Thèse soutenue

Surexploitation de ressources en régime de propriété commune, sélection adverse et exclusion
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Auteur / Autrice : Daniel Fuentes Castro
Direction : Gilles Rotillon
Type : Thèse de doctorat
Discipline(s) : Sciences économiques
Date : Soutenance en 2003
Etablissement(s) : Paris 10

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Résumé

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We study the management of resources under common property regimes and adverse selection settings. In our general framework, we consider a single Principal managing a common resource that is used as an imput in the production of a private good by a continuum of Agents. Each Agent is defined by a particular type, which is non-observable for the Principal. The common ressource is over-used in open-access regime because the Agents are short-sighted face to the final outcome of rent dissipation. Using the theory of contracts, we propose some incentive mechanisms to prevent the over-use of the common. A particular point in our general framework is that we are interested in the allocations which do not exclude any Agent from the access to the resource. This assumption means that we renounceto the first best allocation even in the perfect information context. But it reflects a morerealistic hypothesis in terms of policy-making. Actually, the difficulty of regulation of commons under asymetric information is not only to maintain both the economic activityand the ressource availability, but also the burning question of the sharing of the reduction in total consumption of the common when there is over-use. Preserving the ressource is not sufficient per se. Who is allowed to use the resource is also determinant for the outcome.