0	6
2	Do you believe that the project objectives clear?	81.0	6.0	13.0	2.68	89.0	13
3	Quantifiable?	68.0	9.0	23.0	2.46	82.0	18
4	Achievable?	76.0	5.0	19.0	2.59	86.0	15
5	Does the organization put an Action Plan to achieve the objectives of the projects one after the other?	73.0	7.0	20.0	2.51	84.0	17
6	Does the organization requests your participation in the implementation and plan of actions of the projects?	79.0	5.0	11.0	2.46	82.0	19
7	Does the plan clearly identify: a. Who will do what? b. When? c. Where?	80.0	9.0	11.0	2.69	90.0	10
8	Does the organization use their and your recourses to start the projects?	79.0	9.0	12.0	2.69	90.0	11

9	Does the staff prepare accurate progress reports?	80.0	7.0	25.0	2.42	81.0	21
10	Do you discuss the problems that occur during the project implementation?	79.0	13.0	0.0	2.72	91.0	9
11	Is the evaluation, part of action plan?	68.0	4.0	14.0	2.68	89.0	14
12	Does the organization consider who will benefit from the projects?	93.0	7.0	0.0	2.93	98.0	1
13	Does the organization use monitoring and evaluation to develop and modify projects?	86.0	4.0	10.0	2.77	92.0	7
14	Does the organization study the community need assessments before finalizing project proposal?	75.0	5.0	20.0	2.55	85.0	16
15	Are you a part of setting priorities and the preparation of project proposals?	81.0	8.0	11.0	2.69	90.0	12
16	Do you prepare with the organization a plan to assure of continuity of the projects?	64.0	19.0	17.0	2.47	82.0	20
17	Do you have access to the organization periodic reports on the achievements in comparison with the plan?	61.0	16.0	23.0	2.4	80.0	22
18	Has the organization failed in the achievement of any specific objective?	25.0	54.0	21.0	2.07	69.0	24
19	If the answer is yes, do they discuss reasons for the failure?	31.0	34.0	7.0	2.28	76.0	23
20	Does the organization examine the problems they faced to find solutions at the proper time?	83.0	9.0	8.0	2.76	92.0	8
21	Does the organization examine if the project has achieved its objectives or not?	86.0	7.0	7.0	2.81	94.0	3
22	Does the organization consider the lessons learned for future?	93.0	7.0	0.0	2.9	97.0	2
23	Does the evaluation examine how the results of the projects would help in achieving the goals of the organization?	88.0	10.0	2.0	2.8	93.0	4
24	Does the organization evaluate the objectives and action plans through the monitoring and	87.0	11.0	2.0	2.78	93.0	5

	evaluation process?						

The results in the table above show that: First, 93.0% of beneficiaries think that the organizations consider who will benefit from the projects. Second, 93.0% believe they are benefiting from the lessons of projects for the future, this item got the second place with a relative weight of 97%. Third, 86.0% agree that the organizations evaluate if the projects have achieved their objectives or not, this item got the third place with a relative weight of 94%. Fourth, 88.0% believe that evaluation check how can the project results help in achieving the organizations' objectives. Fifth, 87.0% of agree that organizations evaluate their goals, plans and work to benefit from monitoring and evaluation. Sixth, 87.0% believe that the project objectives help to achieve the overall objectives of the organizations. Seventh, 86.0% agree that the organizations use the monitoring and evaluation to develop and modify projects. Eighth, 83.0% think that the organizations should study the problems they faced in order to get solutions in a proper time. Ninth, 79% ensure that they have discussed the problems they faced projects during the implementation process.

The results added that: First, 80% of beneficiaries believe that the plan have clearly spoken about who will do what, when, where and so on. Second, 79% believe that the organizations use their own resources to start projects. Third, 81% participate in identifying priorities and preparing for the projects study. Forth, 81% think that the project objectives are clear. Fifth, 68% agree that the evaluation is a part of the Action Plan. Sixth, 76% believe that the objectives of organizations are achievable. Seventh, 75% agree that need assessment should be done before the study of projects. Eighth, 73% know that the organizations put Action plan to achieve the objectives of the projects one after the other. Ninth, 68% believe that the goals of organizations are measureable.

In addition the results show that: First, 79% believes that the organizations ask them to participate in the implementation of projects and action plans. Second, 64% ensure that they prepare with the organizations a plan to assure of continuity of the projects. Third, 80% know that organizations team is

preparing accurate reports during the project work. Fourth, 61% say that they are briefed on the periodic reports on the achievements compared with the projects plan. Finally the results shows that: First, 25% believe that the organizations failed to achieve specific activities.

From the proceedings, one can conclude that the beneficiaries aware of project management in the organization that benefit from, and participate in implementation, plans and strategies of projects.

5.2.7 Seventh query: How do beneficiaries know about public relations and sources of evaluation?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of beneficiaries' responses to the items of the seventh domain (public relations and sources of evaluation), also we determined mean and relative weight of the responses to the items of the seventh domain; the results are shown in the following table:

Table (11) descriptive statistics, mean and relative weight of the items of public relations and sources of evaluation domain

No.	Items of the public relations and sources of evaluation	Yes%	No%	To some extent,%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Do you have good relations with organizations?	65.0	2.0	33.0	2.34	78.0	7
2	Is there any relation between the local and international organizations working in your region?	79.0	2.0	19.0	2.6	87.0	3
3	Does the organization have relations with the Palestinian National Authority:	68.0	9.0	23.0	2.47	82.0	6
4	Does the organization have relations with Hamas Government in Gaza :	27.0	20.0	53.0	1.73	58.0	10
5	Does the organization have relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council?	40.0	48.0	12.0	1.71	57.0	11
6	Do you know the objectives and activities of the organization?	81.0	6.0	13.0	2.68	89.0	2
7	Does organization try to influence your decisions?	13.0	77.0	10.0	2.03	68.0	8
8	Does the organization try to develop work relations with other organization?	76.0	0.0	24.0	2.52	84.0	4

9	Do you benefit from training offered by organizations?	96.0	8.0	22.0	2.93	98.0	1
10	Do you get advertising and promotional pamphlets on the organization activities?	70.0	9.0	22.0	2.48	83.0	5
11	Does the organization try to influence the activities and decisions of the government?	19.0	40.0	41.0	1.76	59.0	9

The results in the table above show that: First, 96.0% of the beneficiaries believe they are benefiting from the training that organizations offer; this item got the first rank with a relative weight of 98.0%. Second, 81.0% believe that the organizations give them clear information about the aims and activities, this item got the second place with a relative weight of 89.0%. Third, 79.0% see that there are relations between the local and international organizations that working in the same region. Fourth, 76.0% believe that the organizations try to develop general guidelines with other organizations in aspects of its work. Fifth, 70.0% get advertising and promotional pamphlets. Sixth, 68.0% ensure that the organizations have good relations with the PNA. Seventh, 65.0% ensure that the organizations have good relations with other organizations. In addition, 13.0% think that the organization try to influence their decisions and 19.0% think that the organizations try to influence government activities and decisions.

Furthermore the table shows that: First,27.0% say that organizations have relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council. Second, 40.0% of beneficiaries believe that the organizations in Gaza Strip have relations with Hamas government.

Finally one can conclude that the beneficiaries have a great knowledge and opinion about public relations and sources of evaluation of the organizations that benefit from.

5.2.8 Eighth Query: how do beneficiaries know about the organizational values and ethics?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of beneficiaries' responses to the items of the eighth domain (Organizational Values and Ethics), also we

determined mean and relative weight of the responses to the items of the eighth domain; the results are shown in the following table:

Table (12): Descriptive statistics, mean and relative weight of the items of organizational values and ethics

No.	Items of the values and ethics of the organization	Yes%	No%	To some extent,%	Mean	Relative weight%	Order
1	Do the board of directors, members and beneficiaries participate in defining the values and ethics of the organization?	89.0	5.0	6.0	2.85	95.0	2
2	Did you discuss the values of the organization with the board of directories?	49.0	36.0	15.0	2.36	78.7	3
3	Does the organization have a written values and ethics?	60.0	16.0	24.0	2.35	78.3	4
4	During the planning process, Do values of the organization taken into account?	91.0	5.0	4.0	2.87	95.7	1

The table above shows that: First, 91.0% of beneficiaries ensure that they consider the organization value when planning for the programs. Second, 89.0% believe that members of the board of directors and beneficiaries involved in determining the values of organization that benefited from. Third, 49.0% ensure that they discussed organizations values with the Board of Directors. Finally, 60.0% believe that the values and ethics are written and reachable.

From the previous table one can conclude that the beneficiaries have very good knowledge about the organizational values and discuss them with the management in the organizations that benefited from.

5.2.9 Ninth query: How do beneficiaries know about the legal aspects of the organizations that benefit from?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of beneficiaries' responses to the items of the ninth domain (Legal Aspects), also we determined the mean and the relative weight of the responses to the items of the ninth domain; the results are shown in the following table:

Table (13): Descriptive statistics, mean and relative weight of the items of Legal Aspects

No.	Items of the legal aspects	Yes%	No%	To some extent%	Mean	The relative weight%	Order
	Does the organization have internal bylaws?	98.0	0.0	2.0	2.99	100.0	2
	Do you know if there is an official registration for the organization?	94.0	4.0	2.0	2.98	99.0	3
	Does the organization use its internal bylaws?	96.0	2.0	2.0	2.92	97.0	4
	Does the organization have a Board of directors?	100.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	100.0	1
	Are the mission and role of board of directories clear?	92.0	6.0	2.0	2.90	97.0	5
	Do you have any relationship with board of directories?	65.0	4.0	31.0	2.34	78.0	6

The results in the table above show that: First, the beneficiaries from the organizations ensure that the organizations have Board of Directors. Second, 98.0% believe that the organizations have internal bylaws. Third, 94.0% believe that they know that the organizations are officially registered. Fourth, 96.0% ensure that they use the internal bylaw of the organizations.

Furthermore, 92.0% of beneficiaries think that the mission and role of the Board of Directors are clear. Finally, 65.0% of beneficiaries ensure that they have relations with Board of Directors.

The outcome of the results concludes that the beneficiaries have a great knowledge about the legal aspects of the organizations that benefited from.

5.2.10 Tenth query: How do beneficiaries know about the impact of the Israeli occupation on the activities and roles of the organizations that benefit from?

To verify that, we determined the percentage of beneficiaries' responses to the items of the tenth domain (Israeli Occupation and its impact on the activities and roles of the organizations), also we determined the mean and

relative weight of the responses to the items of the tenth domain; the results are shown in the following table:

Table (14) descriptive statistics, mean, relative weight and order of items of the Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of the organizations

No.	Items of the Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of organizations	Yes%	No%	To some extent%	Mean	The relative weight%	Order
	Do you think that there are obstacles caused by the Israeli Occupation?	92.0	0.0	8.0	2.88	96.0	1
	Do you think activities and programs of organizations affected by the Israeli occupation?	81.0	8.0	11.0	2.7	90.0	4
	Do policies and strategies of the Israeli occupation affect the organizations?	83.0	7.0	10.0	2.75	91.7	3
	Does the Israeli occupation intervene directly or indirectly in the organizations affairs?	49.0	8.0	23.0	2.26	75.3	10
	Does the Israeli occupation affect free movement of organizations staff?	73.0	5.0	12.0	2.65	88.3	6
	Does the Israeli occupation prevent the implementation of the organization programs or projects?	79.0	9.0	12.0	2.69	89.7	5
	Does the Israeli occupation delay the implementation of some programs or projects?	72.0	9.0	19.0	2.55	85.0	7
	Does the Israeli occupation intervene in specifying programs or projects?	20.0	65.0	15.0	2.05	68.3	12
	Does the Israeli occupation affect organizations fundraising?	67.0	14.0	16.0	2.54	84.7	8
0	Do you think that Israeli occupation has an influence on donors to fund or not some organizations?	55.0	20.0	25.0	2.36	78.7	9
1	Do you think the Israeli occupation intervene in specifying the policy of donors?	51.0	14.0	33.0	2.18	72.7	11
2	Does Israeli siege have negative impact on organizations	91.0	2.0	7.0	2.86	95.3	2

	activities?						

The results in the table above shows that: First,92.0% of beneficiaries believe that there are obstacles caused by the occupation now and in the past, this item got the first rank, which indicates that the Israeli occupation has a significant impact on the organizations in the Gaza Strip. Second, 91.0% think that the Israeli siege have a negative impact on the role and activities of the organizations, this item ranked second in terms of their impact on the organizations, this indicates that the Israeli siege has a negative and substantially impact on the work and activities of organizations in Gaza Strip. Third, 83.0% believe that the policies and strategies of the occupation have an impact on organizations and their work, which indicates that Israeli policies and strategies affect greatly the work of the organizations in Gaza Strip.

The results adds that 81.0% think that there is an effect of the occupation on the programs and activities of the organizations, this indicates that the occupation significantly delay the implementation of some programs and activities of the organizations. And, 79.0% agree that occupation prohibits organizations from implementing some of the programs and projects, this indicates that the occupation policy significantly prohibits organizations from implementing some programs and projects.

Furthermore, 73.0% ensure that the occupation prevent the free movement of the organizations' teams, 72.0% see that the occupation hinders the implementation of some programs and projects of the organizations that benefited from and 67.0% see that the Israeli occupation affects the fundraising of organizations and 55.0% think that the Israeli occupation has an influence on donors to fund or not some organizations.

Finally 49.0% believe that the occupation intervene directly and indirectly in the organizations affairs, 51.0% think that the Israeli occupation intervene in specifying the policy of donors and 20.0% believe that the occupation intervened in specifying some programs or projects.

From the abovementioned the results conclude that the beneficiaries know about the impact of the Israeli occupation on the organizations and on the activities and programs of organizations.

5.2.11 Eleventh query: Which domains do the beneficiaries mostly know in the ten management domains of the organizations?

To identify the most important domains to the beneficiaries in the organizations' management, we determine means, standard deviations and relative weights to each dimension and the total degree, as shown in the following table:

Table (15): Shows mean relative weight and order of each domain of organizations management

Domains	Number of Items	Total degree	Mean	Standard Deviation	Relative weight%	Order
Management in the organization	3	6	5.2	0.9	86.2	2
Strategic Planning	9	18	13.3	2.7	73.9	6
Finance	4	8	3.7	2.8	46.0	9
Leadership and decision-making	9	18	15.3	2.5	85.2	3
Fundraising	8	16	11.7	2.7	73.8	7
Project Management	24	48	40.8	5.4	84.9	4
Public relations and sources of evaluation	11	22	15.1	2.2	68.7	8
Organizational values and ethics	4	8	6.3	1.7	78.6	5
Legal Aspects	6	12	11.4	0.9	94.8	1
Israeli occupation and its impact on the activities and roles of organizations	12	24	18.6	4.2	77.5	5

Relative weight is calculated by dividing the mean by the total degree and then multiplying by 100

From the table above, one can notice that the legal aspects ranked first in terms of knowledge by beneficiaries with a relative weight of 94.8%, which means that the beneficiaries have a great knowledge about the legal aspects of the organizations that benefited from. it is clear that management in the organizations have ranked second in terms of importance and knowledge of the beneficiaries with a relative weight of 86.2%, followed in third place by the leadership and decision-making with a relative weight of 85.2%, in the fourth place came the project management with a relative weight of 84.9%, then the organizational values and ethics with a relative weight of 78.6%, while the seventh place was to funding with a relative weight of 73.8%, Finance ranked ninth and last with a relative weight of 46.0%.

Which indicates that the beneficiaries have less knowledge of the domain of Finance organizations that benefit from, as a result that organizations do not allow beneficiaries to be involved or informed of the financial affairs of their organizations.

5.3 Hypotheses of the study:

5.3.1 Hypothesis I: There is no statistically significant relationship between the domain of organizations management and the total degree of domains from the beneficiaries' point of view.

To verify that, we used Pearson correlation coefficient to study the relationship between the following domains (management in the organizations, strategic planning, finance, leadership and decision-making, fundraising, project management, public relations and sources of evaluation, organizational values and ethics, legal aspects, the Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of the organizations) and the total degree of the domains that are known to the beneficiaries of the organizations that benefit from, and the results shown in the following table:

Table No. (16) Pearson correlation coefficient to study the relationship between the study domains and the total degree of the domains from the beneficiaries' point of view.

Domains of the Study	Correlation coefficient	Significance level
Management in the organization	0.33	0.001 **
Strategic Planning	0.37	0.001 **
Finance	0.55	0.001 **
Leadership and decision-making	0.50	0.001 **
Fundraising	0.44	0.001 **
Project Management	0.63	0.001 **
Public relations and sources of evaluation	0.45	0.001 **
Organizational values and ethics	0.66	0.001 **
Legal Aspects	0.48	0.001 **
Israeli occupation and its impact on the activities and roles of the organizations	-0.07	/ / 0.51

** P-value <0.01 * p-value <0.05 / / p-value> 0.05

From the results described in the previous table one can say that: First, there is a positive statistically significant relationship between the total degree and the domain of management in the organization (R = 0.33, p-value <0.01), this indicates that the more knowledge of the beneficiaries about management of organizations leading to increase the total knowledge of organizations and vice versa. Second, there is a positive statistically significant relationship between the total degree of the beneficiaries and strategic planning (r = 0.37, p-value <0.01), ie, the greater the knowledge of the beneficiaries about strategic planning leading to increase the total knowledge about the organizations and work and vice versa.

In addition, there is a positive statistically significant relationship between the total degree of the beneficiaries and the finance domain (r = 0.55, p-value <0.01), this shows that the more knowledge of the beneficiaries about organizations finance leading to increase in the total knowledge about the and vice versa. And, there is a positive statistically significant relationship between the total degree of the beneficiaries and the leadership and decision-making domain (r = 0.50, p-value <0.01), this shows that the more knowledge of the beneficiaries

about organizations leadership and decision-making leading to increase in the total knowledge about the organizations and vice versa.

Furthermore the results show that: First, there is a positive statistically significant relationship between the total degree of the beneficiaries and the fundraising domain ($r = 0.44$, p-value <0.01), this shows that the more knowledge of the beneficiaries about fundraising in the organizations leading to increase in the total knowledge about the organizations and vice versa. Second, there is a positive statistically significant relationship between the total degree of the beneficiaries and the project management domain ($r = 0.63$, p-value <0.01), this shows that the more knowledge of the beneficiaries about project management in the organizations leading to increase in the total knowledge about the organizations and vice versa. Third, there is a positive statistically significant relationship between the total degree of the beneficiaries and the public relations and sources of evaluation domain ($r = 0.45$, p-value <0.01), this shows that the more knowledge of the beneficiaries about public relations and sources of evaluation in the organizations leading to increase in the total knowledge about the organizations and vice versa.

Finally the table shows that: First, there is a positive statistically significant relationship between the total degree of the beneficiaries and the organizational values and ethics domain ($r = 0.66$, p-value <0.01), this shows that the more knowledge of the beneficiaries about organizational values and ethics in the organizations leading to increase in the total knowledge about the organizations and vice versa. Second, there is a positive statistically significant relationship between the total degree of the beneficiaries and the legal aspects domain ($r = 0.48$, p-value <0.01), this shows that the more knowledge of the beneficiaries about legal aspects in the organizations leading to increase in the total knowledge about the organizations and vice versa. Third, there is no statistically significant relationship between the total degree of the beneficiaries and the Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of the organizations domain ($r = -0.07$, p-value >0.05.

5.3.2 The second hypothesis: There are no statistically significant variances in knowledge of the beneficiaries about the domains of management of the nine organizations according to beneficiary's place of residence.

To verify this, the (One-Way ANOVA) analysis has been done to study the variances between beneficiaries' places of residence (north Gaza - Gaza – Middle area - Khan Yunis - Rafah) and the domains of beneficiaries' knowledge of organizations, the results shown in the following table:

Table (17): (One-Way ANOVA) Analysis in the domains of beneficiaries' knowledgement according to beneficiaries' place of residence

Factor	Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Management in the organization	Between Groups	12.4	4	3.09	4.21	0.01 **
	Within Groups	69.7	5	0.73		
	Total	82.1	9			
Strategic Planning	Between Groups	69.8	4	17:44	2.60	0.04 *
	Within Groups	637.3	5	6.71		
	Total	707.1	9			
Finance	Between Groups	82.3	4	20:58	2.90	0.03 *
	Within Groups	673.3	5	7.09		
	Total	755.7	9			
Leadership and decision-making	Between Groups	30.7	4	7.66	1.27	0.29 / /
	Within Groups	571.2	5	6.01		
	Total	601.9	9			
Fundraising	Between Groups	63.8	4	15.95	2.39	0.06 / /
	Within Groups	634.9	5	6.68		

	Total	698.7	9			
Project Management	Between Groups	513.7	4	128.41	5.21	0.01 **
	Within Groups	2340.7	5	24.64		
	Total	2854.3	9			
Public relations and sources of evaluation	Between Groups	36.4	4	9.11	1.86	/ / 0.12
	Within Groups	464.5	5	4.89		
	Total	500.9	9			
Organizational values and ethics	Between Groups	106.6	4	26.64	3:32	0.01 **
	Within Groups	190.0	5	2.00		
	Total	296.6	9			
Legal Aspects	Between Groups	15.7	4	3.92	6.46	0.01 **
	Within Groups	57.6	5	0.61		
	Total	73.3	9			
Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of the organizations	Between Groups	305.8	4	76.45	5.17	0.01 **
	Within Groups	1403.5	5	14.77		
	Total	1709.3	9			
Total degree	Between Groups	1998.8	4	499.71	4.92	0.01 **
	Within Groups	9645.3	5	101.53		
	Total	11644.2	9			

** P-value <0.01 * p-value <0.05 / / p-value> 0.05

The results described in the previous table one can say that: there is a statistically significant variance between the beneficiaries' place of residence and the total degree of management in the organizations and their activities. To know

the variances between the place of residence, the post hoc LSD test has been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was observed that beneficiaries who live in Khan Yunis, believe that they know about the organizations management less than beneficiaries who live in the following governorates (North Gaza, Gaza, Middle area, Rafah), while the beneficiaries who live in Rafah have greater knowledge of the work of organizations than beneficiaries who live in north Gaza and Rafah. These differences are statistically significant, so we conclude that the place of residence has a substantial impact on the beneficiaries to know the nature of the work of the organizations that benefit from. The details will be at the end of the chapter.

4-Table (18) the results of the post hoc LSD test between different places of residence of beneficiaries to domains of beneficiary's knowledge about the organizations management

	Place of residence	Mean	North	Gaza	Central	Khan Yunis	Rafah
Management in the organization	North	4.9	1	0.12	0.72	0.001 **	0.001 **
	Gaza	5.3		1	0.38	0.09	* 0.04
	Central	5.0			1	* 0.02	0.01 **
	Khan Yunis	5.8				1	0.64
	Rafah	6.0					1
Strategic Planning	North	13.0	1	0.46	* 0.05	0.74	* 0.03
	Gaza	12.5		1	* 0.02	0.42	0.01 **
	Central	14.5			1	0.25	0.50
	Khan Yunis	13.3				1	0.12
	Rafah	15.3					1

Finance	North	3.4	1	* 0.03	0.42	0.18	0.20
	Gaza	4.9		1	* 0.02	0.01 **	0.96
	Central	2.8			1	0.58	0.09
	Khan Yunis	2.2				1	* 0.05
	Rafah	4.9					1
Project management	North	41.7	1	0.76	0.38	0.001 **	0.52
	Gaza	41.3		1	0.58	0.001 **	0.43
	Central	40.4			1	0.001 **	0.26
	Khan Yunis	34.2				1	0.001 **
	Rafah	43.0					1
Organizational values and principles	North	6.3	1	0.53	* 0.04	0.001 **	0.06
	Gaza	6.5		1	0.16	0.001 **	0.15
	Central	7.2			1	0.001 **	0.72
	Khan Yunis	3.4				1	0.001 **
	Rafah	7.4					1
Legal Aspects	North	11.5	1	0.35	0.60	0.001 **	0.10
	Gaza	11.3		1	0.23	0.001 **	* 0.04
	Central	11.6			1	0.001 **	0.26
	Khan Yunis	10.3				1	0.001 **
	Rafah	12.0					1
Israeli occupation and its impact on the activity and the role of organizations	North	19.9	1	0. 001 **	0.15	0.49	0.001 **
	Gaza	16.7		1	0.24	0.01 **	0.27

	Central	18.2			1	0.10	0.06
	Khan Yunis	20.8				1	0.001 **
	Rafah	14.9					1
Total	North	1 42.3	1	0.61	0.89	0.001 **	* 0.04
	Gaza	1 41.0		1	0.61	0.001 **	* 0.02
	Central	1 42.7			1	0.001 **	0.08
	Khan Yunis	1 30.0				1	0.001 **
	Rafah	1 50.9					1

** P-value <0.01 * P-value <0.05 / / P-value> 0.05


5. 5 Correlate between factor and total

Table (19)

Correlate

Total	The factors
.350	NGOs Basic Information
.501**	Strategic Planning
.359**	Finance
.528**	The Effective leadership and Decision-Making Process
.530**	Fundraising
.740**	Project Management
.486**	Public Relations and Sources of Evaluation
.519**	NGOs Values and ethics
.397**	Legal Aspects
.243*	Israeli occupation and its impact on the activity and the role of the NGOs

Scatter plot



5.6 Relative weight of the paragraphs

5.6.1 NGOs Basic Information

Table (19)

	Mean	Std. deviation.	Percent	Rank
1 - Is it easy to reach to the NGO	2.96	0.28	0.986	1
2 – Is the work hours of the NGO well Known?	2.94	0.34	0.98	2
3 – Is there a mailing address for the NGO?	2.34	0.77	0.78	3

5.6.2: Strategic Planning

Table (20)

	Mean	Std. deviation.	Percent	Rank
1 – Does the NGO have written vision and mission?	2.87	0.39	0.97	1

2 – Does the NGO have a written plan for next year?	2.32	0.64	0.77	9
4 – Did beneficiaries and workers participate in the planning process?	2.62	0.68	0.87	5
5 – Does the NGO have a written plan for the coming three or five years?	2.57	0.62	0.86	6
6 – Are the plans contain: What will be achieved?	2.33	0.8	0.78	8
To whom?	2.63	0.69	0.88	4
From Who?	2.87	0.34	0.96	2
When?	2.65	0.56	0.89	3
How?	2.62	0.65	0.86	7

5.6.3 Finance

Table (21)

	Mean	Std. deviation.	Percent	Rank
1 – Is there a bank account for the NGO?	2.68	0.53	0.89	
2 - Have you seen the draft budget for the NGO?	2.21	0.61	0.74	
3 - Is the draft budget accessible for you?	2.12	0.64	0.71	
4 - Are the financial reports accessible for you?	2.28	0.61	0.76	

5.6.4: The Effective leadership and Decision-Making Process

Table (22)

	Mean	Std. deviation.	Percent	Rank
1 – Is the Management Team capable of leading the staff to work on the same goals?	2.93	0.33	0.98	1
2 – Does the management Team give you tasks and make sure of completion?	2.87	0.44	0.96	3
3 - Do they ask for your participation in the planning process?	2.44	0.84	0.81	7
4 – Can you raise suggestions and queries?	2.9	0.36	0.97	2
5 - Do you know who decides on all issues?	2.41	0.83	0.8	8

6 - Do you know who is going to do this or that?	2.3	0.77	0.77	9
7 - Do you know where to go when there is a dispute?	2.78	0.58	0.93	5
8 - Do you know about the work through reports or meetings?	2.74	0.66	0.91	6
9 – Does the Management Team train you on necessary skills?	2.81	0.56	0.94	4

5.6.5: Fundraising

Table (23)

	Mean	Std. deviation.	Percent	rank
1 - Do you know who is responsible for fundraising?	2.73	0.65	0.91	4
2 - Do you know if he can make good public relations?	2.73	0.65	0.91	1
3 - Does the NGO try to diversify its sources of funding?	2.7	0.64	0.9	2
4 - Do you participate in the preparation of project proposals?	2.27	0.74	0.76	7
5 - Does the NGO adopt a self-financing mechanism?	2.34	0.81	0.78	6
6 – Does all sources of funding are well- known?	2.2	0.78	0.73	8
7 – Does NGO develop their sources of funding?	2.7	0.64	0.9	3
8 – Is the NGO look for local sources?	2.42	0.87	0.81	5

5.6.6: Project Management

Table (24)

	Mean	Std. deviation.	Percent	Rank
1 – Do you think if the project objectives help to achieve the overall objectives?	2.76	0.64	0.92	6
2 – Do you believe that the project objectives: a. clear?	2.68	0.71	0.89	3

b.. Quantifiable? c. achievable?	2.46	0.85	0.82	8
	2.59	0.78	0.86	5
3 – Does the NGO draw a plan of action to achieve the objectives of the projects one after the other?	2.51	0.83	0.84	7
4 – Does the NGO requests your participation in the implementation and plan of actions of the projects?	2.46	0.85	0.82	9
5 – Does the plan clearly identify: a. Who will do that? b. When? c. Where?	2.69	0.68	0.9	0
6 – Does the NGO consider your recourses and its resources to start the projects?	2.69	0.65	0.9	1
7 – Do you the staff prepare accurate progress reports?	2.42	0.88	0.81	1
8 – Do you discuss the problems that occur during the project implementation?	2.72	0.7	0.91	9
9 – Is the evaluation, part of action plan?	2.68	0.72	0.89	4
10 – Does the NGO consider who will benefit from the projects?	2.93	0.29	0.98	1
11 – Does the NGO use monitoring and evaluation to develop and modify projects?	2.77	0.62	0.92	7
12 – Does the NGO study the community needs before finalizing project proposal?	2.55	0.82	0.85	6
13 – Are you part of the setting of priorities and the preparation of project proposals?	2.69	0.68	0.9	2
14 – Do you prepare with the NGO a plan to assure of continuity of the NGO projects?	2.47	0.77	0.82	0
15 – Do you have access to the NGO periodic reports on the achievements in comparison with the plan?	2.4	0.84	0.8	2
16 – Has the NGO failed in the achievement of any specific objective?	2.07	0.67	0.69	4
If the answer is yes, did they discuss reasons for the failure?	2.28	0.66	0.76	3
17 – Does the NGO examine the problems they faced to find solutions at the proper time?	2.76	0.59	0.92	8
18 – Does the NGO examine whether the project has achieved its objectives or	2.81	0.54	0.94	3

not?				
19 – Does the NGO consider the lessons learned for future?	2.9	0.44	0.97	2
20 – Does the evaluation examine how the results of the projects would help in achieving the goals of the NGO?	2.8	0.6	0.93	4
21 – Does the NGO evaluate the objectives and work plans through the monitoring and evaluation process?	2.78	0.63	0.93	5

5.6.7 Public Relations and Sources of Evaluation

Table (25)

	Mean	Std. deviation.	Percent	Rank
1 – Do you have good relations with NGOs?	2.34	0.95	0.78	7
2 - Is there a relationship between the local and international NGOs working in your region?	2.6	0.8	0.87	3
3- Does the Palestinian National Authority:	2.47	0.85	0.82	6
4 - Does Hamas Government in Gaza :	1.73	0.88	0.58	10
5 -Does the NGOs have relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council?	1.71	0.66	0.57	1
6 – Do you know the objectives and activities of the NGO?	2.68	0.69	0.89	2
7 – Does NGO try to put influence on your decisions?	2.03	0.48	0.68	8
8 - Does the NGO try to develop work relations with other NGO?	2.52	0.86	0.84	4
9 – Do you benefit from training offered by NGOs?	2.93	0.36	0.98	1
10 - Do you get advertising and promotional pamphlets on the NGO activities?	2.48	0.83	0.83	5
11 –Does the NGOs try to influence the activities and decisions of the government?	1.76	0.73	0.59	9

5.6.8 NGOs Values and ethics

Table (26)

	Mean	Std. deviation.	Percent	Rank
1 - Are the board of directors, the members and beneficiaries participate in determining the value and ethics of the NGO?	2.85	0.5	0.95	2
2 - Did you discuss the values of the NGO with the board of directories?	2.36	0.7	0.96	1
3 –Does the NGO have a written value and ethics?	2.36	0.85	0.8	3
4 – During the planning process, Is the value of the NGO taken into account?	2.87	0.44	0.79	4

5.6.9 Legal Aspects

Table (27)

	Mean	Std. deviation.	Percent	Rank
1- Does the NGO have internal bylaws?	2.99	0.1	1	1
2 - Do you know if there is an official registration for the NGO?	2.98	0.14	0.99	3
3 – Does the NGO use its internal bylaws?	2.92	0.39	0.97	4
4 - Does the NGO have a Board of directors?	3	0	1	2
5 – Does the functions and role of board of directories clear?	2.9	0.36	0.97	5
6 – Do you have relationship with board of directories?	2.34	0.92	0.78	6

5.6.10: Israeli occupation and its impact on the activity and the role of the NGOs

Table (28)

	Mean	Std. deviation.	Percent	Rank
1 - Do you think there are obstacles caused by the Israeli Occupation?	2.88	0.48	0.96	1
2 - Do you think activities and programs of NGOs affected by the Israeli occupation?	2.7	0.66	0.9	4
3 – Do policies and strategies of the Israeli occupation affect the NGOs?	2.75	0.63	0.92	3

4 - Does the Israeli occupation intervene directly or indirectly in the NGOs affairs?	2.26	0.81	0.75	10
5 – Does the Israeli occupation affect free movement of NGOs staff?	2.65	0.66	0.88	6
6 - Does the Israeli occupation prevent the implementation of the NGO programs or projects?	2.69	0.68	0.9	5
7 – Does the Israeli occupation delay the implementation of some programs or projects?	2.55	0.8	0.85	7
8 - Does the Israeli occupation intervene in defining programs or projects?	2.05	0.61	0.68	2
9 – Does the Israeli occupation affect NGOs fundraising?	2.54	0.76	0.85	8
10 - Do you think the Israeli occupation has an influence on donors to fund or not certain NGOs?	2.36	0.83	0.79	9
11 - Do you think the Israeli occupation intervene in determining the policy of donors' countries?	2.18	0.91	0.73	1
12 – Does Israeli blockade have negative impact on NGOs activities?	2.86	0.51	0.95	2

5.7 Test questions and hypotheses

1-Level of education and total of the factor

Are there significant differences between the total (the beneficiaries of the activities and programs of institutions) and the level of education?

ANOVA					
	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2723.818	2	1361.909	4.856	.010
Within Groups	27204.372	97	280.457		
Total	29928.190	99			

In examining the test shows us that there are statistical differences between the total (the beneficiaries of the activities and programs of institutions) and educational level of significance level was greeted less than 0.05.

In a study for any level of education the differences proved it was followed by the secondary school's undergraduate.

Descriptive			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Secondary	64	238.4844	17.85123
Diploma	16	226.6875	12.26767
University	20	228.4500	16.01143
Total	100	234.5900	17.38692

2-Governorate and total of the factor

Are there significant differences between the total (the beneficiaries of the activities and programs of institutions) and between place of residence?

ANOVA					
	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	5294.642	4	1323.660	5.105	.001
Within Groups	24633.548	95	259.301		
Total	29928.190	99			

In examining the test shows us that there are statistical differences between the total (the beneficiaries of the activities and programs of institutions) and between places of residence was greeted significance level less than 0.05.

In a study for any residential area, the differences proved it was followed by the population of Rafah residents of the north.

Descriptive			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Gaza north	44	237.5455	16.66420
Gaza	24	229.3750	13.19029
Central Region	15	237.2000	14.07734
Khan younis	10	219.1000	17.43209
Rafah	7	250.4286	23.02793
Total	100	234.5900	17.38692

The results show that, there is a statistically significant difference between the beneficiaries' place of residence to the total degree of management in the organizations. To know the variances between the place of residence, the post hoc LSD test has been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was observed that beneficiaries who live in Khan Yunis, know about management in the organizations less than beneficiaries who live in governorates of North Gaza and Middle area, while the beneficiaries who live in Rafah have greater knowledge of management in the organizations than beneficiaries who live in north Gaza, Gaza and Middle area. These differences are statistically significant, while there is no variance between the other governorates, this indicate that the place of residence has impact on the beneficiaries knowledge about the management of the organizations that benefit from.

Furthermore, there is a statistically significant variance between the beneficiaries' place of residence to the total degree of strategic planning. To find out the variances between the place of residence, the post hoc LSD test has been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was observed that beneficiaries who live in the Middle area and Rafah, know about strategic planning more than beneficiaries who live in governorates of North Gaza and Gaza. These variances are statistically significant, while there is no variance between the other governorates, this indicate that the place of residence has a substantial impact on the beneficiaries knowledge about the strategic planning of the organizations that benefit from.

Also, there is a statistically significant variance between the beneficiaries' place of residence and the total degree of Finance. To find out the differences between the place of residence, the post hoc LSD test has been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was observed that beneficiaries who live in Gaza, know about Finance less than beneficiaries who live in governorates of North Gaza and Middle area, and beneficiaries who live in Rafah and Gaza, know about Finance more than beneficiaries who live in Khan Yunis. These variances are statistically significant, while there is no variance between the other governorates, this indicate that the place of residence has a substantial impact on

the beneficiaries knowledge about the Finance of the organizations that benefit from.

Moreover, there is a statistically significant variance between the beneficiaries' place of residence and the total degree of Project management. To find out the variances between the places of residence, the post hoc LSD test has been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was observed that beneficiaries who live in Khan Yunis, know about Project management less than beneficiaries who live in governorates of North Gaza, Gaza, Middle area and Rafah. These variances are statistically significant, while there is no variance between the other governorates, this indicate that the place of residence has a substantial impact on the beneficiaries knowledge about the Project management of the organizations that benefit from.

As well, there is a statistically significant variance between the beneficiaries' place of residence and the total degree of Organizational values and ethics. To find out the variances between the place of residence, the post hoc LSD test has been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was observed that beneficiaries who live in Khan Yunis, know about Organizational values and ethics less than beneficiaries who live in governorates of North Gaza, Gaza, Middle area and Rafah, and beneficiaries who live in Middle area, know about Organizational values and ethics less than beneficiaries who live in north Gaza. These variances are statistically significant, while there is no variance between the other governorates, this indicate that the place of residence has impact on the beneficiaries knowledge about the Organizational values and ethics in the organizations that benefit from.

Besides, there is a statistically significant variance between the beneficiaries' place of residence and the total degree of Legal aspects. To find out the variances between the place of residence, the post hoc LSD test has been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was observed that beneficiaries who live in Khan Yunis, know about Legal aspects less than beneficiaries who live in governorates of North Gaza, Gaza, Middle area and Rafah, and beneficiaries who live in Rafah, know about Legal aspects more than beneficiaries who live in Gaza.

These differences are statistically significant, while there is no variance between the other governorates, this indicate that the place of residence has impact on the beneficiaries knowledge about the Legal aspects in the organizations that benefit from.

Finally, there is a statistically significant variance between the beneficiaries' place of residence to the total degree of Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and role of the organizations. To find out the variances between the place of residence, LSD test has been done in the case of homogeneity of variance, it was observed that beneficiaries who live in Khan Yunis, think that Israeli occupation has impact on activities and role of the organizations less than beneficiaries who live in Gaza, and beneficiaries who live in Rafah, think that Israeli occupation has impact on activities and role of the organizations more than beneficiaries who live in north Gaza and Khan Yunis, while beneficiaries who live in Gaza, think that Israeli occupation has impact on activities and role of the organizations more than beneficiaries who live in north Gaza. These variances are statistically significant, while there is no variance between the other governorates, this indicate that the place of residence has impact on the beneficiaries opinion about the Israeli occupation and its impact on activities and roles of the organizations that benefit from.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

> "*The cycle can be broken only through comprehensive political initiatives rather than piecemeal economic ones*." Sara Roy[380]

My dissertation is thus divided into two main parts. The first part, comprised of chapters 2 and 3, focuses on the larger history in which the activities of Palestinian civil society and NGO are embedded. Chapter 2 provides a general, economic and political historical background on Palestine, examines the change in, and impact of, Israeli occupation on the occupied territories at various junctures. Chapter 3 provides a brief history of civil society, examines the contribution of Palestinian NGOs to economic development, and scrutinizes their operation during the First and the Second Intifada, under Israeli occupation and after the victory of the Hamas during the 2006 elections. It also analyzes the relationships Palestinian NGOs have with civil society at large in Palestine, with other NGOs worldwide, with the donors and, finally, with the Palestinian National Authority and Hamas led government.

The second part of our dissertation is composed of chapters 4 and 5, and it investigates the broad context in which NGOs operate actually in Palestine on the basis of empirical surveys. Chapter 4 analyzes the answers to the survey submitted to the board of directors and management team of the NGOs with the help of tables and diagrams synthesizing their answers. Chapter 5 analyzes the results of the survey submitted to the beneficiaries of the activities of NGOs here again with the help of tables and diagrams synthesizing the results. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with a series of recommendations to NGOs on how to improve their adaptability to changing circumstances and constraints and with an examination of the role NGOs should play in the future in order to contribute to a healthy civil society and to effective state-building in Palestine.

[380] Roy (2007), p. 332

Throughout the previous chapters, this thesis has aimed at providing the background on the economic and political situation in Palestine as well as general information on civil society and NGOs in theory and in practice. We also proceeded to an analysis of the condition and situation of civil society, including NGOs, in Palestine since the 1920s with an emphasis on the period marked by Israeli military occupation. A recent HRW Report covering this period reveals that "discriminatory Israeli policies control many aspects of the day-to-day life of Palestinians who live in areas under exclusive Israeli control and that those policies often have no conceivable security justification."[381] We then studied the so-called Oslo period and the establishment of the PNA till the Camp David gathering and the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the redeployment from Gaza, and ended with the Hamas gaining control.

Sixty-five years after the United Nations Partition Plan put an end to the British Mandate for Palestine and advocated the creation of an independent Arab and Jewish state, respectively, as a solution to the conflict in historic Palestine, this conflict still shows no tangible sign of appeasement. Decades of conferences, accords, and desperate diplomacy have failed to generate a fair, peaceful and viable two-state solution. In particular, the plight and nightmare of the Palestinians continue on the ground daily. What comprises their daily landscape is: the demolition of houses and the displacement of families – that reached a record number in 2011 -; blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip; limited jurisdiction of the Palestinian National Authority over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; daily humiliations and harassments at checkpoints; no free circulation of persons and goods; the construction of a wall that segregates Palestinians from the Israelis, an Israeli settlement and expansionist policy that continues unabated and thus eliminates the land base for a viable Palestinian state, a hideous system of Israeli laws that discriminates against Palestinians inside Israel and in the occupied territories and the very fragmentation of the occupied territories into ghettos and bantoustans, all of which reminded Archbishop Desmond Tutu upon a visit to Israel and Palestine of what happened to black people in South Africa during the apartheid era.

Impatience with the lasting stalemate in *bilateral* negotiations with Israel and concern about the worsening conditions of Palestinians in the occupied territories may

[381] HRW Report (2010), p. 2, accessible at: hrw.org

be two of the reasons that urged the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to pursue the *multilateral* United Nations option. In this vein, he put the case for Palestinian statehood within the borders that existed before the Six Day War in 1967 at the 66th session of the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2011. In an op-ed in the *New York Times* published prior to his UN speech, President Abbas wrote that Palestine meets "all prerequisites to statehood listed in the Montevideo Convention, the 1933 treaty that sets out the rights and duties of states". In his UN speech itself, President Abbas fit his bid for recognition of a Palestinian state within the larger framework of the Arab Spring, the popular upheaval and dramatic political changes that had swept the Arab region earlier in 2011, and said: "the Arab Spring must be followed by the Palestinian Spring." However, as expected, the United States opposed President Abbas's resolution. While acknowledging that "the Palestinian people deserve a state of their own", American President Barack Obama added that "no vote at the United Nations will ever create an Independent Palestinian state." His remarks were a clear invitation to both Israel and Palestine to return to the negotiating table and make progress towards a two-state solution.

The crux of the problem for Palestinians remains the occupation, and in this vein, Roy (2007) concludes that "in the end the only solution to the conflict lies in restoring what has been lost to both peoples—human dignity. And the only way to do that is to end the occupation and recreate the ordinary so that both Palestinians and Israelis can lead a normal life."[382] It is widely acknowledged that Israel's settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, violate international humanitarian law that prohibits the occupying power from transferring its civilian population into the territories it occupies. Israel appears to be the only country to contest the illegality of its settlements. Human Rights Watch continues to agree with the nearly universal position that Israel should cease its violation of international humanitarian law by removing its citizens from the West Bank.[383]

The socio-economical and political impact of the Occupation's policies and strategies as described in our thesis underlines the sustained centrality of

[382] Roy (2007)
[383] HRW Report (2010)

Israeli policies in separating the people and communities and in establishing buffer zones through settlements, the Apartheid Wall and checkpoints. Furthermore, these policies have drastic consequences on the formative economic growth rates, labor market circumstances and conditions, the terms of trade, and the living conditions of families in the POTs in the short- and medium-term. These policies also highlight the linkages between the Palestinian and Israeli economies and, in particular, the much more vulnerable position of the former with respect to the latter. For Ali (1998), the simple truth is that Oslo and the illusion of peace made the world forget about Israeli violations of human rights in occupied Palestine. People have forgotten that Israel still exercises direct military occupation in 73% of the West Bank and 40% of the Gaza Strip, that it maintains security control over an additional 24% of the West Bank, and suffocates the remaining 3% through closures. By any empirical standard, Palestinian living conditions are much worse now than before the so-called peace process as a direct result of Israeli policies during the past five years[384].

The restrictions imposed on the commercial crossing points between the West Bank and Israel have critically impaired trade ties between Palestinian importers and exporters and the rest of the world. The restrictions also affect manufacturers who rely on imported raw materials. The harm is especially serious in light of the dependence of the Palestinian economy on foreign trade, which constitutes about 80 percent of its Gross Domestic Product. The closing of the crossings also harms internal trade between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Palestinian persons and goods are refused entry inside the Green Line, or exit from the confines of the POTs. Mobility within Palestinian-controlled areas has also been curtailed. If damage to physical assets and human lives were added, the losses would be still higher. According to reports that provide estimates of the impact of the restrictions, approximately 21 percent of Palestinians lived below the poverty line – that is, with $2 per day or less - before the Second Intifada, and by the end of 2002, this figure had increased to 60 percent.

[384] Ali (1998)

Further, the occupation still controls all kinds of movements in and out of the Gaza Strip, including imports and exports. Gaza's foreign trade is almost exclusively with the Occupation or is conducted via the Occupation's ports. Since the takeover of Gaza by the Hamas in June 2007, the Gaza Strip has been under total blockade. The Occupation changed the crossing arrangements at the five border crossings under its control (Beit Hanoun, Al Montar, Shajaiaa, El Qarar, and Karm Abu Salem) and, except for a few cases, does not allow persons or goods to cross between Gaza and the Green Line. The Al Montar Crossing, also known as "Gaza's lifeline" and through which most of the goods coming into or leaving Gaza pass, is almost completely closed, thereby paralyzing many trade sectors and generating growing economic crises.[385] The restrictions on the movement of workers and goods are sweeping and indefinite in duration. Because of the severe consequences on the Palestinian people, this strategy breaches a variety of rights that the Occupation must respect under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: the right to gain a livelihood, the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate nutrition, clothing, and housing, and the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.[386]

In the context of the Jewish-Arab conflict over Palestine, places and place-names have acquired great significance in all efforts to legitimize particular historical rights to the land. The ability of conferring names to given places serves as one of the most telling indicators of political and cultural power.[387] The road to Oslo started with the first waves of Zionist settlement in the 1880s and spans over

[385]http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Economy.asp
[386]http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Economy.asp
[387] Benvenisti, 2000, esp. ch. 1; Enderwits (2002), ch. 4; Khalidi (1997), ch. 2 highlights different usages not only between Jews and Arabs, but also between Muslim and Christian Arabs with a different approach. See also Lewis (1980); Biger (1990), pp. 2-4; Biger (2004), ch. 1. For the role of archaeology in this competition over historical rights and political claims, see also Silberman (1989), *Between Past and Present: Archeology, Ideology and Nationalism in the Modern Middle East*, (New York) and El-Haj (2002), *Archeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society*, Chicago.

more than a century of struggle. It has been a history of limited successes and major defeats. In his book about the 1936-1939 revolt, Kanafani wrote that "in the whole history of Palestinian struggle, the armed popular revolt was never closer to victory that in the months between the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1939."[388] Palestinian demands and expectations increasingly grew more modest as time went by: from an attempt to retrieve the whole of a lost Palestine to a democratic State for Palestinians and Jews, to the two-State solution, to a limited autonomy under the Oslo Accords, with further negotiations presaging a bleak future for Palestinians. The delusion of endurance of settler regimes turned out to be less illusory, at least in Palestine, than many aspirations and hopes in the early 1970s. "The systematic violence against the people and their land is clearly a strategy to deprive Palestinians of their lands and to wipe out their culture, geography, identity, society and history, indeed their existence."[389] Yet, the more proximate factors that made the Oslo Accords possible began, paradoxically, with the consequences of the Palestinian Intifada in the 1987.

A letter to the editor of the Consumer Association of Penang in June 2010 stated that "Israel continues to expand settlements in the POTs which is illegal under International Law. It has built a separation wall inside Palestinian land which is illegal and immoral according to the International Court of Justice."[390] The continuing Israeli occupation, even after the Oslo agreements, was the underlying cause of the Second Intifada. Palestinians had thought that the 1993 Oslo agreement would lead to better lives, greater freedoms, the end of Israeli control, and, at the end of five years (in other words, in 1998), to Palestinian statehood. Oslo was thought to entail the end of Israeli occupation and the start of Palestinian self-determination. Because of the deeply-flawed, enormously conflicting so-called peace process initiated at Oslo, to which must be added the daily frustrations and humiliations inflicted upon Palestinians in the occupied territories, Palestinians in the POTs converged in late September 2000 to

[388] Kanafani (1970), *The 1936-1939 Revolt in Palestine*, Arab Institute of Studies and Publications, Beirut. See also Newjerseysolidarty.org

[389] www.consumer.org

[390] Letter to the editor, June 12, 2010, Consumer Association of Penang, "Why We Need to Support Palestine". Accessible at: www.consumer.org

add fuel to the fire of the Second Intifada that had started. When such changes failed to materialize and when the situation on the ground worsened in many ways in the mid- and late 1990s, many Palestinians started to believe that the diplomatic process was a dead end and only renewed confrontation was the alternative. This dynamic explains much of the popular support for the Second Intifada.[391] Said believes that " [p]eace can come only after the occupations ends"[392]. And Nazzal (2005) concludes by saying: "A Democratic Palestine for all is the only solution that can stop the cycle of violence in the region."[393]

Since 1967, when it seized the West Bank from Jordan during hostilities - and under a variety of governments since the right-wing Likud Party first came to power in 1977 -, Israel has expropriated land from Palestinians for Jewish-Israeli settlements and their supporting infrastructure, has denied Palestinians building permits and demolished "illegal" Palestinian constructions.[394] Yet, during the interim period of the Oslo process, the socio-economic situation has deteriorated dramatically in all aspects of people's life. In addition, the key sources of economic growth and development, particularly in the Gaza Strip, were non-productive and therefore unsustainable over the long-term. Under Israeli occupation and after the redeployment and the blockade, the Gaza Strip remained one of the most impoverished parts of the world.

As the thesis and the reality on the ground make clear, the Palestinian political field differs from that in most other parts of the world in that it includes Palestinian communities with differing socioeconomic, State, and civil society structures. This is true not only in historic Palestine (the 1967 occupied territories and Israel), but also in the Diaspora (*al-shatat*) created by the 1948 Catastrophe (the *Nakba*).[395] Concerning the 1948 and 1967 wars, the Palestinian society in the

[391] Pressman (2003), "The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *Journal of Palestine Study*, p. 118
[392] Said (2002), "A New Current in Palestine", www.thenation.com
[393] Nazzal (2006), "Commemorating the Nakhba: A Democratic Palestine for All the Only Viable Solution," May 17, accessed at: http://www.aljazeerah.info/
[394] HRW Report 2010
[395] Hilal (2010), p. 24

POTs entered a new stage made of the following developments: extreme and sweeping demographic changes measured in terms of hundreds of thousands of displacements and refugees, and forcible occupation of the POTs by Israel. Due to these developments, a new phase of struggle began in order to reorganize the Palestinian population and place it in a position where it was capable of asserting its national rights and was better equipped to fight against the occupation. The main protagonists in this process were political factions and unions until the late 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. In the aftermath of 1982 war in Lebanon, the PLO focused on the POTs as the only available sphere of engagement with the occupation. Political factions began to enhance their activism and mobilization, and this led to the establishment of grassroots structures, which constituted the origin of many current NGOs. Student unions also became very active at that time and organized elections as an integral tool of social mobilization. These sectors of Palestinian civil society performed remarkably during this period. They were also formed outside the national territory not by a State, but by national liberation movements and political factions that emerged in the Palestinian Diasporas. From the outset, then, and in the absence of a sovereign State, the Palestinian political field was subject to powerful outside influences and pressures.

Sanctions generally do not work in Gaza. The occupation-imposed blockade and isolation have not made a dent in Hamas' control that has only grown in the years since the blockade was imposed. Actually, it has provided the Hamas with extra revenue: the governing party is indeed collecting taxes on goods smuggled through underground tunnels straddling the Egypt-Gaza border. After three years of siege and a three-week war of incursion and bombardment during 2008-2009 - following which Gazans have been unable to rebuild because of restrictions on the importation of building materials -, Gaza is completely devastated. Hamid (2010) states that since Israel's winter assault, Gazans have lost access to about 46 percent of their agricultural land - either because of the destruction caused by the Israeli bombardment or because Israel does not allow them to cultivate the land labeled as a "buffer zone." Many fishermen in this

coastal territory have lost their livelihoods as the area in which they are allowed to fish is greatly limited and they frequently come under fire from Israeli patrols.[396]

Behind the veil of blockade and closure, the prospects for economic development in the short- and medium-term are bleak. International funds will, undoubtedly, flow for limited purposes, and bilateral and multilateral capital will continue to be injected into infrastructure projects and relief services as opposed to human resource development, which is Palestine's primary, if not only, asset. Furthermore, being given the uncertainty created by the political situation and the blockade and closure, private Palestinian investment turned out to be much inferior to predicted. Moreover, private capital that has been invested appears to have gone into projects where investors enjoy either an assured monopolistic control (for example, telecommunications) and/or a guaranteed profitable return (for example, housing). Such investments, however, do little to strengthen the productive sectors of the economy or to encourage economic reform.

Development in the POTs will eventually depend not on better sewage systems and increased water use, although these are important, but on the free will and the ability of Palestinians to plan their future autonomously and put their plans into practice. Under the terms of the DP and of the interim agreement, they have no such freedom. The corrupt practices of the PNA worsen existing troubles and impose new constraints. There are clear imperatives for the POTs. First, at the economic level, there is a desperate need of generating direct and sustainable employment followed by economic restructuring, particularly as regards the development of Palestinian industry and agriculture. Second, at the political level, the Israeli occupation government must end the blockade and closure and the PNA must strive to reform its existing anti-democratic government. The sort of pressure needed can only come from people and the international community, particularly, the United Nations, the US and the European Union. At the social level, there is a desperate need of investing in human capital through training, education and health. More attention needs to be directed to restoring the place of the family and the community through focused community and grassroots development programs.

[396] Bayan (2010), www.merp.org

Economic development in the POTs depends upon the following: mainly, external and internal political stability; withdrawal of the military occupation; having lasting peace before, as Roy mentioned, and then, the rule of law; a friendly financial and business environment; better economic infrastructure; standard access to markets and resources farther than a country's borders, a well-functioning educational and health system that generates and sustains a productive workforce and population. Unfortunately, in the POTs today, few, if any, of these conditions obtain. Regrettably and maybe paradoxically, economic conditions have never been more sensitive and the forecast for positive change bleaker. Last but not least in this regard, throughout more than 17 years of a devastating general and partial closure, and blockade, the PNA never appears to have campaigned seriously to put an end to these practices; the best it did was to complain about its economic losses and the inhuman situation.

The worsening state of affairs in the POTs has increased the concern at the internal level regarding a genuine and comprehensive restructuring and development of the PNA and of its institutions. If existing circumstances worsen, this will threaten the whole Palestinian society and will weaken the fight for dismantling the occupation and building an independent, democratic State. Accordingly, Palestinians and Palestinian CS must believe that the development process is an inclusive responsibility; it is a process that must engage all layers of society, including civil society, political movements and parties, as well as the Palestinian people in general.

The roots of the phrase NGO dates back to the 1920s. According to *The Dictionary of Civil Society, Philanthropy and Non-Profit Sector*, the term first originated in the League of Nations in the 1920s, and then came to the United Nations (UN) system[397]. The phrase is used cross-nationally to describe non-profit organizations working in the field of international relations, environment, human rights, humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. Therefore, NGOs

[397] un.org. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_society, www2.lse.ac.uk/CCS/home.aspx, dictionary.reference.com/browse/civilsociety, and www.wordiq.com/definition/Civil_society

are a sub-sector of the non-profit or third sector[398]. Moreover, many NGOs and development organizations have been trying to operationalize the theoretical concept of civil society. However, one should be aware that even though all NGOs are CSOs, not all CSOs are NGOs. Examples of CSOs include civic clubs, community-based groups, labor unions, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations, and, of course, NGOs.

Developing civil society is a major vehicle to induce change and influence the level of awareness and the potential of teamwork. It is a major component of the development and sustainability of the democratic system. Full-fledged democracy is not a political objective that can be achieved immediately. It is an active process that must be developed and maintained continuously.[399] Through its institutions, civil society plays the role of an intermediary between the individual and the State, and performs an organizational task within society. The use of the phrase NGO varies from one place to another; it usually refers to organizations that channel external funding and provide technical assistance in the fields of social and economic development. Usually, a non-profit organization that provides other kinds of public services, for example, unions, social clubs and religious groups, to mention a few, is not considered as an NGO, but rather as a CSO[400]. In addition, one can define an NGO as an organization or a group of organizations engaged in development and poverty reduction work at local, community, national and global levels around the world. A great deal has been written about NGOs, and particularly development NGOs and their role in promoting democracy and social change.[401]. And in the last two decades, much has been written about the emergence of CSOs, including NGOs, and the important role they can play in a country's economic and political development.[402] Furthermore, CSOs play a vital role in maintaining social stability in developed countries. These organizations are independent of the State, with their freedom guaranteed by the country's Constitution[403]. Abdel Samad adds that, historically,

[398] Lewis (2001), p. 38
[399] Al-Shani (2006)
[400] Anheier and List (2005)
[401] World Bank Report (2006f)
[402] Elbayar (2005)
[403] Burhan (2001)

the CS sector provided social services; it now also contributes to societal development, and sometimes to national strategies and structures.[404]

The richness of the contribution of civil society and NGOs to Palestine society throughout its history, their contribution to state-building efforts and the provision of social services among other things, and the search of an alternative solution to the flawed two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestine conflict– all themes whose topicality was only reinforced by President Abbas's UN bid for Palestinian statehood at the UN - governed the choice of the topic of my dissertation "Civil Society and State-Building in Palestine: Past Trends, Current Dilemmas and Future Challenges Faced by NGOs".

As a *theoretical concept*, state-building has gained prominence during the past decades with the growing number of conflict-affected societies. Yet, the focus of our dissertation was not so much on abstract theories of state-building as on its history and practicality in conjunction and/or in intersection with the evolution of civil society and NGOs in Palestine. The perspective on state-building as promoted by the OECD in a report published in 2008 and entitled "Concepts and Dilemmas of State-Building in Fragile Situations" impregnates both the rationale and the methodology of our research.

The OECD report argues that "successful state-building will almost always be the product of successful *domestic* action" and it defines state-building as "purposeful action to develop the *capacity, institutions and legitimacy* of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating mutual demands between the state and societal groups." This definition contrasts with narrow ones that focus only on the establishment, reform or strengthening of institutions. As defined by the OECD, state-building emphasizes state-society negotiations and the fact that state-building comprises *more than formal institutions*. The resilience of society derives from a combination of capacity, effective institutions and legitimacy. In contrast, fragility in conflict-affected societies arises primarily from weaknesses in the dynamic political process through which the expectations of the state and those of societal groups are reconciled.

[404] Ziad (2007)

Among these societal groups figure civil society, in general, and NGOs, in particular. Civil society is usually considered as the 'third sector', next to the State and the market. In the history of political thought, the source of social order has generally been attributed either to Adam Smith's 'invisible hand" of coordination of voluntary individual interests through the market or to Hobbes's heavy hand of state control when people realize that it is in everyone's interest to appoint a third person to govern them and the 'state of nature' ends. Civil society carves a niche between these two modes of social coordination and can be considered as providing a Smithian solution to the Hobbesian problem. Indeed, civil society can be defined broadly as the arena where individuals associate voluntarily to advance common interests that include the provision of social and public services such as health and education, the promotion of economic and social development, and state-building. By this definition, civil society includes charities, self-help schemes, international bodies, human rights campaigns and, of course, NGOs which are the focus of our research and refer to voluntary non-profit and usually non-political organizations pursuing wider social aims that have political aspects.

(What "Civil Society (including NGOs) and State-building means") "Civil Society (including NGOs) and State-building" can mean two different things. First, it can be an analysis of the separate, parallel and complementary efforts of civil society and the State in providing public services such as education, health, housing, and poverty alleviation. Second, the "and" in "Civil Society and State-building" can be understood not as a conjunction, but as an intersection, that is, as the mutual reconciliation of expectations of civil society (including NGOs) and state-building as in the OECD definition just mentioned. Unfortunately, the first systematic and genuine state-building efforts launched in 2009 in Palestine by the Prime Minister Salam Fayyad – "Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State" – is informed by a narrow definition of state-building that focuses on formal institutional building. It thus comes as no surprise that an April 2011 report of the World Bank entitled "Building the Palestine State: Sustaining Growth, Institutions and Service Delivery" does not mention "civil society" or "NGOs" a single time and concludes that "if the PA maintains its performance in institution-building and delivery of public services, it is well-positioned for the establishment of a state at any point in the near future". And, as if to confirm this purely formal view of

state-building that excludes civil society from this very state-building endeavor, Prime Minister Fayyad declared in June 2011 at the celebration of the Third Palestinian NGO Project organized by the World Bank that: "The Palestinian Authority is committed to support and partner with civil society institutions. We acknowledge the contribution of the NGOs in the provision of essential social services in areas where the public sector has difficulties to operate". This narrow interpretation both illustrates and is a consequence of the complexity of state-civil society relationships in Palestine throughout its history, and it provides a justification for the methodology of our research.

Let us now address the question of the role of NGOs during the occupation and the present time. In Palestine, during the period of prolonged military occupation, the civil society, including NGOs, played a crucial role. Since the late 1970s, the role of NGOs as active players in socio-economic development and in the formulation of policies has been outstanding. Barghouthi (2005) points out that throughout their existence, Palestinian NGOs have striven to enhance and organize society's capacities and have offered it support in withstanding the occupation.[405] In the POTs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the NGOs have played a very important, crucial and distinguished political and developmental role. As is true of any society, NGOs in Palestine are, and should continue to be, key players in the development process. During the struggle against the occupation in the POTs, NGOs and civil society took not only the shape of popular resistance, but also that of collective efforts to collect and deliver, often free of charge, relief and development services. The NGO sector has traditionally played a curious role in delivering economic and social services in the POTs, particularly for the most needy people.

The outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada in 1987 marked a turning point in the development of Palestinian civil society. Civil society organizations (CSOs) emerged as a mechanism for political mobilization and as institutions that could be relied upon to provide to the people the much-needed services. The CSOs that emerged before, during and after the First Intifada were mostly an

[405] Barghouthi (2005)

offspring of existing political parties and they were closely linked to the latter. For that reason, the activists of these CSOs were political activists who were appointed by their political parties to take leading roles within the new institutional infrastructure. After the signing of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), CSOs and their activists started the so-called "de-politicization" process, that is, they started detaching themselves from their political movements and parties to become independent entities. The new era was characterized by a deep crisis of the political parties, social polarization and heavy involvement of donor countries and international organizations. The focus of CSOs shifted from politics to service delivery. And the process of "de-politicisation" of CSO activists took place. Regardless of this process, the PNA saw in civil society a threat to its policy of centralizing power and controlling all aspects of Palestinian society. The outpouring of funds for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from the donor community that started during the First Intifada and intensified after the establishment of the PNA accelerated the de-politicization process. The new activists realized that the power of their organizations derived from the newly-gained access to the international arena and the new sources of funding, and not from their affiliation with political parties.

Abedul-El Hadi (1996) states that "I do not want to discuss the important and crucial role awaiting the Palestinian NGOs during the coming period. However, I would like to point out the importance of this role in determining the content of the current building process."[406] Herbert-Copley believes that NGOs have become prominent actors in the development field[407]. Also, Edwards and Hulme believe that NGOs play a distinctive role in development and face a different range of choices and strategies.[408] In addition, they are a mechanism of voluntary action capable of improving democracy, protecting human rights, strengthening local-level planning, promoting social justice, self-reliance, and

[406] Abdul-El-Hadi is the Director of the Bisan Center for Research and Development. He is a member of the Steering Committee of the Palestinian NGO Network.
[407] Herbert-Copley (1987)
[408] Edwards and Hulme (1992)

sustainability, and putting an end to exploitation in development programs [409]. On the one hand, NGOs are forced to play multiple roles because they are committed to responding to the needs of refugees, poor and marginalized people, who themselves are sets that change over time and according to circumstances. This is especially true in a society like Palestine where needs are acute and local structures are still searching their way in trying to meet them. However, it is very difficult to excel at everything[410]. On the other hand, NGOs are faced with reduced flows of external funding from international communities. This new role does not automatically reflect and reproduce independent action; it is to a certain extent the product of multifaceted relationships with the national and international spheres.

The case of Palestinian NGOs at this time is enlightening in this regard. In spite of the motivating autonomous initiatives by Palestinian NGOs during the past 40 years and their significant role in State-building and the construction of civil society, their agendas are unfortunately most likely prejudiced by donor policies and conditionality attached to funding. Such influence is not, however, properly assessed, and is mainly viewed negatively. In addition, there is no investigation of the possible active contribution of Palestinian NGOs to the constructive development of significant perspectives on national and global socioeconomic agendas. While Palestinian NGOs have undertaken very successful forms of professional action such as providing medical services and issuing reliable reports on Palestinian casualties and damage caused by Israeli military operations and other human rights violations, they have not developed a synergy with the political forces (whether it be the political parties, Islamic and National Committee for the Intifada, or unions) or with the population. Therefore, while NGOs have used their international recognition for advocacy and to make available strategic information about the Israeli attacks, they have contributed little locally to harness society's energies during a period of national struggle. Ultimately, their impact on the direction of the uprising has been minimal.[411] At the same time and as applies to the whole region, NGOs in Palestine still remain

[409] Korten (1982) and Biggs and Neame (1995)
[410] Edwards (1996)
[411] Hanafi and Tabari (2005), "The New Palestinian Globalized Elite." *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 24 (13)

an understudied topography, in particular with respect to their relations with donor agencies. There was a period during the so-called Oslo process where civil society was thought to be the cure to many political troubles, but there are clear evidences that civil society has not been able to deliver as expected. Nakhleh was probably right when he said that, emerging from this current state, one observes a number of, what might be called, civil society initiatives, both individual and collective, emphasizing the need for a longer term, "strategic" thinking to explore approaches to "salvaging" the situation.[412] The NGOs' lack of a mass base and focus on development and control issues make them incapable of organizing at the mass level. The most active NGO umbrella organization, the PNGO Network, has limited its actions so far to calls in the local press for a boycott on accepting money from USAID, and against continued participation of organizations in shared Israeli/Palestinian projects. Additionally, it has set up a number of task forces, one of them focused on developing strategies for the internal situation. And many of the 120 member organizations are reviewing their activities in an attempt to make them relevant to the current crisis.

The case of Islamic NGOs is different and deserves some amplification. The birth of the Hamas as a political movement at the onset of the First Intifada was preceded by the effective involvement of Islamic activists in service delivery to the poor and marginalized in the POTs. As from the 1970s, the Israeli occupation embarked on a strategy to build and support the emergence of a new alternative to the Palestinian leadership of the PLO. Islamic political movements that were not *de facto* part of the political scene after the 1967 Israeli military occupation became vocal, started tackling social and religious issues and preaching Islamic ethics against the national factions of the PLO and the Communist Party that were particularly active in the POTs and outside Palestine. This was a welcome new development and from the perspective of the occupation authorities, the split within the Palestinians represented an opportunity to facilitate the emergence of a new political power that delivered a social and religious message opposed to the nationalist message of the PLO. For that reason, the occupation forces facilitated and tolerated the setting up of a network of social

[412] Nakhleh (2008)

institutions in the Gaza Strip by an Islamic NGO called Islamic society or *Al mujam'a al islami*, the genuine precursor of the Hamas. All this happened at a time when the occupation forces were denying the PLO leadership the right to create civil and social societies. At that time, the Islamic societies maintained a very low political profile, abided by the rules of the game, and did seek to get muddled up with the occupation authorities. Their activities exceeded the limits of service delivery societies and started to extend to education through schools, colleges and universities, where they gradually became a major force ranking second behind the Fatah in the Palestinian political arena.

Islamic CSOs and their activists maintained a low political profile until the outbreak of the First Intifada when the Hamas was declared a political movement: "(…) the Palestinian Islamists were for at least a decade, prior to the Intifada, building for themselves religious, social and political infrastructure which enabled them to gain an accumulative influence." When the First Intifada started, the Palestinian Islamists enjoyed a significant quantitative presence in several areas in the POTs. Their power base relied on an extensive network of welfare and social services that helped them expand their power base from the late 1980s to the present time. Comparing the experiences of secular factions, Marxists and Islamic CSOs during the First Intifada, one finds two opposite trends: Islamic civil society activists emerged as political leaders associated with the Hamas while the political leaders of the national secular factions emerged as civil society activists that gradually cut off from their political affiliation with the process of de-politicization.

In order to haul Palestinian society out of this unpredictable crisis, it is of the greatest moment that general and unified action be taken. Palestinians and Palestinian CS believe that a strong domestic coalition and front is the fundamental requirement for enhancing the fight of the Palestinian people and civil society in favor of self-determination, putting an end to the occupation, and establishing an independent Palestinian democratic State founded on respect for the rule of law, human rights and democracy. The capacity of the CSOs, including NGOs, to deliver services and provide a national alternative to the existing Israeli-run service-delivery system has substantially enhanced the role of the former in

developing Palestinian society and in strengthening civil society during the first period preceding the Oslo process. The level of awareness and maturity of the NGO sector, albeit at varying degrees, are apparent in its clear vision regarding the role it plays and has played in Palestinian society. The democratization, independence and liberation of Palestinian society remain some the major challenges confronting the CSOs and NGOs. A challenge of equal importance continues to be the structure and representation of NGOs and their ability to play an active and vital role in the development process in all its dimensions and thereby shape the future of Palestinian society.

Our thesis also attempted to answer to the question of the relations between CS and NGOs, on the one hand, and the occupation, PNA and donors, on the other. Our answer can as summarized thus: since its establishment, Palestinian civil society faces difficult circumstances due to foreign occupation. In addition, during Oslo, CS suffered from the policies conducted by all parties. Indeed, Palestinian society is passing through its worse years. Israeli occupation is distorting its configuration on a demographic level; the PNA and later the Hamas government distorted and are distorting its configuration on a structural level; and donors are distorting its configuration on a functional level. For the very future viability of CS and NGOs and in order for them to play a genuine historical role, they will need to meet directly three important challenges. First, a strong civil society in Palestine will emerge full-fledged only with the active participation of thousands of citizens. This can only be achieved if people have a sufficient understanding of the controversial and contradictory role of NGOs in the region and globally. NGO leaders must constantly work to raise public awareness and understanding of the sector. Broader and deeper public consideration of the role of NGOs is crucial to the enlargement of the sector and to the development of its relationships with the government and the private sector. Second, NGOs must constantly make every endeavor to attain the highest standards of self-good governance – especially, transparency, accountability, sound management, and ethical behavior – with real involvement of the people. NGOs can only serve as convincing advocates and watchdogs of government and business if they themselves uphold the main beliefs and ethics they expect the public and private sectors to meet. Moreover, better transparency and accountability of NGOs will

also allow them to meet their challenge in developing sound relationships with governments. Nevertheless, good governance will prove to be the best insurance policy for the long-term resilience and flexibility of the non-governmental sector.

The underlying strategy consisted in creating "realities on the ground" in anticipation of the final status, but the only visible result was a confused patchwork and mix of enclaves and ghettos isolating Palestinian communities the ones from the others. The policy of blockade and closure separating the West Bank from the Gaza Strip as well as the more comprehensive closure that also separated West Bank communities from each other exacerbated this isolation. Prior to the Oslo process, the PLO was the legitimate advocate of Palestinian national rights and Palestinian statehood. The 1988 declaration by the PLO was acknowledged by the General Assembly of the United Nations and recognized in numerous bilateral agreements with the PLO on the basis of diplomatic exchange. The post-Oslo discourse of State-declaration by the PNA and its inclusion within the agenda of negotiations demonstrate the extent to which the Palestinian authority has directly betrayed existing Palestinian legal rights.

The events leading up to the Oslo Accords saw the PLO lose virtually all sources of income. First, within the framework of the PNA, the way of ruling led to the boycott of the PLO so that it is now barely functioning. Second, UNRWA's budget has been severely cut. Remittances from abroad have all but ceased. Third, the number of Palestinians allowed to enter Israel for work was reduced by 50% after negative fluctuation. Fourth, new super providers, 'international donors,' assumed the task of providing financial support both to the government and for societal subsistence. Fifth, the rule of law, good governance and development became the ostensible objectives of one of the largest global development funding schemes politically directed by the USA and willingly supplied by the EU and individual EU nations.

To examine the function and mechanisms of the aforementioned policies, we must look into the performance of the three basic players: "Israel", the PNA, and the donors within the Oslo context. As mentioned earlier, Israel started its blockade and closure policy in 1993 by activating a state of blockade and general

closure whereby the POTs were sealed off and movement forbidden between, and from, them to "Israel", which included access to Jerusalem without a prior permit. The blockade and general closure are still in effect now and the criteria of eligibility for such a travel permit are variable and arbitrarily applied. This policy prohibits any movement of goods and individuals between the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. This can be relieved at will by Israel to a "partial closure" - which means that some areas, but "not all," and some people, but "not all," can move. The last of these social barbed wires is the policy of "internal closure" which follows the Oslo maps and is directed to shut (A) areas from the rest and, finally, the Apartheid Wall.

The Oslo process has created an indeterminate state of jurisdiction for individuals and institutions that find themselves under changing circumstances, and therefore jurisdictions, on the ground. Our thesis demonstrates that the timing of these changes is determined solely by Israel as is the extent of the changes. By examining redeployment mechanisms and then the categories of jurisdiction that Oslo established. As the DP clearly provided for the gradual transfer of land and authority to take place in an "interim phase", which was supposed to deliver "all West Bank and Gaza Area", "except final status negotiations territories."

Palestinian individuals, institutions and communities have found themselves at the mercy of an arbitrary process of law and administration change, as and when political change happened on the ground. As if the aforementioned is not enough, "Israel" decided, and the Palestinians prudently agreed, to slice the components of jurisdiction to geographical, functional and personal jurisdictions. This was done to accommodate the skewed plan of phased redeployment, but beyond that, it produced a new dynamic of its own. Palestinians could not enjoy the luxury of falling under one whole jurisdiction in the West Bank.

Palestinian society currently resembles totally separate communities and groups of islands apart as it was mentioned clearly in the second chapter, and it is unclear when and how they will reconnect. This explains the phenomena of dual institutions in the public sector, and the nightmare of coordination observed in the private sector and civil society. As it was mentioned earlier, the organic relation of

sectors of Palestinian CS with the PLO, parties, workers unions, professional syndicates, and the NGOs were interlinked with the PLO on levels of strategic leadership, representation, coordination, protection and funding. All these components were lost when the PNA was established and when the division between West Bank and Gaza was created. The PNA did not present itself as an alternative to the PLO because there was not supposed to be an alternative to the PLO. The PNA - being different than the PLO - had very little mandates other than control in the beginnings. From 1993 till now, the PNA had only its bare core content, namely, the executive. Having no overt role in negotiations monitored worldwide by the international community and by its partners, it set out for work. The security branches and forces and a bureaucracy on their own can only behave in a certain manner after all.

On the CS and NGO scene, things were quite similar, especially in terms of sweeps and arrests. It was only when the donors and Western governments got really keen on human rights in Palestine that they put deeds before words and intervened in favor of NGOs and increased the financial support. The result of this showdown was the structural destruction of unions and syndicates; the NGO sector was to be left alone, with nothing other than the share acquired by the authority.

It is important to keep in mind that the authority had almost two years before it had to handle the first elections. Soon after the inauguration of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), it became clear that the executive having practiced (comprehensive government) for two years was not ready to share its powers with newcomers. The limitations of the PLC were soon highlighted in terms of "Israel"-related issues and in terms of its core function, namely, legislation. Comprehensive legislative powers were retained by the two Chairmen. This system of governments began by dismantling civil society sectors, and led to the paralysis of the overall legal establishment.

19 years after Oslo, we are in a much worse situation as far as the entire legal system is concerned. The authority opted to govern by decree and administration instead of legislation, leaving the junkyard of laws to society to

figure out. It is strange that even in choosing the administration, the authority and authorities at that time, did not attempt to unify measures in the POTs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It rather followed a different administration policy in the two areas, for example: alcohol consumption, local TV stations and other civil liberties are strictly banned in the Gaza Strip. And two authorities controlling NGO unions were established in the two areas and they violated citizen and human rights on a daily basis.

The next question to which our dissertation answered concerned the future role of NGOs. It is granted that NGOs can play a significant role in civil society as it is mentioned in our thesis; but the trick is to play a role, not claim to play all roles. This is when NGOs become a danger and participate in the marginalization of their own communities. Not only did the number of NGOs doubled, but the same also applies to their size, budget, and bureaucracy. Few NGOs in Palestine have more staff and budgets than political parties. NGOs are understood in Palestine to have no constancy and consistency other than their board members. Therefore, NGOs stand for, and represent, society, but are only accountable to themselves and donors of course. In fact, many NGOs represent donors more than any other party in Palestine or elsewhere. Because of factors related to demographic isolation and separation mentioned and explained above, of the fear of the PNA, and the focus on the discourse on academic human rights and development destined for Western export - NGO advocacy abandoned concepts of self-determination or national rights. On the other hand, and after hundreds of millions of US dollars spent, Palestine still lacks civil rights movements or even a coalition that seriously engages the legal establishment on rights. Having no constituency for support and advocacy, lacking constitutional institutions to protect, and falling into the trap of all high-tech and state of the art equipment, NGOs are dependent on donors for financial support, political protection, training and even evaluation. Thousands of training workshops and courses began to get on people's nerves, with money wasted in travel, hotels, and meals. At the community level, people do not feel interested in human rights, democracy or development anymore.

As far as the question of networking between NGOs, whether national or international, is concerned, our answer in the thesis can be summarized thus: being in competition in order to attract funds from the donor community, NGOs are not fond of working together. Save in a few cases, NGOs do not draft laws and make law campaigns (for obvious reasons). We are yet to see a functional NGO network or coalition in Palestine. One might think that deciding the importance and relevance of a given project comes first, and before issues related to fundraising. It turns out that this is not the sequence taken today: themes are decided by donors together with financial endowments and NGOs are then subcontracted to implement given projects. The impressive level of project duplications and repetitiveness hardly needs to be mentioned.

Donors and donor governments have a direct role in this human tragedy; among other things, they created two elites: the formal elite of the PNA, and the informal elite of NGOs as they were dubbed by Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar. They both play the same functions using different tools. These functions are the misrepresentation and the marginalization of the Palestinian society. Though both play a serviceable role to the Palestinian public, this is not enough to justify any of the grave mistakes. We should by now know that the best way of handling occupation is to put an end to it, rather than humoring it, as Roy stated 2007 in a quotation mentioned above.

Finally, in addition to Israeli occupation policies and strategies, the main problem facing Palestinian society, in general, and, civil society and NGOs, in particular, at the present time is neither de-development as Roy stated, nor corruption, democracy, transparency, or the absence of the rule of law. It is, rather, the total or general separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip not because of the occupation, but because of the two sets of controlling bodies – the Fatah and the Hamas. These two bodies try to interfere with and control all aspects of the life of the Palestinian people and Palestinian civil society and NGOs in the two areas. The two sets of bodies with parallel civic and security institutions are, on the one hand, violating human and citizen rights of the people and the political opposition on a daily basis. On the other, the leadership, members and supporters of these two governing bodies enjoy privileges that seem

unbelievable to outsiders. While there is very little space for civil society organizations, including NGOs, to work in the two areas excluding the ones who are supporting the two in their areas. Therefore, according to many scholars, the first and priority task for civil society and the NGOs is to endeavor to put an end to the internal separation, arrive at internal reconciliation, and restructure and develop the PNA and PLO. The second task consists in improving the management of NGOs, endowing them with a clear mandate and structure (general assembly, board of directors or trustees and management team) that comply with the law. The third task consists in nurturing relationships, cooperation and coordination with the masses so as to be the real representatives of local communities, grassroots, and beneficiaries, in other words, to be what I call Popular CSOs and NGOs or People CSOs and NGOs.

With all due respect to these political leaders, their statements are not to be taken at face value, especially for *three reasons that underpinned the choice of the topic of my doctoral dissertation:*

First, President Abbas's wish that "the Arab Spring be followed by a Palestinian Spring" sounds anachronistic. The truth is that before it broke out in the rest of the Arab world in late 2010 and 2011, the Arab Spring had started since long in Palestine. While the Arab world in general was sleepy for decades, the history of Palestine is, indeed, replete with examples of popular and massive resistance, the most conspicuous ones of which were the First and the Second Intifada that erupted in 1987 and 2000, respectively. Though the two most discernible and famous uprisings in the occupied territories, it is of moment to stress that both were nurtured and made possible, at least in part, by the rich history of civil society and NGOs in Palestine whose vicissitudes under a variety of political settings are an essential component of our thesis. After all, the earliest Palestinian NGOs were formed in the period of the British Mandate and emerged precisely out of conflict with the Zionist movement, and later, with Israel. To be sure, there is a difference between the massive civil uprisings that put an end to undemocratic and oppressive regimes in the Arab world and the several forms of popular resistance to Israeli occupation in Palestine. However, though these two types of popular upheavals display a *nuance*, their *essence*, namely the capacity of civil

society, associational life and NGOs to change or attempt to change the course of political history in a non-violent way, is common. It is was thus not surprising that President Abbas equated, on the basis of this commonality, the "Palestinian Spring" with "Palestinian independence" by which he meant the end of Israel's presence in the occupied territories and the creation of a Palestinian state. What *was* surprising, however, was that he did not choose to rename the "Arab Spring" the "Arab Intifada" on the basis of the precedence of massive non-violent civil society-based actions in Palestine over the rest of the Arab world

Second, President Obama's statement to the effect that "no vote at the United Nations will ever create an independent Palestinian State" should have been more cautiously and precisely formulated thus: "No vote at the UN *alone or before anything else* will ever create an independent Palestinian State". Neither will the meeting of formal conditions laid down in international conventions such as the Montevideo Convention, for, like charity, statehood and legitimacy begin at home. No international top-down solution or even international acceptability can substitute for local bottom-up domestic legitimacy and statehood. In particular, one of the conditions for a viable Palestinian state is national unity, that is, a Palestinian state that represents all the Palestinian people. That this is not the case was symbolized by the distinct reactions in Gaza and the West Bank to President Abbas's UN speech: thousands of people exulted at rallies in the West Bank run by the secular national movement, Fatah, while there was almost no presence in the streets of Gaza run by the Islamist national movement, Hamas. These distinct reactions in Palestine's two feuding enclaves were surprising as Hamas and the Fatah had signed an agreement in principle in May 2011 to end their bitter four-year rift – which they ratified in November 2011. This was not an unselfish move on both parts, however. Ironically, the reconciliation was an outgrowth of the Arab awakening. Indeed, in March 2011, just weeks after the upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt, young Palestinians took the streets in Gaza and the West Bank under the banner of the "March 15 movement" and clamored for the end of the division that cripples Palestinian politics and erodes confidence in their leaders. Following these manifestations, Fatah and the Hamas woke from their slumber and realized that they needed to renew their legitimacy from within and unification would be their best bet to this end. Though the jury is still out regarding the viability of the reconciliation between

the two dominant parties in Palestinian political life, the March 15 movement has, once again, illustrated the power of civil society to change the political condition in Palestine and, in particular, to urge for state-building efforts.

Third, both Abbas and Obama share with other political leaders the mantra that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be resolved through negotiations for a two-state solution. In spite of his multilateral move, Abbas himself claimed in his speech that negotiations regarding a two-state solution remained his "first option", but he added that prolonged Israeli colonial occupation "will destroy the chances of achieving a two-state solution upon which there is an international consensus". In fact, the window of opportunity for a negotiated two-state solution already seems to be closed because of Israel's unmistakably colonialist policy. The cruel irony is that the endorsement of a two-state 'pragmatic' solution has only led to the emergence of a *de facto* one-state reality whereby a colonialist and discriminatory Israeli regime rules over almost all of historic Palestine. Even Israeli political leaders Ehud Olmert and Ehud Barak have acknowledged that should Israeli sovereignty be maintained forever over Palestinians, this could lead to apartheid. Former American President Jimmy Carter voiced similar concerns in his 2006 book "Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid". And, as if to confirm the prognosis and the diagnosis of these leaders, a report by a French parliamentary committee on "The Geopolitics of Water" released in December 2011 argued that Israel was implementing "apartheid" in Judea and Samaria in its allocation of water, the very source of life. All this places a *moral obligation* on political leaders and diplomats to consider alternatives to the two-state paradigm that have heretofore been outside their radar screen. In particular, several scholars – such as the late Palestinian-American literary theorist Edward Said, the Israeli political scientist and former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti, the American political scientist Virginia Tilley, the Palestinian-American Professor of Law George Bisharat, the Israeli Professor of Political Science and historian Ilan Pappé, to name but a few – and NGOs have called for a bi-national solution to the conflict, in other words, a single democratic, secular State where Jews and Palestinians live side by side on the basis of equal political and civic rights. In the face of the total collapse of the mainstream's exclusive negotiated two-state option, the one-state or bi-national solution deserves a greater hearing according to us.

To conclude, Palestine faces a two-pronged problem summarized by the very title of the program launched by its Prime Minister two years back: "Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Building the State." Efforts to achieve both ends must look forward, but must not forget the past. As our research has shown, civil society, and especially NGOs, in Palestine have strived throughout history towards the end of the occupation and state-building. Unfortunately, these efforts have been hampered by external constraints and limits intrinsic to civil society and NGOs. Among the external constraints figure the changing political circumstances in which NGOs have had to operate. Yet, what is to be hoped for is not stability *per se* for, as part of the Arab world has shown, societies can be stable for decades under "stable" authoritarian conditions that deprive people of their freedom. What is of moment thus is not stability, but resilience, the ability of society to cope with changes in capacity, effectiveness, or legitimacy, all three of which are critical in state-building efforts as we have argued above. Unless political authorities and civil society reconcile their mutual expectations with regard to one another, state-building efforts are doomed to (continue to) fail in Palestine. The reconciliation of expectations will imply, on the one hand, dramatic improvements in the governance of NGOs and, on the other, a wider view of state-building by Palestinian authorities, especially, one that includes civil society and NGOs explicitly in state-building efforts.

As for the end of the occupation, here again, civil society can play a leading role. In an article written after his second visit 10 years after the first to South Africa in 2001, the late Edward Said described how he "returned in a democratic country in which Apartheid had been defeated, and a vigorous, contentious civil society was engaged in trying to complete the task of bringing equality and social justice." While the Palestinian situation is unique in many ways – and has thus justified our historical and empirical approach -, lessons may, nevertheless, be learnt from other experiences around the world that share at least some similar characteristics with the Palestinian situation. In particular, it is important to recall – especially being given the outright dismissal of the one-state, bi-national solution as utopian – that no one could predict the Arab spring, that the Jim Crow laws and South African apartheid were entrenched until the eves of their demise, and that no one foresaw the end of the Berlin Wall. Interestingly, a CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) Report published in 2009 refers to "an inexorable movement away from a two-state to a one-state solution, as the most

viable model based on democratic principles of full equality that sheds the looming specter of colonial Apartheid" and alludes to the unexpectedly quick fall of the apartheid government in South Africa and the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

The lesson from these unexpected historical upheavals and the prediction of the CIA is that what seems to be a utopian one-state solution may turn into reality rapidly – on the basis of a sudden change of hearts and/or minds as happened in South Africa, the Eastern bloc, and the Arab world – and civil society in Palestine needs to be prepared for that, otherwise, the momentum of their actions will be taken over by politicians as recently in the Arab world. Believers in a one-state solution should not despair as some have. For example, in a book published in January 2012 and entitled "Une allumette vaut-elle toute notre philosophie ?" ("Is a match worth all our philosophy?"), Sari Nusseibeh – a Palestinian intellectual who was part of the popular committees behind the First Intifada – laments the impasse in two-state negotiations and suggests that Palestinians abandon their claim to political rights for the moment and content themselves with a status of foreign resident granted by Israel on the basis of which they live, work, or circulate, where they wish. Nusseibeh's suggestion is surprising for someone who participated in secret negotiations and deals with Israeli official during 1980s, just like what happened in South Africa, the Eastern bloc, or the Arab world, no one expected the eruption of the First (and the Second Intifada) in Palestine. To be sure, intellectual discourse and political negotiations have failed to generate a fair solution till now to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But, what *will* generate a one-state solution – that is inexorable, as the CIA Report argues - is precisely a "match" as in the Arab world – the one that allowed the Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi to immolate himself, immolation that ignited the Arab Spring - another unexpected Intifada, or a decisive and unexpected change in minds and hearts in Israel, Palestine and the international community. It is up to civil society and NGOs to work towards this change of minds and hearts, so that instead of a vain community of nations between Israel and Palestine, there be a community of peoples between Jews, Christians and Moslems in Palestine – who are already intertwined politically and economically - on a single territory and under a single state.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I - PNGO STATEMENT ON FOREIGN FUNDING TO THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

April 15, 2006

In light of the outcome of the recent Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, many international bodies hastened to announce their positions whereby political conditions were exerted on the newly elected government. Many international parties proceeded to implement practical measures relating to discontinuation of funding as a result of decisions to end assistance to the Palestinian Authority. Concurrently, the Israeli government took measures and halted transfers of Palestinian tax revenues owed to the Palestinian Authority.

We, the undersigned strongly condemn these arbitrary measures against the Palestinian Authority and people and wish to emphasize the following:

1. The Palestinian elections, praised by the local and international community as democratic, fair and credible, have fairly expressed the will of the Palestinian people and their democratic choice. The election results should be acknowledged by the international community and likewise respect its outcome.

2. The choice for political change is an internal Palestinian issue and any attempts to influence the process and its outcome are unacceptable and flatly rejected by the Palestinian people and our organizations and institutions.

3. Foreign assistance in support of the Palestinian National Authority and its efforts to meet social, economic and security responsibilities of the Palestinian society is integral to the agreements reached and should not be seen as charity; it represents obligations to which the international community has committed itself.

4. The process of linking funding to political conditions and agendas falls outside the stipulations of international agreements, treaties, and legislation, constituting a dangerous infringement of international law and international

humanitarian law. Moreover, it is considered a declaration of a boycott war against the Palestinian people without any legal form or justification.

5. The halting of foreign funding to the Palestinian Authority will dangerously exacerbate the already deteriorating humanitarian situation in the occupied Palestinian territories caused by the continued Israeli occupation.

6. Efforts by certain international bodies to use Palestinian NGOs to implement their political agendas and bypass the Palestinian Authority are rejected outright. We declare our respect to Palestinian law, to the independence of our civil institutions and confirm our commitment to the Palestinian national agenda.

7. Palestinian NGOs affirm the principle of solidarity and cooperation with the various state sectors and the private sector in the framework of sustained, genuine development. Attempts to influence the civil sector to assume a governmental apparatus role is totally rejected. In this context, we emphasize our commitment to our well defined role and respect of the role of other sectors to provide services to the Palestinian society.

8. Palestinian NGOs affirm their commitment to the publicly declared national position as expressed in the Cairo Declaration; we affirm our adherence to the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

9. We call upon all bodies of the Palestinian government (executive, legislative and judicial) to work in unity and conformity to confront the restrictions that have been imposed, all of which will inevitably lead to political, social and economic devastation.

Palestinian NGOs call on all members of the governmental and civil society sectors to work together in combating the imposition of politically

motivated restrictions on foreign assistance which will lead to further deterioration at the political, social and economic levels.

Finally we also call upon Palestinians and friends in the international community to continue to support the popular grassroots movement to resist the Israeli Separation Wall and Israeli settlements (colonies), to counter the Israeli government's plan to impose unilateral solutions and the international community's silent complicity all of which serve to preclude the possibility of establishing a sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

The Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations' Network (PNGO)
General Union of Charitable Societies
National Commission for NGOs
Civil Action Forum

ANNEX II – SECTORWISE LIST OF NGOs AFFILIATED TO THE PALESTINIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION NETWORK (PNGO)

Agriculture

1. Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ)
2. Arab Center for Agricultural Development (ACAD)
3. Khuza'a Center for Sustainable Agriculture
4. Palestinian Agricultural Development Association (PARC)
5. Palestinian Agricultural Society
6. Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC)
7. Union of Palestinian Farmers
8. Ma'an Development Center

Business Development

9. Palestinian Association for Credit & Development (FATEN)
10. Palestinian Association for Development and Reconstruction (PADR)
11. Palestinian Business Women's Association (ASALA)
12. The Palestinian Center for Micro-projects & Development (PCMD)
13. FATEN – Rahhallh and Gaza

Children and Youth

14. A-Hanan Benevolent Association for Mother & Child
15. Al-Huda Development Society
16. Al-Manhal Woman and Child Cultural Center
17. Atfaluna Society for Deaf Children
18. Care for Children with Special Needs
19. Child Care & Maternal Guidance Society
20. Culture and Free Thought Association (CFTA)
21. Defence for Children International (DCI)
22. Early Childhood Resource Center-Children's Rights (ECRC)
23. First Ramallah Group (FRG)

24. Guidance and Training Center for the Child and Family
25. Project Loving Care Society
26. Rawdat Az-Zuhur Society
27. Tamer Institute for Community Education
28. The Arab Society for Orphans
29. The Women and Family Affairs Center

Community Development

30. Bisan Center for Research & Development
31. Ma'an Development Center
32. PANORAMA – Palestinian Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development
33. Project Loving Care Society
34. Rawdat Az-Zuhur Society
35. The Palestinian Working Women Society for Development (PWWSD)
36. Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA)

Consumer Protection

37. Palestinian Society for Consumer Protection

Counseling & Mental Health

38. Child Care & Maternal Guidance Society
39. Guidance and Training Center for the Child and Family
40. Palestinian Family Planning and Protection Association
41. The Gaza Community Mental Health Program
42. The Palestinian Counseling Center (PCC)
43. The Palestinian Working Women Society for Development (PWWSD)
44. Treatment & Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Torture (TRC)

Culture

45. Al-Karmel Cultural Center
46. Al-Maghazi Cultural Center
47. Al-Manhal Woman and Child Cultural Center
48. Al-Taghreed Society for Culture and Art

49. Ashtar for Theatre Production and Training
50. Halhul Cultural Forum
51. Human Developmental Association
52. Khalil Sakakini Cultural Center
53. Popular Art Center
54. Sabreen Association for Artistic Development
55. Science & Cultural Center

Democracy, Research, Media & Communication

56. Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ)
57. Arab Thought Forum (ATF)
58. Health, Development, Information & Policy Institute (HDIP)
59. Land Research Center (LRC)
60. Muwatin: The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy
61. Palestinian Center for Peace and Democracy (PCPD)
62. Palestinian Diaspora & Refugee Center (Shaml)
63. PANORAMA – Palestinian Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development
64. The Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC)
65. **The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)**
66. **The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue & Democracy (Miftah)**
67. Democracy and Worker Rights Center

Education

68. Al-Mawrid Teacher Development Center
69. Early Childhood Resource Center-Children's Rights (ECRC)
70. Educational Development Center
71. Educational Network Center
72. Remedial Education Center
73. Teacher Creativity Center (TCC)

Elderly People

74. Al-Wafa Elderly Nursing Home
75. Atta' Services to the Aged

Environment

76. Palestinian Agricultural Development Association (PARC)
77. Palestinian Agricultural Society
78. The Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG)

Health

79. Atfaluna Society for Deaf Children
80. Care for Children with Special Needs
81. Central Blood Bank Society
82. Dar As-Salam Hospital
83. Health, Development, Information & Policy Institute (HDIP)
84. Union of Health Work Committees (HWC) Jerusalem
85. Union of Health Work Committees (HWC) Gaza
86. Jabalia Rehabilitation Society for the Handicapped
87. Maqassed Charitable Islamic Society
88. Palestinian Family Planning and Protection Association
89. Public Service Society
90. Red Crescent Society (Gaza)
91. Thalassemia Patients' Friendship Society
92. The National Society for Rehabilitation
93. The Palestinian Counseling Center (PCC)
94. Treatment and Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Torture
95. Union of Health Care Committees (UHCC)
96. Union of Palestinian Handicapped
97. Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC)

Human Rights and Legal Aid

98. Ad-Dameer Prisoners' Support and Human Rights Association (Ramallah)
99. Ad-Dameer Association for Human Rights (Gaza)

100. Al-Haq Institute

101. Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights

102. Early Childhood Resource Center- Children's Rights (ECRC)

103. Jerusalem Legal Aid & Human Rights Center (JLAC)

104. Land Defense General Committee- Palestine

• Land Research Center (LRC)

• The Democracy and Workers' Rights Center

• The Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR)

• The Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC)

• Women's Studies Center

Special Needs

• Atfaluna Society for Deaf Children

• Care for Children with Special Needs

• Jabalia Rehabilitation Society for the Handicapped

• Union of Palestinian Handicapped

Women

• A-Hanan Benevolent Association for Mother & Child

• Al-Huda Development Society

• Al-Majd Women's Association

• Al-Manhal Woman and Child Cultural Center

• Al-Najda Social Association

• Child Care & Maternal Guidance Society

• Palestinian Business Women's Association (ASALA)

• Palestinian Family Planning and Protection Association

• Palestinian Women's Union

• The Palestinian Working Women Society for Development (PWWSD)

• The Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC)

• The Women and Family Affairs Center

• Women's Affairs Center

• Women's Studies Center

• Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA)

ANNEX III – APARTHEID WALL, LAND THEFT AND FORCED EXPULSION

The Wall is not being built on, or in most cases near the 1967 Green Line, but rather cuts deep into the West Bank, expanding Israel's **theft of Palestinian land** and resources. In total, 85% of the Wall is located in the West Bank. When completed, the Wall will de facto **annex some 46% of the West Bank**, isolating communities into Bantustans, ghettos and "military zones".

This means that the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including almost **1.5 million refugees**, will be encircled on only 12% of mandate Palestine. Some 12% of Palestinians in the West Bank will be "outside" the Wall in the de facto annexed areas by Israel and in unbearable living conditions - the loss of land, markets, movement and livelihoods - and will face expulsion. This includes over **200,000 Palestinians** of East Jerusalem, who will be totally isolated from the rest of the West Bank. 98% of the settler population will be included in the de facto annexed areas. The Wall is not a new "idea" - since 1994 the Gaza Strip has been surrounded by a barrier which cuts off Palestinians there from the rest of the world.

The Apartheid Wall's Location and Costs

In November 2000 Israeli Prime Minister Barak (Labour Party) approved the first project to build a "barrier". Construction of the Wall, including land confiscation and the **uprooting of trees**, began in June 2002 west of Jenin. As of October 2009, 60% of the Wall has been completed. Construction is ongoing in the districts of Qalqilya, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron. The Jordan Valley is almost completely isolated from the rest of the West Bank.

The Wall's total length will be some **760 km**. The cost of the Wall is now estimated at $2.1 billion. Each km costs approximately $2 million. In addition, the Occupation has spent NIS 2 billion to construct alternative roads and tunnels. The

Wall has destroyed a large amount of Palestinian farmland and usurped water supplies, including the biggest aquifer in the West Bank.

78 Palestinian villages and communities with a total population of **266,442 will be isolated** as follows:

- Villages surrounded by Wall, settlements and settler roads: 257,265 Palestinians.
- Villages isolated between Wall and Green Line: 8,557 Palestinians
- Villages isolated and residents threatened with expulsion: 6,314 Palestinians.

The so-called "disengagement", "modifications", "convergence" and "development" are all part of the Israeli rhetoric that hides the overall strategy for the complete **colonization of the West Bank** and the expulsion or enslavement of the Palestinian population. The "modification" of the path of the Wall, far from being a benefit for the local population, often only returns a fraction of what was stolen. It also serves to distract from the ICJ ruling, which calls for the dismantling of the Wall, not the rerouting of small sections. In addition, these modifications often ensure that the lands that remain isolated behind the Wall cannot be accessed by their owners, effectively annexing them. Instead of dismantling settlements, the Occupation continues to expand settlements, in particular those located around Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

Apartheid Wall as a Network

The concrete Wall is present in Bethlehem, parts of Ramallah, Qalqilya, parts of Tulkarm and throughout the Jerusalem envelope. It is 8 meters high - twice the height of the Berlin Wall - with watchtowers and a "buffer zone" 30-100 meters wide for electric fences, trenches, cameras, sensors, and military patrols.

In other places, the Wall consists of layers of fencing and razor wire, military patrol roads, sand paths to trace footprints, ditches and surveillance cameras.

The Apartheid Wall's "buffer zone" paves the way for **large-scale demolitions** and the expulsion of nearby residents, as in many places the Wall is located just meters away from homes, shops, and schools. The land between the Apartheid Wall and the Green Line has been declared a "seam zone", and all residents and landowners in this area must obtain a permit to remain in their homes and on their lands.

The Occupation has created agricultural "gates" in the Wall; these do not provide any guarantee that farmers will have access to their lands but instead strengthen Israel's strangling system of permits and checkpoints where Palestinians are beaten, detained, shot at and humiliated.

On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the Apartheid Wall, Israeli settlement policies and occupation **violate international law** and must be ended. It reminded the international community that it was obliged to enforce international law and in no way support the existing situation. Despite the ruling of the ICJ, neither states nor international bodies have taken any serious steps towards ensuring that the ICJ recommendations are implemented.

For more details, see the Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign at www.stopthwall.org

ANNEX IV – QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED TO BENEFICIARIES OF NGOS

Form Number:

Response: Accepted ☐ **Refused** ☐

Name: [optional] _____

Beneficiary General Information

1. Age ☐ Male ☐ Female ☐

2. Marital status:
Married ☐ **Widowed** ☐ **divorced** ☐ **not married** ☐

3. Level of education:
Secondary ☐ **Diploma** ☐ **University** ☐ **Postgraduate** ☐

4. Residency ☐ **Governorate** ☐

5. Refugee ☐ Resident ☐

6. Occupation: public sector ☐ private sector ☐

I. NGOs Basic Information

Table (5)

	Yes	No	Slightly
1. Is it easy to reach to the NGO ?			
2. Is the work hours of the NGO well Known?			
3. Is there a mailing address for the NGO?			

II. Strategic Planning

Table (6)

	Yes	No	Slightly
1. Does the NGO have written vision and mission?			
2. Does the NGO have a written plan for next year?			
3. Did beneficiaries and workers participate in the planning process?			
4. Does the NGO have a written plan for the coming three or five years?			
5. Are the plans contain: What will be achieved?			
To whom?			
From Who?			
When?			
How?			

III. Finance

Table (7)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Is there a bank account for the NGO?			
2. Have you seen the draft budget for the NGO?			
3. Is the draft budget accessible for you?			
4. Are the financial reports accessible for you?			

IV. The Effective Leadership and Decision-Making Process

Table (8)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Is the Management Team capable of leading the staff to work on the same goals?			
2. Does the management Team give you tasks and make sure of completion?			
3. Do they ask for your participation in the planning process?			
4. Can you raise suggestions and queries?			

5. Do you know who decides on all issues?			
6. Do you know who is going to do this or that?			
7. Do you know where to go when there is a dispute?			
8. Do you know about the work through			
a. reports			
b. meetings?			
9. Does the Management Team train you on necessary skills?			

V. Fundraising

Table (9)

	Yes	No	Slightly
1. Do you know who is responsible for fundraising?			
2. Do you know if he can make good public relations?			
3. Does the NGO try to diversify its sources of funding?			
4. Do you participate in the preparation of project proposals?			
5. Does the NGO adopt a self-financing mechanism?			
6. Does all sources of funding are well-known?			
7. Does NGO develop their sources of funding?			
8. Is the NGO look for local sources?			

VI. Project Management

Table (10)

	Yes	No	Slightly
1. Do you think if the project objectives help to achieve the overall objectives?			
2. Do you believe that the project			
objectives: a. clear?			

b.. Quantifiable? c. achievable?			
3. Does the NGO draw a plan of action to achieve the objectives of the projects one after the other?			
4. Does the NGO requests your participation in the implementation and plan of actions of the projects?			
5. Does the plan clearly identify: a. Who will do that? b. When? c. Where?			
6. Does the NGO consider your recourses and its resources to start the projects?			
7. Do you the staff prepare accurate progress reports?			
8. Do you discuss the problems that occur during the project implementation?			
9. Is the evaluation, part of action plan?			
10. Does the NGO consider who will benefit from the projects?			
11. Does the NGO use monitoring and evaluation to develop and modify projects?			
12. Does the NGO study the community needs before finalizing project proposal?			
13. Are you part of the setting of priorities and the preparation of project proposals?			
14. Do you prepare with the NGO a plan to assure of continuity of the NGO projects?			
15. Do you have access to the NGO periodic reports on the achievements in comparison with the plan?			
16. Has the NGO failed in the achievement of any specific objective?			
1. If the answer is yes, did they discuss reasons for the failure?			
17. Does the NGO examine the problems they faced to find solutions at the proper time?			
18. Does the NGO examine whether the project has achieved its objectives or not?			
19. Does the NGO consider the lessons learned for future?			
20. Does the evaluation examine how the results of the projects would help in achieving the goals of the NGO?			
21. Does the NGO evaluate the objectives and work plans through the monitoring and evaluation process?			

VII. Public Relations and Sources of Evaluation

Table (11)

	Yes	No	Slightly
1. Do you have good relations with NGOs?			
2. Is there a relationship between the local and international NGOs working in your region?			
3. Does the Palestinian National Authority:			
4. Does Hamas Government in Gaza			
5. Does the NGOs have relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council?			
6. Do you know the objectives and activities of the NGO?			
7. Does NGO try to put influence on your decisions?			
8. Does the NGO try to develop work relations with other NGO?			
9. Do you benefit from training offered by NGOs?			
10. Do you get advertising and promotional pamphlets on the NGO activities?			
11. Does the NGOs try to influence the activities and decisions of the government?			

VIII. NGOs Values and ethics

Table (12)

	Yes	No	Slightly
1. Are the board of directors, the members and beneficiaries participate in determining the value and ethics of the			

NGO?			
2. Did you discuss the values of the NGO with the board of directories?			
3. Does the NGO have a written value and ethics?			
4. During the planning process, Is the value of the NGO taken into account?			

IX. Legal Aspects

Table (13)

	Yes	No	Slightly
1. Does the NGO have internal bylaws?			
2. Do you know if there is an official registration for the NGO?			
3. Does the NGO use its internal bylaws?			
4. Does the NGO have a Board of directors?			
5. Does the functions and role of board of directories clear?			
6. Do you have relationship with board of directories?			

X. Israeli occupation and its impact on the activity and the role of the NGOs

Table (14)

	Yes	No	Slightly
1. Do you think there are obstacles caused by the Israeli Occupation?			
2. Do you think activities of NGOs affected by the Israeli occupation?			
3. Do policies and strategies of the Israeli occupation affect the NGOs?			
4. Does the Israeli occupation intervene directly or indirectly in the NGOs affairs?			
5. Does the Israeli occupation affect free movement of NGOs staff?			
6. Does the Israeli occupation prevent the implementation of the NGO programs or projects?			
7. Does the Israeli occupation delay the implementation of some programs or projects?			
8. Does the Israeli occupation intervene in defining programs or projects?			

9. Does the Israeli occupation affect NGOs fundraising?			
10. Do you think the Israeli occupation has an influence on donors to fund or not certain NGOs?			
11. Do you think the Israeli occupation intervene in determining the policy of donors' countries?			
12. Does Israeli blockade have negative impact on NGOs activities?			

XI. Final Summary

1. What are the NGO strengths?
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2. Why?
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3. What are the NGO weaknesses?
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4. How to overcome these weaknesses?
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ANNEX V – QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND MANAGEMENT TEAM OF NGOS

Basic Information

Table (1)

1. The name			2. Short title, if any,	
3.Registratio			4. Quarter	

n Year				
5. Headquarters			6. Phone Number	
7. Fax No.			8. Postal Address	
9.			10 e-mail. Web page	
11. Director of NGO			12. Name of data entry Function	
13. Organizational Supervision: 1.Governmental ( ) 2. Popular ( ) 3. Foreign ( ) 4. Other ( )				
14. The name of the President or a contact person				

15. Is the institution registered? 1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )
If the institution has registered: where and the registration number? .
....
_____

16. The property Ownership: 1. Private ( )2. Tenant ( ) 3. Holly ( ) 4. UNRWA ( ) 5. Other ( )
_____

17. Does the institution have branches? 1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )
If yes, what is the number and location?
.....
.....

I. NGOs Management Information

Table (2)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Is it easy to reach to the NGO?			
2. Is the NGO work hours of clear?			
3. Do you have mailing address for the NGO?			
4. Is there an in and out trays?			
5. Is there a filing system?			
6. Does someone take minutes for the meetings?			
7. Do you have an inventory system for the NGO?			

8. Do you have regular maintenance for the equipments?			
9. Do you have a list of staff?			
10. Do you have procurement system?			
11. Do you staff regulation?			
12. Do you have clear reporting format?			
13. Is it clear for staff to whom will send reports and when?			

II. Strategic Planning

Table (3)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Does the NGO have written vision and mission?			
2. Does the NGO have a written plan for next year?			
3. Did beneficiaries and workers participate in the planning process?			
4. Does the NGO have a written plan for the coming three or five years?			
5. Are the plans contain: What will be achieved?			
To whom?			
From Who?			
When?			
How?			

III. Finance

Table (4)

	Yes	No
1. Is there a bank account for the NGO?		
2. Have you seen the draft budget for the NGO?		
3. Is the draft budget accessible for you?		

4. Are the financial reports accessible for you?		

IV. The Effective Leadership and Decision-Making Process

Table (5)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Is the Management Team capable of leading the staff to work on the same goals?			
2. Does the management Team give you tasks and make sure of completion?			
3. Do they ask for your participation in the planning process?			
4. Can you raise suggestions and queries?			
5. Do you know who decides on all issues?			
6. Do you know who is going to do this or that?			
7. Do you know where to go when there is a dispute?			
8. Do you know about the work through a. reports			
b. meetings?			
9. Does the Management Team train you on necessary skills?			

V. Fundraising

Table (6)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Do you know who is responsible for fundraising?			
2. Do you know if he can make good public relations?			
3. Does the NGO try to diversify its sources of funding?			
4. Do you participate in the preparation			

of project proposals?			
5. Does the NGO adopt a self-financing mechanism?			
6. Does all sources of funding are well-known?			
7. Does NGO develop their sources of funding?			
8. Is the NGO look for local sources?			

VI. Project Management

Table (7)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Do you think if the project objectives help to achieve the overall objectives?			
2. Do you believe that the project objectives: a. clear?			
b.. Quantifiable?			
c. achievable?			
3. Does the NGO draw a plan of action to achieve the objectives of the projects one after the other?			
4. Does the NGO requests your participation in the implementation and plan of actions of the projects?			
5. Does the plan clearly identify: a. Who will do that?			
b. When?			
c. Where?			
6. Does the NGO consider your recourses and its resources to start the projects?			
7. Do you the staff prepare accurate progress reports?			
8. Do you discuss the problems that occur during the project implementation?			
9. Is the evaluation, part of action plan?			
10. Does the NGO consider who will benefit from the projects?			
11. Does the NGO use monitoring and evaluation to develop and modify projects?			
12. Does the NGO study the community needs before finalizing project proposal?			
13. Are you part of the setting of priorities and the preparation of project			

proposals?			
14. Do you prepare with the NGO a plan to assure of continuity of the NGO projects?			
15. Do you have access to the NGO periodic reports on the achievements in comparison with the plan?			
16. Has the NGO failed in the achievement of any specific objective?			
• If the answer is yes, did they discuss reasons for the failure?			
17. Does the NGO examine the problems they faced to find solutions at the proper time?			
18. Does the NGO examine whether the project has achieved its objectives or not?			
19. Does the NGO consider the lessons learned for future?			
20. Does the evaluation examine how the results of the projects would help in achieving the goals of the NGO?			
21. Does the NGO evaluate the objectives and work plans through the monitoring and evaluation process?			

VII. NGO Staff member

Table (8)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Does the staff have legal contracts?			
2. Do their qualifications and experience related to their post?			
3. Does every staff member know to whom will report and who will him the instructions?			
4. Does the staff have job descriptions?			
5. Does all staff get on job training and external training?			
6. Do they know each other activities and the connections of the activities?			
7. Do the directors encourage the staff after the completion of their work?			
8. Is the employment-based on applications and curricula vitae and transactions?			
9. Is there a training plan for NGO?			
10. Does the salaries increase on clear basis?			
11. Do you modify the job description of the staff?			

12. Do the directors appraise staff efforts?			

VIII. Public Relations and Sources of Evaluation

Table (9)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Do you have good relations with NGOs?			
2. Is there a relationship between the local and international NGOs working in your region?			
3. Does the Palestinian National Authority: a. Ask you to coordinate with them?			
b. Forced you to coordinate with them?			
c. Place restrictions on your work?			
4. Does Hamas Government in Gaza : a. Ask you to coordinate with them?			
b. Forced you to coordinate with them?			
c. Place restrictions on your work?			
5. Does the NGOs have relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council?			
6. Do you know the objectives and activities of the NGO?			
7. Does NGO try to put influence on your decisions?			
8. Does the NGO try to develop work relations with other NGO?			
9. Do you benefit from training offered by NGOs?			
10. Do you get advertising and promotional pamphlets on the NGO activities?			
11. Does the NGOs try to influence the activities and decisions of the government?			

IX. NGOs Values and ethics

Table (10)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Are the board of directors, the members and beneficiaries participate in determining the value and ethics of the NGO?			
2. Did you discuss the values of the NGO with the board of directories?			
3. Does the NGO have a written value			

and ethics?			
4. During the planning process, Is the value of the NGO taken into account?			

X. Legal Aspects

Table (11)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Does the NGO have internal bylaws?			
2. Do you know if there is an official registration for the NGO?			
3. Does the NGO use its internal bylaws?			
4. Does the NGO have a Board of directors?			
5. Does the functions and role of board of directories clear?			
6. Do you have relationship with board of directories?			

XI. Israeli occupation and its impact on the activity and the role of the NGOs

Table (12)

	Yes	No	Sometimes
1. Do you think there are obstacles caused by the Israeli Occupation?			
2. Do you think activities and programs of NGOs affected by the Israeli occupation?			
3. Do policies and strategies of the Israeli occupation affect the NGOs?			
4. Does the Israeli occupation intervene directly or indirectly in the NGOs affairs?			
5. Does the Israeli occupation affect free movement of NGOs staff?			
6. Does the Israeli occupation prevent the implementation of the NGO programs or projects?			
7. Does the Israeli occupation delay the implementation of some programs or projects?			
8. Does the Israeli occupation intervene in defining programs or projects?			
9. Does the Israeli occupation affect			

NGOs fundraising?			
10. Do you think the Israeli occupation has an influence on donors to fund or not certain NGOs?			
11. Do you think the Israeli occupation intervene in determining the policy of donors' countries?			
12. Does Israeli blockade have negative impact on NGOs activities?			

XII. Final Summary

1. What are the NGO strengths?
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2. Why?
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3. What are the NGO weaknesses?
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4. How to overcome these weaknesses?
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