Thèse de doctorat en Informatique
Sous la direction de Andréas Herzig.
Pas de résumé disponible.
This thesis investigates the problem of market mechanism design for supply chain management and e-marketplace development. Firstly, we consider how to design a market mechanism design for capacity allocation. We examine the game-theoretic properties of allocation mechanisms, such as efficiency, profit maximisation, and truth-telling, with respect to quantity competition and price competition in a related market of the supply chain. We find that a few typical allocation mechanisms are sensitive to supply chain settings. We design a new allocation mechanism for supply chains with quantity competition and prove that it is a truth-telling mechanism. Secondly, we investigate the design of market mechanisms for online markets. We introduce an approach to the modelling of online markets as supply chains, in which a coordination mechanism is applied to the market between the online market owner and the sellers. We design a new online market contact based on the idea of profit-sharing and prove that it achieves coordination with advertisement. Finally, we introduce an experimental approach to the design, analysis and implementation of market mechanisms based on double auction. We define a formal market model that specifies the market policies in a double auction market. Based on this model, we introduce a set of criteria for the evaluation of a market mechanism. We design and implement a set of market policies and test them with different experimental settings. The results of experiments provide us a better understanding of the interrelationship among the market policies and also show that an experimental approach can greatly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of market mechanism design.