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SCALE-UP ET ENTREPRENEURIAT SOCIAL: PARTENARIAT, TRANSFERT DES INNOVATIONS ET MODELES DE GESTION

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to deepen the study of social entrepreneurship by examining how social entrepreneurs use partnerships and organize themselves to transfer knowledge. My research takes a first step towards building a theory of innovation transfer and scaling for social entrepreneurship. This study builds on three primary foundations. One is the literature on innovation transfer strategy, which seeks to develop a broad view of the various strategies used by firms to transfer innovations effectively. The second is the literature on social entrepreneurship, which highlights the value-creation focus of certain firms that emerge and operate where situations of simultaneous market and government failure exist. Third, I use the literature on institutions, in particular institutional logics, to explain how organizational processes impacted by multiple logics unfold.

Using an inductive, multiple-case methodology, I illuminate the innovation transfer process as it relates to social entrepreneurs. My objective is threefold. First, I aim to understand how social entrepreneurs manage the innovation transfer process. Second, I want to identify the crucial factors influencing innovation transfer between social entrepreneurs, distinguish these factors from those observed in more traditional settings, and examine their impact on the direction of the innovation transfer process. Third, and finally, I hope to offer possible alternative views to the discussion on "scaling" in the social sector, a debate which has, to date, focused on "scaling organizations" as the primary means to expand the scope and reach of innovations developed by social entrepreneurs.

Keywords:

Innovation transfer, transfer strategy, social entrepreneurship, social enterprises, replication, adaptation, institutional logics, innovation, business models, entrepreneurship

RESUME

L’étude présentée ici tente d’ouvrir une voie intermédiaire en s’attachant au processus de transfert d’innovation entre entrepreneurs sociaux. Nous appuyant sur la littérature sur la stratégie de transfert d’innovation, qui cherche à développer une perspective globale des stratégies variées utilisées par les entreprises pour transférer des innovations efficacement, nous étudions ce processus de transfert dans un contexte d’entrepreneuriat social, où l’équilibre entre objectifs d’efficience et objectifs sociaux plus larges est explicitement plus grand (Pache et Santos, 2010). Nous mettons ainsi en lumière le fait que certains organismes qui apparaissent et opèrent dans des contextes d’échec simultané des marchés et des gouvernements axent leurs activités sur la création de valeur. S’il est vrai que le transfert d’innovation a le potentiel d’ajouter de la valeur à toutes les entreprises, les divergences dans les objectifs organisationnels et les identités de celles-ci peuvent aboutir à des processus de transfert très différents, au fur et à mesure que l’on passe de l’entrepreneuriat commercial traditionnel à l’entrepreneuriat social.

Les travaux de recherche récents sur l’entrepreneuriat social se sont centrés sur le besoin qu’ont ces entrepreneurs d’augmenter leur impact social en développant d’avantage leurs opérations réussies (Bloom et Chatterji, 2009), mais le processus de transfert d’innovations comme stratégie pour augmenter cet impact est mal connu. D’autre part, la recherche sur le transfert d’innovation ne s’est quasiment pas penchée sur cette question, parce- qu’elle n’a pas envisagé comment des entrepreneurs qui veulent créer, et non capter, de la valeur s’engagent dans le processus de transfert. L’objectif de ce travail est d’étudier comment les entrepreneurs sociaux gèrent le transfert d’innovations et s’organisent pour augmenter l’impact de leurs innovations. Le sujet ne se limite donc pas aux mécanismes et aux résultats d’un transfert, comme dans les études précédentes. Les questions posées ici ont pour but de comprendre comment les motivations des entrepreneurs sociaux, que l’on considère comme différentes de celles des entrepreneurs plus traditionnels, influencent la façon dont se déroule le transfert d'innovation. Pour ce faire, nous procédons d'abord au ré-examen des objectifs, du contexte, et du périmètre du transfert d'innovations dans le cas d'entreprises sociales.

Mots clefs: entrepreneuriat social, transfert d'innovation, économies émergentes, scale-up, relations inter-organisationnelles, logiques institutionnelles, partenariats

INTRODUCTION

Le transfert d'innovation est au coeur de la stratégie d'entreprise et de l'entrepreneuriat. Alors que les marchés se sont de plus en plus mondialisés ces dernières décennies, le transfert d'innovation vers les partenaires est apparu comme un moyen relativement peu coûteux et efficace pour que les entreprises développent leurs activités (Gulati, 1998; Ahuja, Polidoro, et Mitchell, 2009). Pour beaucoup d'organisations, le coût élevé du développement à l'international, doublé de la volonté d'accéder à des technologies et des modèles de gestion capables d'atteindre des lieux géographiques et des marchés divers, fait du transfert d'innovation la seule solution viable si elles veulent avoir un impact au-delà de leurs frontières locales. Les chercheurs ont suivi cette tendance avec un grand intérêt, et la prolifération d'études dans ce domaine atteste de l'évolution parallèle des préoccupations de ceux-ci et des praticiens. (Faulkner et de Rond, 2000).

Les chercheurs ont étudié le transfert d'innovation de différents angles, mais les études sur le sujet ont plutôt porté sur deux extrêmes: un angle sous-socialisé, et un angle sur-socialisé, selon la terminologie de Granovetter (1985). D'un côté, les chercheurs dans le domaine traditionnel de la stratégie d'entreprise et de l'économie se sont concentrés sur les motivations relatives à l'efficience des partenaires dans une relation de transfert. Comme l'ont remarqué Ansari, Fiss et Zajac (2010), qui les appellent des « comptes rationnels » de l'adoption d'innovation, ces motivations sont ancrées dans la théorie économique traditionnelle et se concentrent sur les bénéfices économiques présumés résultant de l'adoption d'une pratique suite à un transfert. Ils mettent ainsi en avant le lien entre le rapport coût-efficacité d'une innovation et la probabilité qu'elle soit utilisée par l'entreprise ou l'unité commerciale qui la reçoit (Rogers, 1995). Dans ces modèles, des pressions de sélection sont sans doute à l'oeuvre pour éliminer les organisations qui n'adoptent pas une pratique efficiente. Les dirigeants raisonnables adoptent sans doute les innovations les plus efficientes, ce qui a pour conséquence une amélioration des performances de leur entreprise et un passage de ces innovations chez ceux qui veulent gagner les mêmes effets (Rao, Greve & Davis, 2001). De l'autre côté, les chercheurs travaillant dans la tradition sociologique de la théorie organisationnelle ont eu tendance à regarder l'environnement dans lequel s'inscrit une organisation -tenant compte de facteurs sociaux, culturels, politiques et économiques- et à se demander à quel point cet environnement influence les actions des organisations, au-delà de considérations d'efficience ou de calcul. L'angle institutionnel insiste notamment sur le rôle des institutions et des facteurs culturels locaux dans la forme et la direction que prend le transfert d'innovation ; ceci se retrouve surtout dans des macro-études (eg, Westney, 1987; Djelic, 1998; Hwang et Powell, 2009) mais aussi dans quelques études de cas portant sur le processus de transfert d'innovation (eg, Boxenbaum et Battilana, 2005).

L'étude présentée ici tente d'ouvrir une voie intermédiaire en s'attachant au processus de transfert d'innovation entre entrepreneurs sociaux. Nous appuyant sur la littérature sur la stratégie de transfert d'innovation, qui cherche à développer une perspective globale des stratégies variées utilisées par les entreprises pour transférer des innovations efficacement, nous étudions ce processus de transfert dans un contexte d'entrepreneuriat social, où l'équilibre entre objectifs d'efficience et objectifs sociaux plus larges est explicitement plus grand (Pache et Santos, 2010). Nous mettons ainsi en lumière le fait que certains organismes qui apparaissent et opèrent dans des contextes d'échec simultané des marchés et des gouvernements axent leurs activités sur la création de valeur. S'il est vrai que le transfert d'innovation a le potentiel d'ajouter de la valeur à toutes les entreprises, les divergences dans les objectifs organisationnels et les identités de celles-ci peuvent aboutir à des processus de transfert très différents, au fur et à mesure que l'on passe de l'entrepreneuriat commercial traditionnel à l'entrepreneuriat social.

Le contexte de l’entrepreneuriat social présente un grand intérêt pour la recherche sur l’entrepreneuriat, et constitue un domaine de recherches propres en pleine expansion (Mair et Marti, 2006). L’entrepreneuriat social implique “une activité d’entreprise à but social intrinsèque” (Austin, Stevenson, et Wei-Skillern, 2006), et est souvent caractérisé par l’allocation de ressources (financières, humaines, politiques) à des problématiques sociales négligées (Mair et Marti, 2006; Santos, 2009). Les entrepreneurs sociaux sont à l’origine de nombreuses innovations à la fois dans les pays développés et en développement, allant de l’accès à la chirurgie préventive de la cataracte à la distribution de prêts à faible taux d’intérêt aux femmes pauvres, en passant par la revitalisation de systèmes scolaires urbains ou ruraux (Bornstein, 2004; Elkington et Hartigan, 2008; Phills, Deiglmeier et Miller, 2008). Si les entrepreneurs sociaux diffèrent de leurs homologues plus traditionnels sur un certain nombre de points, c’est le cas tout particulièrement pour ce qui est de leurs motivations lorsqu’ils s’engagent dans des activités entrepreneuriales. Pour les premiers, l’objectif principal est la création de valeur pour la communauté dans son ensemble, tandis que même si les seconds s’intéressent aussi à la création de valeur dans une certaine mesure, ils cherchent à capter celle-ci sous forme de profits financiers pour les dirigeants et les actionnaires (Santos, 2009).

Considérant que les entrepreneurs sociaux sont souvent plus intéressés par le partage de leur innovation pour maximiser leur impact plutôt que par son appropriation pour maximiser leurs profits, le processus de transfert de connaissances pourrait bien être qualitativement différent de celui rencontré chez des entreprises à but uniquement lucratif. Une tentative de transfert dans ce dernier cas représente un jugement spéculative sur ce qu’il serait profitable de répliquer: il faut que l’objet du transfert présente des caractéristiques qui ajoutent une valeur proportionnelle à son coût, valeur qui peut ensuite être appropriée au bénéfice des actionnaires (Winter et Szulanski, 2001; Bloom et Chatterji, 2009). Les entrepreneurs sociaux cherchent également à créer de la valeur, mais avec pour intention première de la transformer en solutions qui génèrent des externalités positives non fournies par la société, plutôt que pour se l'approprier: ils cherchent à s'assurer que cette valeur bénéficie à toute la société plutôt qu'à une petite partie. Ils peuvent ainsi se préoccuper de profits, mais dans la mesure où ils leur permettent de faire perdurer leurs solutions (Santos, 2009).

Les travaux de recherche récents sur l'entrepreneuriat social se sont centrés sur le besoin qu'ont ces entrepreneurs d'augmenter leur impact social en développant d'avantage leurs opérations réussies (Bloom et Chatterji, 2009), mais le processus de transfert d'innovations comme stratégie pour augmenter cet impact est mal connu. D'autre part, la recherche sur le transfert d'innovation ne s'est quasiment pas penchée sur cette question, parce- qu'elle n'a pas envisagé comment des entrepreneurs qui veulent créer, et non capter, de la valeur s'engagent dans le processus de transfert. L'objectif de ce travail est d'étudier comment les entrepreneurs sociaux gèrent le transfert d'innovations et s'organisent pour augmenter l'impact de leurs innovations. Le sujet ne se limite donc pas aux mécanismes et aux résultats d'un transfert, comme dans les études précédentes. Les questions posées ici ont pour but de comprendre comment les motivations des entrepreneurs sociaux, que l'on considère comme différentes de celles des entrepreneurs plus traditionnels, influencent la façon dont se déroule le transfert d'innovation. Pour ce faire, nous procédons d'abord au ré-examen des objectifs, du contexte, et du périmètre du transfert d'innovations dans le cas d'entreprises sociales. Nous étudions également le rôle que joue l'identité de l'organisation dans ces processus (Albert et Whetten, 1985).

Dans la partie empirique de ce travail, nous élargissons le sujet d'étude pour nous attacher à des questions d'ordre plus général. Les chercheurs n'ont pas par exemple traité la question du transfert d'innovation du point de vue d'un organisme engagé dans ce processus. Comment l'entreprise source développe-t-elle une stratégie de transfert concernant ses innovations efficaces? A l'exception de travaux restreints (eg, Williams, 2007), il reste encore aux chercheurs à étudier l'effet d'interaction d'une stratégie de transfert centrée sur la réplication ou sur l'adaptation avec des facteurs contextuels ou organisationnels, et ce pour déterminer comment les entreprises source engagées dans une relation de transfert de savoir dyadique atteignent au mieux leurs buts. En d'autres termes, les entrepreneurs sociaux peuvent-ils transférer leurs acquis le plus efficacement en se tenant toujours à l'une ou à l'autre de ces stratégies? Quels facteurs contextuels influent le plus sur le choix de la stratégie utilisée? Ce choix change-t-il au fil du temps (les entreprises ont-elles recours à des stratégies qui intègrent la réplication et l'adaptation?) ? Si c'est le cas, pourquoi? Mais aussi comment les logiques institutionnelles diverses affectent-elles le processus de transfert d'innovations entre entreprises sociales? Enfin, comment celles-ci s'organisent-elles pour maximiser leur impact et élargir la portée de leurs innovations ?

A l'aide d'une méthodologie d'études de cas multiples inductive, ces questions sont analysées à-travers quatre couples d'entrepreneurs sociaux engagés dans le processus de transfert d'innovation dans cinq économies émergentes (Bangladesh, Inde, Pakistan, Paraguay et Sri Lanka) sur deux continents. La plupart des études sur le transfert d'innovations se sont concentrées sur des contextes occidentaux (eg, Djelic, 1998; Katila et Ahuja, 2002), ou sur des pays qui, sans être occidentaux, sont néanmoins tout aussi développés industriellement (par exemple le Japon – Westney, 1987). Les contextes d'économies émergentes, où les institutions industrielles sont beaucoup moins avancées, n'ont dans l'ensemble pas été étudiés. Les travaux qui les ont inclus ont plutôt porté sur le transfert d'innovations et de schémas organisationnels occidentaux vers des pays en développement, et l'interaction entre l'innovation et ce contexte (eg, Rottenburg, 1996). Très peu d'études se sont penchées sur le transfert de technologies d'une économie émergente à une autre, et encore moins au sein de la même économie. Ce travail tente de combler également cette lacune.

Cette thèse se structure de la façon suivante. Dans la seconde partie, qui fait suite à cette introduction, se trouve la bibliographie et l'analyse des objectifs, du contexte et du périmètre du transfert d'innovation lorsque les organisations concernées sont des entrepreneurs sociaux. Sont exposées ensuite les méthodes de collecte, d'organisation et d'analyse de données utilisées. La quatrième partie présente le premier de trois travaux empiriques, portant sur deux entreprises sociales indiennes engagées dans le processus de transfert d'innovation. La cinquième partie est composée du second essai empirique, celui de l'impact de logiques institutionnelles multiples sur le transfert d'innovation entre entreprises sociales. Le troisième et dernier travail empirique est présenté dans la sixième partie; il se penche sur les façons dont les entreprises sociales s'organisent pour augmenter leur impact en gérant leur système d'activité de façon à répondre aux publics divers dont ils dépendent pour survivre et se développer. Les dernières parties de cette thèse sont consacrées aux références bibliographiques et aux annexes.

ESSAI 1

Le scale-up des innovations sociales:
Le Cas de Gram Vikas

RESUME

L'objectif de cet essai est de mieux comprendre le processus de transfert d'innovations entre organisations du secteur social, un domaine de recherche à la croisée des chemins entre entrepreneuriat social, scale-up, et transfert des innovations. La question suivante sert de ligne directrice à ce travail: Comment les innovations sociales sont-elles transférée*s à d'autres* organisations pour augmenter leur impact ? A-partir d'observations sur le terrain, d'entretiens et de données d'archives provenant d'une tentative de transfert d'innovation sociale en cours en Inde rurale, ce travail montre que le processus de scale-up est semé d'embuches, mais peut néanmoins être réussi en se concentrant sur « l'Arrow core » d'éléments qui assurent le succès d'une innovation sociale.

Mots clefs: entrepreneuriat social, transfert d'innovation, économies émergentes, scale-up, développement international, développement rural, Inde

ESSAI 2

Logiques Institutionnelles Multiples et Partenariat Inter-organisationnel: La Dynamique de la Coopération entre Entreprises Sociales

RESUME

Cet essai porte sur l'évolution des partenariats entre entreprises sociales, des organisations sous-tendues par des logiques à la fois sociales et économiques. A-travers des études de cas longitudinales sur l'interaction de quatre couples d'entreprises sociales opérant dans des économies émergentes, nous analysons les facteurs qui influent sur l'évolution des partenariats de transfert d'innovations. Les conclusions de ces études de cas laissent penser qu'une multitude de logiques, non seulement sociales et économiques, guident l'action des organisations, et que leur corrélation entre organismes détermine la façon dont ceux-ci gèrent le processus de transfert.

Mots clefs: relations inter-organisationnelles, logiques institutionnelles, partenariats, entreprises sociales, relations entre entreprises sociales

ESSAI 3

Forme et Identité Organisationnelles:
Comment les Entreprises Sociales Gèrent leur Système d'Activité

RESUME

Ce travail étudie comment les entreprises sociales gèrent leur système d'activité de façon à répondre aux publics divers dont elles dépendent pour survivre et se développer. Nous étudions comment les formes et les identités des organisations sont affectées par les pressions venant de publics externes tels que les organismes de légitimation, et le rapport du processus de réplication d'innovations chez des organisations partenaires avec ces facteurs. Les implications pour des travaux de recherche ultérieurs sur la conception et la gestion d'entreprises sociales sont également envisagées.

Mots clefs: forme organisationnelle, identité organisationnelle, partenariats, entreprises sociales,
entrepreneuriat social

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

Innovation transfer lies at the heart of business strategy and entrepreneurship. As markets have increasingly globalized in past decades, innovation transfer to partners has emerged as a relatively low-cost and effective way for firms to increase their reach (Gulati, 1998; Ahuja, Polidoro, and Mitchell, 2009). For many organizations the high cost of expanding operations internationally, coupled with the desire for access to technologies and business models which are capable of reaching multiple geographies and markets, leaves innovation transfer as the only viable option for increasing their impact beyond local boundaries. Scholars have followed this trend with great interest, and a proliferation of studies in this area attests to co-evolution of practitioner and researcher concerns (Faulkner and de Rond, 2000).

Researchers have examined innovation transfer from multiple perspectives, but the focus of many studies in this tradition has tended towards two extremes: an under-socialized perspective and an over-socialized one, using Granovetter's (1985) terminology. On the one hand, scholars working in the tradition business strategy and economics have focused on the efficiency motivations of partners in a transfer relationship. As noted by Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac (2010), who term them "rational accounts" of innovation adoption, these motivations are rooted in traditional economic theory and focus on the presumed economic benefits which result from the adoption of a practice following transfer. In this, they highlight the connection between the cost effectiveness or efficacy of an innovation and the likelihood of it being utilized by the recipient firm or business unit (Rogers, 1995). In these models, selection pressures may work to eliminate those organizations which fail to adopt an efficient practice and the most efficient innovations may be adopted by rational managers, resulting in increased performance for their firms and the spread of the innovation to non-adopters that wish to gain the same performance impact (Rao, Greve & Davis, 2001). On the other hand, scholars working in the sociological tradition of organizational theory have tended to look at the environment in which an organization is embedded – including social, cultural, political, and economic concerns – and the extent to which this environment influences the actions of organizations beyond questions of efficiency and calculation. For instance, institutional perspectives stress the role of local cultural factors and institutions in shaping the nature and direction of innovation transfer, especially through macro-level studies (e.g., Westney, 1987; Djelic, 1998; Hwang and Powell, 2009) as well as scattered micro-level case studies of the innovation transfer process (e.g., Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005).

This study attempts to chart a middle course by examining the innovation transfer process between social entrepreneurs. Building on the innovation transfer strategy literature, which seeks to develop a broad view of the various strategies used by firms to transfer innovations effectively, I study the innovation transfer process in a social entrepreneurship context, where there is an explicitly greater balance between efficiency goals and broader, social goals (Pache and Santos, 2010). By doing this I highlight the value-creation focus of certain firms that emerge and operate where situations of simultaneous market and government failure exist. While transfers of innovations have the potential to add value to all firms, differences in organizational objectives and identities may lead to transfer processes which look quite different as we move from traditional commercial entrepreneurship to social entrepreneurship.

The context of social entrepreneurship is highly relevant for business scholars, and social entrepreneurship is a growing field (Mair and Marti, 2006). Social entrepreneurship involves "entrepreneurial activity with an embedded social purpose" (Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern, 2006), and is often characterized by the allocation of resources (financial, human, political) to neglected social problems (Mair and Marti, 2006; Santos, 2009). Social entrepreneurs are the source of numerous innovations in both the developed and developing world, from the provision of low-cost preventive cataract surgeries to the distribution of low-cost loans to poor women to the revitalization of neglected urban and rural school systems (Bornstein, 2004; Elkington and Hartigan, 2008; Phills, Deiglmeier, and Miller, 2008). While social entrepreneurs differ from more traditional entrepreneurs on a number of dimensions, they can be most particularly with respect to their motivation to engage in business activity. For social entrepreneurs, the primary focus is on creating value for the community at large. While tradition entrepreneurs are also interested in creating value to a certain extent, their primary motivation is to capture value for a firm managers and shareholders in the form of economic profits (Santos, 2009).

Because social entrepreneurs are often more interested in sharing their innovation to maximize impact rather than "owning" it to maximize profits, the knowledge transfer process may be qualitatively different from what is observed in transfers between purely for-profit enterprises. For instance, a profit-motivated transfer attempt implicitly represents a speculative judgment about what it is profitable to replicate: it is important to replicate features which add value commensurate to their costs, value which can then be appropriated for the firm's stakeholders (Winter and Szulanski, 2001; Bloom and Chatterji, 2009). Social entrepreneurs also seek to add value, but do so with the primary intent to deliver solutions which address neglected positive externalities rather than to capture that value for themselves: social entrepreneurs work to ensure that the value they create spills over to the whole of society rather than a small part. Thus, profit may be a concern, but only to the extent that it helps to sustain their solutions (Santos, 2009).

While recent research in social entrepreneurship has focused on the need to scale social impact by expanding the growing the operations of successful social entrepreneurs (Bloom and Chatterji, 2009), the process of transferring innovations as a strategy for scaling social impact is poorly understood. Further, research on innovation transfer has neglected this issue almost entirely as it has largely not considered how entrepreneurs whose main mission is creating value, as opposed to capturing value, engage in the innovation transfer process. The purpose of this study is to explore how social entrepreneurs manage the innovation transfer process and organize themselves to scale the impact of their innovations. Thus, the issue is not limited to the mechanics and outcomes of transfer, as in previous studies. Rather, the questions I ask will delve deeply into how the motivations of social entrepreneurs, which are taken to be different from those of more traditional entrepreneurs, influence how the innovation transfer process plays out. I initially address this issue by re-examining the objectives, context, and scope of innovation transfer when the organizations involved are social entrepreneurs. I also examine the role of organizational identity (Albert and Whetten, 1985) in these processes.

In my empirical work, I broaden the focus of inquiry to address some more general questions. For instance, business scholars have also not adequately addressed the question of innovation transfer from the perspective of a firm engaged in the process of transferring an innovation. In other, words, how does the source firm develop a transfer strategy with respect to its successful innovations? With the exception of some limited work (e.g., Williams, 2007), researchers have yet to examine the interaction effect of a replication-focused or adaptation-focused transfer strategy with contextual and organizational factors to determine how source enterprises in a dyadic knowledge-transfer relationship most effectively accomplish their goals. That is, are entrepreneurs able to most effectively transfer their knowledge by always sticking to one strategy as opposed to the other? What contextual factors most influence the choice of strategy used? Does this choice change over time (e.g., do source enterprises use a strategy which incorporates replication and adaptation?)? If so: why? Importantly, how do multiple institutional logics impact the process of transferring innovations between social enterprises? Finally, how do social enterprises organize themselves to maximize their impact and to scale their innovations?

Using an inductive, multiple-case methodology, I study these questions by through of detailed study of four pairs of social entrepreneurs engaged in the innovation transfer process in five different emerging economies on two continents (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Paraguay and Sri Lanka). Most studies of innovation transfer have focused on Western country contexts (e.g., Djelic, 1998; Katila and Ahuja, 2002), or countries that, if not Western, are nevertheless similarly well-developed industrially (e.g., Japan – Westney, 1987). Emerging economy contexts, where industrial institutions are far less advanced, have not been for the most part examined. Studies which have included emerging economies tend to focus on the transfer of western technologies and organizing patterns to developing countries, and how these technologies interact with these contexts (e.g., Rottenburg, 1996). Further, to date, very limited work as looked at the transfer of technologies from one emerging economy context to another, or, indeed, at transfers of technologies within emerging economies. My study addresses these gaps in the literature as well.

The thesis is organized as follows. In the second section (following this introductory initial section), I review the literature and examine the objectives, context, and scope of innovation transfer when the organizations involved are social entrepreneurs. Subsequently, I outline my data collection process and the methods used to organize and analyze the data I collected. In the fourth section of the thesis I present the first of three empirical papers, an exploratory study of two Indian social enterprises engaged in the innovation transfer process. The fifth section encompasses the second empirical essay, which examines the impact of multiple institutional logics on the innovation transfer process between social enterprises. The sixth section presents the third and final empirical essay, which looks at how social enterprises organize themselves to scale impact by managing their activity systems to address the multiple audiences they rely on for their survival and growth. The final sections of the dissertation are the endnotes and appendices.

SECTION 2

THEORY

In this section of my dissertation I begin by organizing the theoretical and empirical literature on innovation transfer into four streams: (1) <u>Diffusion and Adaptation of Innovations</u>; (2) <u>Innovation Transfer through Partnerships: Alliances and Learning</u>; (3) <u>Innovation Transfer through Replication: Franchises and the Reproduction of Knowledge</u>; and (4) <u>Transfer Strategy</u>. Second, I attempt to synthesize these research findings, and discuss how they might apply to the setting of social entrepreneurship, focusing on the objectives, context, and scope of innovation transfer. I also justify why the setting of social entrepreneurship can shed new light on innovation transfer processes by examining these three important areas, and examine the role of organizational identity in these processes. In doing this I integrate common findings and blend complementary findings from the innovation transfer literature into this relatively uncharted context.

Literature Review

The literature on innovation transfer is vast and often unwieldy, ranging from in-depth case studies of particular transfer processes to broad-scale examination of the process across a range of national settings, industries, firms, and organizational divisions and units. While several organizing frameworks are possible, my review starts from macro-level adaptation-focused perspectives on innovation transfer and then moves to the firm-level, where efficiency-focused perspectives on innovation transfer in the context of learning and alliances tend to predominate. I also review the literature on franchise organizations, which examines the replication of innovations and business models, but doesn't neatly fit into either of the first two literature streams examined. These three primary streams are summarized along key dimensions in Table 1. Additionally, I review a fourth, emergent, stream of research which attempts to derive the optimal strategies used by firms to transfer innovations by synthesizing adaptation-focused and efficiency-focused perspectives. Taken together, these studies form a foundation for the study of innovation transfers between social entrepreneurs.

Insert Table 1 about here
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1. Diffusion and Adaptation of Innovations

One stream of research in innovation transfer is what I have turned the "diffusion and adaptation" perspective. This literature on the transfer of innovations is based in the sociological and organizations literature, and indeed has a long history. Starting as far back as the work of Gabriel Tarde (1895), scholars have been interested in the way in which organizational innovations and business models spread, using both macro- and micro-perspectives on this phenomenon. The diffusion and adaptation approach shows how innovation transfer is closely associated with questions of local fit and adaptation, regardless of whether practices or institutions are clearly associated with the commercial side of economic activity or within the government and not-for-profit realms (e.g., Westney, 1987; Guillen, 1994; Djelic, 1998; Powell, Gammal, and Simard, 2005).

Westney's (1987) study of the borrowing of organizational practices focuses on the deliberate emulation of Western organizational models in Meiji Japan is one of the most extensive studies on the subject of transfer. Her historical study is situated in the late-19th century and early-20th century, a period of heavy, Western-style industrialization in Japan. Westney focused on three primary institutions: the police force (following the French model); the postal system (following the British model); and the newspapers (following a few Western models). She concludes that despite the most deliberate efforts to emulate existing models, the original pattern and its extant features cannot be duplicated in a manner that preserves all its features. Unintended departures from the model inevitably occur, and intended departures such "selective emulation" – a process in which the importers of a model choose not to adopt certain features of the original model due to potential conflicts with local values – are also hard to contain (Westney, 1987: 27).

Similarly, Djelic's (1998) history of postwar reconstruction in mid-20th-century Europe demonstrates how local particularities shaped the nature of industrial institutions imported from America and implemented in different national environments. While France and Germany were, to different degrees, receptive to such importation, a combination of varying social, political, and economic forces led to a near total rejection of the American model in Italy. Some studies have included developing countries as the destination of transfer, focusing on the transfer Western organizational patterns with the similar results to the studies already noted; while a surface-level representation of the original imported patterns is discernable, the context results in significant adaptation to local realities (Rottenburg, 1996).

Another set of studies is closely associated with the Nordic school of institutional scholars, and focuses on the dual processes of translation and circulation in innovation transfer (Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996). In this schema a translation model the originator of the innovation has little control or idea about where and when the innovation transfer process concludes. Indeed, parts of an innovation that is spread in time and space may turn up in circumstances that are entirely different from what the originator had envisioned or would have preferred. In this schema, it thus becomes less meaningful to distinguish between an original discovery or innovation and its copy, since the act of "copying" an innovation inevitably results in translation of the innovation to fit local circumstances and realities. Imitation results in outputs that are not copies or radically new inventions, but rather something in between these two ideals (Sevón, 1996).

Taken together, these studies point to the enduring power and role of local institutions in shaping the nature of innovation transfer. In this their focus is on macro-level forces, and in general the diffusion and adaptation perspective gives less weight to the role of firms and individuals in the innovation transfer process. While some studies in this tradition have recently begun to address this point (e.g., Djelic, 2004; Powell et al., 2005), this remains a major limitation. Studies which incorporate notions of agency in the innovation transfer process, both at the level of the firm and the individual, within the broad institutional environment would go a long way towards closing this gap.

2. Innovation Transfer through Partnerships: Alliances and Learning

A second stream of literature looks primarily at the transfer of innovations (practices, business systems, etc.) between firms. It emphasizes the use of dynamic capabilities, relational governance, transaction cost, transaction value, and economics-based frameworks to understand these processes. At the core of most of this research is the strategic alliance, a voluntary partnership between two or more organizations and motivated by strategic motives, shared R&D goals, and the need to spread the costs and risks of innovation, among other reasons (Gualti, 1998). A number of studies within this literature have addressed how knowledge might be transferred between organizations through alliances, and two basic findings seem especially relevant for my study. First, an organization's capacity for learning from its alliance partner depends upon its endowment of relevant technology-based capabilities when entering the alliance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Second, innovation transfer may not merely be dependent on the alliance as such, but also on the level of pre-alliance overlap between the two organizations' technological capabilities (Land and Lubatkin, 1998).

The first important finding is that an organization's capacity for learning from its alliance partner depends upon its endowment of relevant technology-based capabilities when entering the alliance. Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996) tracked changes in the in strategic alliance partners' technological capabilities based on citation patterns of their patent portfolios. They found that absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) is an important factor in the acquisition of capabilities through alliances and bolsters the argument that experience in related technological areas is an important determinant of absorptive capacity. They also used this measure to test hypotheses on interfirm transfer of innovations and found that certain contractual arrangements (e.g., equity joint ventures) are more effective conduits for the transfer of complex innovations and knowledge than others (e.g., licensing agreements). Interestingly, Mowery et al. also found that over the two-year study period (1985-1986) the capabilities of partner firms became more divergent in a substantial subset of alliances. This is consistent with the argument that strategic alliance activity can promote increased specialization, but seems to somehow defy conventional wisdom and the point of forming an alliance in the first place, which is, ostensibly, to share knowledge and capabilities resulting in a greater overlap between the knowledge bases of alliance partners. Thus, the "strategic" aspect of a strategic alliance may drive alliance partners towards specialized knowledge bases to maximize the competitive advantages gained from collaboration – i.e., gaining knowledge of competitors' strengths may lead to specialization in their areas of weakness.

A second finding from this literature is that innovation transfer may note merely by dependent on the alliance, but also on the level of pre-alliance overlap between the two organizations' technological capabilities. For instance, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) develop a dyad-level construct to measure learning between a student firm (pharmaceutical company) and a teacher firm (biotechnology firm) in the context of an R&D alliance. Building on Cohen and Levinthal's (1990) concept of absorptive capacity – which is a proxy for a firm's ability to acquire and utilize new knowledge – they argue that one firm's ability to learn from another firm depends on the similarity of both firms': (1) knowledge bases; (2) organizational structures and compensation policies; and (3) dominant logics. Thus, the ability of a firm to learn from another firm is jointly determined by the relative characteristics of the two firms on these dimensions, particularly the relationship between their knowledge-processing systems. Along the same lines, Faems Janssens, and van Looy (2007), using a comparative case study approach, found that relation-specific investments in similar technological equipment for transferring innovations allows the creation of a physical environment in which acquisition and assimilation of tacit technological knowledge is facilitated. They also found that after the transfer of the initially-desired innovation, expected future payoffs of the relationship can remain stable as long as perceived technological complementarities remain present and perceived market threats remain limited. These two conditions can be realized through either the strategy of one partner introducing a string of new technologies or both partners exploiting the transferred knowledge for different product / market combinations.

Overall, studies in the "alliances, learning, and transfer" stream thus broadly focus on two factors which have relevance for this study: (1) the characteristics of the innovation transferred relative to the knowledge base of the target organization; and (2) the relationship between the knowledge bases of the organizations in an innovation transfer alliance. Particularly in emphasizing the first point, there are many similarities between this literature and the literature on the diffusion and adaptation of innovations. For instance, in macro-level studies of innovation transfer (e.g., Djelic, 1998), the integration of an innovation at a target site is often highly dependent on the nature of pre-existing knowledge structures in domains similar to that of the innovation being transferred. One interesting point of divergence, however, is Mowery et al.'s (1996) contention (seemingly extended by Faems et al., 2007), that alliances can produce either convergence of capabilities through interfirm knowledge transfer or divergence through complementary specialization. This effect may be less pronounced in certain contexts, particularly where the primary goal of the source organization in the transfer process is to scale-up their successful activities in another context (as opposed to maximizing profits). While convergence may be norm in this setting, divergence may result from target organizations' need to differentiate the technology they get from source organizations. But divergence may also be explained through another lens. If we examine this from the point of view of identity boundaries (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005) – i.e., organizational identity or the cognitive frames of individual managers – complementarity may simply be the result of a need for differentiation for each company in an alliance. Thus, if two companies in the alliance share some set of capabilities and operate in similar markets, they may want to specialize as a means of defining a different organizational identity from their partner. This is a question that is potentially worth exploring, both theoretically and empirically.

Another important thread research emerging from this stream is the construct of relative absorptive capacity (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), which is related to the nature of the relationship between organizations in an innovation transfer alliance. This measure has some implications for transfers of innovations between purely for profit-firms, which as well as firms which have conflicting institutional demands such a profit and social goals which may be equally weighted in terms of goal salience (Pache and Santos, 2010). By examining transfers of innovations between organizations through the lens of organizational dyads, it may be possible to develop constructs which offer robust predictive power regarding the potential success of a transfer based on the institutional demands which are most salient with respect to the innovation transfer process. Cultural distance, organizational identity boundaries (e.g., in the sense of for-profit, hybrid, nonprofit, etc.), and various environmental factors may serve as predictor variables which can be conceived at both the firm level and at the level of the organizational dyad. For instance, an identity distance measure might be developed to measure the gap between the organizational identities of two firms in a transfer relationship. Such a measure could serve as a proxy for the relatedness of two firms based on factors of such as country of origin, organizational culture, sector of activity, and a for-profit or not-for-profit orientation.

Finally, an important question which remains open in this research tradition relates to the issue of innovation transfers between firms which have differing levels of embeddedness, or location in the social structure, in their respective organizational environments. In the alliances literature, scholars have recently begun to address how firms with differing levels of embeddedness within a particular social network constrains or enables the formation of new interorganizational alliances (Rosenkopf, Metiu, and George, 2001; Baum Shipilov, and Rowley, 2003; Ahuja, Polidoro, and Mitchell, 2009). This work is important to better understand the network dynamics of collaboration. Additionally, the large-data-set based, deductive methodology these studies employ has shed light on the collaboration process at a macro level. For instance, it is well-understood now that highly embedded firms use their prior connections to build new ties and remain deeply embedded in the network, whereas poorly embedded firms tend to remain at the periphery of the network. What scholars have not examined, however, is the process of interaction between highly embedded firms when innovation transfer is, a priori, a unidirectional process and how highly embedded firms approach partnerships with firms that are relatively less-well-embedded within interorganizational networks when organizational goals necessitate such pairings (e.g., when firms want to increase their impact in new geographies).

3. Innovation Transfer through Replication: Franchises and the Reproduction of Knowledge

A third important stream of innovation transfer research centers on the development and growth of franchise organizations. This stream of literature has from studies in the field of entrepreneurship, and looks primarily at the various strategies used by franchise organizations to achieve growth, in particular through replication mechanisms. While some scholars in this tradition concentrate primarily on agency explanations to elucidate mechanisms of expansion (e.g., Shane, 1996; Combs and Ketchum, 1999), other papers are focused on describing the ways in which organizational systems – consisting of franchises and company-owned units – achieve balance between their inter-related but distinct elements, thereby ensuring both uniformity and system-wide adaptability (e.g., Bradach, 1997).

Several papers take an agency-based approach to growth and firm expansion. Shane's (1996) study examined firms that offered franchise-offering documents in the US in 1983 over a ten-year period. He finds that franchisors using a strategy which emphasizes franchised units achieve greater rates of growth relative to other firms in the sample, and that franchisors who use a strategy which emphasizes the establishment of franchised outlets over company-owned outlets are more likely to survive. Relating these findings to agency theory, Shane posits that the establishment of a hybrid organizational form like franchising is a better mechanism for establishing residual claimancy than the mechanism of paying salaried managers low salaries and large bonuses based on outlet profit. The purchase of a franchise outlet puts the franchisee's capital at risk, creating a downside risk to shirking that performance bonuses do not provide. Thus, franchisors are able to induce greater performance from their franchised units, thereby facilitating expansion (growth) and ensuring the survival of the firm. Building on Shane's work, Combs and Ketchen (1999) find that expanding companies in the restaurant industry with various capital scarcities are more likely to franchise relative to those companies without capital scarcities. Capital scarcity explains this decision to franchise beyond what was explained by agency variables such as foreign expansion, specific knowledge, and outlet-level asset specificity. There are two primary findings. The first is that restaurant chains characterized by capital scarcity expanded through franchising more than their agency costs appeared to demand. Thus, it appears that the decisions of franchisors are impacted by multiple causes, including those predicted by agency theory as well as capital and other resources. The second finding relates to the robustness of agency variables in predicting franchising as the preferred mode of growth, in particular the foreign expansion and outlet-level asset specificity variables. Thus, organizations wishing to expand to far-flung areas outside national borders are more likely to use franchising as an expansion method. This is related to the high direct monitoring costs and the amount of learning about local conditions needed to effectively evaluate managers in this particular context.

Turning now from agency-based explanations for expansion, Bradach (1997) identifies organizational structure, control systems, career paths, and strategy-making processes as four means through which the combination of company and franchise units helps chains achieve their objectives. He calls this the "plural form" of organizational management. The plural form's ability to provide both uniformity and system-wide adaptability hinges on two features of the form: (1) a balance between the amount of similarity and the amount of difference between the two arrangements; and (2) processes that link both arrangements. Balance can only be achieved if there are processes that link the constituent structures: otherwise the structure is simply the sum of its parts. The primary contribution of Bradach's study is that it highlights the limitations of simple models of institutional choice that ignore the role played by the simultaneous use of different structures in managing organizations. Chain organizations are more than the sum of their parts: by having both company and franchise arrangements together, a chain can leverage some of the strengths and overcome some of the weaknesses associated with each arrangement. Related to this, a secondary but important contribution is the identification some of the processes by which chain organizations link company and franchise arrangements, an important theoretical development on which future work in this area (both empirical and theoretical) can build.

There are several potential extensions of work in the innovation through replication stream. In particular, there is a dearth of work related to strategies for managing this process, particularly relating to organizations operating in the social context. A strategic approach to organizational systems management, which the replication stream begins to address (in particular the work of Bradach), is a significant departure from the work of scholars in the diffusion and adaptation tradition reviewed earlier. While replication of knowledge systems takes place in both instances, for franchise organizations replication is part of a conscious strategy of expansion rather and as a result is less likely to be contaminated by unintended or unplanned departures from an original model.

4. Transfer Strategy

Recent work in the area of knowledge transfer has emphasized the strategic aspects of knowledge deployment, in particular the use of templates as a strategy for achieving successful transfers (Winter and Szulanski, 2001; Szulanski and Jensen, 2006; Williams, 2007). There are two primary research foci in this tradition relevant for this proposal. First, starting in the mid-1990s, a number of novel contributions have been made relating to how innovation transfer within an organization depends on various factors, including the characteristics of knowledge and the relationship between the sender and recipient. Second, more recent work takes a broad, strategic view of the transfer process and examines the use of templates during the innovation transfer process to increase performance and the efficiency of transfer.

Zander and Kogut (1995), two of the principal contributors to the first set of studies in the transfer strategy tradition, look at the transfer of manufacturing capabilities within Swedish firms but across national borders. They concentrate particularly on the codification of tacit knowledge in this process, building on earlier work (Kogut and Zander, 1992) which argues for the strategic role of such knowledge in establishing competitive advantage. While codification facilitates the transfer process by making explicit what had previously been "know-how" (or learning by doing), it also makes the knowledge more likely to get into the hands of competitors (e.g., through the movement of employees, leaking of key documents, etc.). Szulanski (1996) takes a slightly different view of internal knowledge transfer, arguing for the difficulty of successfully completing such transfers due to internal "stickiness" (von Hippel, 1994). He views the transfer of best practices as a sequential process in which characteristic factors not only appear in greater or lesser degree and also in a certain order of occurrence. Szulanski's empirical analysis of best practices across a range of companies reveals lack of absorptive capacity of the recipient, the causal ambiguity of the knowledge transferred, and the difficulties encountered in establishing personal interactions between the source and recipient as the principal barriers to internal knowledge transfer. Several recommendations are proposed to improve the transfer of knowledge within firms. For instance, it is suggested that instead of using only incentive systems to mitigate internal stickiness, scarce resources and managerial attention should be devoted to developing the learning capacities of organizational units.

Hansen (1999) builds on the work of Zander and Kogut (1995) and Szulanski (1996), in particular regarding the difficulty of transferring complex knowledge (including noncodified or tacit knowledge), to examine how tie strength and the characteristics of knowledge interact. The main finding of his study of R&D project engineers is that the net effect on project completion time of having either weak or strong interunit ties is contingent on the complexity of the knowledge to be transferred across subunits. While weak interunit ties help a project team search for useful knowledge in other subunits, they may actually impede the transfer of complex knowledge. Strong ties, in contrast, provide the highest relative net effect (or least negative effect on completion time) when the knowledge is highly complex.

Together, these studies highlight how different aspects of knowledge, including channels of transfer and the strength of connections between the source and target units, must be considered in developing an effective transfer strategy. While the studies in this tradition mostly occur between units of a single firm, there are implications for transfers of innovations between firms as well.

In the second set of papers within the transfer strategy tradition, scholars have shifted the emphasis of empirical research from knowledge characteristics to the strategic aspects of knowledge deployment, in particular the use of templates as a strategy for achieving successful transfers (Winter and Szulanski, 2001; Szulanski and Jensen, 2006). These studies follow a classical engineering-based approach to knowledge transfer, which sees knowledge bundles as interlinked routines and processes which interact in specific ways to produce specific results. Tampering with these elements and their associated interconnections can lead to the breakdown of the whole system.

Winter and Szulanski (2001) established some theoretical foundations this a strategic view of replication by developing the concept of the "Arrow Core," which refers to an understanding of which knowledge attributes are replicable and worth replicating, together with knowledge of how these attributes are created. It specifies which traits are replicable, how these attributes are created, and the characteristics of environments in which they are worth replication. This information set can be thought of as the complete answer to the question: "What, how, and where should the replicator be trying to replicate?" With respect to the practice transfer and innovation diffusion literature, Winter and Szulanski note that replicating a template often involves transfers not only of varying scope (narrow vs. broad), but also transfers of knowledge or elements that are may be nonessential. As an example, the

Intel corporation utilizes a “copy exactly” strategy in the construction of new manufacturing plants based on the design and operation of successful existing facilities, down to the color of walls in new plants (McDonald, 1998). By zeroing in on an Arrow core over various replication attempts, organizations can come to a better understanding of the essential elements necessary for replication to succeed, and which elements can be left out without jeopardizing this success.

One of the first empirical extensions of Winter and Szuanski’s (2001) work was Szulanski and Jensen’s 2006 study of the Mail Boxes, Etc. (MBE) franchise in Israel. Backed by data from this longitudinal case study (1995 to 2001 period), they conclude that presumptive adaptation – or modification of a practice to adapt to the local environment – of knowledge assets may be detrimental to performance. Measuring franchise network growth, they find that presumptive adaptation actually has an inhibitory effect, whereas a conservative approach to adaptation, which entails close adherence to the original practice (i.e., a template), results in rapid network growth. In a similar vein, Jensen and Szulanski (2007), utilizing a longitudinal study (1992 to 1999 period) of Xerox’s European Divison, find that adhering to a template during the knowledge transfer process leads to more effective knowledge transfer, as defined by both the level of adoption (of initiatives by recipient units – both number of units adopting and extent of implementation) and by performance of the level of performance of recipient units after implementation of the transferred routine.

To a certain extent, these both sets of studies attempt to integrate the three streams of innovation transfer research discussed earlier in this proposal to develop a broad view of the various strategies used by firms to transfer innovations effectively. Nevertheless, certain gaps remain, and there is much work to be done to extend research on transfer strategy. For instance, as noted above, some empirical research supports the Arrow core hypothesis. These studies provide evidence that presumptive adaptation of knowledge assets from one national setting to another may be detrimental to performance (Szulanski and Jensen, 2006), that adhering to a template during the knowledge transfer process leads to more effective knowledge transfer (Jensen and Szulanski, 2007), and that firms replicate more when organizational knowledge is ambiguous, but prefer adaptation when knowledge is context-dependent (Williams, 2007). For the most part, however, this work does not take into account the process through which companies come to an understanding of the most essential elements for transfer success. Such understanding is important to developing a view of knowledge transfer which takes into account the extent to which firms can predict how a given innovation or practice will interact with the broader organizational environment, and whether some elements are indeed more essential for transfer success than others.

Knowledge Transfer and Social Entrepreneurship

In the literature review section of this proposal, I described four distinct streams of knowledge transfer research. These streams have emerged from diverse sources and have tended to emphasize various aspects of the innovation transfer process, from success in knowledge sharing and performance improvements to the extent of local "fit" of transferred innovations and practices as they move from the source enterprise to the target site. Nevertheless, despite their apparent differences, I believe these streams of research offer complementary insights into the innovation transfer process, and these complementarities may become more apparent if situated a context which allows the strengths of each stream to emerge. I believe social entrepreneurship is such a context.

Part of the reason for the gaps outlined in the literature review may be that prior research has almost exclusively examined transfers of knowledge within and between purely for-profit enterprises, a setting in which (increased) profits can serve as a proxy for (increased) understanding. This link is at best tenuous, and at worst potentially disastrous for the organizations involved, as demonstrated by the diffusion and adoption of financial innovations which played a large role in causing the current global financial crisis (Davis, 2009). I argue that by studying transfers of knowledge between firms which primarily seek to create social impact rather than generate profits, or social entrepreneurs (Dees, 2001), researchers can shed light on the process by which organizations start to recognize the most important elements of an innovation and their interconnections to other elements of the organization and environment. There is a strong starting hypothesis here: I implicitly assume that innovation transfer between social entrepreneurs might be qualitatively different from innovation transfer as discussed in other contexts.

Social entrepreneurship involves "entrepreneurial activity with an embedded social purpose" (Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern, 2006), and is often characterized by the allocation of resources (financial, human, political) to neglected social problems (Mair and Marti, 2006; Santos, 2009). Social entrepreneurs are the source of numerous innovations in both the developed and developing world, from the provision of low-cost preventive cataract surgeries to the distribution of low-cost loans to poor women to the revitalization of neglected urban and rural school systems (Bornstein, 2004; Elkington and Hartigan, 2008; Phills, Deiglmeier, and Miller, 2008). Because social entrepreneurs are often more interested in sharing their innovation to maximize impact rather than "owning" it to maximize profits, the role of understanding in knowledge transfer in a social entrepreneurial setting takes on heightened importance. When the profit motive is muted, understanding the linkages between knowledge elements arguably becomes important: greater attention is paid to the social impact of the innovation, and less to its financial impact.

However, while social entrepreneurs are often successful in establishing effective business models to address problems in their local areas of operation, they face enormous challenges in scaling their operations to maximize their ability to tackle social problems and also to achieve greater “social” returns for constituents such as funding agencies (Bloom and Chatterji, 2009). While some scholars have discussed scaling the organization to increase a social entrepreneur’s impact, few studies have looked at the transfer of innovations between different social entrepreneurs as a means to scale up. Thus, the transfer of knowledge resources between social entrepreneurial organizations is critical to their success, but it is a phenomenon which remains understudied.

In the sections below, I investigate the mechanisms governing transfer of innovations between social entrepreneurs. Namely, I compare and contrast the objectives, context and scope of innovations transferred by commercial entrepreneurs and social entrepreneurs to deepen our existing understanding of the organizational theory of innovation transfer.

5. Objectives of Innovation Transfer

Innovation transfer in the social entrepreneurship context differs significantly from what we can infer from existing studies. While social entrepreneurs, like commercial entrepreneurs, undertake innovation transfer in order to create value, the motivations for entrepreneurial activity are very different for these two groups. More than organizational form (e.g., nonprofit vs. hybrid vs. purely commercial), some scholars argue, social entrepreneurs are thus defined by their focus on social objectives (Bradach, 2003; Dees, Anderson, and Wei-Skillern, 2004; Austin et al., 2006). Social entrepreneurs are focused on creating value with spills over to the rest of society or to neglected regions or groups. On the other hand, commercial entrepreneurs’ incentives derive from capturing value (Santos, 2009) in the form of economic profits for their shareholders and managers, the principal beneficiaries of their success. While value must of course be created to be captured, and commercial entrepreneurs clearly have a social impact beyond the profit motive, I argue that this is not their primary goal, and that this has an impact on the innovation transfer process.

For social entrepreneurs, as with commercial entrepreneurs, value capture is also necessary to sustain the organization and compensate managers, but value creation is a more salient for social entrepreneurs than value capture.

Insert Table 2 about here

These different motivations may potentially impact the innovation transfer process for social entrepreneurs in a couple of ways. First of all, freed from the need to answer questions like "who wins?" or "who competes more effectively?" during an innovation transfer, social entrepreneurs can focus what value might actually get created for society from spreading a particular technology or practice (Austin et al., 2006). Thus, there may be greater attention to the social impact a solution may have in particular contexts and realities, even if such attention results in less wide-spread implementation of that solution. For instance, Gram Vikas, an innovation Indian rural development organization which helps villages install and operate clean water systems, insists that 100% of families in its project villages participate in their program. This is a non-negotiable condition, and is rooted in the belief that only by having 100% participation can the organization begin to break down the caste barriers which are endemic to Indian villages. As a result of this requirement, however, Gram Vikas has been relatively slow to spread its innovation (a water and sanitation program for rural areas), since most villages will not accept it, and the organization only transfers it to partners that will honor this commitment to 100% inclusion (Chowdhury and Santos, 2010).

A second particularity in the innovation transfer process for social entrepreneurs may result from the interaction of a social entrepreneur's mission and performance measurement systems. Since performance for social entrepreneurs is less likely to be measured solely on economic profits, social entrepreneurs may be more likely than commercial entrepreneurs to engage in innovation transfer even when implementation of a solution at the target site is not cost-effective initially. Because the influence of social entrepreneurs' actions is spread over long periods of time, there is less of a short-term need to validate the success of a transfer attempt by demonstrating increased profitability in the short-term. This means that social entrepreneurs are willing to transfer their innovations to areas where others wouldn't necessarily go due to cost concerns. While eventually the transfer may need to meet minimum levels of economic sustainability, this doesn't have to take place initially.

6. Context of Transfer

The context of innovation transfer also leads to some particularities in the innovation transfer process for social entrepreneurs. For example, in many cases a social entrepreneur can still meet with some degree of success while pursuing an opportunity, despite an inhospitable context. In fact, social entrepreneurs may choose to pursue opportunities to address social change not despite of, but because of, an inhospitable context. Thus, social entrepreneurs may respond in fundamentally different ways to adverse contextual conditions than their commercial counterparts. To illustrate, during harsh economic times, social needs tend to intensify, and many new social enterprises may be established to serve these needs, despite an unfavorable funding environment. In other cases, a social issue may be compelling only to a relatively small number of constituencies and may have very low visibility, yet a social entrepreneur may seek to make an impact by raising awareness and attention to the issue. Indeed, an adverse context may often lead the social entrepreneur to seek to change the context itself, as often the social problem is deeply embedded in contextual factors (Phils et al., 2008).

These differences between innovation transfer in the commercial vs. social entrepreneurship setting are also reflected in the relative weight given to regulatory frameworks vs. normative and cognitive frameworks in guiding organizational action

(Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002). Several scholars have argued that the regulatory framework in which transfer occurs is only one, over-studied, aspect of the environment in which innovation transfer occurs (Munir, 2002). Cognitive and normative frameworks for social enterprises are also important, and particularly so in social environments where the focus on firm profits is less salient. One way to examine these frameworks is through the lens of organizational identity.

7. Organizational Identity and Boundaries

The identity orientation an organization chooses to adopt has the potential to strongly influence its actions and outlook (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000; Tripsas, 2009). Just as individuals maintain separate identities based on the groups they belong to, scholars have suggested that organizations form identities based on the relationships they have within their operating sphere. Organizational identity – an internalized perception of the organization held by its members – is the sum of beliefs employees, managers, and owners hold about the organization (Albert and Whetten, 1985). The broader construct of organizational identity is thus linked to the identities of the individuals within the organization, but at the same time separate from them – above them, forming a collective purpose behind the organization.

Scholars have found that organizational identity is a powerful force for strategic choice in the nonprofit sector. The importance of creating and maintaining an organizational identity in the nonprofit organization may be a crucial source of resource acquisition, community goodwill, and ongoing support. In general, organizational identity impacts (1) organizations' responses to various external events and issues (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Tripsas, 2009); and (2) the boundaries of organizations with respect to areas of expertise, willingness and ability to add elements to the product portfolio, among other factors (Kogut and Zander, 1996; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005; Tripsas, 2009). At the core of most of this research is the view that organizational identity matters, and that while the environment shapes organizational responses, these responses emanate ultimately emanate from the individuals at the core of a firm. To the extent that these individuals shape and are shaped by the sense of "who we are" as an organization, they are also the source of responses (or non-responses) to external issues and changing environmental conditions.

For Kogut and Zander (1996), these individual responses are rooted in the dichotomy between self-interest and a need to belong in explaining the behavioral underpinnings of the rise of firms over markets. While productivity grows with the division of labor, specialization increases the costs of communication and coordination. They propose that a firm be understood as a social community specializing in speed and efficiency in the creation and transfer of knowledge. In this scenario, knowledge of the firm has an economic value over market transactions when identity leads to social knowledge that supports coordination and communication. Through identification, procedural rules are learned, and coordination and communication are facilitated across individuals and groups of diverse specialized competence.

Tripsas' (2009) idea is that an organization's ability to integrate or assimilate a new technology is related not only to factors concerning the technology itself, but also the organization's own identity, particularly if the technology is identity-challenging and also because any identity shifts associated with integrating the technology may disrupt existing organizational routines and lead to a potentially prolonged period of instability. This is very much related to Kogut and Zander (1996) in the sense that since identity implies an adherence to a symbolic coding of values and rules ("who we are"), the ability of firms to change (through learning or otherwise) is influenced by normative boundaries of firms

Beyond the issue of organizational identity (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991), but certainly interlinked, is the conception of an identity boundary (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005). It my be possible to develop a set of forces which may impact how an organization either maintains or shifts its identity boundary depending how it engages in the innovation transfer process (voluntary). For instance, as a source organization gains more and more experience with the innovation transfer process (i.e., becomes more of a "social franchiser"), does it start to see itself less as a social organization and more as a "research and development" organization or a quasi-business engaged in empowering the poor? How does this potential preconception impact the source organization's involvement in the innovation transfer process? It's relationship with target organizations?

What makes a firm's boundaries distinctive is that the rules of coordination and the process of learning are situated not only physically in locality, but also mentally in an identity. Because identity implies an adherence to a symbolic coding of values and rules, the costs and substance of discourse, coordination, and learning are influenced by normative boundaries of firms. The concept of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) suggests that the mind requires consistency when conscious of conflicting results, and yet is a resourceful and flexible instrument in resolving conflict. Identity implies similarly that social entities to which members hold their loyalty provide a logic of reliability and consistency in rules and symbolic categorization. To a certain extent, technologies drive the coherence of firms, and to the extent that members value their sense of belonging to a social organization, for instance, these identities may be the organizational borders for the firms.

Santos and Eisenhardt (2005, p. 502) present an interesting quote which may have implications for the link between organizational identity boundaries and innovation transfer for social entrepreneurs: "Identity often dominates efficiency considerations: a boundary that challenges organizational identity is not likely to be considered and accepted by organizational members, even if there is evidence for increased governance efficiency. Managers are likely to ignore or misinterpret this evidence." Thus, from the perspective of organizational identity boundaries, technologies or innovations that challenge an organization's existing identity is not likely to be considered legitimate and accepted by organizational members, even if there is evidence for increased efficiency (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Tripsas, 2009). Why should organizations readily accept an innovation which may help them add social value through meaningful, already-tested activities if this innovation goes against / deviates from core elements of their organizational identity?

For social enterprises organizational identity is a primary vehicle through which organizational members interpret the world (Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996), and in the absence of profit concerns organizational identity is likely to guide firm strategy and actions to a greater extent than in the commercial sector, including during the innovation transfer process. Additionally, looking at a firm's identity, both at the individual and organizational levels, might help us to understand better the transfer process, particularly if both firms' self-conceptions are very similar or very divergent. In the first instance a franchising / replication effort may result in the target firm working to differentiate the technology such that it can claim differentiation from the source firm (an "identity threat" argument). In the latter case adding a particular technology or process to the target firm's portfolio may not result in any identity threat because it is already so different from the source firm.

8. Knowledge Scope and Organizational Identity

Most of the research in the alliances, learning and transfer research streams focuses on the transfer of successful practices or technologies from the source to the target site (Darr, Argote, and Epple, 1995; Szulanski, 1996; Tucker, Nembhard, and Edmondson, 2007). For social enterprises, however, innovation transfer involves not only specific practices, but often entire systems of inter-related knowledge elements. This adds additional levels of uncertainty to the transfer process, as these systems may include one or more elements which are not easily codified and therefore difficult to transfer effectively (Szulanski and Jensen, 2006). In this, transfer between social entrepreneurs is closer to diffusion and adaptation tradition, which also focuses on the transfer of models and organizational patterns, though, significantly, transfer between social entrepreneurs occurs the level of organizations rather than organizational collectives or societies (e.g., Westney, 1987; Djelic, 1998).

One way to overcome this barrier is to replicate, or copy exactly, the innovation being transferred (Winter and Szulanski, 2001), which allows the transfer of all the component knowledge elements without needing to understand their causes, consequences, and interdependence (Williams, 2007). Replication contrasts with adaptation, which involves two or more simultaneous changes to an innovation at the target site in the course of the transfer process. Adaptation assumes that the interdependence of the component knowledge elements of the innovation being transferred is well-enough-understood that these elements can be modified while retaining the value-added features of the innovation (Szulanski and Jensen, 2006; Williams, 2007).

Replication and adaptation are thus closely tied to the scope of innovations transferred, which refers to the portion of the total knowledge endowment of the recipient organization that is transferred. Transfers of broad scope greatly modify (or create, in the case of franchises) the organizational context of the target organization. In contrast, transfers of narrow scope leave the organizational context of the target firm relatively intact (Winter and Szulanski, 2001; Szulanski and Jensen, 2006; Williams, 2007) as these transfers represent only a small portion of the total knowledge endowment of the target firm. For broad scope innovation transfers, where the causal links between different knowledge elements are more numerous and harder to ascertain, replication offers the greatest likelihood of maintaining the value-added impact of the innovation (Winter and Szulanski, 2001; Szulanski and Jensen, 2006). For narrow scope innovation transfers, adaptation is a viable strategy as there are fewer knowledge elements and interrelationships to consider (Williams, 2007).

I argue that knowledge scope interacts with the degree of convergence or divergence between the source and target organizations' identities to influence the motivation of the target firm in particular to replicate or adapt a practice. Organizational identity influences the premises which underlie members' choices regarding strategic, organizational, and operational issues (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). These choices interact with other exogenous factors and yield some consequences in terms of profits, market share, competitive position, size, etc. Members' interpretations of these consequences are also shaped by the organization's identity. A given level of value added is perceived as satisfactory or not depending on the organization's purpose and "normal" expectations of value added in the core business. As long as members are either satisfied with consequences of their actions, can live with unsatisfactory consequences, or believe that marginal fine tuning of their actions can improve the consequences, they are inclined to keep working at the surface of the organization by re-enacting familiar behavioural patterns. Throughout this process, they reinforce, although in an unconscious way, the underlying organizational identity and increase consistency among its dimensions (Gioia and Thomas, 1996).

This goes to the heart of the knowledge transfer problem in the social entrepreneurship context. Once the decision to accept an innovation has been made, target organizations will decide whether to replicate or adapt an innovation based two primary factors. On the one hand, they must assess the level of ambiguity of a broad vs. narrow scope innovation and the impact the innovation might have on their organization's own identity.

On the other hand, target organizations are also likely to assess the degree of convergence between their own organizational identity and that of the source organization to assess potential similarities and consistencies in strategic outlook and motivation of the organization's members (Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton, 2000). Darr and Kurtzberg (2000), for instance, find that organizations with similar strategic outlooks were more likely to successfully transfer innovations compared to firms with different strategic outlooks. While strategic outlook similarity isn't an exact proxy for organizational identity convergence, there are many common features between the two (Gioia and Thomas, 1996), and organizations operating in the social sector are especially likely to take into consideration their "fit" with a transfer partner (Austin et al., 2006).

In the case of a broad scope innovation transfer, knowledge ambiguity is high, potentially favoring replication as a transfer strategy. We can then distinguish between convergent or divergent between the source and target social entrepreneurs. If identities are convergent, there may very well be a "fit" between the source and target organizations, but another factor may also come into play. By replicating a broad scope innovation from the source firm the target firm may in the process compromise its own, unique organizational identity. In other words, replication of a broad scope transfer with convergent source-target identities may represent an identity threat to the target organization. Because the organization's identities are so close, adding a substantial portion of another organization's activities may pose a threat (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996) to the target firm's identity, especially since its identity is so closely aligned with the source firm's. The target firm doesn't want to be seen as an extension of the source firm. On the other hand, if the identities are divergent, I believe the balance between knowledge scope and organizational identity with dictate the opposite outcome. A target firm which has an organizational identity that is divergent from the source firm will choose replication, which is more likely to preserve the value-added impact of the innovation in the case of a broad transfer (Szulanski and Jensen, 2006). Because the two organizations' identities are so different, incorporating innovations which have a potentially large impact on the target firm are more easily accommodated (i.e., there is no identity threat from the transfer).

In the case of a narrow scope innovation transfer, knowledge ambiguity is low. In this instance convergent source-target organizational identities indicate a "fit" between the source and target organizations, and the narrow scope of the innovation being transferred means that it is not identity-threatening for the target organization (as narrow scope knowledge transfers leave the organizational context of the target firm relatively intact)(Winter and Szulanski, 2001). Thus, with greater understanding of linkages and convergent organizational identities (and strategic outlook similarities) puts pressure towards replicating the innovation. For the case of firms with divergent source-target organizational identities, the opposite may be true. Because there is greater understanding of linkages between knowledge elements, the target firm is likely to adapt the innovation, especially since divergent organizational identities may indicate a difference in strategic outlook and activities.

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF THREE RESEARCH STREAMS

	Diffusion and Adaptation	Alliances and Learning	Franchises and Replication
What is transferred?	Business models, organizing templates, organizational patterns, practices	Practices, resources and knowledge	Knowledge systems
Who is involved?	Governments, recipient firms and units, officials, operational managers, senior management	Source and target firms, operational managers, senior management	Company unit managers or franchisees
When does transfer occur?	When governments attempt to re-create successful foreign organizing templates and firms in their local context; when firms attempt to leverage the success of an innovation at multiple sites	When firms enter an alliance to share lessons and gain access to new innovations and knowledge	When franchisor attempts to increase revenues through expansion or through royalty payments from franchisees
How does transfer occur?	Codification of business models and practices; through transfer of tacit knowledge through personal networks	Codification of a practice or process	Replication of an inter-connected system of knowledge elements
Key tools of source organization	Facilitating the codification of business models, organizing templates, and practices	Modeling successful practices, codification of knowledge	Modeling successful practices, codification of knowledge
Key tools of target organization	Modeling successful business models and practices	Knowledge of target context	Royalty payments; knowledge of target context
Theoretical roots	Organizational theory	Organizational theory; Transaction cost economics; Relational governance & Dynamic capabilities perspectives	Organizational theory; Transaction cost economics; Agency theory

TABLE 2

INNOVATION TRANSFER IN COMMERICAL AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP

	Commercial entrepreneurship	**Social entrepreneurship**
Economic motivation	Maximize	Satisfice
Social motivation	Satisfice	Maximize
Incentives	Capturing value	Creating value
Who are the principals?	Shareholders, managers	Local community, populations neglected by market and government
What is delivered to principals?	Economic benefits (profits)	Social impact, social recognition
Context of transfer	Regulatory frameworks (e.g., tax and legal), macroeconomy, sociopolitical environment	Normative and cognitive frameworks, sociopolitical environment, macroeconomy (with decreased salience of market-selection mechanisms)

SECTION 3

METHODS

I now outline a research study to explore the transfer of innovations between social entrepreneurs as a way to increase social impact, building on the theoretical work described earlier in this proposal. The study involves inductive case studies of social enterprises involved in the process of transferring innovations to partners which are also social enterprises. This multiple-case design is a well-developed methodology used in the organizational research to expand existing theory. Multiple cases permit a replication logic in which cases are treated as independent experiments, each serving to confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from the others (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). As befits the exploratory nature of the primary research question in this study, no testable hypotheses were formed prior to data collection (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Suddaby, 2006). Rather, the goal of the study to use the data collected to develop specific theoretical constructs and related propositions which advance current organizational theory in novel directions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1991; Siggelkow, 2007). This methodology is particularly suited to the study of social entrepreneurship, which, while context and story "rich," suffers from a paucity of theoretical development (Dees et al., 2004; Austin et al., 2006).

Data

To understand how social entrepreneurs manage the innovation transfer process, I studied a cohort of source-target pairs engaged in the process of transferring innovations. The study is part of a broader effort at to examine the transfer process called the Social Innovation Transfer Project. Where possible, examined this process longitudinally, that is, from start to finish. All of these pairs are composed of social entrepreneurs at both the source and target site. The project involved real-time tracking of these transfer projects over a period of up to 48 months. At the beginning of the study I sought to follow eight source-target pairs, with each source organization associated with two target organizations. Due to logistical and timing reasons, I ended up doing an in-depth study of four source-target pairs. However, by the end of the project I was able to do interviews with social entrepreneurs at six source organizations, and ten target organizations.

I conducted site visits to each of the four primary source and target locations, though for practical concerns (e.g., safety, cost limitations, etc.), "virtual site visits" by means of telephone conversations were conducted with manager may be conducted at two sites. Additional data were be collected subsequent to the field visits through telephone interviews and email exchanges. This timing of this data collection (approximately 6-18 months following initial visit) was sufficiently distant to allow longitudinal patterns to emerge, but at the same time recent enough to allow accurate and detailed data collection for the purposes of this study (Eisenhardt, 1991; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009).

Specifically, my sample consisted of four organizational pairs, as mentioned above, including one source (transferring the innovation) organization and one target (receiving the innovation) organization in each pair. These organizations were drawn from a sample of sixteen finalist organization pairs from the proposal submission process to a well-known European Foundation. Pairs of organizations submitted proposals jointly in the hopes of receiving funding for innovation transfer between a source and target organization pair. Five winners were selected from the sixteen finalists, though I had access to the full proposals of all sixteen finalists (including the winners), and to the full list of applicants and letters of interest for the competition. This gave me a broad sample and allowed me examine whether there were significant differences between finalists and non-finalists, as well as winners and non-winners from the sixteen finalist source-target pairs.

To complete research case studies for each of the four in-depth transfer processes, I relied on multiple data sources, including: field observations; interviews; organizational records; emails; meeting notes; annual reports; project reports and updates; briefs and monographs; books written on or about the social entrepreneurs being studied; consulting evaluations; and survey data. Table 3 provides a comprehensive list of the data sources used in developing this study.

Insert Table 3 about here

Data Collection and Analysis: Four Stages

I now outline below the four stages of data collection that constituted this project. The first two stages were a preliminary survey and an exploratory case study, were completed by February 2009. Data from these two stages was used to develop the remainder of the study, which concluded in June 2012.

Stage One: Preliminary Survey

In July and August 2008, a short survey (attached as Appendix A) was sent out to the 16 finalist source social entrepreneurs for the competition, including the five winners. The purpose of the survey was to gather information on the innovations developed by these organizations, and to gain a greater understanding of past, present, and future attempts to transfer these innovations. Of the sixteen organizations contacted, fourteen completed the survey. Data gathered from these surveys was used to construct a list of the most promising organizations for follow-up subsequent stages of the study.

Stage Two: Exploratory Study

In early 2009 (January – February), an exploratory case study was conducted on-site at two organizations – one source organization, one target organization – in India to gain preliminary insights into the process through which social entrepreneurs transfer their innovations to partners as a means to increase social impact. Utilizing an in-depth, semi-ethnographic field method, I spent approximately two weeks at the source entrepreneur site, and one week at the target organization, conducing interviews with staff members at all levels and going on numerous field visits to observe projects associated with the innovation. In addition to interviews gained access to archival materials at the organization's offices which offered information distinct from what is available in publicly-available materials such as web sites, annual reports, and funding proposals. Finally, by a large amount of time at the source entrepreneur's headquarters I was able to gain some understanding of the organization's culture and approach to innovation transfer at level of operations staff and mid-level managers responsible for project implementation.

A research case based on data gathered during the visit was written to highlight the key findings and directions for inquiry in subsequent phases of the research. The exploratory study also allowed the "field-testing" of a data gathering tool which will be refined for use in the primary data-gathering phase of the research. Further details regarding the study's design, findings, and key insights are provided in the next section of this proposal. The study interview guide is attached as Appendix B.

Stage Three: Site Visits

During the third phase of the project I conducted site visits to the organizational pairs ultimately selected for further study. I utilized an in-depth, semi-ethnographic field method in which the researcher spends approximately one week (or more) at the organization, conducing interviews with staff members at all levels and competing field visits to project sites as necessary and feasible. In addition to interviews gained access to archival materials which at the organization's offices, and to gain some understanding of the organization's culture and approach to innovation transfer distinct from what is written in publicly-available materials such as web sites, annual reports, funding proposals, etc. These site visits were completed during the period running from January 2010 through July 2010, and constituted the bulk of data collection for the project. Specifically, in February, March, and April of 2010 I visited both source social entrepreneurs and target organizations on the Indian subcontinent, namely, in Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka. I completed field visits to Paraguay and Brazil in July 2010.

Stage Four: Follow-up and Data Analysis

Following the field visits I engaged in extensive analysis of the data gathered at the field sites, though the process of data analysis has been ongoing since the first preliminary surveys were returned to me in July 2008. Interviews were transcribed, documents were analyzed, and four in-depth research cases were written to attempt to understand the innovation transfer process. I also followed-up via telephone and email with organizations to get updates on project activities as necessary. This allowed enough time to elapse for new data to be available, allowing me to examine how the innovation transfer process is unfolding over time.

TABLE 3

CASE STUDY DATA COLLECTION SOURCES

Interviews	Archival Sources	Observation	Preliminary Survey
On-site at project locations where possible	Annual reports	Participation in meetings and direct observation at both source and target organizations	Data on innovations developed by source social entrepreneurs
At least senior managers at each organization, source and target	Reports to foundations and other stakeholders	Visits to project sites, at both source and target social entrepreneurs	Information on past, ongoing, and future innovation transfer attempts
Multiple levels - managerial and organizational - within the organization as well as stakeholders (e.g., beneficiaries)	Internal memos	Direct observation at points of interaction between beneficiaries and operational staff	Data on geographic scope of innovation transfer attempts
Process descriptions + structured questions during Pilot Study	Email exchanges	Public presentations	
Process descriptions during Phase III of Data Collection	Official correspondence Draft documents Websites Consulting evaluations Books	Other interactions between social entrepreneur staff and local population, government officials, donors, and other stakeholders	

TABLE 4

DATA COLLECTION TIMELINE

Stage	Name	Time Period	Description
1	Preliminary Survey	July-August 2008	Short survey was sent out to the 16 finalist organizational pairs; 15 completed the survey. Data from surveys used to construct a list of the most promising organizations for follow-up.
2	Pilot Study	January-February 2009	An exploratory case study was conducted on-site at a source and target organization in India to gain insight into the social innovation transfer process. The pilot study allowed the "field-testing" of a data gathering tool which will be refined for use in the primary data-gathering phase of the research. A research case based on the data gathered during the field visit was written to highlight the key findings and directions for inquiry in subsequent phases of the research.
3	Field Visits	January-September 2010	From January 2010 through July 2010 I conducted the bulk of my data collection efforts. In February, March, and April of 2010 I visited both source social entrepreneurs and target organizations on the Indian subcontinent, namely, in Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka. I conducted field visits in Paraguay and Brazil in July 2010.
4	Follow-up and Data Analysis	July 2008-June 2012	Following and concurrent to field data collection I gathered updates on the progress of the innovation transfer processes via email exchanges and telephone calls. I made these calls as required to fill in gaps uncovered during the data analysis process. Data analysis was an ongoing process running into June 2012. During this time I hope to wrote up research cases, trying to identify the arc of the innovation transfer process in each dyadic interaction.

SECTION 4

ESSAY 1

EXPLORATORY STUDY FINDINGS[1]

The research underlying my dissertation began with a exploratory study to gain preliminary insights about how social entrepreneurs engage in the process of innovation transfer to partners as a means to increase their social impact. In this first phase, I developed a single, exploratory case study, based on archival sources as well fieldwork at a source entrepreneur and its partner, the target organization. Both of these organizations operate in the rural public health sector in India, albeit using different approaches to address the root problems of access to better sanitation and health in village areas. During a one-month long visit to India undertaken in January and February 2009, I visited both these organizations and conducted 28 interviews with senior executives, mid- and field-level project managers, and program beneficiaries (the interview template is included in Appendix B). The conversations ranged from 30 to 90 minutes in length, and a total of 18 interviews were conducted at the source entrepreneur site. Additionally, 10 interviews were conducted at the target organization site. As several interviews at both the source entrepreneur and target organization were undertaken in a group setting, a total of 39 individuals were interviewed across the sites.

I analyzed the exploratory case with the help of a research colleague. We discussed the logic underlying the transfer process in this particular instance, and how it might be generalized and extended to other settings, including transfer between organizations outside the setting of social entrepreneurship. Combining insights from these discussions, a review of the literature on organizations and strategy, as well as the archival records and interviews associated with the pilot study, I determined that the unit of analysis for the study, the innovation transfer attempt, is worthy of further study in the social entrepreneurship context. The pilot study provided clear evidence of this for the following reason: the relationship between the source entrepreneur and the target organization was formed with the express purpose of transferring knowledge. The partners had engaged in reciprocal staff visits to share ideas and best practices in the two years prior to signing a transfer agreement, though no formal mechanism for innovation transfer was established before the agreement was signed. Thus, there is a clear source of knowledge and receiver of knowledge in this setting, so the outcome of the relationship is more straightforward than in other relationships where transfer can be non-cooperative and in both directions (e.g., see Gulati, 1998 for a review of these other cases). This is the form of relationships I will study for the remainder of the cases in this dissertation.

In the two sub-sections below, I more clearly define: (1) the choice of the source social entrepreneur in the pilot study and detail more precisely the innovation being transferred; and (2) the main findings derived from a study of the transfer process between the source social entrepreneur and the target organization.

Source Entrepreneur Choice and the Innovation Being Transferred

I chose Gram Vikas, the source entrepreneur for the pilot study, for its pioneering role as a social innovator. The organization, along with its founder and Executive Director, Joe Madiath, has received numerous social venture industry awards, including the Ashoka Changemakers Innovation Award, the 2007 Skoll Award for Social Entrepreneurship, and the 2006 India NGO [Nongovernmental Organization] of the Year Award. The partnership between Gram Vikas, which was founded in 1979, and the Comprehensive Rural Health Project (CRHP), the target organization in the study (founded in 1970), is one of the best-documented ongoing partnerships in the organization's portfolio. I was granted access to virtually all the paper and electronic records related to the partnership, which originated several years before the current transfer attempt, and was additionally able to interview key players involved in the partnership at both organizations, including beneficiaries at the village level. In the terminology of Yin (2009), the transfer attempt from Gram Vikas to CRHP represents a “revelatory case” which can guide future theory development research by looking at a situation which previously has not received significant research scrutiny.

I now turn to a discussion of the social innovation transferred from Gram Vikas to CRHP. In the early 1990s Gram Vikas, which had started out as an organization working to improve the living conditions of tribal peoples in Orissa, India’s poorest state (Keirns, 2007), found that 80% of the morbidity and mortality in rural Orissa could be traced to the poor quality of drinking water. A direct cause of poor water quality was the unsanitary habits around human waste disposal. The organization thus began an initiative covering 337 families in five pilot villages to bring water and sanitation services to rural villages[2] (Gram Vikas, 2002). This program, known as the Movement and Action Network for Transformation of Rural Areas (MANTRA), is now the foundation of Gram Vikas’ activities and its most powerful social innovation.

MANTRA begins with the starting assumption that water and sanitation services are not privileges exclusively reserved for the most prosperous, highest-ranking, elements of urban society; rather, they are a right and resource to be equally shared among all members of a community, regardless of social position or geographic location. Nevertheless, the prosaic reality of life in rural Orissa belies this aspirational ideal: even to this day – after 17 years of work on the problem by Gram Vikas and other NGOs as well as continuing work on the problem by the state government for decades – less than 20% of the rural population in Orissa has access to protected water, less than 1% to a piped water supply and less than 5% to sanitation facilities (Gram Vikas, 2008). For Gram Vikas this seemingly intractable problem presented an opportunity. By working to address the problem of poor (or nonexistent) water and sanitation facilities, the organization could simultaneously address the deep-seated problems of poverty and social exclusion in rural Orissa. MANTRA was therefore developed as a program which goes well beyond simple infrastructure development for water and sanitation:

> MANTRA unites communities to overcome barriers of social exclusion. Water and sanitation, as an entry point activity in new settlements, is not only a vehicle for improved health, but also a way of transforming hierarchical chaste and gender based exclusion into **equitable inclusion** (Gram Vikas, 2008; emphasis theirs).

At the surface level, MANTRA delivers concrete water and sanitation infrastructure to villages. Gram Vikas ensures that all the families in a MANTRA village will have access to the same minimum level of products and services, including: (1) toilets and bathing rooms in every house; (2) 24-hour piped water supply to the toilet, bathing room, and kitchen of every family; and (3) the construction of a water tank as a community asset (Gram Vikas, 2008; Keirns, 2007). Beyond this, MANTRA is guided by five Core Values – Inclusion, Social Equity, Gender Equity, Sustainability, and Cost Sharing – which link in fundamental ways to the broader social mission of "equitable inclusion" which Gram Vikas espouses.

To achieve "equitable inclusion" in MANTRA villages, Gram Vikas lays out two primary conditions, each of which encompasses different core values. First, villages join MANTRA only through an "all or none" scheme. Either 100% of the families in a village join the program, or no families join. There is no in-between. In this way, Gram Vikas emphasizes the value of "Inclusion" as a core value. This requirement is highly related to the values of "Social Equity" and "Gender Equity" as well, and these are manifested in villages by representation of all sections of the community in village decision-making processes and equal participation of men and women in community level decision-making and control.

Second, to ensure the financial and operational stability of the water supply and sanitation installed, all families must participate in the scheme by contributing, on average, 1,000 rupees towards a "corpus fund" which goes towards maintenance costs and expansion of the water supply and sanitation system once it has been installed. This condition is most closely tied to the two core values of “Cost Sharing” and “Sustainability”, and is based on the principle that the poor can and will pay for development services, and that the beneficiaries of MANTRA themselves are reliable sources of revenue for maintaining the water and sanitation systems.

Main Findings from Exploratory Study

The exploratory case study of the transfer of Gram Vikas to CRHP led to some preliminary findings about the process of innovation transfer between social entrepreneurs. The first finding relates to the transfer of core elements of an innovation. They are essential. As noted by Winter and Szanski (2001), by zeroing in on an “Arrow core” of elements over various replication attempts, organizations can come to a better understanding of how innovation replication succeeds, and which elements can be left out without jeopardizing this success. Gram Vikas’s work in rural Orissa since 1992 allowed has many such replication attempts to take place, the vast majority of them under the organization’s control and administered through project sub-offices. As the organization starts to expand by partnering with other organizations outside the state, some of this control is inevitably lost. Aside from differences in organizational size, structure, and mission – for instance, Gram Vikas is a registered social organization with roots in social movements whereas CRHP is a social organization which founded on the religious conviction of its founders, who are devout Christians – regional differences between various states in India may also play a role in the acceptance and implantation of MANTRA. For instance, states differ significantly in their legislation and arrangements for water and sanitation, and they also differ in terms of what may or may not be culturally acceptable to the rural populations Gram Vikas wishes to serve (Gram Vikas, 2009; Keirns, 2007).

With this understanding, Gram Vikas's attempt to transfer MANTRA has been characterized by a focus on the two key elements it feels are necessary to ensure the program's success: (1) 100% participation of families in project villages through the construction of a bathing area and toilet facilities for each household; and (2) creation of a self-sustaining Corpus Fund – for maintenance costs and new installations – belonging to the village into which every family contributes an average of 1000 rupees (approximately $21). These are the elements the organizations insists that partners such as CRHP replicate as part of the MANTRA transfer; changing them would change the nature of the innovation such that the expected outcome (100% availability of water and sanitation services in a village) would be compromised. On the other hand, w e observed that Gram Vikas was quite open to adaptation of MANTRA "around the edges" of the innovation, away from the core. For instance, in Orissa the sourcing of specialized materials for construction other than those contributed by villagers is done with the help of the state government, and subsidies are paid to villagers to aid in MANTRA-related construction once the initial corpus fund contributions have been made. This ensures that villagers continue to feel an ownership in the project beyond their initial contributions. Gram Vikas was willing to relax these conditions, however, and fit them to the needs of CRHP, which relies less on government funding and more on charitable donations as a supplementary source of funding for its operations, and where the concept of direct subsidies to families in project villages is less established. This is in line with prior research on replication of innovations, which associates effective knowledge transfer with adhering to a template (in this case, the two broad "core" elements of MANTRA) while acknowledging the role of necessary adaptation when knowledge is context-dependent (Williams, 2007) as with the case of varied sourcing procedures for procurement of MANTRA-related construction materials arising from differences in resource availability between Orissa and Maharashtra.

Insert Table 5 about here

The second finding relates to the process of scaling innovations for social entrepreneurs. For Gram Vikas, which has worked for almost two decades to develop and refine MANTRA, its particular model of water and sanitation for rural areas is "patent free"[3]. This means that the innovation can be freely shared with partners without consideration of concerns related to competition and losing "market share" to organizations which perform similar activities (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008). In this respect Gram Vikas is similar to other social entrepreneurs, who have a predominant focus on value creation for the broader social environment rather than value appropriation for shareholders and management (Santos, 2009). However, this does not mean that the innovation is freely implementable. For Gram Vikas creating value means creating value for all the members of a community, from the richest to the poorest in the village. As such the organization engages in a very controlled version of knowledge transfer with respect to MANTRA, a process which is governed by four distinct periods of engagement with the implementing partner, including: (1) an intensive period of "courtship" where Gram Vikas and the target partner learn about each other's work (the informal collaboration period); (2) intensive training for both staff and villagers at the tartget partner's project sites and the signing of a formal transfer agreement which governs the implementation of MANTRA at these sites (during the transfer formalization phase); (3) an extensively-monitored implementation of MANTRA at the transfer partner's pilot project village (the MANTRA implementation phase); and (4) institutionalization of the MANTRA program through regular village meetings at the pilot site and collaboration with neighboring villages (the maintainence phase). By having some degree of control over the transfer process, as is the case when firms enter into dyadic partnerships with well-defined milestones, social entrepreneurs can thus scale their innovations while keeping the original version of it relatively intact.

This leads to my third broad finding: the scaling process for social entrepreneurs is fraught with challenges, including those which arise with respect to the meaning of innovations as they flow from one organization to another. Social entrepreneurs are often interested in assuring consistent and faithful implementation of their innovation, but they are also aware that contextual adaptation of certain elements of the innovation may nevertheless be inevitable (Ansari et al., 2010). As noted by Powell, Gammal, and Simard (2005), the temporal and experiential nature of contact between the source and target organization in an innovation transfer process can shape adoption at the target site. Thus, in the case of Gram Vikas and CRHP, the regular and faithful interaction of each organization's leaders during the various phases of the innovation transfer helped Gram Vikas to limit deviation from the MANTRA model's core elements as it travelled from Orissa to Maharashtra. Gram Vikas was able, in this sense, to control the core and the "meaning" of the innovation, which is to increase the level of social equity in rural villages by means of comprehensive (i.e., 100%) water and sanitation coverage. To the extent that the philosophy of Gram Vikas' work is present at CRHP it may not be because of the two organizations' shared ideologies, but rather because the organization used various strategies to maintain core elements of the innovation and ensure fidelity to it (Ansari et al., 2010). Though Gram Vikas doesn't have formal power over CRHP, there is considerable influence as a result of the formalized partnership (Bradach, 1997).

The fourth and final finding relates to the nature of partnerships social entrepreneurs enter into not only to scale their innovations, but also for the more general purpose of sharing knowledge and best practices which may be more widely spread than to just a single partner within the context of a dyadic alliance. One of the notable characteristics of alliances and partnerships generally, in both the social and purely commercial realms, is the increasing diversity of partners, motives, and goals in entering alliances (Austin, 2000; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008). This diversity is also manifested in the variety of governance structures, or the formal contractual structures, used to organize the partnerships. The variety of organizing structures implies that firms face an array of choices in organizing their alliances (Powell et al., 2005). For Gram Vikas, this structure was formalized in the form of a transfer agreement which laid out the conditions and specifications related to implementing MANTRA. In the early stages of inter-organizational transfer of a successful social innovation, I believe that this agreement may serve a function that is analogous to a franchise agreement for commercial firms – including fast-food chains such as McDonald's and services companies such as MailBoxes, Inc. – which expand through outlets run by non-company management (Bradach, 1997; Szulanski and Jensen, 2006).

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TABLE 5

STAGES OF TRANSFER OF MANTRA TO CRHP

Stage	Time Period	Duration	Description
Informal Collaboration	2005 - 2007	24 months	Senior-level staff members and field coordinators engage in exposure visits; sharing of best practices, but no formal implementation of practices.
Transfer Formalization	2007 - 2008	12 months	Needs assessment conducted; meetings held in six CRHP villages to gauge interest in the program; one village selected as model village for implementation of MANTRA; villagers and CRHP staff travel to GV for exposure visit; transfer agreement signed; technical staff from Gram Vikas will come to CRHP to help identify good water sources and confirm the appropriateness of model village for the project; a group of villagers from model village as well as a CHRP field coordinator travel to Orissa for a four-week training program
MANTRA Implementation	2008 - 2009	18 months	Trained villagers share their knowledge and implement MANTRA in model village with the help of CRHP staff members; gathering building materials; forming a Management Committee for the corpus fund; construction of soak pits for toilet facilities; constructing the actual bathing and toilet rooms as well as a communal well and water tank.
Maintainence	2010 - 2011	Up to 24 months	MANTRA up and running in model village; regular village-driven meetings held to discuss problems with use or maintenance of the new facilities; villagers and CRHP staff work to maintain 100% community participation, to ensure proper upkeep, and to prevent abuse or overuse of the water supply; proper functioning of MANTRA in model village is expected to facilitate the spread of program.

SECTION 5

ESSAY 2

MULTIPLE INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL PARTNERSHIP

Multiple institutional logics and inter-organizational partnership: The dynamics of cooperation between social enterprises

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a study on the evolution of partnerships between social enterprises, organizations that are embedded in competing social and economic logics. Through longitudinal case studies of the interaction between four pairs of social enterprises operating in emerging economy settings, I analyze the factors which influence the evolution of knowledge transfer partnerships. Evidence from these case studies suggests that a variety of logics, not simply social and economic logics, were guides for organizational action, and that the extent to which these logics were aligned between firms determined the how firms managed the knowledge transfer process.

Keywords: inter-organizational relations, institutional logics, partnerships, social enterprises, social entrepreneurship

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the growth of social enterprises, which provide vital services across diverse sectors of the economy such as education, healthcare, and enterprise development, has received significant popular and academic attention. For instance, the growth of microfinance organizations, both for-profit and not-for-profit, has captured the imagination of government and non-governmental organization officials and a generation of students in public policy and business schools across the world. The rapid increase in attention to these firms reflects not only the tremendous demand for the services they provide, but also the potential that many see for these services to reach greater and greater numbers of people. In short, there is a clear and compelling case for social enterprises to "scale" their successful models and practices beyond their local area to maximize their impact on society.

While a number of options for scaling the impact of this knowledge exist, including developing franchises or diffusing best practices via mediating bodies such as multilateral organizations, partnering with other social enterprises remains among the most popular options (Bloom and Chatterji, 2009). Traditional research on inter-organizational partnerships has considered the value of partnerships in gaining access to new markets and technologies, as well as important knowledge-sharing and organizational learning goals (Greve, 2003). This research, however, has tended to focus on organizations which operate with a profit-maximizing logic[1]. It has not considered organizations where profit-maximization is only one of a number of logics which guide organizational action (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Organizations operating with a multiplicity of institutional demands have varying responses to these demands (Djelic and Quack, 2004; Oliver, 1991). When these demands conflict, as may be the case with organizations that balance social and economic goals (e.g., micro-finance companies), the organization's response may be a function of the

[1] A central idea in the institutional literature is the concept of logic, which generally refers to the broad cultural beliefs and rules that structure cognition and fundamentally shape decision-making and action in a field (Thornton and Ocascio, 2008; Thornton, 2002; Friedland and Alford, 1991).

nature of the conflicting demands and the way this conflict is dealt with by organization members (Pache and Santos, 2010).

Earlier work by institutionalists tended to emphasize how dominant logics can shape and order organizational fields (Reay and Hinings, 2005), or even how such logics are transformed over time, leading to distinct periods of stability each characterized by different sets of beliefs and activities guiding organizational action (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). More recently, the notion of multiple logics has come to the fore. For instance, Lounsbury's (2007) work on the role of "trustee" and "performance" logics in shaping practices within mutual fund industry in Boston and New York highlights how multiple forms of rationality may underlie change processes within organizational fields. Relatedly, Battilana and Dorado (2010) examined how "banking" and "development" logics influenced the internal dynamics of organizations – specifically, the development of human resources practices and policies in Bolivian commercial microfinance organizations.

While greater attention is now being focused on multiple institutional logics and their impact on organizational fields and within organizations themselves, for the most part researchers haven't focused on how multiple logics can influence inter-organizational processes. This is important because the inter-organizational setting allows us to see how alignment or non-alignment of logics in organizational pairs may impact organizational processes. This setting also allows researchers to observe how organizational processes unfold and are interpreted by the parties in these interactions. Thus far, such work has been missing in organizational theory.

This paper seeks to extend work on institutional logics to the realm of inter-organizational partnerships. Its purpose is to better understand partnership between social enterprises (Mair and Marti, 2006; Dacin, Dacin, and Matear, 2010) where the goal is transferring knowledge (Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005; Lounsbury, 2007) for the purpose of scaling up social innovations (Bloom and Chatterji, 2009). Combining both perspectives allows us to develop a better understanding of the ways in which organizations manage relationships with partners that have different logics, and how alignment or non-alignment of logics impacts the strategies used by organizations to transfer knowledge to partners. Based on a comparative study of two pairs of social enterprises, the paper traces how organizations manage knowledge transfer to partners with different logics over time. It makes three contributions: (1) first, it provides evidence for several logics that remain under-explored with respect to their impact on interorganizational partnerships, a spiritual logic, an activist logic, and a technology logic; (2) second, it links differences between the logics of social enterprise partners to the strategies firms use to transfer their knowledge while retaining the fidelity of that knowledge (Ansari, Zajac, and Fiss, 2010); (3) third, it argues that the impact of these logics on the partnership process may be greater than the impact of cultural differences.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Recent research in organizational theory has looked at the embeddedness of organizations in pluralistic institutional environments where multiple logics prevail. This research builds on prior work on institutional dynamics, which tended to see institutional change as driven by changes in a single, dominant logic (Thornton, 1999; Thorton and Ocasio, 1999). While a move from a focus on dominant institutional logics to multiple, co-existing logics offers numerous opportunities to re-conceive organizations and their broader environment, a number of challenges also arise. When new institutional logics prevail in the environment, organizations tend to imitate the most successful organizations embedded in and identified with these logics. When there are multiple logics in the environment, however, organizations have greater freedom with respect to the institutional pressures that they choose to comply with. In such instances, organizations may choose to adopt and re-interpret successful practices and standards as exemplified by institutional logics by means of a process of translation (Czarniawska and Sevon, 1996) or editing (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996).

Additionally, a plurality of institutional logics impacts upon questions of identity as well. As scholars have noted, identity plurality in organizations, often emerging from environments with different sets of norms, may lead to tensions and conflicts within organizations (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Fiol, 2009). This research hasn't yet considered, however, how multiple logics impact upon inter-organizational processes. In this setting the institutional environment may impact upon organizations in different ways, and thus lead to inter-organizational processes which are different from what has been predicted by prior theory. Below I briefly review some of the literature on knowledge transfer and inter-organizational partnerships, the core phenomena examined in this study. Additionally, as this study focuses on cooperation between social enterprises attempting to scale up successful social innovations, I focus in particular on the literature which examines partnerships formed for the purpose of sharing knowledge.

Knowledge: Diffusion and Adaptation

Traditional research on inter-organizational partnerships has considered the value of partnerships in gaining access to new markets and technologies, as well as important knowledge-sharing and organizational learning goals (Greve, 2003). This research, however, has tended to focus on organizations which operate with a profit-maximizing logic. It has not considered organizations where profit-maximization is only one of a number of logics which guide organizational action (Friedland and Alford, 1991). One way to do this may be to examine the extensive literature on knowledge transfer is based in the sociological and organizations literature, which looks at both inter-organizational and macro-processes. Scholars have long been interested in the way in which organizational innovations and business models spread, using both macro- and micro-perspectives on this phenomenon

(Tarde, 1895; Rogers, 1995). This "diffusion and adaptation approach" shows how knowledge transfer is closely associated with questions of local fit and adaptation, regardless of whether practices or institutions are clearly associated with the commercial side of economic activity or within the government and not-for-profit realms (e.g., Westney, 1987; Guillen, 1994; Djelic, 1998; Powell, Gammal, and Simard, 2005).

For instance, Westney's (1987) study of the borrowing of organizational practices focuses on the deliberate emulation of Western organizational models in Meiji Japan is one of the most extensive studies on the subject of transfer. Her historical study is situated in the late-19th century and early-20th century, a period of heavy, Western-style industrialization in Japan. Westney focused on three primary institutions: the police force (following the French model); the postal system (following the British model); and the newspapers (following a few Western models). She concludes that despite the most deliberate efforts to emulate existing models, the original pattern and its extant features cannot be duplicated in a manner that preserves all its features. Unintended departures from the model inevitably occur, and intended departures such "selective emulation" – a process in which the importers of a model choose not to adopt certain features of the original model due to potential conflicts with local values – are also hard to contain (Westney, 1987: 27). Similarly, Djelic's (1998) history of postwar reconstruction in mid-20th-century Europe demonstrates how local particularities shaped the nature of industrial institutions imported from America and implemented in different national environments. While France and Germany were, to different degrees, receptive to such importation, a combination of varying social, political, and economic forces led to a near total rejection of the American model in Italy. Some studies have included developing countries as the destination of transfer, focusing on the transfer Western organizational patterns with the similar results to the studies already noted; while a surface-level representation of the original imported patterns is discernable, the context results in significant adaptation to local realities (Rottenburg, 1996).

Another set of studies is closely associated with the Nordic school of institutional scholars, and focuses on the dual processes of translation and circulation in innovation transfer (Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996). In this schema a translation model the originator of the innovation has little control or idea about where and when the innovation transfer process concludes. Indeed, parts of an innovation that is spread in time and space may turn up in circumstances that are entirely different from what the originator had envisioned or would have preferred. In this schema, it thus becomes less meaningful to distinguish between an original discovery or innovation and its copy, since the act of "copying" an innovation inevitably results in translation of the innovation to fit local circumstances and realities. Imitation results in outputs that are not copies or radically new inventions, but rather something in between these two ideals (Sevón, 1996).

Taken together, these studies point to the enduring power and role of local institutions in shaping knowledge transfer. In this their focus is on macro-level forces, and in general the diffusion and adaptation perspective gives less weight to the role of firms and individuals in the innovation transfer process. While some studies in this tradition have recently begun to address this point (e.g., Djelic, 2004; Powell et al., 2005), this remains a major limitation. Studies which incorporate notions of agency in the knowledge transfer process, both at the level of the firm and the individual, within the broad institutional environment would go a long way towards closing this gap.

Knowledge: Inter-organizational Partnerships

Beyond sociological perspectives on knowledge transfer, a large stream of literature in organizations looks at the transfer of knowledge, including best practices and business processes, between firms. This research emphasizes the use of dynamic capabilities, relational governance, transaction cost, transaction value, and economics-based frameworks to understand these processes. At the core of most of this research is the strategic alliance, a voluntary partnership between two or more organizations and motivated by strategic motives, shared R&D goals, and the need to spread the costs and risks of innovation, among other reasons (Gualti, 1998). A number of studies within this literature have addressed how knowledge might be transferred between organizations through alliances, and two basic findings seem especially relevant for this study. First, an organization's capacity for learning from its alliance partner depends upon its endowment of relevant technology-based capabilities when entering the alliance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Second, knowledge transfer may not merely be dependent on the alliance as such, but also on the level of pre-alliance overlap between the two organizations' technological capabilities (Land and Lubatkin, 1998).

The first important finding from this literature is that an organization's capacity for learning from its alliance partner depends upon its endowment of relevant technology-based capabilities when entering the alliance. Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996) tracked changes in the in strategic alliance partners' technological capabilities based on citation patterns of their patent portfolios. They found that absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) is an important factor in the acquisition of capabilities through alliances and bolsters the argument that experience in related technological areas is an important determinant of absorptive capacity. They also used this measure to test hypotheses on inter-firm transfer of knowledge and found that certain contractual arrangements (e.g., equity joint ventures) are more effective conduits for the transfer of complex innovations and knowledge than others (e.g., licensing agreements). Interestingly, Mowery et al. also found that over the two-year study period (1985-1986) the capabilities of partner firms became more divergent in a substantial subset of alliances. This is consistent with the argument that strategic alliance activity can promote increased specialization, but seems to somehow defy conventional wisdom and the point of forming an alliance in the first place, which is, ostensibly, to share knowledge and capabilities resulting in a greater overlap between the knowledge bases of alliance partners. Thus, the "strategic" aspect of a strategic alliance may drive alliance partners towards specialized knowledge bases to maximize the competitive advantages gained from collaboration – i.e., gaining knowledge of competitors' strengths may lead to specialization in their areas of weakness.

A second finding from this literature is that innovation transfer may note merely by dependent on the alliance, but also on the level of pre-alliance overlap between the two organizations' technological capabilities. For instance, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) develop a dyad-level construct to measure learning between a student firm (pharmaceutical company) and a teacher firm (biotechnology firm) in the context of an R&D alliance. Building on Cohen and Levinthal's (1990) concept of absorptive capacity – which is a proxy for a firm's ability to acquire and utilize new knowledge – they argue that one firm's ability to learn from another firm depends on the similarity of both firms': (1) knowledge bases; (2) organizational structures and compensation policies; and (3) dominant logics. Thus, the ability of a firm to learn from another firm is jointly determined by the relative characteristics of the two firms on these dimensions, particularly the relationship between their knowledge-processing systems. Along the same lines, Faems, Janssens, and van Looy (2007), using a comparative case study approach, found that relation-specific investments in similar technological equipment for transferring innovations allows the creation of a physical environment in which acquisition and assimilation of tacit technological knowledge is facilitated. They also found that after the transfer of the initially-desired innovation, expected future payoffs of the relationship can remain stable as long as perceived technological complementarities remain present and perceived market threats remain limited. These two conditions can be realized through either the strategy of one partner introducing a string of new technologies or both partners exploiting the transferred knowledge for different product / market combinations.

Overall, studies in this research stream thus broadly focus on two factors which have relevance for this study: (1) the characteristics of the innovation transferred relative to the knowledge base of the target organization; and (2) the relationship between the knowledge bases of the organizations in an innovation transfer alliance. Particularly in emphasizing the first point, there are many similarities between this literature and the literature on the diffusion and adaptation of innovations. For instance, in macro-level studies of innovation transfer (e.g., Djelic, 1998), the integration of an innovation at a target site is often highly dependent on the nature of pre-existing knowledge structures in domains similar to that of the innovation being transferred.

One interesting point of divergence, however, is Mowery et al.'s (1996) contention (seemingly extended by Faems et al., 2007), that alliances can produce either convergence of capabilities through interfirm knowledge transfer or divergence through complementary specialization. This effect may be less pronounced in certain contexts, particularly where the primary goal of the source organization in the knowledge transfer process is to scale-up their successful activities in another context (as opposed to maximizing profits). While convergence may be norm in this setting, divergence may result from target organizations' need to differentiate the technology they get from source organizations. But divergence may also be explained through another lens. If we examine this from the point of view of identity boundaries (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005) – i.e., organizational identity or the cognitive frames of individual managers – complementarity may simply be the result of a need for differentiation for each company in an alliance. Thus, if two companies in the alliance share some set of capabilities and operate in similar markets, they may want to specialize as a means of defining a different organizational identity from their partner. Below, I develop arguments as to why this situation may obtain when inter-organizational partnership takes place in the presence of multiple institutional logics.

METHODS

Research Design and Setting

The research focused on social enterprises, which are organizations that have a social component at the heart of their activities. I used an exploratory, comparative-case research design to explore the impact of multiple institutional logics on partnerships between social enterprises. This multiple-case design is a well-developed methodology used in the organizational research to expand rather than test existing theory. Multiple cases permit a replication logic in which cases are treated as independent experiments, each serving to confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from the others (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). Additionally, by choosing an inductive design, I sought to pursue an opportunity to build theory and gain deep insight into a relatively unexplored area, the dynamics of cooperation between social enterprises engaged in scaling innovations. As befits the exploratory nature of the primary research question in this study, no testable hypotheses were formed prior to data collection (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Suddaby, 2006; Strauss and Corbin, 2008). Rather, the goal of the study was to use the data collected to develop specific theoretical constructs and related propositions which advance current organizational theory in novel directions (Eisenhardt, 1989). This methodology is particularly suited to the study of social entrepreneurship, which, while context and story “rich,” suffers from a paucity of theoretical development.

To understand the dynamics underlying partnerships between social enterprises, I studied four source-target pairs engaged in collaboration for the purpose of transferring knowledge. Each of these pairs includes one source (transferring knowledge) organization and one target (receiving knowledge), and pairs are composed of social enterprises at both the source and target site. As all the organizations were located in emerging economies, this study examines relatively under-explored phenomenon of "South-to-South" organizational partnerships (Khanna and Papelu, 2001). I describe the social enterprises included in this study in more detail below.

Site Selection

These organizations were drawn from a sample of sixteen finalist organization pairs from the proposal submission process to a well-known European Foundation. Pairs of organizations submitted proposals jointly in the hopes of receiving funding for innovation transfer between a source and target organization pair. Five winners were selected from the sixteen finalists, though I had access to the full proposals of all sixteen finalists (including the winners). I also had access to the full list of applicants and letters of interest for the competition, and administered a survey in the summer of 2008 to all sixteen finalist source organizations (with fifteen responses) to capture information on their innovations and their past, extant, and future knowledge transfer partnerships.

Organizations in this study

All eight of the organizations in this study are drawn from the broad field of social enterprises (Dees, 2002). Seven of these organizations are located on the Indian subcontinent: 4 in India, and one each in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The eighth organization is located in Paraguay. The pairs are constituted by country of origin as follows: India-India (within country transfer), India-Sri Lanka (within region transfer), Bangladesh-Pakistan (within region transfer), and India-Paraguay (out of region transfer). Two pairs of organizations are drawn from the public health sector; the other two pairs are drawn from the sustainable development sector. In Table 6 and below I describe each of the organizations, going from one pair to the next.

Pair One: Gram Vikas-Comprehensive Rural Health Project

Gram Vikas is the source organization of the first pair. Through its Movement and Action Network for the Transformation of Rural Areas (MANTRA) program, it addresses the clean water and sanitation needs of rural populations in its home state of Orissa, in eastern India, as well as in several areas in neighboring states. As of March 2009, MANTRA was operational in approximately 700 villages covering nearly 45,000 families and a population of over 240,000 people.

The Comprehensive Rural Health Project (CRHP) is the target organization of the first pair. CRHP has developed its' own successful model of the Village Health Worker (VHW) as the basis for the overall health of a particular village over the past four decades. The VHW model is well-known as a primary health care model for rural areas in the developing world (Arole and Arole, 1994). By partnering with Gram Vikas, CRHP – which operates on a much smaller scale, covering approximately 70 villages – sought to bring comprehensive water supply and sanitation services to the rural areas around Jamkhed.

Pair Two: Aravind Eye Hospital-Fundación Visión

The Aravind Eye Hospital (Aravind) is the source organization of the second pair. Located in Madurai, India, the organization has been working since 1976 to eliminate needless blindness by providing comprehensive eye care services to the poor. Its technology has allowed millions of poor people to work, support their families, and lead fuller, more productive lives. One of the most productive eye care facilities in the world, Aravind has reached impressive scale; in 2009 it treated over 1.4 million patients, two-thirds of them for free. Aravind also has proven methodology for transferring its model to other eye care providers in developing countries through the Lions Aravind Institute of Community Ophthalmology (LAICO).

Fundación Visión is the target organization of the second pair. Founded in 1992, it is the leader in blindness prevention in Paraguay, and opened a new 6000 m^2 hospital in 2009 in central Asuncion. Fundación Visión is the only institution in Paraguay that provides regular monthly ophthalmologist care in rural areas of the country and trains "eye health promoters" to seek out persons in need of treatment for blindness and other eye problems. The partnership with Aravind was undertaken so that Fundación Visión could increase the "quality, volume and sustainability of the eye care services," improve the quality of its ophthalmology training programs, and to increase the options for financing of eye care procedures in Latin America.

Pair Three: Development Alternatives Group-Sewa Lanka

The Development Alternatives Group / TARA is the source organization of the third pair. Technology and Action for Rural Advancement (TARA), one of the affiliate companies of Development Alternatives, is a social enterprise which "pioneers business approaches by which local communities and entrepreneurs adopt technologies for enhancing incomes and creating value for the poor." It is headquartered in New Delhi, India and was established in 1985. The organization's primary mission is to create sustainable livelihoods on a large scale. It does this by selling "technology packages" for sustainable local enterprises, including hardware and equipment supply and on-site training.

Sewa Lanka is the target organization of the third pair. It was founded as a development organization focusing on the most disadvantaged communities of Sri Lanka, with a goal of overcoming the country's religious and ethnic divides. Sewa Lanka emphasizes rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic social and physical infrastructures to support recovery, and promotes community-level enterprise. It partnered with TARA to gain knowledge of technology and know-how related to a variety of environmentally sustainable construction materials for use in its project communities. These materials include stabilised compressed earth blocks, micro-concrete roofing technology, and concrete paver technology. TARA also worked with Sewa Lanka to develop its ability to market and distribute these products.

Pair Four: Waste Concern Group-Saiban

Waste Concern, the source organization of the fourth pair, was established in 1995 as a research and development organization working in the area of waste management, clean energy, sustainableagriculture and climate change.   Waste Concern has developed low cost sustainable composting/ recycling technologies to convert organic waste into compost in slums, rural and urban areas. This technology has been replicated both in urban and rural areas of Bangladesh as well as in other Asian and African countries.

Saiban, the target organization of the fourth pair, is a Pakistani organization that seeks to improve the standard of living in Pakistan by providing the underserved population with access to legal housing and amenities. Targeting low-income families living in squatter settlements, Saiban builds housing developments in several settlements which it offers at affordable rates with secure residential tenure and public utilities. Saiban collaborated with Waste Concern to develop a project where Waste Concern's model of managing waste would be replicated at its housing development in Karachi.

Data Collection

This study uses four data sources: (1) a survey on social enterprises' innovations and knowledge transfer partners; (2) semi-structured interviews; (3) field observations; and (4) archival data and documents.   The survey phase of this research is described in the "Site Selection" section above. The primary source is semi-structured interviews with individual respondents, and a total of 83 interviews were conducted (see Table 7). These interviews were conducted mostly on-site with senior managers and program implementation staff at each of the organizations which comprise this study. The majority of interviews were taped and transcribed. When taping wasn't possible – for instance, when an interviewee refused to be taped or when taping was impractical – I took extensive field notes and transcribed and summarized these into my laptop computer within 24 hours of the interview's completion.

I spent approximately two weeks at each source organization site and one week at the target organization site. Based on preliminary discussions during the pilot study phase of this project as well as theory and research on innovation transfer and social entrepreneurship, I developed two separate interview protocols, one for the source organization and one for the target organization, which provide a semi-structured framework for examining my primary research question: How do organizations manage relationships with partners that have different institutional logics? These protocols included questions on each organization's history, the history and nature of the innovation developed by the source entrepreneur, the history of the relationship between the source and target organization observations, how the knowledge transferred was implemented at the target site, the role of source and target organization members in the transfer, and how the knowledge was received by customers or beneficiaries at the target site.

I supplemented my interview findings with field observation. This took the form of traveling to project sites, often in rural areas of the emerging market countries where this research took place, to observe the activities of both the source and target organizations. In addition to photographing and gathering information about the performance, operation, and implementation procedures for these innovations, I chatted with beneficiaries and innovation implementation staff at these sites. I jotted notes on a paper pad during these visits which were later typed into the field journal I kept on my laptop computer. At a few sites I was able to conduct participant observation by playing the role of customer (e.g., at the Aravind Eye Hospital in southern India I went through the entire eye screening process and received a prescription for reading glasses).   These field notes have greatly enriched my understanding of the innovations being implemented. Finally, I as part of my collection of archival material and documents I was able to access both publicly-available and internal organizational records, including emails, meeting minutes, annual reports, project reports and updates, briefs and monographs, books written on or about the social entrepreneurs being studied, consulting evaluations, and survey data. I outline the four stages of data collection which constitute this study in Table 8.

Data Analysis

The data was analyzed iteratively, as I kept going back and forth between theory development and empirical data analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 1998). This approach is particularly suitable for the social entrepreneurship setting as it allows the development of concepts in close connection to previous theorizing in the realm of institutional logics and inter-organizational partnerships. I worked between interviews, field notes, company documents, archival records, and relevant literature to develop themes and codes in order to categorize findings.

My preliminary analysis was based on institutional logics as a method of analysis (Thornton and Ocascio, 2008). As noted by Scott (1995), institutional logics define what actors in a field understand to be appropriate goals and the appropriate means for achieving these goals. In this method of institutional analysis, it is important to “pay close attention to content, examining the specific belief systems as they are understood and interpreted by members in a field” (Scott, 2001). While I started by coding by “social” and “commercial” logics guiding the action of social enterprises, I soon found these to be inadequate descriptors. Indeed, within the broad category of "social" logics I identified three distinct logics – a spiritual logic, an activist logic, and a technology logic. In addition, I found that, consistent with theory, an economic logic was also guiding the actions of these social enterprises. I found that while some organizations were highly influenced by the economic logic, others were influenced much less. The next section elaborates on these logics further.

After the initial analysis I began with an intensive analysis of some interviews to draw relevant codes related to the actions used by source and target enterprises to manage the transfer process. Concurrently, I developed case reports for each of the four cases, describing key organizational features (structure, key executives, funding sources), the values guiding organizational action and their associated practices, and the justifications given by organizational members for these values and practices. I then moved to using data tables and the NVivo 9 software package to conduct cross-case analysis and to analyze the remainder of the interviews and other materials, based on the codes drawn from the intensive analysis. This phase allowed me to review my codes and dimensions. After identifying the core logics guiding the social enterprises in this study, I analyzed the data further to elaborate on these logics and attempted to tie them to specific actions and strategies. I also developed tables and graphs to facilitate comparisons, and examined how the emergent logics impacted partnership between social enterprises and specifically how organizations managed the transfer of knowledge to and from other social enterprises.

FINDINGS

Prior work on multiple or conflicting logics in organizations has highlighted the role of a dominant logic or competing logics in guiding or constraining organizational action (Pache and Santos, 2010; Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007). My preliminary (first-order) findings show that these logics are broader and richer than scholars have previously considered. I have also found that these logics impact on inter-organizational processes in particular ways.

There are three major findings. First of all, I found that social enterprises are not uniformly impacted by one or two dominant logics of action (e.g., a social logic and an economic logic). Rather, a rich set of logics, multiple in nature, impact their actions. For instance, while other scholars have focused on social and economic logics in the past, no study has thus far examined how spiritual logics can guide the actions of enterprises as they manage the partnership process. Activist logics have been discussed in the social movements literature (de Bakker and den Hond, 2008), but in this study they are examined in an emerging economy, India, where they haven't been looked at before. Equally, organizations impacted by a technology logic may also manage the partnership processes in a way that is distinct from what a broad "social" logic might predict. Finally, "high" and "low" forms of the economic logic were adopted by each of the eight organizations in this study.

Second, institutional logics channel and guide the process of knowledge transfer by impacting the micro-processes of knowledge transfer as they are enacted at the organizational level. These processes are historically informed, and also relate to how social enterprises manage their relationships with partners. Specifically, institutional logics can impact the way in which organizations incorporate different practices and innovations from partners.

Third, the impact of institutional logics on how relationships with partners are managed may be greater than the impact of cultural differences as they relate to the same processes.

Organizations' commitment to multiple logics

Recent work by Purdy and Gray (2009) has examined the conditions that encourage the persistence of multiple logics in a field. Among the factors proposed are multiple local contexts for practice diffusion (and thereby local adaptation) and the lack of a dominant, overarching regulatory or professional framework that is able to imposed field-level standards. Both these factors exist in varying degrees for the cases examined in this paper. As a result, the actions of organizational actors in both instances seem to be influenced by multiple logics, including some which have not been well-characterized before in the institutions literature.

In the first instance, the public health domain has led to the development of relatively distinct organizational models Gram Vikas and CRHP, as well as at Aravind and Fundación Visión. In this section I review the sources and origins of four broad categories of logics I was able to identify in the field: activist, spiritual, technical and economic logics.

At the level of social logics, I found the most variation between the organizations. That is, there was no "unique" social logic guiding the actions of the organizations in this this study. Rather, there were two broad categories of social logics. I found that Gram Vikas (the source organization in pair 1) was driven primarily by a social commitment grounded in the social activist tradition which gave birth to the organization in the late 1970s. I called this an "activist logic". For CRHP, as well as for the two organizations in the second pair, Aravind and Fundación Visión, I identified an underlying "spiritual logic" rooted in their own organizations' histories.

Finally, all of the organizations in this study were influenced, to differing degrees, by an economic logic. Consistent with theory in social entrepreneurship, this economic logic was embedded in the necessities of the sector in which the organizations operated, and were related to issues of operational efficiency and demand generation for the services that they provide. In addition, some organizations had a "strong" form of this economic logic impacting their actions, whereas others had a "weak" form.

However, my point of departure from prior work is in the way in which I found that economic logics and the three social logics mentioned above interact in the inter-organizational setting. Specifically, even when there was alignment between the strength of the economic logic for the two organizations in a dyad (e.g., strong-strong or weak-weak), if there was a clash at the level of social logics the partnership process didn't proceed smoothly. However, a mismatch between the strength of the economic logic between organizations in a pair (e.g., strong-weak) exacerbated already existing tensions at the level of social logic non-alignment. I describe the development of these logics below and identify some of their basic features in Table 9.

Activist Logic

Gram Vikas has its roots in the Indian voluntary movements of the 1960s and 1970s. During this period many university students became social volunteers. One of them, Joe Madiath, led a group which came to the state of Orissa (traditionally one of India's poorest and least developed) from its southern neighbor, Tamil Nadu, in 1971. Setting out in the wake of a devastating cyclone which hit the eastern part of the Bay of Bengal, the group was highly motivated by the idea of social equity and wanted to do something for the countryside. After the crisis was over, Madiath and several other volunteers stayed on to continue with rural development activities in the state. For the next few years they experimented with various activities to help the poor, mostly in irrigation technology and agriculture. This group formed the core for what would become an officially registered organization, Gram Vikas, in January 1979, with Madiath as its Executive Director.

Gram Vikas, which means "village development" in both Hindi (India's official language) and Oriya, the local language in Orissa, was originally formed to address the needs of the so-called adavasi, or tribal minorities, of the state. Initially, the organization worked to address the intertwined problems of alcoholism and debt within adavasi communities.

Subsequently, the organization began to get involved in other areas of rural development, including education, health care and sanitation, income generation, and small-scale energy production through the development of biogas generators. At the root of all all of these activities was a desire to develop a comprehensive approach to addressing the underlying social conditions that kept the people poor. In the early 1990s, following a study of rural development problems, Gram Vikas found that 80% of the morbidity and mortality in rural Orissa could be traced to the poor quality of drinking water. A direct cause of poor water quality was the unsanitary habits around human waste disposal. The organization thus began an initiative covering several hundred families in five pilot villages to bring water and sanitation services to rural areas (Gram Vikas, 2002). This program, known as the Movement and Action Network for Transformation of Rural Areas (MANTRA), is now the foundation of Gram Vikas' activities.

MANTRA begins with the starting assumption that water and sanitation services are not privileges exclusively reserved for the most prosperous, highest-ranking, elements of urban society; rather, they are a right and resource to be equally shared among all members of a community, regardless of social position or geographic location. Nevertheless, the prosaic reality of life in rural Orissa belies this ideal. After two decades of work on the problem by Gram Vikas and other NGOs, in addition to continuing work on the problem by the state government for decades, less than 20% of the rural population in Orissa has access to protected water, less than 1% to a piped water supply and less than 5% to sanitation facilities (Gram Vikas, 2008). For Gram Vikas this seemingly intractable problem presented an opportunity. By working to address the problem of poor (or nonexistent) water and sanitation facilities, the organization could simultaneously address the deep-seated problems of poverty and social exclusion in rural Orissa. MANTRA was therefore developed as a program which goes well beyond simple infrastructure development for water and sanitation:

"in water and sanitation we are really addressing the need of the pooresT of poor because the poorest of the poor by themselves cannot go for a water supply system, a running water *supply system. They cannot construct a toilet or they don't have the resources to construct a* toilet and a bathing room whereas the villages which we take up because of the 100%, the better off people contribute for the poorest of the people, poorest of the poor and they also get the same facility. The poor is included, you know, that inclusion happens the poorest of the poor families are consulted in further development of the village in the planning process, *in the implementation process, in the evaluation process also… this is a program which is* addressed or attuned towards the poorest of the poor, who in their lifetime or for generations together would not be able to go for such kind of a system maybe for generations together. And in this process we are not only providing water and sanitation, they are also getting into a governance part of the whole village, we also create an atmosphere in the village that there should not illiterate in the village, there should not be a person with polio or TB or those sort *of things… So the poor also gets benefited not only in the water and sanitation, but they also* get benefitted in the health education, the sharing of the community income which is equally distributed or the benefit from the sale of that community products, you know, it is benefitting the entire village. So that way it is addressing the need of the poor the maximum which the would not to hav*e dreamt of in the absence of this kind of a program."* (Program Manager, Gram Vikas)

At the surface level, MANTRA delivers concrete water and sanitation infrastructure to villages. Gram Vikas ensures that all the families in a MANTRA village will have access to the same minimum level of products and services, including: (1) toilets and bathing rooms in every house; (2) 24-hour piped water supply to the toilet, bathing room, and kitchen of every family; and (3) the construction of a water tank as a community asset (Gram Vikas, 2008; Keirns, 2007). Beyond this, MANTRA is guided by five Core Values – Inclusion, Social Equity, Gender Equity, Sustainability, and Cost Sharing – which link in fundamental ways to the broader social mission of "equitable inclusion" which Gram Vikas espouses.

To achieve "equitable inclusion" in MANTRA villages, Gram Vikas lays out two primary conditions, each of which encompasses different core values. First, villages join MANTRA only through an "all or none" scheme. Either 100% of the families in a village join the program, or no families join. There is no in-between. In this way, Gram Vikas emphasizes the value of "Inclusion" as a core value. This requirement is highly related to the values of "Social Equity" and "Gender Equity" as well, and these are manifested in villages by representation of all sections of the community in village decision-making processes and equal participation of men and women in community level decision-making and control.

Second, to ensure the financial and operational stability of the water supply and sanitation installed, all families must participate in the scheme by contributing, on average, 1,000 rupees towards a "corpus fund" which goes towards maintenance costs and expansion of the water supply and sanitation system once it has been installed. This condition is most closely tied to the two core values of "Cost Sharing" and "Sustainability", and is based on the principle that the poor can and will pay for development services, and that the beneficiaries of MANTRA themselves are reliable sources of revenue for maintaining the water and sanitation systems.

In summary, MANTRA has allowed Gram Vikas to develop a system whereby public health is utilized as a way to break through the tradition caste and class barriers of the Indian village. This is because the program operates at both the level of public health and a deeper level related to the social change and activism logic ultimately driving the organization's work. Relating to the public health imperative, a senior manager noted:

… water is a common need for all, whether rich or poor, and clean water, that too is a common need for all…. So there is a logic [in MANTRA] for [100%] inclusion… if you do sanitation only for a certain section of the people, those who can afford to do it and the rest you just leave out, you are not going to get clean water in the area.

The second justification goes to the "deeper" meaning of MANTRA. Because the program uses water and sanitation as an "entry point" into project villages where developing greater social equity is the overarching goal, compromising on this condition would jeopardize the one of the fundamental reasons for creating MANTRA in the first place. Leaving aside the impracticality of getting clean water in a village where even a small percentage of the population persists in unsanitary hygiene practices, the 100% requirement ensures that all villagers, regardless of caste or class or income, are equal on at least one dimension: access to clean water and good sanitation facilities. Thus, another program manager noted:

we say that in whichever village we implement [MANTRA] we should have 100%, coverage of all the families. That is our belief, our faith. We are believing it and no force in this world can destroy us from that.

Similarly, at Sewa Lanka in Sri Lanka, the activist logic arose from a belief in the importance of long-term development in changing communities, as the company's Vice Chairman noted:

Our main mandate for Sewa Lanka is long-term development and we also really insist on that even in our relief and other stages when we have different stages. Even at a lower level our main theme would be like mobilization of the communities into smaller groups and, you know, so we have the base into development. So we start with that.

Spiritual Logic

I found that CRHP, Aravind, and Fundación Visión were guided by a core spiritual logic in their actions. This was in addition to the health logic common to all organizations in this study. In this section I illustrate the spiritual logic as it manifested itself at these organizations. I do so by concentrating on Aravind, and supplementing the illustration with information form CRHP and FV as well.

Aravind is a pioneer in the provision of comprehensive eye care services to the poor. Its late founder, Dr. G. Venkataswamy, was fifty-eight years old and recently retired from the Indian civil service when he started the organization as an 11-bed hospital founded in a private residence in 1976. Dr. Venkataswamy (or "Dr. V." as he was affectionately known) was greatly inspired by the teachings of Sri Aurobindo, one of the leading sages of southern India. This spiritual commitment is a core guiding principle of the organization, and the teachings of Sri Aurobindo inspired Aravind's late founder, Dr. Govindappa Venkataswamy. His words are quoted on the second page of Aravind's 2007-2008 Annual Report:

Our effort is to make Aravind an instrument of the Divine Will. We strive to forget our limitations and work with the direction of the Divine Will, not in a vain superficial way but with a deep commitment and faith that guidance comes from a higher level of consciousness.

Then one is able to work with the great confidence that comes only with that faith and realization that we are all part of a spiritual capacity or spiritual power. It is then that all of nature works with you. You don't feel that you are a superior being but you are an instrument in the hands of a higher force and it is in that spirit that we meet our day to day struggles and successes.

This organizational-level commitment is also manifested in the daily operations of the organization, and influences the actions of organizational members. For instance, the Chief Medical Officer of an Aravind district hospital similarly referenced a "higher power" guiding the organization:

*"... I don't know whether you believe it or not, but in this part of country, and on the Indian subcontinent, I think it's believed everywhere, that we are ins*truments only. Somebody else *has decided that what I should do, huh? So whatever we are doing I don't think it's our effort only, many people put the same amount or effort or more, but they don't achieve that. Somebody wants... us to do that much, so we a*re able to do. So definitely I feel that way, that whatever we are doing, that divine force is there, a higher power is pushing us, he wants us *to get that, I mean, wants us to do the work. So, I strongly feel it's there, if it is there at a* certain poin*t in time, we will feel it, now you can't really insulate yourself from it."*

Similarly, Fundación Visión displayed a commitment to Christian principles in its work:

*Our mission is "to be a leading institution in the prevention of blindness, in the prom*otion of ocular health and in the delivery of high-quality services, as well as in the training of new *professionals for community health." The work of the organization rests on Christian* principles and relies on the Bible as the sufficient rule of faith and conduct. (Fundación Visión web site; accessed: 30 May 2011).

At CRHP a similar ethos permeates the organization. The following passage is taken from the organization's web site:

The CRHP community has an underlying orientation toward Christian spiritual values, which serves as a source of inspiration for many staff. The project welcomes and respects people of all traditions and beliefs, and expects visitors to respect the Christian foundation of CRHP. The project does not force conversions on any of our project communities or visitors nor do we require participation in religious services. Our aim is to reinforce positive humanistic values common to all groups in order to achieve harmony and well-being within the community.

The staff holds daily early morning devotions, which also serves as a community-building activity for the staff and the local Christian population. It is also a way for us to start the day together. Everyone is welcome to attend but it is completely optional. CRHP also hosts the Jamkhed Community Church and there is a service on Sunday morning, which is nondenominational and all are welcome. For non-Christians, these activities also offer an opportunity to experience and learn more about the Christian faith if so desired.

That a spiritual logic was found at Aravind, CRHP, and Fundación Visión is unsurprising. What is interesting is how organizational-level action can be influenced and guided by such spiritual values. Parboteeah and colleagues (2009) have noted that religion has a strong norm-setting influence with respect to work, which is seen as an obligation to society. In this way religion creates important work expectations for individuals, expectations which grow stronger when this work is situated in religious contextual environments. At these three organizations spiritual values were an integral part of the work environment. This was manifested not just in the statements of organizational members and in official documents, but also in the physical symbols and objects which reinforced these values within these organizations. For instance, statues and pictures of Sri Aurobindo are found in the main entrance of all the major buildings within the Aravind system that I visited.

The spiritual logic is important in this context as it helps to create a sense of common purpose and unity not just within the organization itself and between organizational members, but also between other organizations which share the same or similar values. Beyond this, a spiritual logic also informs the way actors at Aravind, CRHP, and Fundación Visión approach their tasks within the health care realm, with their patients, and with respect to their interactions with members of other organizations.

Technology Logic

A third set of organizations channeled their activities in the form of a technology logic. This logic was common to TARA, Waste Concern, and Saiban, and was strongly related to the engineering and technocratic backgrounds of the organizations' founders and, often, senior staff members. The primary manifestation of this logic at the organization level was a strong commitment to scientific standards, research and development, and a belief in the power of technology to positively impact individuals and communities. For instance, the Executive Director of Waste Concern described his organization's activities as follows:

What we do is we set the standards, design and during implementation one of our staff visits the city to check the design it has been followed and there has been no deviation and during the implementation phase, operation phase, again first thing is that people from Saiban came to Dhaka learn the operational practices and then after two three months we again went there – we check that whether they are, they are following it properly. So these are things *that you… So they have to convince the locality that they are going to build a plant and we* always tell everybody that you have to be transparent, tell them what you are doing and share the information as much as possible. And then if you get positive response, then build the plant.

Economic Logic

At all the companies in the study, there was, in keeping with theory in social entrepreneurship, an economic logic which counterbalanced the various social logics. However, the economic logic differed in strength across companies – for some it was a major driving force, for others it was far less important or even de-emphasized. For Aravind, spiritual commitment was balanced with a focus on delivering services efficiently. This, as much as any spiritual element, was considered by Aravind's Executive Director as the fundamental pre-requisite for transferring knowledge to partners:

*"I think most essential [element of the Aravind model to be transferred] is the mindse*t. *Because I think the process… you can say one thing is more important than the other. For a* given hospital something can be more important than the other, you know, like certain hospitals they could be already having a tremendous number of patients, you know, but then their conversion rate, they are having very low acceptance or so there we do not focus too much on marketing, you know, that will be institution-specific. But fundamentally the most *important thing is the mindset, how they start thinking*…. the market focus, customer focus, *all of that… wanting to become efficiency focused or wanting to become self*-supporting. You know, if you are always having the mindset that you can always raise money, you are never *going to become efficient."*

At other organizations, however, the focus on efficiency and economic factors was consciously moved to the background. For instance, at Sewa Lanka, the Vice Chairman of the Board was very explicit about how the profit motive was not a main driver of the company's for-profit activity:

... as much as we have Sewa Lanka we have these two other arms, Sewa finance and Sedco. SEWA finance is very much independent in working on different finances and just giving funding, giving loans to the people or to communities. Sedco is our marketing arm where they deal with this micro-entrepreneurship, small businesses, where you deal with the marketing, so these are the two arms we actually become operative when we are reaching *development stage… They are both profit companies, but* not to be big profits [sic] but also they take their profit and to send it to the communities. Like the SEWA finance we give money into very sophisticated good CBOs who can go into good businesses like small entrepreneurship where they can own their own, but they have to repay the loan. So the interest is again is given to another native person. So it also has a community development *concept, it's not like a pure business, it's also connected very much with the communities. It's not like a business…*

In the case of inter-organizational partnerships, when the organizations in a dyad differ in the degree to which they are driven by the economic logic, tensions can arise and impact the relationship. Whereas in general the partnership between TARA and Sewa Lanka operated smoothly, there was a clash at the level of both social logics and the economic logic. Whereas TARA was influenced by technology logics and had a strong economic logic to its actions, Sewa Lanka's activist logic and weak economic logic led to disagreements between managers at these organizations.

For instance, the primary project manager at TARA for the Sewa Lanka project expressed doubt about Sewa Lanka's commitment to get involved in private sector activities and reach truly large numbers of people:

SLF [Sewa Lanka Foundation] *is one of the big NGOs in Sri Lanka, no doubt there's very* good infrastructure, very good everything, but I think the people there are more and more involved in the project kind of activity. TARA is also working on projects kind of activity, but TARA is more willing to do some technology implementation through private companies and other agencies. The NGO model is not very much feasible in the market. Only if the normal people can accept this technology and they want to earn money by this technology, then we can say this is one of the successful model in every way.

Later on, this clear divide between the level of impact of the economic logic on TARA and Sewa Lanka resulted in tensions when TARA approached Sewa Lanka to serve as its sales agent for construction-material related machines in Sri Lanka at 15% commission rate. Sewa Lanka's board felt that entering into this kind of relationship would undermine the organization's reputation as an (activist) organization working with the grassroots population of Sri Lanka:

> There has been a small problem in the relation between Sewa Lanka and TARA because TARA is preparing an agreement between SEDCO and TARA. And SEDCO's board won't approve it, because SEDCO's board thinks we will get a bad impression from becoming an agent of TARA [by selling their products in Sri Lanka for a commission].

As of the official end of the collaboration between TARA and Sewa Lanka, in July 2010, this agreement remained unsigned:

> TARA and SEDCO; a business arm of SLF, have agreed to collaborate for promotion and marketing of TARA products and services in Sri Lanka through a commercial agreement currently under negotiation (Joint Final Report to the Schwab Foundation, July 2010).

Multiple logics and practice adoption

My case data suggest that source enterprises that enter into partnerships in order to increase the social impact of their innovations have developed strategies to ensure that their business models and innovations get scaled up. These strategies are deeply rooted in not only the process of scaling, but also the way different institutional logics at the source and target enterprise interact, and the extent to which the logics of the source enterprise and the target enterprises are aligned.

Additionally, data from the cases indicate that the source social enterprises actively manage their relationships using inter-related strategies related to the underlying balance between multiple institutional logics. These tactics can be broadly organized into one major process: maintaining innovation fidelity. In other words, the source enterprises attempt to maintain the fidelity of their original model or innovation at the target site to preserve the intended social impact. They achieve this goal through a number of tactics, including bargaining with managers at the target organization to adopt practices and techniques developed by the source entrepreneur to ensure that the success of the original model and innovation in its new locale. As described below, the process of maintaining innovation fidelity is related to separate aspects of the social enterprises' indirect ability to influence other organizations. This process enables source organizations with limited resources and a constrained direct ability to control of their partners' actions to exercise significant influence despite the absence of an ownership stake or even a principal-agent relationship at the target organization.

Maintaining Innovation Fidelity

For source social enterprises, the primary way to ensure that the impact of the knowledge transferred is to ensure adherence to the fidelity of the original innovation (Ansari et al., 2010). This means that the original intent of the idea has to be maintained as the innovation travels from the source to the target site. Aravind and Gram Vikas had different ways of accomplishing this goal. For Aravind, the focus was on maintaining basic operating principles which would allow their systems to transfer over to Fundación Visión. Several Aravind managers commented to me about these principles, including the importance of starting the day early and keeping a focus on being organized to do good work. This was true of staff members both at headquarters (e.g., at LAICO, the Lions Aravind Institute of Community Ophthalmology, Aravind's training arm, and at the Madurai base hospital) and in field locations. For instance, a Faculty member at LAICO commented:

… we are trying to share principles, you know, it may not be exactly that you can replicate all *our procedures but the principles can always be replicated anywhere … for example, I will tell you, we start everyday at 7 o'clock, 7 AM in the operating theatre, 7:30 AM in the out-patient department.... We don't say, y*ou also should start at 7, if you start at 7 well and good, *but not necessary. You can start at 8 o'clock, 8:30, 9 o'clock, fine… but how you start is what's important, how you are organized to do good work…. in the places where it is* possible we suggest t*hat they should start little early or something…* Fundación Visión , time is not a problem for them, they start early.

At the Theni field hospital, the Medical Director made a similar comment:

… we follow certain principles, the basic principle on with the hospital Aravind Eye care to *ensure those things. For instance, like discipline. We start 7:30 in the morning… Whatever we have committed has to be honored. It's written that at 7:30 the hospital starts, and a* patient coming at 7:30 should be able to see it.

For Aravind, at the root of transferring technical procedures related to information technology, patient management, and community engagement is a focus on developing values which help organizations improve in each of these areas. This was the feeling of Fundación Visión 's Chief Operating Officer as well:

Especially Aravind helps us to improve our procedures and improve the way we are attending the community. They are helping us to improve the attention we give to our patients, and they are telling us to correct some procedures, so we can have a better flow of patients or we can attend more volumes. So they are helping us technically but they are also saying that we have to develop our values, and our discipline too. So they are saying we have to do both.

Geographic differences and transfer

Interestingly, the impact of cultural differences on the innovation transfer process was relatively muted compared to the institutional factors discussed above. Instead, what I found was that organizations tended to refer to geographic differences only with respect to actual or potential pitfalls in the transfer process; otherwise, the issue was for the most part in the background. For instance, executives at Gram Vikas and CRHP, which had a relatively challenging in-country transfer, cited cultural differences between different regions in India as a reason why there had been so many problems with their collaboration:

*"I think what makes a difference is tribal areas [as in Orissa] and plains area*s [as in Maharashtra] where the caste system is so ingrained, I mean, even though we have done so *much to change the caste barriers, it's still harder to get 100% involvement" (Associate* Director, CRHP)

This finding tended to go counter to expectations, as I assumed that cultural differences would be greatest when the members of the source-target pair were located in different countries, and especially where the "cultural difference" between the organizations' home countries was greatest – i.e., between India and Paraguay in the case of Aravind and Fundación Visión .

However, in the case of Aravind and Fundación Visión , which are located nearly ten thousand miles (sixteen thousand kilometers) apart, geographic separation provided an opportunity rather than a barrier for transfer:

> *“I kind of saw an opportunity, you know, to create synergy because Latin America is a place where there isn't any place to just do high volume affordable care. I think it’s largely* mindset kind of a thing and [their models are] very heavily driven by the US model. So they practice very expensive medicine, which benefits 2% of the population, and a vast majority cannot afford that price. So, but this guy really genuinely wanted to help the poor people, Reinhold Dirks [Head of Fundación Visión *]. So that’s how that idea came up and Martin [Burt, head of Fundación Paraguaya] was willing, Reinhold was willing... we were trying to* create a win-*win model” (Executive Director, Aravind Eye Care System).*

It might be the case the “foreignness” of Fundación Visión relative to Aravind actually spurred effort on the part of both parties to make the relationship work. That is, due to the potential for miscommunication organizational members actually made a greater effort to communicate effectively with their counterparts from across the world. In the case of Gram Vikas and CRHP, organizational managers may have under-estimated the effort required to engage a partner and beneficiaries from an organization within the same country. For instance, an aborted training attempt of villagers from CRHP – i.e., they became homesick in Orissa and went back to Maharashtra early – may be an instance where intra-country differences were not properly taken into account.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

A number of scholars have called for research which highlights the distinctive nature of organizational processes in a social entrepreneurial context, where multiple institutional logics operate (Pache and Santos, 2010; Dacin et al, 2010; Dees, Anderson, and Wei-Skillern, 2004). My research addresses this call by examining how social enterprises manage partnerships with other organizations with different logics. It makes several contributions.

First, this work helps to illuminate the extent to which organizations which operate in environments with multiple institutional demands and with multi-dimensional goals manage their organizational processes and behaviors in order to achieve increased impact nationally and internationally (Dacin et al, 2010). By illuminating heretofore under-examined institutional logics, a spiritual logic and an activist logic, it provides opportunities for researchers to develop these concepts further.

Second, the paper highlights the tactics used by firms to manage knowledge transfer partnerships with partners that have different logics. For organizations with social goals, partnership is a means to "create social value" and indeed to spread the organization's key values to other organizations and locales. The organizational field plays a major role in shaping these values and the nature of the partnership (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). Alignment of the source and target enterprises' values greatly facilities inter-organizational collaboration. When alignment isn't there, however, national cultural and institutional factors become more important in determining the direction and success of a partnership. While target organizations enter into the partnership initially to gain access to new technologies and resources, the values component becomes paramount in sustaining the partnership and making it valuable for both the source enterprise and the target organization. What emerges from the rich case data which constitute this study is that the form of inter-organizational partnership is influenced by the extent to which the source organization manages to balance its multiple logics with those of its partner.

Third, by situating institutional logics research in an inter-organizational setting, I begin to unpack the processes which emerge when the logics of different organizations have to be simultaneously considered. In doing this, I address the following questions: Are these mechanisms indeed different from knowledge transfer mechanisms studied by organizational scholars? How do partners in a dyadic transfer relationship coordinate their efforts and to what extent to they ensure the fidelity of the innovation is maintained across settings (Lounsbury, 2001; Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac, 2010)?

Finally, this research contributes to the nascent literature on “scaling” entrepreneurial innovations in social settings (Bloom and Chatterji, 2009; Dees et al, 2004). It does this by offering possible alternative views to the discussion on “scaling” in the social sector, a debate which has, to date, focused on “scaling organizations” as the primary means to expand the scope and reach of innovations developed by social entrepreneurs. By highlighting the possibility of instead “scaling solutions” (Dees et al, 2004) through inter-organizational partnership as a means to achieve similar impact, I described how organizations have a variety of options available in their toolkit to address the issue of increased impact. My research also defines some of the tactics used by social entrepreneurs to manage this process when it involves the transfer of an innovation to a partner organization.

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TABLE 6
Characteristics of the Social Enterprises in this Study

	Pair 1		Pair 2		Pair 3		Pair 4	
Organization	Gram Vikas	CRHP	Aravind	Fundación Visión	TARA	Sewa Lanka	Waste Concern	Saiban
Source / Target	Source	Target	Source	Target	Source	Target	Source	Target
Domain	Public Health	Public Health	Public Health	Public Health	Sustainable Rural Development	Sustainable Rural Development	Sustainable Urban Development	Sustainable Urban Development
Country	India	India	India	Paraguay	India	Sri Lanka	Bangladesh	Pakistan
Founding Year	1979	1970	1976	1992	1984	1993	1996	1991
Number of Employees	500	65	3000	100	260	780	30	15
Field Visit	January and February 2009	February 2009	February and March 2010	July 2010	March 2010	April 2010	February 2010	n/a
Number of Interviews	19	11	12	10	12	6	11	2

Table 7
Data Collection Timeline

Stage	Name	Time Period	Description
1	Preliminary Survey and Site Selection	July-August 2008	Short survey was sent out to the 16 finalist organizational pairs; 15 completed the survey. Data from surveys used to construct a list of the most promising organizations for follow-up.
2	Pilot Study	January-February 2009	The initial case study was conducted on-site at the source and target organizations of Pair 1, both located in India, to gain insight into the social innovation transfer process. This pilot study allowed the "field-testing" of a data gathering tool which was refined for use subsequent data-gathering.
3	Field Visits and Interviews	February-July 2010	In February, March and July 2010 I visited source and target social enterprises in Pair 2, Pair 3, and Pair 4 in Bangladesh, India, Paraguay, and Sri Lanka.
4	Follow-up and Data Analysis	July 2008-June 2012	Following and concurrent to field data collection I gathered updates on the progress of the knowledge transfer processes via email exchanges and telephone calls. I also had access to the periodic updates sent by each pair of organizations to the funding agency, up to and including the final reports (submitted in the summer of 2010) Final phone calls with both source and target organizations were conducted through June 2012.

Table 8
Comparison of the Activist, Spiritual, Technology and Economic Logics

Characteristic	Social Logic - Activist	Social Logic - Spiritual	Social Logic - Technology	Economic Logic
Goals	Change undesirable social conditions through identifying and addressing root causes of problem	Relieve Suffering of beneficiaries while adhering to core religious principles	Improve human well-being by applying technology and know-how	Maximize surplus revenue through efficiency of operations
Target Population	Beneficiaries across class and caste levels, with a particular focus on the poorest of the poor and the most marginalized	Beneficiaries to be served, particularly the poor and marginalized	Populations to be served, including the poor but also entrepreneurs and other citizens	Clients to be served with a focus on efficiency and on generating demand for future interventions
Operational principles	Design interventions to change underlying unequal social structure	Design interventions to serve beneficiaries and to serve a "higher power"	Improve human life and conduct research and development to improve practices	Maximize surplus revenue through efficiency of operations and demand generation

Table 9
The Varieties of a Social Logic

Organization	Gram Vikas	CRHP	Aravind	Fundacion Vision
Pair Number	1	1	2	2
Institutional Logic	Activist	Spiritual	Spiritual	Spiritual

Illustrative Quote	Generating 100% consensus of all caste and creed living in a village, with everybody contributing to a village corpus fund... these are all tall orders and difficult things. So given all these, scaling up is not that fast as an individual oriented program which we were implementing, this we accept with all humility... but we say that whichever village we implement should have 100%, coverage of all the families. That is our belief, our faith, we are believing it no force in this world can destroy us from that.	We believe that all people are made in the image of God and endowed with talents and abilities. We are called to facilitate and empower the poor and marginalized and enable them to achieve their full potential through a value-based approach with equity and justice.	Our effort is to make Aravind an instrument of the Divine Will. We strive to forget our limitations and work with the direction of the Divine Will, not in a vain superficial way but with a deep commitment and faith that guidance comes from a higher level of consciousness. Then one is able to work with the great confidence that comes only with that faith and realization that we are all part of a spiritual capacity or spiritual power. It is then that all of nature works with you. You don't feel that you are a superior being but you are an instrument in the hands of a higher force ...	The work of the organization rests on Christian principles and relies on the Bible as the sufficient rule of faith and conduct. Our purpose is to establish a high-quality, self-sustainable, faith-based medical service model that will serve the entire population of Paraguay with no gender, social, religious or racial discrimination and that may inspire other physicians to join in the work.

Table 9
The Varieties of a Social Logic

Organization	TARA	Sewa Lanka	Waste Concern	Saiban
Pair Number	3	3	4	4
Institutional Logic	Technology	Activist	Technology	Technology
Illustrative Quote	Ultimately the overall mission is we say is to create sustainable livelihood on a large scale... our sustainable livelihoods are technology based, they service the poor and the under-served, three they respond to local resources and four they actually create value across the entire value chain... we are technology experts.	development… is working through the communities and also strengthening the communities… our main theme is mobilization of communities into smaller groups so we have a base for development.	Waste Concern... is a research and development organization...working in the area of waste management, clean energy, sustainable agriculture and climate change... Waste Concern for the first time initiated community based waste management and recycling [and it has] developed low cost sustainable composting/ recycling technologies to convert organic waste into compost in slums, rural and urban areas.	Saiban builds housing developments in several settlements which it offers at affordable rates with secure residential tenure and public utilities... our screening process, our financing schemes, our technical low cost construction advice to new homeowners, our social mobilization teams and social support network.... that gives us the incremental developmental housing projects for low-income and marginalized populations. We disseminate information about this approach to researchers and professionals, government politicians, and other groups

SECTION 6

ESSAY 3

ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY: HOW SOCIAL ENTERPRISES MANAGE THEIR ACTIVITY SYSTEMS

Organizational Form and Organizational Identity: How Social Enterprises Manage Their Activity Systems

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how social enterprises manage their activity systems to address the multiple audiences they rely on for their survival and growth. It does this by examining the ways in which organizational form and organizational identity are impacted by pressures from external audiences such as legitimating organizations, and how, in turn, the process of replicating innovations through partner organizations relates to these concepts as well. Implications for future research on designing and managing social enterprises are discussed.

Keywords: organizational form, organizational identity, partnerships, social enterprises, social entrepreneurship

INTRODUCTION

The great variety of organizational forms relates broadly to the variety and scope of activity carried out by organizations in modern society (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Sorenson & Audia, 2000; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Traditional entrepreneurs have as their primary goal the generation of profit, though social concerns can also be built into their activities and forms. Thus, the originally locally-embedded Starbucks stores, which started with a community-defining, status-conferring (to customers) ethos, gave way to the mass-market-focused franchise form of today (Simon, 2009). The company's motivation is economic (generating profits) more so than social (building community), or perhaps using the social aspects to maximize the economic goals. As it grew beyond a certain size the economic motivations become more readily apparent, and the company's organizational form grew into something more familiar for delivering mass-market products. This form allowed Starbucks to focus on issues of price, quantity, and special offers to lure customers rather than relying on the "special ethos" which the locally-focused branches it had been able to create earlier on in the life of the company.

While the shift to a franchise form for companies like Starbucks may seem natural, this is not the not necessarily the case for social enterprises, which have a social mission at the core of their activities and prioritize social impact over economic profit. This is of importance as social entrepreneurs address multiple audiences, often with conflicting interests, through their activities (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Pache and Santos, 2010). They thus have to organize themselves around these multiple purposes in a way that traditional enterprises don't have to. While work on organizational forms has recently filtered into the literature on social enterprises (Tracy, Phillips, and Jarvis, 2011), much work still remains to be done on the way social enterprises manage and organize their systems of activities.

In constructing their businesses, most traditional entrepreneurs establish "reproducer organizations" which imitate the identities of organizations having an existing organizational form. Only a small number of entrepreneurs establish "innovator organizations" whose identities are novel or significantly different from existing organizational forms (Aldrich, 1999). The emergence of these innovator organizations, which represent potential new organizational forms, depends on the diversity of knowledge and resources available for nascent entrepreneurs to recombine in novel and successful ways (Aldrich, 1999). Once created, the establishment of these potential new organizational forms as recognized organizational forms depends on a process of external legitimization. Beyond this question of external legitimation, the identity orientation an organization chooses to adopt has the potential to strongly influence its actions and outlook (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000; Tripsas, 2009) as well. Just as individuals maintain separate identities based on the groups they belong to, organizations form identities based on the relationships they have within their operating sphere.

Thus, for this process of external legitimization to be successful a new organizational form must have an identity which is sufficiently recognized to be placed into a cognitive category, while at the same time having a symbolically distinct identity which leads to a collective recognition of this identity and enables it to become socially codified (Dobrev, Ozdemir & Teo, 2006). During this process of legitimization organizations are not passive but actively participate by garnering support from key institutions, such as the State, customers and regulatory bodies, hence to ensure successes efforts must be focused on the most influential stakeholders (Rao, 1998). Organizations may therefore develop their activity systems to address a broad range of constituencies, and the organizational form which results from this process will reflect that inclination; this concern is especially salient for social enterprises, which explicitly balance social and economic goals. Social enterprises must often obtain resources from organizations which may be embedded in environments where action is primarily guided by social motivations or economic motivations, and they need to be able to design their activities to reflect the multiple audiences they are required to address.

Using data drawn from the archives of a well-known social entrepreneurship foundation, a survey, and field observations and interviews, I examine how social enterprises develop their activity systems to address the range of audiences they deal with, including potential partners with whom they might share their knowledge. My focus is on the different models social entrepreneurs use to organize themselves, and I discusses how such organization impacts attempts to transfer key innovations and business models. I argue that different aspects of a social enterprise's model determine the extent to it uses various strategies to increase its impact.

THEORY

Organizational Form

The concept of organizational form is widely used in organizational theorizing and research and is necessary for work which goes beyond the organizational level of analysis. Population ecologists use form as the basis of a definition of populations, their primary unit of analysis (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). For these studies populations are defined as groups of organizations sharing the same form which are either localized geographically (Sorenson & Audia, 2000) or via a common network (DiMaggio, 1991). The population ecology theory of structural inertia holds that change of core structures is risky and harmful for organizations (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), this theory separates "core" features from peripheral ones. This distinction can only be achieved through a clear definition of the organizational form in question. Additionally, institutional theory is concerned with processes of mutual influence shared between organizations the concept of organizational form is also fundamental to studying the emergence, diffusion and death of institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

While organizational form is a widely used and crucial concept, its definition is not straightforward and has evolved over the course of its usage. Historically the most common way of identifying an organizational form has been to define it based on a cluster of features which organizations belonging to the form all possess. Romanelli (1991) notes that "the concept of organizational form refers to those characteristics of an organization that identify it as a distinct entity and, at the same time, classify it as a member of a group of similar organizations". This feature-based conception of organizational form often leads researchers to delineate between core and peripheral features of the organization and define form as being the collection of core features such as authority structures and procedures (Carroll & Hannan, 2000). The definition of organizational form along product or service lines is a feature-based conception, for example Carroll and Hannan's (1989) density-dependency study of five organizational populations which included American breweries and Argentinean newspapers. Perhaps the most widely cited example of a feature based conception of organizational form is Weber's (1979) rational-legal bureaucracy, which he defined in terms of procedures, employment relations and authority structures. While within this conception of organizational form there is no agreed upon taxonomy of organizations, all approaches treat forms primarily as structural arrangements which can be technically assessed.

A second conceptualization of organizational form is that based on social boundaries. This conceptualization, originally proposed by Hannan and Freeman (1986) views forms as socially bounded sets of features, and thus the strength and precision of social boundaries, for example social networks or usage of core technologies, are critical to the definition of organizational forms. A specific way of measuring forms within this social boundaries approach is that of identifying structurally equivalent organizations (DiMaggio, (1986). Organizations are structurally equivalent if they occupy similar positions within a network, i.e. if their ties to other actors in a network are alike (Burt, 1976). This measure is somewhat contentious as it can only realistically be measured within a population while the concept of organizational form transcends populations. It is important to note that while the social boundaries conceptualization of organizational forms has generated interest it is relatively undeveloped, particularly in the empirical domain.

More recently, a new conceptualization of organizational form has been proposed which has influenced a number of theoretical and empirical papers. This views organizational form through the lens of identity. According to this approach, forms are external identity codes which confer both a set of properties, which could be structural or network features, and a set of regulations which are socially enforced (Polos, Hannan, & Carroll, 2002). These identity codes are not internally constructed but externally bestowed as in the case of social identity at the individual actor level (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). Thus, an entity maintains their identity through the satisfaction of constraints placed upon it by the external environment's taken-for-granted expectations of both what the entity should do and what properties it should have. Related work by institutional scholars has moved to link the idea of organizational form to the broader institutional context within which an organization is situated. For instance, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) define organizational form as "an archetypical configuration of structures and practices gtiven coherence by underlying values regarded as appropriate within an institutional context."

In either case, the violation of identity codes imposed by the external environment / actors has consequences for the entity's classification of belonging to the specific form in question. Carroll and Swaminathan's (2000) study of the emergence of the microbrewery organizational form in the USA demonstrates the impact of violations of identity codes on granting of an organizational form. The identity code attached to the organizational form of a microbrewery held constraints such as small production volume, craft production techniques and a closeness to customer in the marketing and distribution. The authors found that established industrial breweries could not position micro-brewing products as their organizational identity violated the identity legitimately associated with that of a microbrewery. This violation of identity code meant that they had limited success in releasing products into the market niche. The only large breweries which enjoyed some success were those that started new microbreweries which were held at arms length from the mother organization and hence could be legitimately thought of as of having a true microbrewery form. This paper aims to will build on this recent conceptualization of organizational form as an external identity code, with some reference to the institutionalist conception of organizational form as well.

Emergence of New Organizational Forms

One can think of the creation and establishment of organizational forms as a process involving two core phases; the initial emergence of a potential form, and, the development and legitimization of an identity scheme or prototype for the form. Once the form and its accompanying identity code have reached a taken-for-granted legitimized status it is considered to be a true organizational form.

The initial emergence of a potential organizational form requires innovation. This innovation can occur within the setting of existing organizations or by entrepreneurs who form de novo firms. The past century has seen a proliferation of organizational forms within the US health care market, the initial ideas and emergence of which on the whole originated in organizations of an existing legitimized form (Ruef, 2000). In contrast, the microbrewery organizational form in the US emerged as a result of entrepreneurs beginning de novo businesses (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). The emergence of these innovator organizations, which represent potential new organizational forms, depends on the diversity of knowledge and resources available for nascent entrepreneurs to recombine in novel and successful ways (Aldrich, 1999). Alongside access to diverse knowledge and resources, initial emergence is often accompanied by a preliminary stage of idea circulation and testing out intentions with the potential organizational form's external environment (DiMaggio, 1991). These active interactions can also be witnessed in the mobilization of social movements which frequently provide support and necessary resources to aid the form emergence (Swaminathan & Wade, 2001). Thus, the engagement of prospective stakeholders and other parties in the external environment is necessary during the initial emergence of a potential form. Some of these parties will become critical in the development and legitimization of an identity scheme or prototype necessary to move the form's status from potential to taken-for-granted.

The basic model for the second phase of new form establishment is a density-dependent legitimization process (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). As the number of organizations taking the potential new form increases a ceiling is reached where the form becomes externally recognized and accepted as a true, rather than potential, form.

As demonstrated in the disk array industry, the establishment of a new form via density-dependent legitimization is not a straightforward counting game with increases in the number of organizations having that potential form leading to the form's establishment (McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll, & Khessina, 2003). What matters is the density of organizations adopting the potential form as their master identity. When organizations derive their identities from other more central activities, as in the case of disk arrays, the establishment of an organizational form is unlikely as the external environment will have low awareness of the identity. This case study demonstrates that the legitimization of an organizational form is more likely, and occurs more rapidly when the potential form is held by a high density of de novo firms rather than being embedded in established organizations.

The legitimization of a new organizational form does not only depend on the type of firms adopting it but is also impacted by the identities of previously established organizational forms. Dobrev, Ozdemir and Teo (2006) argue for a "violation-by-comparison" effect which describes the necessity for a new form to have a non-legitimate identity and concurrently share a general identity with an established organizational form. On one hand, having an overlapping identity with an established organizational form aids in the legitimization process, however, on the other hand this overlap can make it difficult for the new form to become recognized and established in a population. Hence a new organizational form arises when its identity is sufficiently recognized to be placed into a cognitive category, while at the same time having a symbolically distinct identity which leads to a collective recognition of this identity and enables it to become socially codified.

Some events are particularly important to note for the emergence and legitimization of new organizational forms; regulatory changes, technology innovations or patents and the identification and official naming of new organizational forms to name a few. Ruef (2000) considers regulatory changes in the timing of organizational form founding in the US Health Care market. Akin to Dobrev, Ozdemir and Teo (2006) Ruef's analysis highlights the importance of the position of a new form's identity in relation to existing community form identities. He finds that as the density and mass of existing populations increase, novel forms which have related identities are rendered more legitimate and hence the likelihood of gaining regulatory legitimation for these new forms increases, a process named cross-form legitimation. This relationship holds to a point at which the saturation of the niche leads to competition at a level which inhibits the appearance of new organizational forms, a process named cross-form competition.

Certain organizations are heavily reliant on regulatory approval to legitimize new organizational forms, such as those in the public sector or those which rely on state approval (Tucker, Singh, & Meinhard, 1990). Others rely on different mechanisms of legitimization such as the recognition that a potential form offers a distinct employment opportunity by individuals in the labor market. This step was highlighted in Brint and Karabel's (1991) study of American Community Colleges whose legitimization as a new organizational form was accelerated when they became recognized as offering unique training and employment prospects. It is important to note that during the phase of form legitimization organizations do have some agency as to how the form's identity code is molded. Rao's (1998) study of the emergence of watchdog organizations in the US reveals that those organizations and entrepreneurs who can garner more support from the State, other organizations and professionals have a greater influence on the formation of the form's identity code and hence stand to benefit once the form is legitimized.

While organizations do have some agency in the legitimisation process, all of the studies reviewed above highlight the predominantly external nature of the process. Organizations which belong to the new potential form can emit signals of their desired identity code, however it is the external environment that makes sense of these signals, assess them in light of the wider organizational field and finally shape and legitimize, or not, an identity scheme or prototype for the new organizational form.

Social Entrepreneurship, Organization Form, and Organizational Identity

As noted in a recent review of the field of social entrepreneurship by Dacin, Dacin, and Tracey (2011), issues of image and identity have not been well-explored by scholars of social entrepreneurship. This is important because identity links very clearly to both internal and external audiences to the idea of organizational form. What earlier researchers in the area authors didn't focus on in their piece however, is how environmental conditions resulting from a strong pressures to fulfil social goals (Battilana and Dorado, 2010), can be incorporated into the organization of activity systems and how these pressures impact issues of organizational identity as well. I begin to address these questions in this study.

METHODS

Research Design and Data Collection

The research in this study focused on social enterprises, which are organizations that have a social component at the heart of their activities. I used a comparative-case research design to explore how social enterprises manage their activity systems with reference to organizational form and organizational identity. Multiple cases permit a replication logic in which cases are treated as independent experiments, each serving to confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from the others (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). By choosing an inductive design, I sought to pursue an opportunity to build theory and gain deep insight into a relatively unexplored area, how social enterprises organize themselves to address multiple audiences as well as to facilitate replication of their innovations.

These organizations in this study were drawn from a sample of sixteen finalist organization pairs from the proposal submission process to a well-known European Foundation. Pairs of organizations submitted proposals jointly in the hopes of receiving funding for innovation transfer between a source and target organization pair. Five winners were selected from the sixteen finalists, though I have access to the full proposals of all sixteen finalists (including the winners). In July and August 2008, a short survey was sent out to the 16 finalist source social entrepreneurs for the competition. The purpose of the survey was to gather information on the innovations developed by these organizations, and to gain a greater understanding of past, present, and future attempts to transfer these innovations. Of the sixteen organizations contacted, fourteen completed the survey. I used data from this survey, which examined gathered information on source entrepreneurs' innovations, as well as their past, present, and future knowledge transfer collaborations, to supplement archival material provided by the foundations (including the proposals referenced above).

In addition, I conducted 110 interviews with executive, mid-level, and operational employees, as well as beneficiaries, with six of the sixteen finalist organizations and six partner organizations (that is, at twelve organizations total). The vast majority of these interviews were conducted during field visits during the period running from January 2009 through July 2010. Specifically, in January and February 2009 I visited two organizations in India. In February, March, and April of 2010 I visited organizations on the Indian subcontinent, namely, in Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka. I completed field visits to organizations in Paraguay and Brazil in July 2010.

Data Analysis

After gathering together data from the surveys, archival data, and interviews, I organized data on the projects and the replication attempts (see Table 10). As I was interested in the question of how organizational form and organizational identity impact organizations' strategies for transferring their knowledge, I first attempted to get an understanding which organizations were replicating their innovations more than others. Thus, I grouped each of the fourteen organizations in this study based on the number of replication attempts each had undertaken. This classification can serve as a proxy for looking at how social enterprises develop their systems of activities in order to facilitate partnership with other organizations. While some organizations are less focused on such partnership (perhaps due to their stage of development or focus on local / organic growth), others rely on partnership as a primary method to increase the impact of their activities. Organizations with more than ten replication attempts were classified in the **Proven** phase of replication; that is, they had extensive experience with transferring knowledge to partners. Organizations with one to ten replication attempts were classified as **Intermediate** replicators. These organizations had some limited experience with replication, but were not attempting it on a large scale. Finally, organizations with no replication attempts were classified as being in the **Concept** phase of replication as they had developed a model, wished to replicate it (as evidenced by their application to the foundation for funding), but still had not gone ahead with this attempt. Of the fourteen organizations examined in this study, six were classified as Proven replicators, five were classified as Intermediate replicators, and three were classified as being in the Concept phase.

Insert Table 10 about here

In the second phase of data analysis I went in-depth into the three categories I had constructed to examine how social enterprises manage their activity systems by working with their organizational form and organizational identity. My goal was to find links between the way social enterprises organized their activities and the primary audiences they were addressing with their activities. I was also interested in how their organizational form and identity related to the process of replicating their innovations through partnerships with other social enterprises.

FINDINGS

How Social Enterprises Develop and Manage Activity Systems

The analysis of the data as described above revealed distinct differences between social enterprises in the way in which they manage their activity systems. Concept phase firms were most likely to embrace an organizational form and organizational identity which was congruent with the notions of social business, especially a focus on the commercial or "enterprise" portion of this concept as promoted by leading intermediary organizations such as the Schwab Foundation. The reasons for this focus are varied, they are seemingly driven by a need to fit notions of "legitimate" social enterprises in order to attract funding from the wide array of funders coming into this space. Intermediate phase firms were more concerned with separating different aspects of their operations for different audiences, from traditional government and international funders to more recent social entrepreneurship-focused funders. Many of these organizations were established prior to the emergence of social entrepreneurship as a well-accepted notion in the international and social development discourse. They thus seemed to embrace the notion of social entrepreneur but were still cautious about retaining the non-governmental organization (NGO) label that many social enterprises working in emerging economies are given. Finally, Proven phase replicators were close to Intermediate phase replicators in their addressing multiple audiences through their organizational form, but they showed greater variation in the organizational identities that they put forward. Specifically, these organizations tended to have identities (as determined by self-descriptions drawn from archival documents and interviews) that were grounded in one particular category of activity (e.g., eye care or development of educational materials) rather than being spread across multiple domains. In this they were similar to the Concept phase replicators. Figure 1 summarizes these relationships.

Insert Figure 1 about here

In the remainder of this chapter, I elaborate on how these three categories of social enterprises, classified by degree of experience with replicating their innovations with partners, manage their activity systems with respect to the notions of organizational form and organizational identity.

Concept Phase Replicators

Social enterprises in the early stages of development are in a perpetual state of flux. While they are attempting to develop a viable service or product to meet their social goals, they must also develop a structure and range of activities which can grant them a legitimate status within the universe of social enterprises. This status is important as it provides access to a range of resources beyond revenues generated from sales or other from other earned income. Thus, as noted above, Concept phase firms were most likely to embrace an organizational form congruent with accepted notions of a social business. Of the three organizations in this study which were categorized as being in the Concept phase (due to their not having any attempts to replicate their innovations with partners), all emphasized the commercial aspects of their business model in interviews and application materials. For instance, a manufacturer of health-related technologies described how their primary work was around commercializing and bringing to market a test for identifying tuberculosis:

> We propose *to move the MODS test from being a "research" assay to being a simple and effective "commercial" test kit that can be procured by TB control programs in India and* elsewhere. We will transfer the MODS kit development to the Tulip Group of Companies, a *manufacturer of diagnostic tests for infectious diseases*... We are working together with the Tulip Group of Companies to democratize access to this technology and will meet the demand of the Indian and global MODS market.

Pressures towards adopting an organizational form which highlighted the commercial aspects of their activity most likely came from several sources. One of the primary sources of influence is the presence of intermediary "Social Entrepreneurship Organizations" such as Ashoka, the Lemelson Foundation, and the Schwab Foundation. Indeed, the Schwab Foundation has developed an influential classification of social enterprises which highlights the various organizing models adopted by social enterprises that they support, including the social business model (see Table 11). Beyond this, there is also a strong role played by other organizations in the social entrepreneurship field which have adopted a social business form of organization. For instance, all the organizations in this study were selected by one of the major social entrepreneurship foundations as high potential or already high performing social enterprises. Thus, through interactions with peer social enterprises, Concept stage social enterprises may look to other organizations within their peer group for inspiration with respect to the organization form they choose to adopt.

Insert Table 11 about here

This phenomenon is illustrated in the work of Jack Sim of the World Toilet Organization in Singapore, an organization working on global sanitation issues and which is classified as a Concept phase replicator in this study. Sim set up the World Toilet Organization in 2001 as "the global voice that advocates sustainable toilet systems through capacity building, public education and implementation of real time projects. It aims to investigate the root causes of dirty toilets and identify key motivations and incentives for good solutions, by assuming the role of a "Change Agent" to bring social change, accelerate the learning curve through knowledge sharing, mobilizing resources and coordinating both volunteers and organizations." This work was initially done on a not-for-profit basis, but in recent years, as the organization has become increasingly recognized as a "social enterprise" by the social entrepreneurship community, it has adopted an increased orientation towards adding a business component to its activities. For instance, Jack Sim noted, in a personal interview with the author, that the bottom of the pyramid (BOP) approach would be a very important component of the World Toilet Organization's activities going forward:

the bottom of the pyramid is very attractive now and were are catalyzing our work to make it to go faster. And there are two elements in this. First, integrating solutions: that means you cannot solve sanitation, but you must integrate it with health, with school, with religious building, with housing, yeah. Second, there is an economic component: you can integrate with livelihood because of the entrepreneur jobs, employment and all that. The economic component is very important: it is what makes our work sustainable. It makes our company a *social business enterprise*... We have been working to use market approach for sanitation and with sanitation marketing we are creating a training model of how the local poor can start a business to manufacture, promote, maintain, finance and reach out to customer.

This focus on a "sustainable" economic component to the organization's activities has very much emerged in recent years through the organization's interaction with organizations such as the Schwab Foundation, Ashoka, and other important organizations in the field of social entrepreneurship. While almost all of the World Toilet Organization's revenues come from government and foundation support to date, it is the market or business component of the organization that is emphasized on the company's extensive website, in promotional materials, and during Sim's numerous interactions with the media.

Though they have not yet attempted to replicate their innovations through partnerships with other social enterprises, organizations in the Concept phase are nevertheless aware of they may need to replicate their innovations in the future with partners. They thus are focused on developing a structure and activity focus that will facilitate this future work. For the most part this seems to be a structure that has commercial viability with a social focus, in short, the "social business" model advocated by organizations such as Schwab Foundation. The founder of Conversion Sound, a social enterprise focused on developing "high-end digital hearing aids" for emerging economy markets, emphasized that adopting the proper organization form had implications for this future ability to scale the impact of his company's innovation:

> *We're definitely in the start-up phase of our operations, and we're definitely looking for ways* to expand. *But you have to remember one thing: for us, it's not* about scaling and replication. *It's about* structure, people, and distribution. These are the things which let scaling happen. For us that means adopting a business structure, an LLC form, but having a strong fidelity to *the social mission. So we're a business that's socially oriented – we're a social business…*

In summary, the three firms in the Concept phase of replication focused on developing business models that mimicked key aspects of the dominant social enterprise model: a "social business" form. This adoption, which highlighted the economic aspects of social entrepreneurial activity, was also associated with organizational identities rooted in a particular sphere of activity, possibly to ease the subsequent scaling of these models through partnerships with other social enterprises or other means. Thus, intermediary legitimating bodies and peer social enterprises seemed to have influenced these organizations to adopt a "most legitimate" form of organizing their activities.

Intermediate Phase Replicators

In contrast to organizations in the Concept phase, the five Intermediate phase replicator organizations tended to develop their organizational forms which addressed multiple audiences. These organizations embraced the notion of social entrepreneur but were still cautious about retaining the non-governmental organization (NGO) label that many social enterprises working in emerging economies are given. Additionally, organizations in this category tended to have a broader range of activities relative to those in the Concept and Proven phases.

One firm that exemplifies these characteristics is Technology and Action for Rural Development (TARA) / Development Alternatives in India (for clarity, I will use TARA to refer to the entire organization in this paper). This organization develops "franchises" for its clients, who are often established businessmen, NGOs branching into revenue-raising activities, and groups of citizens who wish to establish some form of commercial business. TARA works in four broad phases, addressing different audiences with the broad scope of activities contained in each of these steps. First, TARA's engineers, marketing staff and field workers visit different regions of India to test the applicability of various TARA machines, for instance, machines for producing bricks or concrete roofing files. These machines are notable in that they are designed to use locally-available materials, such as mud or flyash (which is the waste produced from thermal power-generating plants), as their main inputs. TARA staff pay particular attention to the materials that are available in abundance and cheaply in a particular geographic area or region during these field visits and during interactions with local businessmen and others. They also try to estimate the demand for various construction materials in these regions.

Subsequently, using material gathered from these field visits, TARA engineers work to develop machines which will be able to use locally-available materials. Starting with existing technology, they work to modify machines to use these materials. Prototype machines are developed at the TARA Machines campus in New Delhi, and then tested on various materials at the TARA Gram "rural laboratory" in Orcha, a small town of about 8,500 people (Indian Census, 2001) located five hours south of New Delhi in the state of Madhya Pradesh. Third, once the technology has been refined and field-tested, TARA marketing staff members take the refined machines and create the "technology packages" which will be sold to rural entrepreneurs. This entails not just delivering and offering training for operating the machine, but also training in materials procurement, relationship management, and general business knowledge required to operate a small business. Finally, TARA goes into the field and actually sells the technology packages. Using a team of staff hired in different regions and localities, TARA approaches local businessmen, women's groups, youth groups, and others to take up their packages. The goal is to ultimately spur the development of financially- and environmentally-sustainable businesses which can survive without receiving government subsidies, foundation grants, and the like:

"... we help set up special businesses who in turn service the customers. Our products are basic need products, so therefore we are in affordable housing technologies, affordable renewable energy, affordable clean drinking water, affordable recycling solutions, affordable clothing, and any new demands that much. We work with poor and under-serviced communities and provide solutions that are not in conflict with the environment, with their *environment… and you should know that 90% of my business is with private sector companies* and individuals. 10% is with institutions. Five years ago it was exactly opposite. It was 90% institutions and 10% entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs were rare, right? They really were the ones big risk takers, you know, Mavericks who would basically go for this. Now, it is mainstream, everybody knows because I can point you to hundred successful guys, go and talk to them, go and talk to them, they will look at it" *(TARA President)*

While research-and-development functions and work with local communities is handled by various not-for-profit units within Development Alternatives, namely, the Innovations Solutions Branch, the Development Solutions Branch and the Communications Solutions Branch. The commercial side of the organization is handled within a separate the Business Solutions Branch, which includes various outgrowths, including: TARAhaat (an Information Communication technology enterprise that provides IT-based education in rural areas); TARA Machines (which promotes and sells green technologies such as handmade paper machines and mud-block making machines); TARA Enviro (which promotes eco-friendly products); and TARA Nirman Kendra (which delivers environmentally friendly and affordable habitat products and consultancy services for enabling sustainable building practices). This separation of activities is important as it allows the organization to focus staff on for-profit or not-for-profit activities as required, as well as providing it room to deal with the various for-profit, not-for-profit, and governmental constituencies encountered during the course of working across India.

Despite the end-goal of independent commercial viability, TARA regularly works with organizations outside the purely commercial realm to obtain funding and support for its projects. In these interactions, TARA very much emphasizes its own identity as an NGO. For instance, in India various governmental bodies are charged with increasing the scope and depth of business activities in the vast rural hinterlands of the country. One of these organizations, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), has a partnership with TARA to aid in the distribution TARA's technology packages in rural Maharashtra. Maharashtra is one of India's most industrialized states, but nevertheless has huge rural areas which have not enjoyed the large scale economic developed enjoyed by cities such as Hyderabad and Chennai (Madras). Using NABARD's vast network within the state of Maharashtra, TARA has been able to infiltrate rural markets where there is a need for businesses which can produce construction materials at a low cost for local builders. It works with five women's groups in the Eastern part of Maharashtra. TARA has also expanded internationally and enjoys a partnership with the well-known Sri Lankan NGO Sewa Lanka.

TARA has kept the number of collaborations it enters into, both international and domestic, intentionally small, choosing rather to follow a course of organic growth for the company itself through developing and supporting franchisees. In doing this, TARA sees itself as a "business-to-business" service provider. According to TARA President Dr. Arun Kumar:

there is a client I am trying to influence. But I am not reaching out to our client directly: my reach out to the client is through an intermediary. This can be the entrepreneur, a pure business entrepreneur, it can be a community groups, it can be a special purpose groups, who just come together for that purpose. And or it could be actually an institution itself, which wants to perform the task. So our job is to influence these groups and we can adapt ourselves based on the groups we are working with. You have to know how to speak the language that *each of these groups speak. That's very important….*

Beyond TARA, several of the other social enterprises in the study focused on multiple audiences in designing their organizations, and diversified across their sets of activities as well. For instance, Gram Vikas, an Indian organization working primarily on issues of water and sanitation, has a broad range of activities that focus on community development, including education programs, healthcare, community forestry, and income-generation activities. The organization has also developed a broad range of revenue sources, including income generated from beneficiaries, support from local and national government sources, and funding from international agencies. While it embraces a "social enterprise" label, it has existed long before the term "social entrepreneur" came into vogue. As such, the organization has only recently started to label it activities as social enterprise activities. For many within the organization it remains an NGO focused on issues of rural development and community empowerment.

Proven Phase Replicators

As noted earlier, six of the fourteen organizations in this study had extensive experience (i.e., more than ten attempts) with replicating their successful innovations with social enterprise partners. These Proven phase replicator organizations were close to Intermediate phase replicators in their addressing multiple audiences through their organizational form. However, they displayed a variety of organizational identities. These organizations tended to have identities (as determined by self-descriptions drawn from archival documents and interviews) that were grounded in one particular category of activity (e.g., eye care or development of educational materials) rather than being spread across multiple domains. In this they were similar to the Concept phase replicators.

Once of the most successful organizations in this category is Waste Concern, Bangladesh-based organization working on issues of sustainable waste management. Waste Concern has developed three levels of waste management systems based on the needs of the community into which they are entering: small, medium, and large. Each of these models has been tested and refined by Waste Concern over the 15 years of its existence, and the models have further been codified into various "blueprints" which serve as referents for organizations which wish to adopt these models on their own or with some level of consultation with Waste Concern. The organization almost exclusively uses partnerships to disseminate its models.

Waste Concern has organized itself as a "Research & Development" ("R&D") organization. Indeed Waste Concern refers to itself an "R&D" organization in the proposals submitted for replication funding, as well as on its website. The organization's leaders see themselves in this way as well. For instance, while the organization was founded in 1995 and has been very successful, it actually only has 30 employees total in its main office and at the management level for its' field sites. Workers at the field sites, add maybe 50 more peoplefor a total of 80 employees (2010 total). So the organization is still under 100 employees.

The organization’s approach is to work specifically on developing, piloting, and validating different models of waste management which are specifically adapted to the resource constraints and operational limitations of developing countries in general but Bangladesh in particular. After it has succeeded in developing these models it doesn’t try to go and build more of them in other parts of the country. Rather, Waste Concern partners with other organizations – be they municipalities, NGOs, or private-sector companies – to expand its impact. Their term for this process is “replication.”

Waste Concern’s focus on developing different scales of Waste Management models throughout its history has given it an edge as an “idea factory” but not as a particularly strong implementing organization. It started out with small-scale models of waste management and collection in Dhaka’s poorer and slum areas. Once these models were validated and the organization encountered some operational issues with respect to keeping these models going – for instance, it built a waste collection site on rented land which was subsequently converted into a space for an office tower – other organizations, including NGOs and for-profit local entrepreneurs, took up the mantle. In this sense Waste Concern helped to institutionalize the concept of “waste as a resource” at a neighborhood level in Dhaka. Similarly, its mid-scale model was hampered by the land-hungry nature of Dhaka, a city which grows further and further out with each passing year (with more than 16.5 million people in its metropolitan area). At present Waste Concern has no demonstration small-scale model – though there are blueprints available for replicating it – and the mid-scale model is located outside of Dhaka in the form of its “Recycling Training Center.”

The organization’s is also working on developing waste management systems for large-scale model for municipalities. This work is being developed via a joint venture with WWR Recycling of the Netherlands, one of the world’s largest commercial recycling companies. The first plant – with a capacity of 120 tons per day of waste, though currently around 80 tons are being processed – completed in November 2008 and two more are planned to be built localities adjacent to Dhaka. This would give the joint venture – named WWR BioFertilizer Ltd. – about 700 tons / day of capacity. In addition to converting organic waste into organic fertilizer, the plant is also keeping track of the amount of methane arrested so that WWR BioFertilizer can apply for carbon credits through the Kyoto Protocol. With these two revenue streams, from the sale of the fertilizer and the carbon credits, the plant should be self-sufficient within a number of years (though at present it is not breaking even).

The organization's use of different corporate forms to address its various audiences is remarkable. What is called the "Waste Concern Group" is actually a collection of five companies, the not-for-profit Waste Concern (founded 1995 and focusing research and development, including pilot waste and clean energy projects), and four for-profit companies, including: Waste Concern Consultants (providing consultancy and advisory services to low and middle-income countries on waste management and other issues); WWR BioFertilizer (a joint venture company of Waste Concern and World Wide Recycling BV of the Netherlands working as an investor and operator for organic waste recycling projects through composting); Waste Concern Baraka Agro Products Ltd (promoting organic farming, eco-friendly agriculture as well as organic agro products); and Matuail Power Ltd. (a joint venture company of Waste Concern and World Wide Recycling BV of the Netherlands working as an investor and operator for waste to energy projects).

While the companies continues to receive grants, etc. for some of its work, in many instances payments are made to Waste Concern Consultants for evaluations, development of work plans, management advice, etc. which can then be used to fund the research operations of the Waste Concern not-for-profit entity. The organization thus has a not-for-profit research arm, but the implementation, replication, and operational aspects of the organization are housed in for-profit entities. In this sense, it has embraced a true "social enterprise" identity, while at the same time keeping its status as an NGO in order to work with the numerous governmental and multi-lateral bodies and foundations.

In addition, in the realm of partnering with other social enterprises, the organization has developed a relatively formalized approach. Waste Concern uses various agreement documents when entering into partnerships. These documents describe the work to be carried out and the particular responsibilities of each party in the partnership. While some of the agreements are legally binding, others are not but rather serve to clarify roles and responsibilities so that joint work can be carried out smoothly. As noted by co-founder Maqsood Sinha:

> we had to use few things to replicate the model initially as the organization Waste Concern/ Our waste management models have to help others to learn, so whatever knowledge we have we transfer. We transfer it training people, hands on training, give kind of training to the poor people. We informally transferred this knowledge, but tried to be formal as possible and getting the other side to be engaged in it as a joint venture. We want same level of involvement from both sides.

In addition to Waste Concern, another organization which has replicated its innovations numerous times is IDEAAS of Brazil. As noted by IDEAAS' founder Fabio Rosa:

> IDEAAS works in the field of energy access. And when working on this field we have two kinds of actions where we can use energy to promote social and economic development. Energy access to people or to ordinary benefits like common things and this is one way and the other way is the productive use of energy... My main objective is to install social company or initiatives that are able to provide energy access to the people on a sustainable way. Yeah. This is important, so this is the first vision, the main vision.

For Rosa, the organization of the company is around the core focus of energy access. Beyond that, what is important is to organize a business model which is not only sensitive to the various needs of the populations being served, but also to the different constituencies that will be supporting it, including governments who may step in and take over the work of the social enterprise:

> *... after years working on the energy access field I organized like metrics of sustainability.* And this metrics of sustainability is divided in my mind five different areas: (1) Business

models; (2) management model; (3) legal and regulation; (4) financing; and (5) technology. Technology, if you are installing an initiative on energy access, energy, this is very important to understand all of the components on this five different areas and this is very important to manage how often information - information of these five areas. Because sometimes we are able to design a business model and you go - to operate and you can be effected by the - on energy access. This is very common tool here about this, people are starting as social - social initiative and after two or three years working on installing this initiative the government announces a project rural electrification. But this kind of problems, the same problem in India, Morocco, in South Africa, this is important to understand how often things and how to define strategy that will help how to operate to survive. I am not a winner; I am a survivor, *okay. I am a survivor… I am looking for an initiati*ve that is sustainable.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study takes a step towards developing a richer understanding of how social enterprises organize themselves to address multiple audiences. By linking notions of organizational form and organizational identity to the choices social enterprises make with respect to their activity systems, this study brings to the attention of scholars and managers of social enterprises the need to think about the different kinds of legitimacy demanded by different audiences. The data from this study suggest that social enterprises organize their activity systems not just in response to the demands of the population that they are serving, but also due to a number of field-level forces which impact the choice to adopt one form of organization over another. In turn, this adoption of a particular organizational form has implications for the identity of the social enterprise beyond the issues of founders' predispositions, organizational history, and the context in which the organization operates. This paper also contributes to the literature on the creation and establishment of new organizational forms studying how intermediary organizations and peer organizations may play a large role in how organizational forms are developed and legitimized.

Future research in this area can go in a number of directions. While I have suggested that external legitimating organizations and peer organizations influence social enterprises' choice of organizational form, stronger evidence might be obtained from a study which draws on networks of social enterprises and social entrepreneurs. This area seems particularly promising. As noted by a number of scholars (Romanelli, 1991; Caroll and Hannan, 1989; Polos et al., 2002), the emergence of new forms requires external involvement, and therefore understanding the role of networks in this process is important. In the first phase of such emergence, innovation is critical, and sparse networks facilitate idea generation (Burt, 2004), weak ties act as bridges for conduits of information (Granovetter, 2005), and networks rich in knowledge heterogeneity are most facilitative of creativity and innovation (Stuart & Podolny, 1999). However, in the second phase of legitimation, the mobilization of support and selling the identity of the organizational form is critical, so dense networks facilitate selling ideas and putting them into action may be more important (Uzzi, 1997). By tying network research to data on social entrepreneur networks (say from Ashoka), we may be able to get a better sense of the micro-dynamics of how the organizational forms and identities described in this research come into being.

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TABLE 10

Project Descriptions & Stage of Development

Organization	Sector	Stage of Development	Project Description
Aaravind	Public Health	Proven – 247 replication attempts	Designing services - both range and the volume, based on the community need is the key for an effective eye care programme. Aravind, through LAICO tries to accomplish this by sharing its model of high volume, high quality and affordable eye care through structured Consultancy & Capacity building processes – starting with gap analysis to facilitating eye care programmes in developing a good strategic plan and provide need based assistance during its implementation. This process is based on four core principles in eye care – Demand generation, Resource utilisation, Quality of services and becoming financially viable. Over a period of time, the partnering agency will become a similar resource centre for the hospitals from Latin and South American countries.
abcdespanol	Education / Economic Development	Intermediate – 9 replication attempts	I created a series of educational games of which “abcdespañol” and “ABC of mathematics” are the most relevant. We have based the design of our educational system on the GAME because the specific situation of the illiterate population calls for a simple and effective technology, easy to use by the illiterate and which can be quickly and safely applied and replicated by all the sectors of the community wishing to collaborate in the literacy effort. People (children, young and adults) learn to read and write in a very short period of time (between 90 and 120 hours), and they learn cooperating with each other and enjoying the task.
Barefoot College	Energy / Economic Development	Proven – numerous attempts since 1986	The College by training rural unemployed youth as well as semi-literate and literate rural women, as barefoot solar engineers, from different part of the country, have since 1986, installed solar home lighting systems in their villages. They also fabricate and produce solar lanterns. More than 200 kilowatt solar energy is being generated across the country thorough systems and lanterns.

Ciudad Saludable	Public Health	Proven – Multiple attempts across 4 countries	Ciudad Saludable uses practical, efficient and sustainable technologies in order to improve the waste management problems in several regions of Peru. We have a holistic approach where technology plays an important role to succeed with the Ciudad Saludable's model. The centerpiece of Ciudad Saludable (CS) strategy is a community-based solid waste management system, consisting of community-organized and effectively linked collection, recycling, disposal, and processing activities. The primary tools CS uses are employment and income-generating micro-enterprises, which it has coaxed into existence at every stage of the waste management cycle and organized into a network that assures both the efficiency of the overall operation and community participation in the planning, execution, evaluation and fine-tuning of the endeavor. Ciudad Saludable serves as a source of technical knowledge and advice for the network and is an avid promoter of simple and low-cost technologies, including ingeniously designed tricycles that permit workers (who live in the communities served) to separate waste while collecting it from community sites.
Conversion Sound	Public Health / Technology	Concept – No replication attempts	Development of a hearing high end digital hearing aid with the following innovations: (1) Disruptive pricing (cost innovation: 77 dollars wholesale price from over 150 dollars); (2) Disruptive fitting system; (3) Reducing the training time so non-medical team can work on this project; and (4) Non-conventional distribution channels
Gram Vikas	Public Health	Intermediate – 3 replication attempts	As 80% of all diseases are caused in India because of polluted water, mainly because of faeces contamination, sanitation is a prerequisite for quality of water. To ensure water quality there has to be 100% coverage all families with sanitation. This is possible only with the social mobilization of the people. People build a toilet and a shower for every family in a habitation with little external support. Water is pumped up to a water tower and distributed through 3 taps to every toilet, bathing room and kitchen round the clock.
Honey Care Africa	Agriculture / Economic Development	Intermediate – 1 replication attempt	HCA manufactures the Langstroth hives to high technical standards. The Langstroth hive, which has now been used successfully for commercial honey production in many parts of the World, has a number of benefits over the traditional and top bar hives. Not only are the yields much higher, but they are also accessible to women and youth, as they are placed at ground level and not up in the trees. This project will work with rural small scale farmers and local centres to train them on the production of the Langstroth hive. Once the groups are trained, they will be able to multiply their production of hives, and supply other farmer groups in the region. The project will work with local distributors, training them to become efficient suppliers of honey, and gain additional income. In addition HCA guarantees market of honey produced by the rural farmers at a fair price anywhere in Kenya. In this regard, HCA will collect all quantities of honey produced from the farmers at fair market price.

IDEAAS	Energy / Economic Development	Proven – 11 replication attempts	IDEAAS is developing and introducing new technological models (off grid and on grid) and business models to bring energy access to the humanity. Today there is approximately 2 billions of people lack access to electricity.
Kickstart	Economic Development	Intermediate – 7 replication attempts	KickStart addresses the root cause of poverty: lack of wealth. KickStart does this by designing, manufacturing, distributing, marketing and selling low-cost capital equipment to poor people that enables them to make more money and lift themselves out of poverty. For example our range of 'MoneyMaker™' human-powered irrigation pumps enables subsistence farmers to increase their productivity and incomes by a factor of 4 to 10, transforming their farms into profitable enterprises.
PATH	Public Health / Technology	Concept – No replication attempts	Microscopically Observed Drug Susceptibility Testing or "MODS" is a simple, manual, liquid culturing technique that can simultaneously detect Mycobacterium tuberculosis (TB) infection and drug susceptibility, a necessity due to the rise of multi-drug resistant (MDR) and extremely drug resistant (XDR) strains of TB. Such a tool, which can detect both TB and MDR TB in a rapid, accurate, and cost-effective manner, has the potential to greatly aid TB control efforts. PATH proposes to move the MODS test from being a "research" assay to being a simple and effective "commercial" test kit that can be procured by TB control programs in India and elsewhere. PATH will transfer the MODS kit development to the Tulip Group of Companies (Tulip), a manufacturer of diagnostic tests for infectious diseases, based in Goa, India. Tulip will manufacture a modified plastic plate, a biosafety cap to cover the plastic plate, and the media components that will meet the demand of the Indian and global MODS market. PATH and the Tulip Group of Companies are working together to democratize access to this technology.
PDA	Public Health	Proven – 50 replication attempts	A. NGO sustainability (financial); B. Partnership with Business sector to end poverty; C. AIDS education + Prevention; D. Water resources (village Piped Water Supply).
TARA	Economic Development / Construction	Intermediate – 4 replication attempts	The social innovation being transferred is the dissemination of clean technologies for sustainable livelihoods and environmentally sound enterprises to deliver building products and basic needs solutions for housing on an affordable basis.

Waste Concern	Public Health	Proven – 50 replication attempts	The major goal of Waste Concern is to convert \`Waste\` into \`Resource’ with the help public-private-community partnership approach and appropriate technology. By promoting the concept of waste as resource and public-private-community partnerships, Waste Concern is stimulating behavioral changes in urban communities, farmers and the waste management industry in Bangladesh as well as in south and south east Asian region. Waste Concern is focusing on recycling of organic waste (which constitutes 80% of the waste) into compost (bio-fertilizer) and use of compost to reduce top soil erosion, and to help maintain food security of the country and also to reduce green house gas emissions.
World Toilet	Public Health	Concept – No replication attempts	The social innovation transfer was to bring best practice in sanitation promotion from Gram Vikas to other social enterprises through WTO's plan of developing a sanitation marketplace for sanitation world-wide. It includes education, promotion, design of products, mass production, distributions, and delivering all these through a SaniShop franchise concept where the locals can take a micro-loan to start the business and solve the problem of 2.6 billion without access to proper sanitation in a sustainable manner.

TABLE 11

Field-Level Standards of Social Enterprise Form:
Schwab Foundation Typology of Social Enterprises

LEVERAGED NON-PROFIT VENTURES
The entrepreneur sets up a non-profit organization to drive the adoption of an innovation addressing a market or government failure. In doing so, s/he commits a cross section of society, including private and public organizations as well as volunteers, to drive forward the innovation through a multiplier effect. The organization depends on outside funding for its survival, but its longer term sustainability is enhanced because of the commitment of a multiplicity of actors to the vision and objectives of the organization, which often ends up transcending the organization itself. Over time, the founding entrepreneur can morph into a figurehead, in some cases for the wider movement, as others assume responsibilities and leadership.
HYBRID NON-PROFIT VENTURES
The entrepreneur sets up a non-profit but the model includes some degree of cost-recovery through the sale of goods and services to a cross section of institutions, public and private, as well as to target population groups. However, to be able to sustain the transformation activities in full and address the needs of clients, who are poor or otherwise marginalized from society, the entrepreneur must mobilize other sources of funding from the public and/or the philanthropic sectors. Those funds can be in the form of grants or loans, and even quasi-equity.
SOCIAL BUSINESS VENTURES
The entrepreneur sets up a business to drive transformational change. While profits are generated, the main aim is not to maximize financial returns for shareholders but to grow the social venture and reach more people in need effectively. Wealth accumulation is not a priority, and profits are reinvested in the enterprise in order to fund expansion. Entrepreneurs seek investors who are interested in combining financial and social returns on their investments.

Source: Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship
http://www.schwabfound.org/sf/SocialEntrepreneurs/Profiles/Abouttheorganizationalmodels/index.htm
Accessed: 23 May 2012

FIGURE 1
Factors Influencing Social Enterprises' Activity System Choices



SECTION 7

ENDNOTES

1. A version of the “Exploratory Study Findings” section was published as Chowdhury and Santos (2010).

2. Personal Interview with the Executive Director, Gram Vikas, February 2009.

3. Ibid.

SECTION 9

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE OF PRELIMINARY SURVEY QUESTIONS

<u>Social Innovation Transfer Project</u>
Preliminary Questionnaire

1. Please describe in one paragraph the social innovation your organization is transferring.

2. Prior to applying for the [SOCIAL ENTEPRENEURSHIP COMPETITION], did you undertake any attempts to replicate your social innovation in new geographies?

☐ Yes ☐ No

If YES, how many times did you attempt replication and when?

Were these attempts successful? Could you please list the organizations you attempted to replicate with?

3. Other that the social innovation replication that you are undertaking with the [SOCIAL ENTEPRENEURSHIP COMPETITION], are there any other attempts you are currently developing?

☐ Yes ☐ No

If YES, could you list these? At which stage of the replication process are they?

4. Do you plan to undertake any more replication attempts of your social innovation in the near future?

☐ Yes ☐ No

If YES, when do you plan to undertake these replication attempts? With which organizations and in which geographies?

APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW GUIDE

Introduction

1. Background of researcher. Offer thanks for agreeing to interview.

2. Research Purpose: To investigate how organizations scale-up innovations through transfer to other organizations.

3. Research Approach: I am tracking the transfer of innovations by social organizations to partners and analyzing the underlying decisions involved in this process and the rationale.

4. I want to get as broad a perspective of [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR] as possible, and I one way to do this I think is to speak with people at all levels of the organization. I'd like you to be as free and frank as possible with your answers, but do tell me if any particular remarks might be problematic, etc.

5. I usually transcribe all the interviews for my research – it helps me be more attentive to research during our talk. Do you mind if I record our conversation (turn voice recorder on).

6. How much time do we have? (Usually 60 minutes – 90 minutes)

General Background and Personal Information

I would like to start by betting a broad picture of your personal background.

1. Please tell me about your role at [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR]? Specifically, can you tell me about what your position entails and which areas are under your responsibility?

(For the Founder / President: Has your role evolved over the years? How and why? What is your general management philosophy?)

2. Who do you see as the most important people in [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR]? Could you please give me at least two or three adjectives to describe them?

3. Please summarize the strategy of [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR] in impacting society and improving the lives of people. How do you think this strategy came about? How is it different from the strategies used by other organizations in your area? How is it the same?

The Innovation

Description:
Source unit:
Target unit:

1. The transfer of this innovation from [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR] to [TARGET ORGANIZATION]? was:

a. Mandated by top management

b. Strongly encouraged
c. Favored
d. Optional
e. Entirely spontaneous

2. Who, in your opinion, initiated the transfer of this <u>innovation</u> from [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR] to [TARGET ORGANIZATION]? (tick one or more)?

a. Source
b. Target
c. Funding agency
d. Government body
e. Beneficiaries (villagers)
d. Other

3. What was your role in this process? How much of your time did you spend working on the [TARGET ORGANIZATION]? staff (ask for percentage)? Did you go to [TARGET ORGANIZATION]?? How many times? When?

4. What are the elements of this innovation? Which is the most important (i.e., the innovation wouldn't work without it)? What has been transferred to [TARGET ORGANIZATION]? – whole or part of the innovation? Why? How might this innovation be applicable to other contexts?

5. Was this innovation changed for [TARGET ORGANIZATION]? in some way vs. how it was done at [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR] originally? How so?

6. I'd like to establish a chronology of this innovation. When was it developed? Can you tell me how it was developed within your organization? When did you feel you had made the desired impact in your local area? When was the decision to expand beyond your local area made?

7. How did you come to select [TARGET ORGANIZATION]? as a partner for the transfer of this technology? Please describe this process for me.

8. On a scale of 1 to 5, how well do you thing the transfer process has been going? Are the villagers at the pilot [TARGET ORGANIZATION]? site using this technology per your conversations with [TARGET ORGANIZATION]??

9. What do you think will be the most important determinant of whether the transfer of this technology to [TARGET ORGANIZATION]? is successful?

10. What are the greatest challenges you've faced during the scaling-up process? Have you encountered different challenges in your local area versus expanding to areas further away?

11. Reflecting back on the transfer of sanitation technology between [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR] and [TARGET ORGANIZATION]?, what would have been the single most important action to facilitate the transfer.

Mission and Values

1. Does [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR] have a precise vision about how to conduct social change? If so, what do you think it is?

2. What values drive [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR]? Have these changed over time?

3. How would you describe the culture of [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR]? What is the guiding force behind the organization's actions? Social mission? Science?

Organizational Evolution (Top Executives Only)

1. Imagine that you're writing a history of [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR]. Tell me what you want to write. What are the major changes the organization has faced?

Note: Follow story, be clear about time-line, keeping in mind issues of internal and external identity.

2. In 10 years, where do you see [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR]? What will [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR] have accomplished during this period?

3. What was the founding mission of [SOURCE ENTREPRENEUR]? Is this still the mission of the organization? If not, what has changed?

Documents to Request

- ✓ Annual Reports
- ✓ Financial Reports
- ✓ Strategic planning documents, past and present
- ✓ Organizational chart: Number of employees, number of departments, change over time
- ✓ External media coverage of organization – articles, web sites, mentions in reports, etc.

Demographic, health, and other relevant data for geographic areas served by the organization (e.g., at the district, town, village levels)

APPENDIX C
CURRICULUM VITAE

IMRAN CHOWDHURY

Management Department
ESSEC Business School
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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Business Administration, 2012 (expected), ESSEC Business School, Paris, France
Dissertation: "Scaling in Social Entrepreneurship: Partnerships, Knowledge Transfer and Business Models" (Proposal defended in January 2010)
Committee: Anca Metiu (Co-Chair), Filipe Santos (Co-Chair), Ignasi Marti, Stoyan Sgourev, Noshua Watson

M.Sc. in Management, 2008, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France
Concentration: Organizational Behavior

B.A. (Honors) in Anthropology and Geography, 2002, Hunter College (CUNY), New York, USA
Honors: Fulbright Scholar, Phi Beta Kappa

Regents Diploma, **1998**, Stuyvesant High School, New York, USA

CURRENT RESEARCH INTERESTS

Institutions; Social entrepreneurship; Inter-organizational partnerships; Emerging economies; Sustainability

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

Scaling in Social Entrepreneurship: Partnerships, Knowledge Transfer and Business Models

My dissertation examines the impact of institutions on the growth processes of social enterprises. In particular, I investigate how multiple institutional logics influence social enterprises' use of partnerships to scale their impact, and how social entrepreneurs develop sustainable business models. I rely on a multiple-case study approach – drawing on insights gained through survey data, archival analysis, field observations, and interviews – to explore these issues in the context of health care and sustainable development social enterprises in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, and Sri Lanka.

RESEARCH

Publications:

Pache, A., & Chowdhury, I. 2012. Social entrepreneurship education as a socialization process into multiple institutional logics. **Academy of Management Learning and Education**, forthcoming.

Chowdhury, I. 2012. Multiple institutional logics and inter-organizational partnership: The dynamics of cooperation between social enterprises. **Academy of Management Best Papers Proceedings**, Boston.

Chowdhury, I., & Santos, F. 2010. Scaling social innovations: The case of Gram Vikas. In P. Bloom and E. Skloot (Eds.), **Scaling Social Impact: New Thinking**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 147-168.

Under Review:

Zubcsek, P., Chowdhury, I., & Katona, Z. Information communities: The network structure of communication.
Status: Under 1st round review at **Social Networks**.

Working Papers:

Chowdhury, I. Multiple institutional logics and inter-organizational partnership: The dynamics of cooperation between social enterprises (Dissertation Paper).
Status: Preparing for submission to **Academy of Management Journal**.

Mehrpouya, A., & Chowdhury, I. Sustaining the social-financial performance link: A framework for analysis.
Status: Preparing for submission to **Academy of Management Review**.

In Progress:

Chowdhury, I. Constructing social entrepreneurial business models: A multi-country field study (Dissertation Paper).
Status: First draft complete.

Watson, N., & Chowdhury, I. The role of private sector actors in public goods provisioning: Two cases from Sri Lanka.
Status: Data analysis.

REFEREED CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

"Multiple institutional logics and inter-organizational partnership: The dynamics of cooperation between social enterprises"

- Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management. Boston, USA. August, 2012.
- European Group for Organization Studies Colloquium. Gothenburg, Sweden. July, 2011.
- New Institutionalism Workshop. Lyon, France. March, 2011.

"The emergence of non-profit functions within for-profit organizations: Corporate philanthropy in France, 1980-2011" (with A. Gautier & A. Pache)

- European Group for Organization Studies Colloquium. Helsinki, Finland. July, 2012.

"Sustaining the social-financial performance link: A framework for analysis" (with A. Mehrpouya)

- Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management. San Antonio, USA. August, 2011.

"Scaling social innovations: The case of Gram Vikas" (with F. Santos)

- Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management. Montréal, Canada. August, 2010.
- Academy of International Business Annual Meeting. Rio de Janerio, Brazil. June, 2010.
- NYU Conference of Social Entrepreneurs. New York, USA. November, 2009.

"Identification and innovation: The impact of institutions"

- Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management. Chicago, USA. August, 2009.

"Information communities: The network structure of communication" (with P. Zubcsek & Z. Katona)

- Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management. Anaheim, USA. August, 2008.
- European Group for Organization Studies Colloquium. Amsterdam, Netherlands. July, 2008.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

ESSEC Business School, Paris, France

Course Instructor, M.Sc. in International Management Program
- Strategy and Management (Core Course), Spring 2011
- Organizational Behavior (Core Course), Winter 2011

Teaching Assistant, Global MBA Program
- Business, Sustainability and Society (Elective Course), Winter 2012

Teaching Assistant and Guest Lecturer, M.Sc. in International Management Program
- Strategy and Management (Core Course), Fall 2010
- Organizational Behavior (Core Course), Fall 2010

Guest Lecturer, Certificate Program in Social Entrepreneurship
- Scaling Social Enterprises (Elective Course), Spring 2010

PEDAGOGICAL CASE STUDIES (WITH TEACHING NOTES)

Sibieude, T., & Chowdhury, I. 2012. World Toilet Organization, Singapore: Leveraging Resources for Social Impact. ESSEC Business School Case, pending submission to ECCH.
- **2nd Place Winner**, oikos International Case Competition 2012, Social Entrepreneurship Track

Chowdhury, I., & Santos, F. 2010. Gram Vikas: What is the Essence of Social Entrepreneurship? Case 810-002-1 and 810-002-8, ECCH.

- Published in J. Hamschmidt and M. Pirson (Eds.), **Case Studies in Social Entrepreneurship and Sustainability: The oikos Collection**. Sheffield, UK: Greenleaf Publishing (2011).

HONORS AND AWARDS

Research Fellowship, Institute for Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship, ESSEC Business School, September 2011- August 2012

Travel Award, Academy of International Business / Seth Foundation. June 2011.

Invitations to Doctoral Workshops
- Doctoral Consortium, European Group for Organization Studies. Gothenburg, Sweden. July, 2011.
- Doctoral Consortium, Academy of International Business. Nagoya, Japan. June, 2011.
- Doctoral Consortium, Organization and Management Theory Division, Academy of Management. Montréal, Canada. August, 2010.
- Doctoral Consortium, International Management Division, Academy of Management. Montréal, Canada. August, 2010.

ACADEMIC SERVICE

Ad hoc Reviewer: Journal of Management Studies, Academy of Management Learning and Education

Ad hoc Reviewer, Academy of Management Annual Meetings: Entrepreneurship, International Management, and Organizational and Management Theory Divisions, 2009 – Present

WORK EXPERIENCE

International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, New York, USA & Entebbe, Uganda
- Grants Manager and Project Consultant, 2003-2006
- Intern, Summer 2000

National AIDS Commission, Lilongwe, Malawi
- Management Associate (Fulbright Scholar), 2002-2003

Save the Children (US), Lilongwe, Malawi
- Intern, Summer 2002

Pfizer, Inc., New York, USA
- Intern, Summer 2001

OTHER DETAILS

Nationality:	USA
Languages:	English (Native), Bengali (Fluent), French (Intermediate), Spanish (Basic)

REFERENCES

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to deepen the study of social entrepreneurship by examining how social entrepreneurs use partnerships and organize themselves to transfer knowledge. My research takes a first step towards building a theory of innovation transfer and scaling for social entrepreneurship. This study builds on three primary foundations. One is the literature on innovation transfer strategy, which seeks to develop a broad view of the various strategies used by firms to transfer innovations effectively. The second is the literature on social entrepreneurship, which highlights the value-creation focus of certain firms that emerge and operate where situations of simultaneous market and government failure exist. Third, I use the literature on institutions, in particular institutional logics, to explain how organizational processes impacted by multiple logics unfold.

Using an inductive, multiple-case methodology, I illuminate the innovation transfer process as it relates to social entrepreneurs. My objective is threefold. First, I aim to understand how social entrepreneurs manage the innovation transfer process. Second, I want to identify the crucial factors influencing innovation transfer between social entrepreneurs, distinguish these factors from those observed in more traditional settings, and examine their impact on the direction of the innovation transfer process. Third, and finally, I hope to offer possible alternative views to the discussion on "scaling" in the social sector, a debate which has, to date, focused on "scaling organizations" as the primary means to expand the scope and reach of innovations developed by social entrepreneurs.

Keywords: Innovation transfer, transfer strategy, social entrepreneurship, social enterprises, replication, adaptation, institutional logics, innovation, business models, entrepreneurship, emerging economies

RESUME

L'étude présentée icitente d'ouvrir une voie intermédiaire en s'attachant au processus de transfert d'innovation entre entrepreneurs sociaux.Nous appuyant sur la littérature sur la stratégie de transfert d'innovation, qui cherche à développer une perspective globale des stratégies variées utilisées par les entreprises pour transférer des innovations efficacement, nous étudions ce processus de transfert dans un contexte d'entrepreneuriat social, où l'équilibre entre objectifs d'efficience et objectifs sociaux plus larges est explicitement plus grand (Pache et Santos, 2010). Nous mettons ainsi en lumière le fait que certains organismes qui apparaissent et opèrent dans des contextes d'échec simultané des marchés et des gouvernements axent leurs activités sur la création de valeur. S'il est vrai que le transfert d'innovation a le potentiel d'ajouter de la valeur à toutes les entreprises, les divergences dans les objectifs organisationnels et les identités de celles-ci peuvent aboutir à des processus de transfert très différents, au fur et à mesure que l'on passe de l'entrepreneuriat commercial traditionnel à l'entrepreneuriat social.

Les travaux de recherche récents sur l'entrepreneuriat social se sont centrés sur le besoin qu'ont ces entrepreneurs d'augmenter leur impact social en développant d'avantage leurs opérations réussies (Bloom et Chatterji, 2009), mais le processus de transfert d'innovations comme stratégie pour augmenter cet impact est mal connu. D'autre part, la recherche sur le transfert d'innovation ne s'est quasiment pas penchée sur cette question, parce-qu'elle n'a pas envisagé comment des entrepreneurs qui veulent créer, et non capter, de la valeur s'engagent dans le processus de transfert.L'objectif de ce travail est d'étudier comment les entrepreneurs sociaux gèrent le transfert d'innovations et s'organisent pour augmenter l'impact de leurs innovations. Le sujet ne se limite donc pas aux mécanismes et aux résultats d'un transfert, comme dans les études précédentes.Les questions posées ici ont pour but de comprendre comment les motivations des entrepreneurs sociaux, que l'on considère comme différentes de celles des entrepreneurs plus traditionnels, influencent la façon dont se déroule le transfert d'innovation. Pour ce faire, nous procédons d'abord au ré- examen des objectifs, du contexte, et du périmètre du transfert d'innovations dans le cas d'entreprises sociales.

Mots clefs:entrepreneuriat social, transfert d'innovation, économies émergentes, scale-up, relations inter-organisationnelles, logiques institutionnelles, partenariats